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Sri Vir Digambar Jai... v. Pramod Kumar Jain An...

Allahabad High Court
Apr 16, 2008
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Legal Opinion Summary — Krishna Murari, J.

Factual and Procedural Background

The dispute arises out of Sri Vir Digambar Jain Dharamshala and Sri Mahavir Jain Dharmarth Aushadhalai, described as a private trust created by a trust deed of the late Lala Nanhe Mal Jain. The petitioners claim to be the managing trustees of the trust.

Opposite parties Nos. 1 to 4 moved an application under Section 92 of the Code of Civil Procedure (CPC) seeking permission to file a suit alleging the trust was a public trust, with prayers including removal of the trustee, framing a scheme of administration, custody of trust property, and submission of accounts. Those proceedings were registered as Misc. Case No. 48 of 2004 and were contested by the petitioners.

During the pendency of those Section 92 proceedings, respondents 9 and 10 filed Writ Petition No. 9014 of 2008 in the nature of a public interest litigation alleging mismanagement of the trust. This Court disposed of that writ petition but granted respondents 9 and 10 the liberty to join the ongoing Section 92 proceedings. Pursuant to that liberty, respondents 9 and 10 applied to be impleaded under Order I, Rule 10 CPC, sought an injunction under the inherent powers of the Court (Section 151 CPC) and moved under Order XXVI, Rule 9 CPC for appointment of a Commissioner to inspect the trust property and report. The District Judge, Ghaziabad, by order dated 3.4.2008, allowed all three applications.

The petitioners filed the present writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution challenging the District Judge's order of 3.4.2008. The parties' counsel appeared and, with their consent and no counter-affidavit from opposing counsel, the writ petition was finally disposed of by this Court.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether a Court has jurisdiction to entertain and pass orders on applications for impleadment (Order I, Rule 10 CPC), injunction (Order XXXIX CPC or under inherent powers Section 151 CPC) and appointment of a Commissioner (Order XXVI, Rule 9 CPC) during the pendency of proceedings under Section 92 CPC seeking leave to institute a suit (i.e., before leave is granted and a suit is instituted).
  2. If the Court has any power before leave under Section 92 CPC is granted, whether that power extends to (a) impleadment of additional parties, (b) passing injunctions to preserve trust property, and (c) issuing a commission to make local investigations and record evidence.

Arguments of the Parties

Petitioners' Arguments

  • Since the application seeking leave under Section 92 CPC was pending and leave had not been granted, a suit could not be said to have been instituted; consequently, the District Judge lacked jurisdiction to allow application for impleadment, injunction and appointment of a Commissioner because those powers can only be exercised in a pending suit.

Respondents' Arguments

  • The impleadment application was filed pursuant to the liberty given by this Court when disposing of the writ petition filed by respondents 9 and 10, and therefore its allowance was appropriate.
  • Invoking the inherent powers of the Court under Section 151 CPC, the Court appropriately directed the parties to maintain status quo in relation to the trust property to prevent waste or damage during the pendency of the proceedings.
  • The appointment of a Commissioner was justified to inspect the trust property and report, so that any injunction order could be made effectively operative.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
R.M. Narayana Chettiar v. N. Lakshmanan Chettiar, AIR 1991 SC 221 Establishes that leave under Section 92 CPC is a condition precedent to institution of a suit under that section. Cited to support the proposition that, unless leave is granted under Section 92, a suit is not instituted and therefore powers applicable "in a suit" normally do not arise.
R. Venugopala Naidu v. Venkatarayulu Naidu (Charities) Supports the representative character of proceedings under Section 92 CPC and that named plaintiffs act on behalf of the public at large interested in the trust. Applied to hold that proceedings under Section 92 are representative, making all interested persons effectively parties; therefore impleadment of additional interested persons does not offend the character of the proceedings.
Mohd. Ali v. Ahmed Ali Holds that Court has inherent jurisdiction to protect property pending ascertainment of rights (including appointment of a receiver) once there is cognizance of a dispute involving a trust. Relied on to justify invocation of inherent powers (Section 151 CPC) to pass interim measures such as injunctions or appointment of receivers to safeguard trust property pending determination of leave under Section 92 CPC.
Fateh Ali Mirza v. Sajjad Hussain, AIR 1937 Cal. 740 Affirms the District Judge's competency to appoint a receiver pending determination of suit matters, including competency of suit. Quoted with approval to support the proposition that courts may appoint protectors of property (e.g., receivers) pending resolution of substantive matters.
N. Anandam v. Ayyanna (Madras High Court) Holds that appointment of a receiver to protect and preserve trust properties could be made even pending disposal of an application for leave under Section 92 CPC. Relied upon to strengthen the conclusion that interim protective measures are available prior to grant of leave to sue under Section 92.
Narsingh Das v. Mangal Dubey, 83 5 All 163 (Full Bench) States the principle that procedural powers are to be considered permissible unless expressly prohibited; prohibition should not be presumed. Used to support the conclusion that absence of an express provision in the Code forbidding a course of action does not mean courts lack power to take necessary interim measures under Section 151 CPC.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Court began by interpreting Section 92(1) CPC, observing that leave of the Court is a condition precedent to institution of a suit under that section. R.M. Narayana Chettiar (AIR 1991 SC 221) was cited for this proposition: unless leave is granted the suit cannot be deemed instituted or pending.

The petitioners argued that provisions in the Code that expressly speak of powers exercisable "in a suit" (e.g., Order I, Rule 10; Order XXXIX; Order XXVI, Rule 9) could not be invoked while the Section 92 leave application was pending because there was no suit. The Court acknowledged the literal force of that submission.

However, the Court undertook a contextual and purpose-driven analysis of Section 92 proceedings. It emphasized that Section 92 proceedings are representative, brought on behalf of the public at large or all those interested in the trust. The Court noted that the named plaintiffs represent the entire body of persons interested in the trust and that all such persons are considered parties in law. On that basis, and given the liberty previously granted by this Court to respondents 9 and 10 to join the Section 92 proceedings, the District Judge's allowance of the impleadment application was held not to be illegal or without jurisdiction.

Turning to interim protective measures, the Court analyzed the availability of inherent powers under Section 151 CPC. It explained that Section 151 recognizes the Court's inherent jurisdiction to make orders necessary for ends of justice or to prevent abuse of process. Inherent power, the Court stated, cannot be invoked where the Code expressly provides for a situation; but if the Code does not provide for the contingency, Section 151 may be invoked to prevent waste or damage to trust property while the Section 92 application is pending.

The Court relied on Mohd. Ali v. Ahmed Ali and Fateh Ali Mirza v. Sajjad Hussain to establish that a court which has cognizance of a dispute involving trust administration has both jurisdiction and a duty to safeguard trust property and may appoint receivers or take other protective steps pending final determination. The Court also referenced N. Anandam to show that appointment of a receiver could be made even while an application for leave under Section 92 remains pending.

On that basis, the Court concluded that it could invoke Section 151 CPC to pass injunctions (and analogous protective relief) to preserve and protect public trust property pending disposal of the Section 92 leave application. The Court noted an underlying policy: preventing irreparable harm to trust property outweighs strict textual limitations where the Code contains no alternative protective remedy.

However, the Court drew a distinction with respect to appointment of a Commissioner under Order XXVI, Rule 9 CPC. It reasoned that a Commissioner's report is evidence that becomes part of the record under Order XXVI, Rule 10 and sub-rule (2), and evidence can validly be taken on record only in a pending suit for deciding parties' rights. Since the grant of leave under Section 92 does not adjudicate rights and a suit is not instituted until leave is granted, the Court held that issuing a Commission for inspection and reporting could not be justified at the leave stage because the Commissioner's report would constitute evidence that cannot be taken on record in absence of a suit.

Consequently, while the Court sustained the District Judge's exercise of power to implead respondents and to pass injunctive/protective orders under Section 151 CPC, it found the order appointing a Commissioner under Order XXVI, Rule 9 to be unsustainable in the pre-suit context and therefore quashed that part of the District Judge's order.

Holding and Implications

Holding:

  • The challenge to the District Judge's allowance of the impleadment application and the injunction/status-quo order is dismissed. The Court held that impleadment was permissible given the representative character of Section 92 proceedings and the liberty previously granted to respondents to join those proceedings; and injunctions/protective orders can be issued under the Court's inherent powers (Section 151 CPC) to prevent waste or damage to trust property while leave under Section 92 is pending.
  • The order appointing a Commissioner under Order XXVI, Rule 9 CPC is quashed. The Court held that issuing a Commission and receiving the Commissioner's report (which is evidence) cannot properly be done in the absence of a pending suit because evidence-taking and recording is a function in a suit.
  • Overall disposition: The writ petition was dismissed insofar as it challenged impleadment and injunction orders, but was allowed insofar as it challenged the appointment of the Commissioner; the petition is therefore allowed in part.

Implications:

  • Direct effect on parties: respondents 9 and 10 remain impleaded in Misc. Case No. 48 of 2004 and any injunction/status-quo orders made under Section 151 CPC remain valid; the specific Commissioner's appointment and related order are nullified.
  • Broader legal consequence: the judgment recognizes a court's inherent power (Section 151 CPC) to pass interim protective measures (such as injunctions or appointment of receivers) prior to grant of leave under Section 92 CPC where the Code provides no specific remedy to prevent waste or damage. However, it draws a clear line that evidentiary measures (such as issuing a Commission under Order XXVI that produces evidence to be taken on record) cannot be ordered prior to institution of a suit.
  • No new standalone precedent beyond the application and reconciliation of existing authorities is asserted; the Court applied and synthesized earlier decisions to resolve the specific procedural question before it.

Ancillary outcome: The Court ordered no costs between the parties.


End of summary — based exclusively on the provided opinion.

Show all summary ...

Krishna Murari, J.:— By means of this petition filed under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, the petitioners have challenged the order dated 3.4.2008 passed by the District Judge, Ghaziabad in proceedings under section 92 of the Code of Civil Procedure, (for short, ‘the Code’) allowing the applications moved by respondents 9 and 10, under Order I, Rule 10 of the Code for their impleadment, under section 151 seeking injunction and Order XXVI, Rule 9 for appointment of a Commissioner.

2. Facts giving rise to dispute are as under:

Sri Vir Digambar Jain Dharamshala and Sri Mahavir Jain Dharmarth Aushadhalai is stated to be a private trust created through a trust deed executed by one late Lala Nanhe Mal Jain. Petitioner No. 2 claimants to be the managing trustee of the said Trust. An application under section 92 of the Code was moved by opposite party Nos. 1 to 4 seeking permission to file a suit on the allegations that it was a public trust with a prayer to remove the trustee and to frame a scheme of administration for managing the affairs of the trust and or giving custody of the trust property to the managing committee and to submit the accounts. The proceeding was registered as Misc. Case No. 48 of 2004 and was contested by the petitioners. During the pendency of the proceedings respondents 9 and 10 filed Writ Petition No. 9014 of 2008 in the nature of a public interest litigation alleging that the trust was being mismanaged. This Court, finding that proceedings under section 92 of the code were pending, disposed of the petition with the liberty to the applicants therein to join in the said proceedings. Thereafter, respondents 9 and 10 moved an application under Order I, Rule 10 of the Code seeking impleadment in Misc. Case No. 48 of 2004. An application under section 151 of the Code for maintaining status-quo with respect to the trust property and another application under Order XXVI, Rule 9 of the code for appointment of a Commissioner to make inspection and submit details of the trust property was also moved. The applications were resisted by the petitioners by filing objections. District Judge vide order dated 3.4.2008 allowed all the three applications.

3. I have heard Sri Rakesh Pande for the petitioners, Sri Anoop Trivedi for respondent Nos. 1 to 4 and Sri Ravi Agarwal for respondents 9 and 10.

4. Counsel appearing for the respondents do not propose to file any counter-affidavit and with the consent of learned Counsel for the parties, the writ petition is being finally disposed of at this stage.

5. It has been urged by learned Counsel for the petitioners that since the application seeking permission to institute the suit is pending till date and permission having not been granted, the suit cannot be said to have been instituted as yet as such the application for impleadment, injunction and issuance of a Commission have been wrongly and illegally allowed inasmuch as the said power can only be exercised by the Court in a pending suit.

6. In reply, it has been submitted that the impleadment application was moved in pursuance to the liberty given by this Court while disposing of the writ petition filed by respondents 9 and 10 and the same has rightly been allowed. It has further been submitted that invoking inherent power under section 151 of the code the Court has directed the parties to maintain status-quo in respect of the trust property in order to prevent waste and damage of the same during the pendency of the proceedings and the Commissioner has been appointed to submit a report about the details of the trust property so that the injunction order may be effectively made operative on the same.

7. I have considered the rival submission.

8. The question which arises for consideration is whether the Court has jurisdiction to entertain and pass orders on such applications in proceedings under section 92 of the Code seeking leave of the Court to file suit. Section 92(1) relevant for the purposes of the case reads as under:

“92(1). In the case of any alleged breach of any express or constructive trust created for public purposes of a charitable or religious nature, or where the direction of the Court is deemed necessary for the administration of any such trust, the Advocate-General, or two or more person having an interest in the trust and having obtained the [leave of the Court], may institute a suit, whether contentions or not, in the principal Civil Court of original jurisdiction or in any other Court empowered in that behalf by the State Government within the local limits of whose jurisdiction the whole or any part of the subject-matter of the trust is situate to obtain a decree—

(a) removing any trustee;

(b) appointing a new trustee;

(c) vesting any property in a trustee;

[(cc) directing a trustee who has been removed or a person who has ceased to be a trustee, to deliver possession of any trust property in his possession to the person entitled to the possession of such property;]

(d) directing accounts and inquiries;

(e) declaring what proportion of the trust property or of the interest therein shall be allocated to any particular object of the trust;

(f) authorizing the whole or any part of the trust property to be let, sold, mortgaged or exchanged;

(g) setting a scheme; or

(h) granting such further or other relief as the nature of the case may require.”

9. From the language of the section it is clear that leave is a condition precedent to the institution of the suit itself. Thus unless the leave is granted the suit cannot be deemed to have been instituted much less pending. The Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of R.M Narayana Chettiar v. N. Lakshmanan Chettiar . AIR 1991 SC 221. has ruled that in view of the language used in section 92 of the C.P.C leave of the Court is a condition precedent for institution of a suit against a public trust for the relief set out in the said section.

10. Based on the aforesaid interpretation of section 92 and the words “where a suit has been instituted” used in Order I, Rule 10 and “where in any suit it is proved by affidavit or otherwise” used in Order XXXIX of the Code dealing with temporary injunction and interlocutory orders and “any Court in any suit issue a Commission” used in Order XXVI, Rule 9 providing for the Commission to make local investigation, it has been sought to be urged on behalf of the petitioners that during the pendency of the leave application, there is no suit in existence hence no order for impledment, temporary injunction or appointment of a commission could have been passed and the impugned orders are without jurisdiction inasmuch as the powers in respect thereof can be exercised by the Court only in a pending suit.

11. Application under Order I, Rule 10 was moved by respondents 9 and 10 in pursuance to the liberty given by this Court to join in the pending proceedings under section 92 of the code. Apart from above, it is undisputed that proceedings under section 92 of the code is of representative character on behalf of the public at large. The purpose of section 92 is to give protection to public trust of charitable or religious character from being subject of harassment by suit being filed against them and as such it provides that suits of such nature can be filed by Advocate-General or two or more persons having an interest with the leave of the Court. While granting the leave the Court does not decide the rights of the parties but merely ascertains whether there is a prima-facie case for granting leave to file suit. The suit is fundamentally on behalf of the entire body of persons who are interested in the trust. The beneficiaries of the trust which may consist of public at large, may choose two or more persons amongst themselves for the purpose of filing a suit under section 92 of the code and the cause title in that event would show only their names as plaintiffs but in such a situation the persons whose names are on the cause title are not the only parties to the suit. The named plaintiffs being the representatives of the public at large which is interested in the trust all such interested persons would be considered in the eyes of law to be parties to the suit. The very nature of the suit makes all those who have common interest in the suit as parties and binds not only the parties named in the cause title but all those who are interested in the trust. This finds support from the decision of the Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of R. Venugopala Naidu v. Venkatarayulu Naidu Charities.2 The suit under section 92 of the Code being not like an ordinary suit where there is a lis between two parties and an objection could be raised by either of the parties to the suit with regard to impleadment of third party in the proceedings. The suit under section 92 being representative in character and all those interested in the trust could be considered in the eyes of law to be parties to the suit, a few such interested persons also being added as applicants in the proceedings and their names being added in the cause title will make no difference inasmuch as all the interested persons on account of the nature of the proceedings are deemed to be parties to the suit.

12. In view of above, no illegality appears to have been committed by the Court below in allowing the application of respondents 9 and 10 being impleaded in the proceedings.

13. In so far as the order directing the parties to maintain status-quo passed by the Court below is concerned, the arguments have been advanced on behalf of the petitioners in the light of the provision of Order XXXIX of the code whereas the order has been passed by the Court below on the application moved by respondent Nos. 9 and 10 invoking the powers conferred on the Court by virtue of section 151 of the code which reads as under:

“Nothing in this code shall be deemed to limit or otherwise affect the inherent power of the Court to make such orders as may be necessary for the ends of justice, or to prevent abuse of the process of the Court.”

14. This section gives legislative recognition to the well established principle that every Court has inherent in its very constitution all such powers as may be necessary to do the right and to undo a wrong in the course of administration of justice or in other words every Court has inherent power to act ‘ex debito justitiae’. However, inherent power cannot be exercised when the Code itself provides for a particular situation or contingency or provides for a procedure to be adopted. It is only when there is no provision in the code for dealing with a particular situation, inherent powers of the Court conferred by section 151 of the code can be availed of by a party for redressal of its grievances.

15. In the facts of the present case, the suit cannot be said to have been instituted for want of permission, the Court obviously could not have exercised the powers conferred by Order XXXIX. There being no other provision in the Code to deal with such a situation, in such contingency the Court will not be powerless and a mere mute spectator to the trust property being wasted and damaged, and the inherent power can be invoked to pass suitable order to prevent the wastage and damage of the trust property.

16. In the case of Mohd. Ali v. Ahmed Ali,3 while dealing with the question whether while setting aside the order of the District Judge removing the existing mutuwalli of the waqf and appointing another mutawalli on the ground that the order was without jurisdiction, the High Court could appoint a receiver to safeguard the property for such period during which proper proceeding could be instituted by the parties, the majority view observed as under:

“Jurisdiction to protect property pending ascertainment of rights is inherent in any Court which once has cognizance in any form of a dispute involving the execution of a trust or the administration of assets and the Court has not merely the jurisdiction, but a duty to safeguard them.”

17. While upholding the power to appoint a receiver in such a situation to safeguard the trust property the following observation of the Calcutta High Court in the case of Fateh Ali Mirza v. Sajjad Hussain . AIR 1937 Cal. 740., was noted with approval by the majority:

“We are of the opinion that it was well within the competency of the learned District Judge, 24 Parganas in the exercise of its discretion to appoint the receiver pending the determination of all the matters in issue between the parties in the suit including the issue as to the competency of the suit.”

18. It has further been observed as under:

“Bearing in mind the principles laid down by the authorities mentioned above in cases analogous to the present one, it seems to me that the appointment of a receiver for a short period would be eminently just and convenient and the Court has ample powers for making such an appointment under Order XL of the C.P.C or in the alternative under section 151 of the C.P.C”

19. Relying upon the Full Bench decision of this Court in the case of Mohd. Ali (supra), the Madras High Court in the case of N. Anandam v. Ayyanna Grouvder,5 has also held that an order for appointment of receive to protect and preserve the trust properties could be made by the Court even pending disposal of the application for leave under section 92 of the C.P.C

20. From the aforesaid discussion, it is clear that even pending determination of the issue as to the competency of the suit itself or in other words pending application seeking permission to file suit, powers of the Court can be invoked for passing suitable orders appointing a receiver to prevent the trust property from being wasted or destroyed.

21. Applying the same analogy the Court in exercise of its inherent power can pass suitable injunction order as well to preserve and protect the pubic trust properties during the pendency of the application for leave under section 92 of the Code.

22. Even the absence of a express provision in the code to meet such contingency also cannot constitute a valid ground to hold that Court has no power to pass such order, for two reasons; “firstly, power of section 151 can be invoked when there is no express provision in the code to meet the situation and secondly, provision cannot be presumed to be prohibited, as a general principle unless shown to be prohibited by law as observed Mahmood J. in the case of Narsingh Das v. Mangal Dubey . 83 5 All 163 F.B and noted by the Full Bench in Mohd. Ali (supra) case as under:

“The Courts are not to act upon the principle that every procedure is to be taken as prohibited unless it is expressly provided for by the code, but on the converse principle that every procedure is to be understood as permissible till it is shown to be prohibited by law. As a matter of general principle prohibition cannot be presumed.”

23. In view of the above facts and discussions, I have no hesitation in holding that Court can invoke inherent power conferred by section 151 of the Code to pass injunction order to preserve and protect the public trust property even pending disposal of application for leave to file suit under section 92 of the Code.

24. However, the reason for upholding the power of the Court to pass injunction order during the pendency of the application for leave under section 92 cannot be said to be available in the case of application for appointment of a commission. Under Order XXVI, Rule 9 the Court is empowered to issue a commission during the pendency of the suit to make an investigation and submit a report elucidating any matter in dispute or to ascertain the spot situation under Order XXVI, Rule 10 the Commissioner is under an obligation to submit a report in writing and under sub-rule (2) the report of the Commissioner and evidence taken by him shall be evidence in the suit and form part of the record. Evidence can only be taken on record by the Court in a pending suit for deciding the rights of the parties. While considering the application for leave the Court does not adjudicate the rights of the parties. The Court has merely to see whether there is a prima facie case for granting leave to file the suit, i.e, to say suit to be instituted lies within the ambit and scope of section 92 of the code and for that the Court has to satisfy itself whether the persons asking for leave have interest in the trust, whether the trust is a public trust, whether there are grounds, prima facie, that there has been a breach of trust. For this satisfaction to be recorded by the Court the issuance of a commission to make local inspection provided by Order XXVI, Rule 9 for the purpose of elucidating any matter in dispute or for ascertaining the market value of any property and the like can by no stretch of imagination be said to be required. The Commissioner's report being in the nature of evidence, it is clear that without a suit being pending it cannot be taken on record and thus during the pendency of the application under section 92 seeking leave to file suit, the Court cannot issue a Commission for inspection and submit a report for the same is neither required at the stage of grant of leave nor liable to be taken on record being in the nature of evidence in the absence of the suit being pending.

25. In view of the above facts and circumstances, the writ petition challenging the orders passed on the application for impleadment as well as injunction must fail and hereby stand dismissed. However, the order issuing commission is not liable to be sustained and the same is hereby quashed.

26. As a result, the writ petition stands allowed in part.

27. However, in the facts and circumstances, there shall be no order as to costs.

Petition Allowed.