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Raghavendra Swami Mutt v. Board Of Commissioners, Hindu Religious Endowments, Madras .
Structured Summary of the Opinion
Factual and Procedural Background
This appeal arises from a petition under S. 84(2) of the Madras Hindu Religious Endowments Act filed by the Raghavendraswami Mutt, Nanjangud (represented by its head and by power of attorney holder Ritti Krishtamachar) in the District Court at Bellary. The petition sought to set aside an order of the Board of Commissioners for the Hindu Religious Endowments, Madras, which had declared the institution known as the Nanjangud Shri Raghavendraswami Mutt at Manthralaya (Mantralaya/Manthralaya) to be a "mutt" as defined by the Act. The petitioner was unsuccessful in the District Court and brought the present appeal under S. 84(3) of the Act.
The core dispute concerns (a) whether the institution at Mantralaya is a "mutt" within the meaning of the Madras Act and therefore subject to the Board's jurisdiction, and (b) whether a prior Board decision of 11 October 1928 (which had treated the mutt as situated at Nanjangud in Mysore and thus outside Madras Presidency jurisdiction) operated as a bar to the later inquiry and decision.
Two learned judges delivered opinions in this appeal (Chandra Reddy, J. concurring with his learned brother; and Shrinivasachari, J.), and both affirmed the judgment under appeal and dismissed the appeal with costs.
Legal Issues Presented
- Whether the institution at Mantralaya is a "mutt" as defined in s. 9(7) of the Madras Hindu Religious Endowments Act (i.e., an institution for religious instruction and spiritual headship) and thus falls within the jurisdiction of the Madras Board.
- Whether the institution's alleged origin as a tomb or samadhi (of Sri Raghavendraswamy) prevents it from being characterised as a mutt or a religious institution under the Act.
- Whether the Mantralaya institution is merely a branch of the main mutt at Nanjangud (in Mysore) and, if so, whether such branch remains outside the operation of the Madras Act because the headquarters was outside the Madras Presidency.
- Whether an earlier decision of the Board (in 1928) that the mutt was situated at Nanjangud and thus outside the Board's jurisdiction operates as a conclusive bar to a fresh inquiry and decision when circumstances have changed.
Arguments of the Parties
Appellant's Arguments (as advanced by Mr. Kuppuswamy)
- The institution at Mantralaya is not a mutt but only a tomb (samadhi) of a saint (Sri Raghavendraswamy) and public worship there does not make it a mutt.
- Alternatively, the Mantralaya institution is only a branch of the principal Raghavendraswamy Mutt located at Nanjangud (Mysore Presidency) and therefore the Madras Act (and the Board's jurisdiction) does not apply.
- The prior decision rendered by the Board in 1928, which treated the mutt as situated at Nanjangud and outside Madras Presidency jurisdiction, is final and operates as a bar to the present inquiry and order.
Respondent / Board and District Court Position
- The Board contended, and the District Judge found, that the institution at Mantralaya itself satisfies the definition of a mutt under s. 9(7) of the Act and therefore is amenable to the jurisdiction of the Madras Board because it is situated in the Madras Presidency.
- Evidence (documentary and oral) showed regular religious functions at Mantralaya, permanent residence and activity of the Swami there, large endowments and land in Bellary district, public worship and feeding of devotees, and institutions such as a Sanskrit college — all consistent with mutt characteristics.
- The earlier 1928 decision did not bar a fresh inquiry where circumstances had changed (in particular, the effective headquarters and activities of the mutt had shifted to Mantralaya).
Table of Precedents Cited
| Precedent | Rule or Principle Cited For | Application by the Court |
|---|---|---|
| Ramprakash v. Anand Das, ILR 43 Cal 707; AIR 1916 PC 256 | Descriptive definition of a "mutt" (asthala/muth) — institution of monastic nature established for service of a cult, instruction in tenets, with a Mahant/head who presides and initiates disciples. | The court relied on Lord Shaw's passage to identify the essential characteristics of a mutt and to test whether Mantralaya conformed to those indicia. |
| Sammantha Pandara v. Sellappa Chetti, ILR 2 Mad 175 | Authorities bearings on what constitutes essentials of a mutt (cited as supportive authority). | Used as supporting authority in assembling the indicia of a mutt which the court applied to the evidence about Mantralaya. |
| Vidyapurna Tirtha Swami v. Vidyanidhi Tirtha Swami, ILR 27 Mad 435 | Judicial observations on purposes and characteristics of mutts (the primary purpose: fostering spiritual learning and maintenance of teachers). | Cited to reinforce the description of mutts and to show that Mantralaya met those characteristics. |
| Draivisundaram Pillai v. Subramania Pillai, 1945-1 Mad LJ 328; AIR 1945 Mad 217 | Distinction that a gift to build/maintain a tomb (samadhi) per se may not be a charitable endowment; certain tomb-related expenditures held not charitable. | The court distinguished the present facts from this precedent, holding that origin as a tomb does not preclude an institution later developing characteristics of a mutt. |
| Velluswamy Goundan v. Dandapani, 1946-1 Mad LJ 354; AIR 1946 Mad 485 | Bequest for maintaining puja at a samadhi held invalid where the bequest was regarded as superstitious and not a valid charitable endowment. | The court treated this precedent as inapplicable where an institution, though originating in a samadhi, had evolved into a mutt/temple with public religious functions. |
| Commissioners, H. R. E. Board, Madras v. Narasimham, 1939-1 Mad LJ 134; AIR 1939 Mad 134 | Where an institution, irrespective of origin, has developed into a place of worship with regular rites and public belief in its efficacy, it is a temple within the Act; origin is not decisive. | The court relied on this decision to hold that Mantralaya's origins (samadhi) did not prevent it being treated as a mutt/temple under the Act because pilgrims believed in its religious efficacy and regular worship and offerings occurred. |
| Ratnavelu Mudaliar v. Commissioner for Hindu Religious and Charitable Endowments, 1953-2 Mad LJ 574; AIR 1954 Mad 398 | Where people long regarded an institution as a place of religious worship used as of right, it is a temple within the Act even if its origin was a samadhi and traces of Guru Pooja remain. | Used to support the proposition that beginnings of an institution do not determine its present character; applied to reject the appellant's origin-based argument. |
| Board of Commissioners for Hindu Religious Endowments, Madras v. Rathnaswami Pillai, ILR (1937) Mad 504; AIR 1937 Mad 232 (Full Bench) | An order of the Board under particular circumstances is not conclusive when circumstances or law change; an earlier declaration (e.g., that a temple was excepted) did not bar reclassification after legislative amendment or changed facts. | The court invoked this Full Bench principle to hold that the 1928 Board order was not a bar where circumstances had changed (headquarters moved to Mantralaya) and where the amended S.84(1930) had narrowed the inquiry. |
Court's Reasoning and Analysis
The court's analysis proceeded along two principal lines: (A) whether Mantralaya is a mutt within the meaning of the Act; and (B) whether the prior 1928 decision precludes a fresh inquiry or different conclusion.
A. Whether Mantralaya is a "mutt"
- The court first examined pleadings and evidence and noted that in the proceedings below and before the Board the parties had consistently proceeded on the basis that the institution was a mutt (often described as a branch of the Nanjangud mutt), and the cause-title itself described the appellant as the Raghavendraswamy Mutt having headquarters at Nanjangud.
- Documentary material and the testimony of petitioner witnesses (P.W. 5, 6, 7 and others) were summarized to show active mutt-like functions at Mantralaya: daily puja/archana, annual Visesha puja, feeding of thousands (5,000–6,000), pilgrims gathering from all over India, car festival, a golden mandapam, presence and residence of the Matadhipathi/Swami at Mantralaya, arrangements for meditation and puja, religious lectures, a Sanskrit college, an office and maintained accounts, and substantial landed endowments (2,000–3,000 acres in Bellary district).
- The court articulated the legal definition and indicia of a mutt (quoting authority and textbooks): a mutt is an institution for spiritual instruction, presided over by an ascetic/spiritual head who exercises headship over disciples; it is a centre of theological learning and religious instruction.
- Applying those indicia to the factual record, the court concluded that Mantralaya satisfied the essentials of a mutt: presence and residence of the preceptor (Swami), organized public worship and ritual, instruction and lectures, feeding/charitable activities, and organizational structures (office, accounts, college).
- The court rejected the appellant's argument that origin as a tomb/samadhi prevents mutt status, distinguishing prior Madras bench decisions that struck down singular bequests to tombs as charitable gifts. The court emphasized authorities (Narasimham; Ratnavelu Mudaliar) holding that origin does not control if an institution has developed over time into a place of worship in fact and in public belief.
- The court also rejected the "branch-only" contention: the court found the evidence did not support the claim that Mantralaya was merely subordinate; material showed Mantralaya had independent importance (larger structures, golden mandapam, present Swamiji installed and resident at Mantralaya and carrying out all functions there), and substantial properties located in the Madras Presidency supported jurisdictional reach.
- Statutory interpretation: the court relied on the inclusive definition of "mutt" in s.9(7) which expressly includes "places of religious instruction which are appurtenant to such institution" and concluded that adjacency or co-location of the main seat was not a necessary prerequisite for application of the definition.
B. Whether the 1928 Board decision barred the enquiry
- The court examined the earlier 1928 order that had held the mutt's headquarters at Nanjangud and thereby excluded the institution from the Board's jurisdiction. The court observed that the factual situation had demonstrably changed between 1928 and the 1947 inquiry: the Matadhipathi had been installed at Mantralaya, had taken up residence there, conducted all religious activities there, and Mantralaya had become the effective headquarters.
- Relying on the Full Bench authority (Rathnaswami Pillai) and the Board's own prior statement that the 1928 order "will not stand in the way of the Board exercising jurisdiction over temples, if any, in the Madras Presidency under the trusteeship of the petitioner," the court held an earlier decision under specific circumstances did not operate as an immutable bar where circumstances changed or the law was altered (the court also noted amendment of S.84 by Act IV of 1930 narrowing the inquiry to whether an institution is a mutt or a temple as defined in the Act).
- Conclusion on this point: the Board's inquiry in 1947 was competent and the 1928 decision did not preclude a fresh determination in light of changed facts (and amendment to the statute's provisions governing inquiry).
Procedural disposition
Both judges endorsed the District Judge's factual findings and legal conclusions: the institution at Manthalaya is a mutt within s.9(7) and is within the jurisdiction of the Madras Board; the earlier 1928 decision did not bar re-examination given changed circumstances and statutory amendment. Therefore the appeal was dismissed with costs.
Holding and Implications
Holding: The judgments of the lower court and the Board were upheld; the appeal is DISMISSED and the judgment under appeal is confirmed, the dismissal being with costs.
Immediate consequences for the parties:
- The institution at Manthalaya is legally characterised as a "mutt" within the meaning of s. 9(7) of the Madras Hindu Religious Endowments Act.
- Accordingly, the institution at Manthalaya falls within the jurisdiction of the Board of Commissioners for Hindu Religious Endowments, Madras, and the prior Board order declaring it a mutt stands; the petition to set that order aside was unsuccessful.
- The earlier Board decision of 11 October 1928 does not operate as an absolute bar to later inquiries or different conclusions where the facts have substantially changed (for example, the effective headquarters and activities having shifted to Manthalaya).
Broader legal implications drawn by the court:
- The court applied and reiterated established principles that (i) the origin of a religious institution (e.g., arising from a samadhi or tomb) does not preclude its classification as a mutt or temple if it has developed the essential characteristics of such an institution, and (ii) a prior administrative or judicial classification may be revisited when circumstances materially change or the governing law is amended.
- The court emphasised the statutory reach of s.9(7) (inclusive language) and the effect of the amended S.84 (Act IV of 1930) in confining inquiries to whether an institution is a mutt or temple as defined in the Act.
No statement in the opinion suggests that the court intended to create a new legal precedent beyond applying existing authorities to the facts before it; the decision rests on established definitions, the evidentiary record, and recognized precedent concerning changed circumstances and institutional character.
Judgement
CHANDRA REDDY, J. :- I agree with the conclusions of my learned brother. The relevant facts are set out in his judgment and it is not necessary to recapitulate them here. The subject-matter of this appeal is a petition under S. 84 (2), Madras Hindu Religious Endowments Act filed by Sri Raghavendraswami Mutt by its head Sri Swayamindra Thirta Sri Padangalavaru by power of attorney holder Ritti Krishtamachar in the Court of the District Judge, Bellary to set aside an order passed by the Board of Commissioners for the Hindu Religious Endowments, Madras, declaring the institution as a mutt as defined in the Madras Religious Endowments Act. The petitioner being unsuccessful there has brought this appeal.
2. Mr. Kuppuswamy appearing in support of this appeal urged two main contentions, that the institution is not a mutt but only a tomb of a saint known as Sri Raghavendraswamy who was the predecessor of the present Matadhipathi or at any rate it is only a branch of the main mutt situated at Nanjangud and that the decision rendered previously by the same Board in the year 1928 operates as a bar to the present order and that the Hindu Religious Endowments Act (hereinafter called the Act) was not applicable to the mutt as its headquarters was not within the Madras Presidency but at Nanjangud in the Mysore Presidency, was final and could not be reopened.
3. The first part of the contention is based upon the case that there is a mutt founded by a follower of Madvachari the expounder of the Dwaita system of philosophy at a place called Nanjangud, Mysore State, that in the 17th century one of the heads of the mutt by name Sri Raghavendraswamy who was regarded as a very holy person happened to visit a place called Mantralaya in Bellary district and entered Samadhi in or about the year 1670. A tomb was constructed in his memory and pooja is performed at the tomb every day and also public worship at the tomb and in reality there is no mutt at all.
4. This submission is without any relation to the pleadings and the facts as emerge from the evidence let in by the appellant. The attitude now adopted by the counsel seems to he the result of an after thought. Throughout the proceedings in the Court below and before the Hindu Religious Endowments Board, the parties proceeded on the basis that it was a mutt but only a branch of the Raghavendraswamy Mutt situated at Nanjangud. It was so described in the petition presented in the Court of the District Judge out of which this appeal arises. Even in the earlier enquiry in 1928 before the Hindu Religious Endowments Board, its character as a Mutt was not in question, the only issue raised being whether the Act would apply to endowments attached to institutions outside the Presidency. In the cause-title to this appeal, the appellant is described as Sri Raghavendraswamy Mutt having its headquarters at Nanjangud.
5. The various documents filed by both sides in support of their respective cases also describe this institution as a mutt. It is, therefore, futile to contend that there is no mutt at all at Mantra, laya. Dehors these admissions contained in the pleadings, the material on record does not leave any room for doubt. Some of the witnesses examined for the appellant have given a clear account of the nature of the institution at Mantralaya and the activities of the Matadhipathi at that place. P. W. 5 son of the present Swamiji, deposes that at the shrine at Mantralaya there is puja performed for the tomb every day and every year there is Visesha puja on the day of the death of the Swamiji. There are archakas to maintain daily puja and arrange for worship of the public there. At the Brindavanams or shrines at Mantralaya, about 5,000 or 6,000 people are fed by the mutt. For the abovesaid festivals, people from all over India gather. There is also a car festival on the Avadhuna occasion. Archana is done every day at the shrines of Mantralaya. There is a golden Mandapam at Mantralaya. He had also admitted that the present head of the Mutt has been staying at Mantralaya, that arrangements are being made at Mantralaya for his meditation and puja, that teachings, religious lectures and discourses are conducted by Matadhipathi at Mantralaya. It is also an admitted fact that at least 2,000 or 3,000 acres of land in Bellary district were endowed to this institution. P. W. 7 had to admit that the institution at Mantralaya is called Mantralaya Mutt. There is also an office at Mantralaya and accounts are maintained there. The admission of P. W. 6 is significant in this regard.
"As Swamiji is at Mantralaya we call it a Mutt at Mantralaya. Wherever Swamiji is, it is a mutt. There are two shrines at Brindavanam in one room and two in another room at Mantralaya. There is also a Sanskrit college at the mutt at Mantralaya. Every day people going to the mutt at Mantralaya for worship are fed by the mutt. There is a silver chariot owned by the mutt at Mantralaya worth about Rs. 50,000."
The testimony of the witnesses for the petitioner clearly establish the existence of a mutt.
6. Mutts are established for inculcating particular religious doctrines, and instructions in the tenets and observances of a particular system of philosophy are imparted to the disciples. They are centres of theological learning. A mutt is presided over by an ascetic who exercises or claims to exercise headship over a body of disciples, and a spiritual fraternity would eventually grow up. So, the presence of a preceptor who preaches the tenets of a particular cult to his disciples is essential for the existence of the mutt.
7. In Ramprakash v. Anand Das, ILR 43 Cal 707 at p. 713 : (AIR 1916 PC 256 at p. 257) (A) there is an interesting passage bearing on this subject in the judgment of Lord Shaw :
"An Asthal, commonly known in Northern India as a Muth, is an institution of a monastic nature. It is established for the service of a particular cult, the instruction in its tenets and the observances of its rites. The followers of the cult and disciples in the institution are known as Chelas; the Chelas are of two classes celibate and non-celibate.
The Mahant is the head of the institution. He sits upon the Gaddi; he initiates candidates into the mysteries of the cult; he superintends the worship of the idol and the accustomed spiritual rites" etc.
In his Hindu Law of Religious and Charitable Trust, Mr. B. K. Mukherjea (Judge, Supreme Court of India) says at page 326 that
"unlike debutter where the essential or central part of the institution is a deity or idol, the presiding element in a Mutt is an ascetic or religious teacher who together with his disciples and, co-disciples form a sort of spiritual family. Both a Mutt as well as a debutter owe their existence to benefactions or grants of property made by pious benefactors. In one case the grantee is an idol for whose ministration of service the debutter is created; in the other case the result of the benefaction is the creation of an institution for the benefit of a fraternity of religious men at the head of which stands the superior or Mohunt who represents the entire institution. *** But if a pious ascetic gathers round him a number of disciples whom he initiates into the mysteries of tenets of his order and such of his disciples as intend to become ascetics renounce all connections with their family and claims to family wealth, and affiliate themselves so to say with the spiritual fraternery would eventually grow up."
Again at page 327 it is remarked :
"The primary purpose of a Mutt on the other hand is to encourage and foster spiritual learning by maintenance of a competent line of teachers who impart religious instructions to the disciples and followers of the Mutt and try to strengthen the doctrines of the particular school or order of which they profess to be adherents."
Vide also Sammantha Pandara v. Sellappa Chetti, ILR 2 Mad 175 at p. 179(B) and Vidyapurna Tirtha Siuami v. Vidyanidhi Tirtha Swami, ILR 27 Mad 435 at p. 439 (c). From these passages is to be gathered as to what constitute the essentials of a mutt. The depositions of the several of the petitioners witnesses extracted above clearly indicate that the institution of Mantralaya conforms to all the indicia laid down in the decisions.
8. Mr. Kuppuswamy contended that as this institution had grown out of a tomb it could not be regarded as a mutt or a religious institution. For this proposition, reliance is placed on two Bench judgments of the Madras High Court, Draivisundaram Pillai v. Subramania Pillai, 1945-1 Mad LJ 328 : (AIR 1945 Mad 217) (D) and Velluswamy Goundan v. Dandapani, 1946-1 Mad LJ 354 : (AIR 1946 Mad 485) (E). In the first of the cases, the testator in his last will and testament provided for the construction of a muttam for the purpose of conducting poor feeding etc. and for the construction of a tomb in which he should be buried after his death and a Muttam over the tomb where a sivalingam should be installed and puja or worship to be conducted. It was decided by the Bench consisting of Leach, C.J., and Justice Lakshmanarao that the latter direction should not be given effect to as the spending of money on the building of a tomb and its maintenance would not constitute a charitable endowment and to that extent the gift failed. But the learned Judges upheld the direction for the construction of a Mattam for purposes of conducting poor feeding and also for supply of butter-milk to poor persons are being valid since they had the effect of constituting public charity.
9. In the second of the cases, the question considered was whether a bequest for the purpose of maintaining puja at a Samadhi was valid and it was answered in the negative as it was thought that it was gift with superstitious purposes. The basis of that decision was that there was only one gift and that it was to Samadhi and that everything else was subsidiary to it.
10. These rulings are inapplicable to a case like the one on hand. If an institution answers the description of a mutt or a temple it does not lose its character as such, merely because it owes its origin to a tomb of a great saint. It may be that at the inception there was a samadhi. But the question is whether the characteristics of a mutt as indicated above are present or not. Merely because it was connected with a tomb it cannot fall outside the definition of a mutt. There is authority for this view, in decided cases.
11. In Commissioners, H. R. E. Board, Madras v. Narasimham, 1939-1 Mad LJ 134 : (AIR 1939 Mad 134) (F) a Bench of the Madras High Court ruled that whatever might be the origin of an institution, if in course of time it had developed into a place of worship and Nitya Naivedya Deeparadhana was performed and offerings were distributed and the public who took part in the worship believed in its efficacy the worship was religious and the institution a temple within the meaning of the Madras Religious Endowments Act. The learned Judges remarked :
"The test is not whether it conforms to any particular school of Agama Sastras; we think that the question must be decided with reference to the view of the class of people who take part in the worship. If they believe in its religious efficacy, in the sense that by such worship, they are making themselves the object of the bounty of some superhuman power, it must be regarded as religious worship."
In the present case, there can be little doubt that the pilgrims resorting to this institution from all parts of the country had faith in its religious efficacy. It came out in evidence that Prasadams and Tirthams were offered and every day hundreds of people gathered there to receive them and the offer worship at the shrine."
12. A judgment of another Bench of the same Court in Ratnavelu Mudaliar v. Commissioner For Hindu Religious and Charitable Endowments, 1953-2 Mad LJ 574 : (AIR 1954 Mad 398) (G) is to the same effect. There, it was held that where people had regarded an institution for a long period as a place of religious worship which they used as a matter of right, the institution is a temple and does not fall outside the definition in S. 9 (12) though in its origin it was a samadhi and continues to retain traces of it and Guru Pooja was performed in the precincts. It follows that the beginnings of the institution will not have much bearing in deciding the question whether an institution is a mutt or a temple. This argument, therefore, fails and is rejected.
12a. This brings me to the second part of the contention, namely, it being only a branch and not having an independent and separate existence it would not fall within the operation of the Act. The argument is that the jurisdiction of the Board could be extended only to an institution which has its head-quarters within the State. I do not think I can agree with this view. For one thing, it is difficult to hold that the mutt at Mantralaya is only a branch, the main institution being only at Nanjangud. The evidence noticed above does not support any such contention. The various documents relied on by the petitioner in which the description is given as Raghavendraswamys mutt situated at Nanjangud or the manager for the time being of Sugna Narendra Swamy Mattam do not advance the case of the appellant as they do not establish that the mutt at Mantralaya is only a branch. They consist mostly of either title deeds granted to the manager for the time being of the institution or some communications said to have been sent by the officials of the Mysore Government for the purpose of making some arrangements for the tours of the Matadhipathi. They have been dealt with by my learned brother in his judgment and I concur in his conclusion that they do not establish the case of the plaintiff. Further, it is in evidence that the bulk of the properties is situated in this state. The institution was the recipient of several grants by the Madras Government. It is also evident that more importance is attached to the mutt at Mantralaya, that the structures are much bigger there having a golden mantapam whereas there is no such at Nanjangud, that the present Swamiji himself was installed at Mantralaya and that he has taken his abode at that place, that he had never visited Nanjangud after the installation, that he had been performing all his duties and functions as the head of the mutt at Mantralaya arrangements having been made at that place for his meditation, puja, teaching disciples and for all religious lectures, discourses and worships, I have already referred to the evidence of P. W. 6 that wherever Swamiji is it is a mutt." The statements of other witnesses referred to above also far from lending any support to the theory of the appellant, suggest that the mutt at Mantralaya is at any rate an independent and separate entity being as important, if not more, than the one at Nanjangud. Further, an off-shoot of a parent mutt could grow more important and eclipse the original one and thus be wholly independent and there is no question of subordination.
13. This is borne out by a passage in Ganapathi Ayyars "Hindu and Mohammadan Endowments" at page 272 -
" There are muths which are offshoots of another parent mutt. The muth at Benares affords an instance. It would seem that when one Masilamoni Desigar was the Pandara Sannadhi at Dharmapuram, a Tambiran of his Adhinam established the muth at Benares. Benares being regarded as a holy city by the Hindus, the muth at Benares naturally rose into pre-eminence and it came to own several subordinate muths both in Northern and Southern India, such as the muths at Morangi in Nepal, at Achiram in Travancore and at Chidambaram, Rameswaram, Kumbakonam and Trichinopoly. The muth at Tirupanandal in its origin the offshoot of the muth at Benares soon, however, came to be the ultimate centre of control and the Benares muth was relegated into a subordinate position and was constituted into a subordinate centre of control. But the Tambiran of Tirupanandal is not subordinate to the Pandara Sannadhi of the Dharmapuram muth."
14. That apart, to bring it within the definition of a mutt as given in s. 9 (7) of the Act, it is sufficient to show that it is a place of religious instruction being appurtenant to a mutt. Mutt is defined in s. 9 (7) as an institution for the promotion of the religion presided over by a person whose duty is to engage himself in spiritual service or who exercises or claims to exercise spiritual headship over a body of disciples and succession to whose office devolves in accordance with the directions of the founder of the institution or is regulated by usage ; and includes places of religious worship other than a temple or places of religious instruction which are appurtenant to such institution". It is thus manifest that even a place of religious instruction as appurenant to the main institution is brought within the scope of the definition. It is argued that the main institution to which the place of religious instruction is appurtenant must be situated in and at the same place. I do not think that this is a necessary requisite. If both the places are adjacent to each other, it is unnecessary to invoke this inclusive definition. For these reasons, this contention also cannot prevail.
15. This brings me to the question whether the Board was precluded from holding an inquiry by reason of the previous decision rendered in 1928. The basis of the earlier order was that the Act was inapplicable to the institution as the headquarters was within the State of Mysore and thus not amenable to its jurisdiction. We are not now concerned whether that conclusion is well founded or not. It is apparent on the face of the record that that situation has since changed, the headquarters of the institution now being at Mantralaya. The evidence to the effect that the present Swamiji was installed at Mantralaya, that ever since he has been having the headquarters at Mantralaya, delivering religious lectures and having discourses at that place only and never having gone to Nanjangud has already been alluded to. It is the presence of the preceptor teaching the disciples that makes the mutt and it is not the mere structures of the buildings that constitute a mutt. So, whatever might have been the position in the year 1928, it is since altered as the Matadhipathi has chosen Mantralaya for his religious activities. I have already referred to the establishment of Sanskrit, college in this place and other matters which are suggestive of the shifting of the headquarters to Mantralaya.
16. That a decision rendered under particular circumstances cannot be regarded as conclusive and final when there is a change of circumstances is evident from a decision of the Full Bench of the Madras High Court in Board of Commissioners for Hindu Religious Endowments, Madras v. Rathnaswami Pillai, ILR (1937) Mad 504 : (AIR 1937 Mad 232) (H). It was laid down there that an order of the Board declaring a particular temple to be an excepted temple within the meaning of the definition, as it then stood in the Act of 1927 was no bar to its holding alter the Amending Act of 1930 that it was a non-excepted temple according to the new definition. In my opinion, this principle also applies to a case of changed circumstances and is not confined to alteration in law. It has also to be observed here that the Board in its prior order has definitely remarked :
"This order will not stand in the way of the Board exercising jurisdiction over temples, if any, in the Madras Presidency under the trusteeship of the petitioner."
17. It is brought out in the evidence of the P. Ws. that there are several shrines dedicated to Anajneya and other deities attached to this institution, that there was a big temple car costing about Rs. 50,000.
18. Furthermore, the inquiry under S. 84 of the Act as it stood in 1927 could extend to a dispute whether the mutt or the temple is one to which the Act applies. Obviously, it is under this clause that the decision was rendered at that time. This section had undergone a change. By Act IV of 1930, S. 84, as it stands today, was substituted. The section as amended in 1930 contemplates only an inquiry whether an institution is a mutt or a temple as defined in the Act, etc. Under the amended provision of law, enquiry should be confined only to the question whether it is a mutt or a temple. In view of this change in law, the enquiry by the Board which has given rise to this appeal should also be held to be competent in view of the judgment of the Full Bench of the Madras High Court already noticed.
19. In the result, the judgment under appeal is confirmed and the appeal dismissed with costs.
20. SHRINIVASACHARI, J. :- This is an appeal under S. 84 (3) of the Madras Hindu Religious Endowments Act, against the Judgment of the District Judge, Bellary, in Original Petition No. 112 of 1947. These proceedings arose out of an application filed under S. 84 (2) of the Madras Hindu Religious Endowments Act by the Raghavendraswami Mutt, Nanjangud, represented by its Swami, per power of attorney holder for a declaration that the institution known as Nanjangud Shri Raghavandraswami Mutt at Manthralaya is not a mutt as defined in the Act and for setting aside the order of the Religious Endowment Board of 31st May 1947 declaring the above institution to be a Mutt.
21. It may be mentioned before the above application was filed proceedings were started suo motu by the Hindu Religious Endowments Board, Madras to decide the question as to whether Shri Raghavendra Swami Mutt at Manthralaya was a Mutt within the meaning of the Act. There proceedings were started on the report of the Division Commissioner of the Hindu Religious Endowments Board. The Board after an elaborate enquiry opined by majority that the institution at Manthralaya was a Mutt and as such came within the jurisdiction of the Board. The petitioner being aggrieved by this order filed the above petition before the District Judge, Bellary. The petitioner stated in his application that the institution was originally started by one Madhawacharya the expounder of Dwaita Philosophy, who founded a Mutt at a place called Nanjangud in the Mysore State, that thereafter the Swami had to move to a place called Manchala or Manthralaya in the District of Bellary and stayed there on account of disputes with regard to the lands belonging to the Mutt situated there. The petitioner also stated that one of the heads of the Mutt Shri Raghavendra Swami happened to stay there for a long time and breathed his last there. There was a Samadhi built for him and the place assumed great importance as a place of pilgrimage for the devotees of Shri Eaghavendra Swami. It was further stated that the Board had on a former occasion started proceedings under S. 84 of the Act, made an elaborate enquiry and came to the conclusion that the institution of Shri Raghavendraswami Mutt situated at Nanjangud was in the Mysore State, outside the Madras Presidency and hence the Act could not govern the aforesaid Mutt. The petitioner contended that in the face of this order, it was not open to the Board to have made a fresh enquiry and come to a different conclusion. The proceedings of the Board were attacked as illegal and ultra vires, not falling within the scope of S.84 of the Act.
22. On behalf of the Board it was urged that the institution at Manthralaya was itself a Mutt coming within the definition of a Mutt under S. 9 (7) of the Act and the place being situated in the Madras Presidency was subject to the jurisdiction of the Madras Religious Endowments Board.
23. The petitioner relied upon a number of documents and also led oral evidence. After elaborately discussing the evidence on record the District Judge gave the finding that the institution at Manthralaya was a Mutt as defined in S. 9 (7) of the Act and consequently amenable to the jurisdiction of the Board. Being aggrieved by this order the petitioner has filed the present appeal.
24. It would be desirable to examine the scope and import of the Act. The proceedings out of which this appeal has arisen having been started in 1947, the Act that would govern the case would be the Madras Hindu Religious Endowments Act, Act II of 1927 as amended by Act X of 1946. Act II of 1927 repealed the former Act of 1923. As the Preamble would indicate the object of the Act was to provide for the better administration and governance of certain Hindu Religious Endowments within the Presidency of Madras. Religious Endowment would mean property set apart permanently for a religious purpose, a religious establishment or institution. It would, therefore, follow that the Madras Act would apply to all such religious endowments in the Presidency of Madras. Religious Endowment has been defined in the Act as all property belonging to or given or endowed for the support of Mutts or temples or for the performance of any service or charity connected therewith and includes the premises of Mutts or temples .... (vide 9. 9 (ii) of the Act). Mutt has been defined as an institution for the promotion of the Hindu Religion presided over by a person whose duty is to engage himself in spiritual service or who exercises or claims to exercise spiritual headship over a body of disciples. The institution at Manthralaya satisfied the above definition in that there is a Swami presiding over the institution as head, who engages himself in spiritual service.
25. Learned Counsel emphatically urged that the particular institution at Manthralaya could not be called a Mutt within the meaning of S. 9 (7) of the Act. He elaborated his argument by submitting that a Mutt is the place where religious institution has been started for the first time and if the head of the Mutt went about giving religious discourses at various places and established religious centres the latter would not constitute Mutt. In substance the argument of the counsel was that the place where a religious institution was started for the first time by a religious head could alone be called a Mutt and no other and as this Mutt was started at Nanjangud the Raghavendraswami Mutt should be regarded as being at Nanjangud outside the jurisdiction of the Madras Board. Our attention was invited to certain documents which are letters addressed to authorities for making proper arrangements for the tour of the Swami. In all these letters reference is made to the Swami as Raghavendra Swami at Nanjangud. It is unnecessary to deal with the letters individually. Another class of documents relied upon by the petitioner are Government orders which made mention of Raghavendraswami Mutt at Nanjangud, for example, EX. A-67, an order of the Finance Department of the Government. It approves of the nomination of a Swami to succeed another Swami "to the Peetah of the Shri Raghavendraswami Mutt at Nanjangud". Because the Mutt was originally started at Nanjangud, it may generally and popularly be known as the Mutt at Nanjangud. Any number of these letters or Government orders cannot advance the case of the petitioner any further because a person calling a Mutt by a particular name or making reference to it as the Mutt of Nanjangud would not make the institution located at Manthralaya not a Mutt if it otherwise satisfies the requirements of the definition contained in s. 9 (7). It is admitted that although the Mutt was originally started at Nanjangud the heads of the Mutt made extensive tours and established religious institutions at various places and one such institution was established at Manthralaya. The institution established at Manthralaya overshadowed the institution originally started at Nanjangud. Manthralaya became the abode of a very large number of the disciples of Raghavendraswami. There is regular pooja every day and people gather from all over the country for worship, many disciples are fed. There is a public library and a school. It is in evidence that although the Mutt was started at Nanjangud the Swami never went to Nanjangud. Manthralaya alone became the headquarters. P. Ws. 5, 6 and 7 depose to the fact that the Swami did not visit Nanjangud in the course of his tours, P. W. 7 says that the present head of the Mutt was installed at Manthralaya. If the headquarters was at Nanjangud why should such an important ceremony as the installation of the head of the Mutt take place at Manthralaya and not at Nanjangud. It is clear from the evidence that large and valuable endowments have been made for the institution at Manthralaya, vide EXS. B-6 to B-16. Where therefore from the evidence it is abundantly clear that Manthralaya was made the permanent abode of the head of the Mutt and no relics of the Mutt ever remained at Nanjangud it is futile to contend that Nanjangud alone should be regarded as the headquarters of the Mutt. According to Bejan Kumar Mukherjea (late Chief Justice of India) a Mutt signifies an abode or residence of ascetics. The essential feature of a Mutt is the presence of an ascetic or religious teacher with his disciples. An institution for the benefit of a religious fraternity headed by an ascetic is called a Mutt - Vide the Hindu Law of Religious and Charitable Trust - Bijan Kumar Mukherjea. All places where institutions are established as centres of theological learning would be called Mutts. We might refer to the observations of Sir S. Subrahmaniya Iyer, J., in this regard in the case of ILR 27 Mad 435 (c). Similarly Sir V. Bashyam Iyengar, J., in the same case observed that Mutts were started with the object of imparting spiritual instruction to the disciples. There may be several offshoots of the original place of theological learning and every such place would become a Mutt by itself as religious instruction is imparted there.
26. We are of the opinion that every essential feature of a Mutt is to be found in the institution at Mantralaya and it, therefore, clearly falls within the definition of a Mutt as contained in S. 9 (7) of the Act.
27. The argument that the order of the Board made on 11th Oct. 1928 holding that the institution of Shri Raghavendraswami Mutt was situated at Nanjangud and, therefore, the Act would not govern the Mutt, was final cannot be sustained. It is always open to the Board to revise its order in view of subsequent events and circumstances. It had become abundantly clear at the time when it commenced the enquiry in 1947 that the institution at Manthralaya alone was the headquarters of the Swami and Nanjangud had gone into insignificance and under such circumstances it was open to the Board to arrive at a conclusion different from what had been decided on a previous occasion. We are in respectful agreement with the Full Bench Judgment in ILR (1937) Mad 504 : (AIR 1937 Mad 232) (H).
28. The judgment of the lower Court is upheld and the appeal dismissed with costs.
Appeal dismissed.
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