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Raj Narain Jain v. Fourth Additional District Judge, Allahabad

Allahabad High Court

May 21, 1976

Judgment

Subsequent
References

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Structured Summary of the Opinion (K.N. Singh, J.)

Factual and Procedural Background

The petitioner is the tenant of a one-room shop on the ground floor of house No. 381, Badshahi Mandi, Allahabad. Respondents Nos. 2 and 3 (Subhash Chandra and Prem Chandra) are the landlords who reside on the first floor of the same house. The landlords applied under Section 21 of the U.P. Urban Buildings (Regulation of Letting, Rent and Eviction) Act, 1972 for release of the ground-floor shop occupied by the petitioner. The Prescribed Authority rejected the landlords' application by an order dated 5 April 1974. On appeal, the Additional District Judge, Allahabad, set aside the Prescribed Authority's order, holding that Explanation IV to Section 21 provided conclusive proof of the landlords' bona fide need because they occupied part of the building; the Additional District Judge released the shop in favour of the landlords and awarded the petitioner two years' rent as compensation. The petitioner filed the present writ petition under Article 226 challenging the validity of the Additional District Judge's order. During the pendency of the writ petition, another tenant (Sheo Mohan) vacated a different portion of the building, and the landlords occupied that vacated accommodation.

Legal Issues Presented

Whether Explanation IV to Section 21 of the U.P. Urban Buildings (Regulation of Letting, Rent and Eviction) Act, 1972 is applicable where the accommodation in the tenant's possession is an independent, self-contained commercial unit (a one-room shop) and the landlord resides in a separate, self-contained portion of the building.
Whether subsequent events occurring during the pendency of proceedings (specifically, the landlords' occupation of accommodation vacated by another tenant) may be taken into account when determining whether the landlord's need for eviction under Section 21 remains bona fide.
Whether the High Court, in exercise of its powers under Article 226, may interfere with or revisit a finding of fact recorded by an inferior court (the Additional District Judge) in circumstances where subsequent events bear upon the question in issue.

Arguments of the Parties

Petitioner's Arguments

Explanation IV to Section 21 does not apply because the petitioner's one-room shop is an independent, self-contained unit; there are no common amenities shared between the petitioner and the landlords.
Explanation IV is intended to apply only in the case of a residential building; the tenant's shop is a commercial unit and therefore Explanation IV is not attracted.
The Additional District Judge erred in treating the landlords' need as conclusively proved by Explanation IV and in relying upon that Explanation to order eviction.
After the writ petition was filed, another tenant (Sheo Mohan) vacated accommodation which the landlords then occupied; this subsequent occupation removed the landlords' need for the petitioner's shop, and that change in circumstances should be taken into account.

Respondents' Arguments

Since the landlords resided in a part of the same building in which the petitioner was a tenant, Explanation IV applied and therefore constituted conclusive proof of the landlords' bona fide need.
The High Court should not interfere with the Additional District Judge's findings of fact; reliance was placed on the Supreme Court decision in Bhabhuti Mai Rai Chand v. Lami Bai R. Tarte to argue that Article 226 cannot be used to correct pure factual errors that are within the province of an appellate court.
The subsequent events which occurred after filing of the writ petition (i.e., the landlords occupying the vacated accommodation) cannot be taken into account to judge the validity of the Additional District Judge's order.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent	Rule or Principle Cited For	Application by the Court
Abdul Waliab v. District Judge, Meerut, Writ Petition No. 2360 of 1974 (1976 A.L.R. 76)	Explanation IV to Section 21 applies only where the accommodation in dispute and the accommodation occupied by the landlord are vitally connected and share common amenities; if the disputed accommodation is a self-contained allotable unit, Explanation IV is not attracted merely because the landlord occupies another part of the building.	The court agreed with this view and held that Explanation IV was not attracted in the instant case because the petitioner's shop was an independent, self-contained unit and did not share common amenities with the landlords' accommodation.
Pasupuleti Venkateswarlu v. The Motor and General Traders, A.I.R. 1975 S.C. 1409	The Supreme Court observed that courts may take into account subsequent events which have a material bearing on the continued existence of the landlord's need when considering eviction applications.	The court relied on this principle and held that subsequent events (the landlords' occupation of accommodation vacated by another tenant) may properly be considered in a writ petition under Article 226 to determine whether the landlord's need remained bona fide.
Bhabhuti Mai Rai Chand v. Lami Bai R. Tarte, A.I.R. 1975 S.C. 1297	The Supreme Court observed that the High Court's supervisory jurisdiction under Article 226 should not be invoked merely to correct errors of fact that are within the province of an appellate court.	The respondents relied on this authority to resist interference with the Additional District Judge's factual findings; the court distinguished the present situation by explaining that it was not reappraising evidence but addressing subsequent events that materially altered the factual matrix and therefore justified reconsideration in the interest of justice.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The court's analysis proceeded in two principal strands: (1) the proper scope and application of Explanation IV to Section 21 of the U.P. Urban Buildings Act, 1972; and (2) the relevance of subsequent events that occurred during the pendency of the writ petition.

On Explanation IV:

The court examined the language and effect of Explanation IV, noting that it operates as a rule of evidence: if the building under tenancy is part of a building the remaining part of which is occupied by the landlord for residential purposes, that fact shall be conclusive proof that the building is bona fide required by the landlord.
Relying on the reasoning in Abdul Waliab, the court accepted the distinction between (a) cases where the disputed accommodation and the landlord's accommodation are vitally connected and share common amenities (in which case Explanation IV may be attracted), and (b) cases where the disputed accommodation is an independent, self-contained, allotable unit (in which case Explanation IV is not attracted merely because the landlord occupies another part of the building).
Applying that principle to the facts before it, the court concluded that the petitioner's one-room shop was an independent, self-contained unit and that there were no common amenities shared with the landlords. Therefore Explanation IV did not apply and the Additional District Judge erred in relying on it as conclusive proof of the landlords' bona fide need.

On subsequent events and the scope of Article 226:

The court considered the effect of events that transpired after the Additional District Judge had decided the appeal: specifically, another tenant (Sheo Mohan) vacated a separate portion of the building, which the landlords then occupied, leaving only the petitioner's one-room shop occupied by the petitioner.
Relying on the Supreme Court's observation in Pasupuleti Venkateswarlu, the court held that it is open to courts to take into account subsequent events that have a material bearing on the continued existence of the landlord's need. Although the cited observations were made in the context of revision under Section 115 CPC, the court reasoned that the underlying principle—consideration of subsequent events to do justice between the parties—applies equally to writ petitions under Article 226.
The court distinguished the respondents' reliance on Bhabhuti Mai Rai Chand v. Lami Bai R. Tarte by explaining that it was not undertaking a re-appraisal of the evidence or attempting to correct a pure error of fact on record as an appellate court would. Instead, the court noted that changed circumstances arising during the writ petition's pendency had a direct and material bearing on whether the landlords continued to bona fide require the petitioner's accommodation. For that reason, reconsideration was necessary in the interest of justice.
Consequently, the court concluded that the Additional District Judge's conclusion as to the landlords' bona fide need should be re-examined in light of the changed factual circumstances (i.e., the landlords' occupation of vacated accommodation), and it was improper to ignore those subsequent events.

Holding and Implications

Holding: The court allowed the writ petition, quashed the order of the Additional District Judge, and directed the Additional District Judge to reconsider the landlords' need in accordance with the observations made in this judgment.

Implications and consequences:

Direct effect on the parties: The Additional District Judge's order releasing the petitioner’s shop to the landlords and awarding two years' rent as compensation has been quashed. The matter is remitted to the Additional District Judge for fresh consideration of whether the landlords bona fide require the petitioner's accommodation, taking into account (i) that Explanation IV to Section 21 does not apply to an independent, self-contained allotable unit which does not share common amenities with the landlord's residence, and (ii) subsequent events (such as the landlords' occupation of accommodation vacated by another tenant) that materially affect the existence of the landlords' need.
On broader legal consequences: The court expressly applied existing authorities (as summarized above) to hold that subsequent events may be considered in a writ petition under Article 226 where they materially bear on the issue; the opinion directs reconsideration rather than pronouncing a definitive new rule beyond the application of those authorities.

All statements in this summary are drawn exclusively from the text of the provided opinion and do not add or infer facts beyond that text.

Show all summary ...

K.N. Singh, J.-

This petition is directed against the order of the Additional District Judge, Allahabad releasing the accommodation in question in favour of respondent landlords.

The petitioner is tenant of one room shop situate on the ground floor of house No. 381 Badshahi Mandi, Allahabad. Subhash Chandra and Prem Chandra, respondents Nos. 2 and 3, are its landlords, they reside on the first floor of the house. They made application under Section 21 of the U.P. Urban Buildings (Regulation of Letting, Rent and Eviction) Act, 1972, hereinafter referred to as the Act, for the release of the ground floor shop which was in the occupation of the petitioner. The Prescribed Authority rejected the application by its order dated April 5, 1974. On appeal by the respondent-landlords the Additional District Judge, Allahabad, set aside the order of the Prescribed Authority on the finding that since respondent-landlords were residing in a portion of the building, their bona fide need stood conclusively proved in pursuance of Explanation IV to Section 21 of the Act. The Additional District Judge recorded findings that the landlords need was bona fide and genuine even on merits. He, therefore, released the shop in favour of the landlords and awarded two years rent to the petitioner-tenant as compensation. Aggrieved, the petitioner-tenant filed this petition challenging validity of the order of the Additional District Judge.

Learned counsel for the petitioner urged that Explanation IV to Section 21 was not applicable to the instant case. The learned District Judge committed patent error of law in recording finding that there was conclusive proof about the bona fide need of the respondent-landlords as they were residing in a portion of the building. On the admitted facts the building consists of three portions. The landlords reside in one portion, while another tenant Sheo Mohan was residing in the second portion, and the petitioner was carrying on business in one room shop situate on the ground floor. Thus there were two tenants in addition to the landlord residing in the building. There is no dispute that one-room shop which has been in the tenancy of the petitioner was an independent self-contained unit. There was nothing common between the landlord and the petitioner tenant and they were not using any common amenities. Section 21 lays down that the Prescribed Authority may, on the application of the landlord, evict a tenant from the building under tenancy or any specified part thereof if it is satisfied that the building is bona fide required by the landlord for his occupation. Explanation IV to Section 21 lays down that if the building under tenancy is a part of the building of which the remaining part is in the occupation of the landlord for residential purposes, then this fact shall be conclusive proof that the building is bona fide required by the landlord. Explanation IV enacts a rule of evidence to the effect that if the landlord is residing in the remaining apart of the building, it will be conclusive that his need is bona fide. It is however significant to note that Explanation IV applies only in a case of a residential building. If the building under tenancy is not a residential building, Explanation IV shall not be attracted. In the instant case, admittedly the petitioner has been carrying on business in the one room-shop situate on the ground floor. Therefore, Explanation IV is not attracted, and the landlord's need could not be held to be conclusively proved. The Additional District Judge committed error in placing reliance on Explanation IV.

Explanation IV to Section 21 is not applicable to the instant case as the shop in question which is in the petitioner's tenancy is an independent unit and the landlord was residing in another portion which was self-contained and formed a separate unit. The petitioner and the landlord did not use any common amenity, therefore the landlords were not residing in a part of the building as contemplated by Explanation IV. Learned counsel for the respondents urged that since the landlords were residing in a part of the same building in which the petitioner was tenant, Explanation IV was attracted. This question was considered at length by brother Shukla, J. in Abdul Waliab v. District Judge, Meerut Writ Petition No. 2360 of 1974 decided on 1976 A.L.R. 76. After considering the matter at length the learned Judge held that if the accommodation in dispute and the one in the occupation of landlords are so vitally connected with each other that on account of their proximity the tenant and the landlord both share all common amenities, then it can be said to be one allotable unit or an accommodation, in that event Explanation IV will be applicable, but in a case where the accommodation dispute is not vitally connected with the accommodation in the occupation of the landlord and they do not share common amenities and the accommodation and the tenancy of the tenant is an allotable unit, then Expln. IV would not be attracted merely because the landlord is residing in a part of that tracted merely because the landlord is residing in a part of that, building which may be independent and self-contained unit. I agree with the view expressed by the learned Judge. Explanation IV in my opinion is not attracted to a case where the tenant is in occupation of a self-contained unit, allottable to a tenant without affecting the use of the other part of the building by the landlord. For this reason also the Additional District Judge committed error in placing reliance upon Explanation IV.

The Additional District Judge held that the need of the landlord was bona fide and genuine even on merits. In coming to that conclusion he recorded finding that the landlord's family consisted of nine members and the accommodation available to the landlords was hardly sufficient to meet their need. Learned counsel for the petitioner urged that the landlords had made application for the eviction of Sheo Mohan, another tenant, who was residing in a part of the building. During the pendency of this petition, Sheo Mohan vacated the accommodation in his tenancy and the landlords occupied the same which consists of two rooms, a verandali and a courtyard and one room and an open terrace on the first floor. Thus at present the landlords are occupying the entire building except the one room on the ground floor which is in the petitioner's tenancy. On behalf of the tenant it is urged that the landlord's need if any ceased to exist after they occupied the accommodation which was in the tenancy of Sheo Mohan. Learned counsel for the respondent-landlords urged that the subsequent events which took place after the filing of the writ petition cannot legally be taken into account in judging the validity of the order of the Additional District Judge.

In Pasupuleti Venkateswarlu v. The Motor and General Traders A.I.R. 1975 S.C. 1409 the Supreme Court observed that while considering the need of the landlord for the purpose of evicting a tenant it is open to Courts to take into account subsequent events which may have material bearing on the continued existence of landlord's need. No doubt these observations were made in a case where revision was maintainable before the High Court under Section 115 of the Civil Procedure Code, but the principle that subsequent events should be taken into account to do justice between the parties, is fully applicable to a writ petition also. The primary purpose of a writ petition under Article 226 is to do justice between the parties and to ensure that the authorities constituted under the Act, act in accordance with the provisions of the Act, and no injustice is caused to the parties. If during the pendency of the writ petition the landlords occupied additional accommodation which was sufficient to meet their need in that case it would be unjust to evict the petitioner-tenant who has been carrying on business in the shop for his livelihood. I am, therefore, of the opinion that it would not be proper or desirable to ignore the subsequent events which took place in the instant case as they have material bearing on the question of bona fide need and requirement of the landlord.

Learned counsel for the respondent urged that this Court has no power to interfere with the finding of fact recorded by the Additional District Judge. He placed reliance on the Supreme Court decision in Bhabhuti Mai Rai Chand v. Lami Bai R. Tarte A.I.R. 1975 S.C. 1297, where the Supreme Court observed that the power of superintendence of High Court under Article 226 cannot be invoked to correct error of fact which only a superior court can "do in exercise of its power as a court of appeal. The question does not arise in the present case. The findings of fact recorded by the Additional District Judge are not being reviewed or set aside on a re-appraisal of the evidence as is normally done in appeal. The subsequent events which have come into existence during the pendency of the writ petition have material bearing on the controversy inasmuch as the respondent-landlords have to occupy the entire accommodation available in the building except one-room shop occupied by the petitioner. At the time the Additional District Judge considered the bona fide needs of the landlord on merits, the accommodation which was in the tenancy of Sheo Mohan was not in the occupation of the landlords. Therefore, this question could not be considered by him. Now since the landlord has got additional accommodation it is necessary in the interest of justice to reconsider the landlord's need. If this is not done great injustice would be caused to the petitioner-tenant. Section 21 of the Act contemplates eviction of a tenant at the instance of the landlord with a view to provide additional accommodation to the landlord to meet his need. If there are several tenants in the building and the landlord occupies one portion and makes an application for eviction of a tenant from one portion of the building on the ground of his bona fide need and requirement for additional accommodation, the authorities constituted under the Act as well as the courts must consider the question as to whether the landlord's need still continued to be bona fide. The need of the landlord for additional accommodation need not be pressing on the date of making application but it must continue to be so even at the stage of appeal or writ petition. If during the pendency of appeal or writ petition, the landlord occupies additional accommodation vacated by other tenants of the building, the bona fide need of the landlord may cease to exist. In that event it will be unjust to evict a tenant under Section 21 of the Act. The powers or this Court under Article 226 are wide enough and are not circumscribed by any technical rules of procedure. The Court has wide power to issue direction to advance the cause of justice. I am, therefore, of the opinion that subsequent event has a material bearing on the landlord's need and as such it is necessary that the question as to whether the landlord bona -fide requires the accommodation which is in the petitioner's tenancy must be investigated in the light of the changed circumstances.

In the result, I allow the petition and quash the order of the Additional District Judge and direct him to consider the landlord's need in accordance with the observations made in this judgment.