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Smt. Mahendra Kaur v. Hafiz Khalil Etc.

Allahabad High Court
Sep 5, 1983
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Judgment Summary — Full Bench (K.C. Agarwal, J.)

Factual and Procedural Background

Hafiz Khalil (opposite party no. 1 / plaintiff) filed Suit No. 1972 seeking injunction against Smt. Jiwan Kaur (since deceased) and Sardar Inder Singh, restraining construction on the suit land and interference with his right of egress and ingress. Smt. Jiwan Kaur died on 17 November 1974. The plaintiff did not move substitution under Order XXII within the 90-day period and did not timely apply for setting aside the abatement. Much later, on 18 May 1976, the plaintiff applied under Order XXII Rule 4 for substitution, alleging that he acquired knowledge of the death on 27 March 1976; subsequently he applied for condonation of delay and on 7 September 1976 for setting aside abatement.

The learned Munsif rejected the substitution and related applications on 31 January 1978, holding the delay unexplained. Nevertheless the Munsif directed impleadment of the heirs of the deceased defendant under Order I Rule 10, relying on the decision in Khalil Ahmad v. Additional District Judge, Gorakhpur (AIR 1974 Allahabad 422). A revision was preferred against that order.

A Single Judge of the High Court entertained doubts about the correctness of Khalil Ahmad (supra) and referred the matter to a larger Bench. A Division Bench remitted the issue of sufficiency of cause for condonation of delay to the trial court, and later referred the legal question to a Full Bench. The Full Bench was constituted to decide whether the view in Khalil Ahmad (supra) correctly laid down the law on the applicability of Order I Rule 10(2) where abatement under Order XXII had occurred.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the view in Khalil Ahmad v. Additional District Judge, Gorakhpur (AIR 1974 Allahabad 422) — permitting addition/impleadment under Order I Rule 10(2) even after abatement — correctly states the law.
  2. Whether Order I Rule 10(2) (a general provision to add or strike out parties) can be invoked to add or substitute heirs/legal representatives after a suit has abated under Order XXII for failure to bring them on record within the statutory period.
  3. Whether Order XXII (specifically Rules 4 and 9) and the Limitation Act (section 5) provide the exclusive and exhaustive mechanism for substitution, setting aside abatement and revival of suits when a party dies during pendency, thereby excluding resort to Order I Rule 10(2) or inherent powers (Section 151).
  4. Whether the learned Munsif erred in finding that the substitution application was time‑barred and that sufficient cause for setting aside the abatement was not shown.

Arguments of the Parties

Munsif's Position (trial court)

  • Directed impleadment of the heirs of the deceased defendant under Order I Rule 10 relying on Khalil Ahmad (supra), treating the Court as having power to implead heirs even though substitution and setting aside abatement applications were rejected.
  • Concluded, however, that the plaintiff's delay in moving substitution/setting aside abatement was not satisfactorily explained and thus rejected the substitution and delay-condonation applications.

Respondent No. 1's Arguments (as recorded)

  • Emphasised the Supreme Court's judgment in Bhagwan Swarup v. Moot Chand (AIR 1983 SC 355) — and particularly an observation by D. A. Desai, J. — to contend that Order I Rule 10 might be available when Order XXII Rule 4 could not be resorted to; asserted that the Supreme Court had in effect accepted applicability of Order I Rule 10(2) even where abatement had occurred.
  • The opinion records that learned counsel for Respondent No. 1 placed weight on D. A. Desai, J.'s remarks and on a concurrence by A. N. Sen, J., arguing this supports the usage of Order I Rule 10(2) to bring heirs on record despite abatement; the Full Bench considered and rejected this reading of Bhagwan Swarup (supra) as incorrect.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Khalil Ahmad v. Additional District Judge, Gorakhpur (AIR 1974 Allahabad 422) Held that Order I Rule 10(2) gives power to the Court to implead any person when necessary to effectually adjudicate questions in the suit; inaction of plaintiff cannot affect the Court's power under this Rule. The Full Bench examined this decision and found that relevant aspects were not brought to the learned Judges' notice; the Bench disagreed with applying Order I Rule 10(2) to cases where abatement had taken place and substitution under Order XXII was not timely sought or allowed.
Mst. Bibi Rehtnani Khatoon & others v. Harkoo Gope & others (AIR 1981 SC 1450) Examined the scheme of Order XXII and explained the concept of abatement and substitution — heirs/legal representatives must be substituted where right to sue survives; failure to substitute results in abatement. Used to confirm that abatement is automatic, substitution under Order XXII is the prescribed route, and that abatement ends the suit unless setting aside is successfully obtained under Rule 9.
J C. Chatterji v. S.K. Tantdon (AIR 1972 SC 2526) Principle that a legal representative continues suit only on the cause of action of the deceased and cannot set up a new individual right. Cited to explain the limited rights of substituted legal representatives under Order XXII.
State Trading Corporation of India Ltd. v. K.V. Vaidyalingam & others (AIR 1978 Madras 294) Highlighted differences between persons added under Order I Rule 10 and those substituted under Order XXII. Referred to support the distinction between adding a party under Order I Rule 10 and substitution under Order XXII.
Gobardhan Das v. Darshan Singh (AIR 1969 Punjab & Haryana 372) Addition of a party under Order I Rule 10(2) can be done only in a pending suit and not where a defendant is dead (i.e., where abatement may have occurred). Cited as supporting the proposition that Order I Rule 10(2) is not the mechanism to substitute heirs after death where abatement has taken effect.
Sisir Kumar Tarafdar v. Manindra Kumar Biswas (AIR 1958 Calcutta 681) Interpreted sub-rule (2) of Order I Rule 10: distinguishes between "joined" and "added" and notes deliberate omission of the word "substituted"; sub-rule (2) was not meant for substitution of heirs/legal representatives. Relied upon to support that Order I Rule 10(2) does not empower substitution of heirs; it enables joining of parties who ought to have been joined but not substitution after abatement.
Venkateshwar Rao v. Government of Andhra Pradesh (AIR 1966 SC 828) General principle: where a special provision is made for a matter, that matter is excluded from the scope of a general provision. Applied to hold that the specific rules in Order XXII override the general power under Order I Rule 10(2) in matters of substitution and abatement.
C.I.T. Patiala v. Shahzada Hand & Sons (AIR 1966 SC 1342) Echoes the principle that a specific statutory provision excludes a general one on the same matter. Used together with Venkateshwar Rao to support the specific-versus-general rule of interpretation for Order XXII versus Order I Rule 10.
Bhagwan Swarup & others v. Moot Chand & others (AIR 1983 SC 355) Considered scope of Order I Rule 10 and Order XXII Rule 4; held that where substitution under Order XXII Rule 4 was not taken in time, the consequence could not be circumvented by resort to Order I Rule 10. Cited and interpreted: the Bench noted observations by D. A. Desai, J. but concluded those remarks did not mean Order I Rule 10 could be used to avoid the consequences of abatement; used to reject Respondent No.1's argument.
Rameshwar Prasad v. Shambehar Lal (AIR 1963 SC 1901) When legal representatives were negligent in not taking substitution steps, the Court should not exercise discretion to nullify abatement. Relied upon to show the Court should not use discretionary powers to circumvent statutory consequences of abatement caused by negligence.
Union of India v. Ram Charan (AIR 1964 SC 215) Court should not invoke inherent powers under Section 151 to implead legal representatives to nullify effect of abatement where party failed to take timely steps and application to set aside abatement was refused. Applied to reject the proposition that inherent powers can be used to bring heirs on record after abatement and failed Rule 9 applications.
Mohan Raj v. Surendra Kumar (AIR 1969 SC 677) Where statute makes a person a necessary party and provides dismissal if not joined, court cannot add the party by resort to general provisions like Order I Rule 10. Used to support the principle that specific statutory requirements cannot be circumvented by invoking a general party-addition power.
Razia Begum v. Sahibzadi Anwar Begum & others (AIR 1958 SC 886) Order I Rule 10(2) is a discretionary power to add parties and must be exercised in view of facts and circumstances; case did not involve abatement. Distinguished on facts; cited to show the discretion exists but is fact-specific and not a blanket substitute for Order XXII where abatement has occurred.
Mahomedally Tyedally v. Safiabai (AIR 1940 PC 215) Privy Council case where heirs were added under Order I Rule 10(2) though substitution had not been sought by plaintiff; concerned administration suit and no abatement. Distinguished by the Full Bench as not assisting the position of the opposite party because it involved administration proceedings and did not involve abatement.
V.N. Bandekar v. M/s Janardan G. Thaly (AIR 1979 Goa) ; Jamuna Rai & others v. Chandradip Rai (AIR 1961 Patna 178) Authority supportive of the view that Order I Rule 10(2) does not apply to cases where abatement has occurred. Referred to as supporting authorities for the Full Bench's conclusion that Order I Rule 10(2) cannot be used to substitute heirs after abatement.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Full Bench approached the reference by first examining the scheme and purpose of Order XXII of the Code of Civil Procedure. It emphasized that Order XXII is exhaustive regarding representation of persons who die during the pendency of a suit and prescribes a 90‑day window for substitution; if substitution is not sought within that period the suit abates automatically. The Court noted that abatement is automatic and does not require a specific judicial order.

The Bench then contrasted the specific rules of Order XXII (notably Rules 4 and 9) with the general power in Order I Rule 10(2) to add or strike out parties. Relying on settled rules of statutory interpretation (special provision prevailing over general) and several precedents, the Court held that Order XXII's specific provisions governing substitution, abatement and setting aside abatement exclude the general remedial power under Order I Rule 10(2) for the purpose of substituting heirs or legal representatives after abatement.

The Court considered authorities (including Bhagwan Swarup, Rameshwar Prasad, Union of India v. Ram Charan and Mohan Raj) which show the limits of a court's discretionary or inherent powers and how they should not be exercised so as to nullify the statutory consequence of abatement caused by failure to take timely steps. The Bench also relied on decisions interpreting Order I Rule 10(2) (e.g., Sisir Kumar Tarafdar) which distinguished addition/joining of parties from substitution of heirs.

The Full Bench examined the submission that Bhagwan Swarup (supra) supports use of Order I Rule 10(2) post‑abatement, but concluded that the Supreme Court in that case did not hold that Order I Rule 10(2) can be used to circumvent the consequence of abatement; rather, the remarks were limited and on the facts the heirs had themselves applied for substitution and the abatement‑setting aside was allowed on those facts.

The Bench observed that Khalil Ahmad (supra) had not placed all relevant aspects before the learned Judges; relying on the authorities and the specific/general rule of interpretation, the Full Bench concluded that Order I Rule 10(2) cannot properly be used to substitute heirs and legal representatives where the suit has abated for failure to bring them on record and where an application to set aside the abatement has not been allowed.

On the merits of the trial court's factual finding, the Full Bench recorded that nothing had been shown to it to establish that the learned Munsif erred in finding the substitution application was filed beyond time or that sufficient cause for setting aside the abatement had been made out. The finding against the respondent under section 5 of the Limitation Act was also not assailed successfully.

Holding and Implications

Core Holding: The Full Bench held that it is not permissible to resort to Order I Rule 10(2) to bring the heirs or legal representatives on record when a suit has abated because the statutory procedure under Order XXII (Rules 4 and 9) was not followed or when an application to set aside the abatement has been refused. The Court concluded that the specific provisions of Order XXII and the Limitation Act prevail over the general power in Order I Rule 10(2) for substitution after death.

Disposition in this case: REVISION ALLOWED. The judgment and order of the court below dated 31 January 1978 was set aside, and the suit was declared to have abated as against the deceased defendant No. 1.

Implications: The direct consequence in this matter is that the trial court's direction to implead the heirs under Order I Rule 10(2) was set aside and abatement was declared. The Full Bench clarified the law that substitution and revival after death must proceed under the specific regime of Order XXII (and, where applicable, the Limitation Act) and cannot be circumvented by invoking the general party‑addition power of Order I Rule 10(2) or the court's inherent powers. The opinion emphasizes that the Court's discretionary powers must not be exercised so as to nullify the consequences of statutory abatement.

This summary is based exclusively on the content of the provided opinion and does not add or infer facts beyond that text.

Show all summary ...

K.C. Agarwal, J. – This Full Bench has been constituted to decide the correctness of the decision in Khalil Ahmad v. Additional District Judge, Gorakhpur and others, AIR 1974 Allahabad 422. 2. The facts of the case relevant for deciding the reference are these. Hafiz Khalil, opposite party no. 1 filed suit No 1972 for injunction against Smt. Jiwan Kaur (since deceased) and Sardar Inder Singh, restraining them from making any construction on the land in suit and further, from interfering in his right of egress and ingress over the land in dispute. 3. Smt. Jiwan Kaur died on November 17, 1974. The plaintiff did not move any substitution application and setting aside abatement within time prescribed by law. Much after the expiry of time, the plaintiff applied on l8th May, 1976, under Order XXII Rule 4 of the Code of Civil Procedure for substitution, on the ground that, he had acquired knowledge of deceased Smt. Jiwan Kaur on 27th March, 1976. Thereafter, he moved two applications, one for condonation of delay, and thereafter, on 7th September, 1976 for setting aside the abatement. 4. Having held that the delay had not been satisfactorily explained, as there was no sufficient cause for condonation of delay and setting aside the abatement, the learned-Munsif rejected the application on 31st January, 1978. Being of the opinion that the heirs of the deceased Smt. Jiwan Kaur could be brought on record under Order 1 Rule 10 of the Code of Civil Procedure despite the rejection of the substitution application and the applications for setting aside abatement and condonation of delay, the Court directed for impleadment of the heirs of the deceased Smt. Jiwan Kaur on 31st January, 1978. Learned Munsif relied on Khalil Ahmad v. Additional District Judge (supra) for directing impleadment of the heirs of the deceased Smt. Jiwan Kaur. In this case, a Division Bench of this Court held that Order 1 Rule 10 (2) of the Code of Civil Procedure gives power to the Court to implead any person as a party when such impleadment is necessary to enable the Court to effectually adjudicate upon the questions involved in the suit. Inaction of the plaintiff to implead or bring on record a person as defendant, according to the Division Bench, cannot affect the Court’s power under this Rule. 5. This revision preferred against the aforesaid judgment when was listed before a learned Single judge of this Court, he entertained doubts about the correctness of the view taken in Khalil Ahmad v. Additional District Judge, Gorakhpur and others, (supra). Consequently, he directed the papers to be laid before the Hon’ble the Chief Justice for referring the case to a larger Bench. 6. The case came up before a Division Bench on 2nd July, 1979. The Bench remitted an issue about the sufficiency of cause for condonation of delay, to the trial court for decision inasmuch as there was no finding on this issue. The finding returned on this controversy was against the plaintiff-opposite party. However, being of the view that the reference made by the learned Single Judge should more appropriately engage the attention of a Full Bench, the Division Bench referred the case to the Full Bench on July 2, 1979. Consequently, the Hon’ble the Chief Justice has constituted this Bench for deciding whether the view in Khalil Ahmad v. Additional District Judge. Gorakhpur (supra) laid down the law correctly. 7. Order XXII of the Code of Civil Procedure applies to cases of creation, transfer or devolution of interest during the pendency of a suit. It is exhaustive of the manner in which persons who died during the pendency of the suit or appeal can be represented by their heirs and legal representatives. The stage at which Order XXII comes into play is when one of the litigants, necessary to the suit, is dead. Immediately after the expiry of 90 days of the death of such a person, the suits automatically abated. If the suit is one in which the “right to sue” does not survive, the death puts an end to the suit. If, on the other hand, it is a suit in which the “right to sue” survives, the death will not put an end to the suit 8 In Mst. Bibi Rehtnani Khatoon and others v. Harkoo Gope and others, AIR 1981 SC 1450, the Supreme Court examined the scheme of Order XXII of the Code of Civil Procedure and after having examined the scheme, the Supreme Court held: “The concept of abatement is known to civil law. If a party to a proceeding, either in the trial court or in appeal or revision dies and the right to sue survives or a claim has to be answered, the heirs and legal representatives of the deceased party would have to be substituted and failure to do so would result in abatement of proceedings Now, if the party to a suit dies and the abatement takes place, the suit would ablate.” 9. The abatement of a suit is automatic. No specific order is required to be passed by the Court for the said purpose. For 90 days, the period prescribed for moving of application for substitution, the suit does not finish or is not put to an end to. But, if no substitution application is filed, the conclusion automatically coming into operation is to bring about an end to the suit 10. Order XXII of the Code of Civil Procedure lays down a whole-some procedure for moving an application to bring on record the heirs of the deceased litigant. If the application is not filed within 90 days, the suit will stand abated and the effect of its abatement under the provisions of any of the previous rules of Order XXII is dealt with in Rule 9, and sub-rule (2) thereof provides the remedy by the person aggrieved by the abatement. Under Rule 9, the plaintiff or the person claiming to be the legal representative of the deceased plaintiff can apply for setting aside the abatement and if it is proved that he was prevented by any sufficient cause from continuing the suit, the Court can set aside the abatement or dismissal of the suit on such terms as to costs. On setting aside the abatement, life into the suit is infused and it will proceed from the stage at which the death had taken place. It may be stated that a legal representative can continue the suit only on the cause of action sued upon and cannot set up a new or individual right (See J C. Chatterji v. S.K. Tantdon, AIR 1972, SC 2526). He thus cannot take or set up a plea open to him personally. His plea would be such as is appropriate to his character as legal representative. He will not be entitled to take a plea contrary to the case taken up by the deceased. 11. Order XXII of the Code, of Civil Procedure specifically lays down the procedure to be followed on “death, marriage and insolvency of parties.” Order 1 Rule 10 C.P.C. confers power on a Court to add a person as a party at any stage of the proceeding either upon or without the application of either party, if in the opinion of the Court the addition of such a person appears to be just in order to enable it effectively and completely to adjudicate upon and settle all the questions involved in the suit. There is a vital difference between Order 1 Rule 10 and Order XXII Rules 4 and 9 of the Code of Civil Procedure. Order 1 Rule 10 “does not deal with substitution of heir and legal representatives of a deceased. It confers power on the COURT to implead or add a person as party or to strike down a person improperly joined, if the Court finds it necessary for determination of the real matter in dispute. Order XXII Rule 4 confers right on a plaintiff to bring on record the heirs and legal-representatives of a deceased. If the right to sue does not survive,’ the suit shall come to an end and shall abate. The right conferred by Order 1 Rule 10 C.P.C. enables the Court to add a person as a party. Order 1 Rule 10 has a specific and limited purpose which is different from one contemplated by Rules 4 and 9 of Order XXII of the Code of Civil Procedure. The two provisions deal with different eventualities and contingencies As already held above, it is one thing to file an application to implead certain persons as party to the suit in place of a deceased party under Order XXII Rule 4 C.P.C. and it is entirely different to apply under Order 1 Rule 10 C.P C. to add a new party. The main difference is that the rights of the parties in one case would be altogether different than that of the party in the other case. A legal representative has the same status and rights as that of the deceased, whereas the rights and obligations of a person impleaded under Order 1 Rule 10 C.P.C. would not be circumscribed, and that he would be entitled to take any plea which he is advised to do. 12. In State Trading Corporation of India Ltd. v. K.V. Vaidyalingam and others, AIR 1978 Madras 294 this aspect of the matter has been considered and the difference between the rights of two types of persons brought on record has been high-lighted. 13. In Gobardhan Das v. Darshan Singh, AIR 1969 Punjab and Haryana 372, a learned Judge has referred to the purpose of Order 1 10 (2) of the Code of Civil Procedure and laid down that addition of a party under the aforesaid provision can be done only in a pending suit and not in one where the defendant is dead. 14. In Sisir Kumar Tarafdar v. Manindra Kumar Biswas, AIR 1958 Calcutta 681, a Division Bench of the Calcutta High Court held that the first part of sub-rule (2) gives the Court the power to strike out the name of any party” improperly joined, and the second, for the addition of a party. The learned Judges pointed out the significance of the word “joined’’ and “added” and omission of the word “substituted” in the wording of sub-rule (2). The omission to use the word “substitute” in Order 1 Rule 10 (2), in the opinion of the learned Judge, was deliberate. They held that the case of mere substitution is distinct from addition and is not covered by sub-rule (2) of Rule 10 of Order 1 of the Code. We are in respectful agreement with this view and find that sub-rule (2) of Rule 10 of Order 1 enables the Court to join a person as a party who ought-to have been joined. This provision was not meant to be applied to a case of substitution of one party on the death of his predecessor-in interest. There would be no power in a court under Order 1 Rule 10 C.P.C. to substitute the heirs and legal representatives of the deceased defendant. In the case of abatement taking place, what is necessary further is its setting aside. Under Order 1 Rule 10 C.P.C. the court may add or subtract a party. It cannot set aside the abatement and substitute the heirs of the deceased. 15. The settled rule of interpretation of statute is that if there is a specific provision dealing with a particular matter, the same will override -the general. The provision is said to be specific when it is precise or exact in respect of fulfillment of a particular object. 16. In Venkateshwar Rao v. Government of Andhra Pradesh, AIR 1966 SC 828, and in C.I. T. Patiala v. Shahzada Hand & Sons, AIR 1966 SC 1342, the Supreme Court has held that if a special provision is made on a certain matter, that matter is excluded from general provision. 17. What will follow from the above principle is that since there is a specific provision dealing with the substitution, abatement’ and setting aside the abatement in Order XXII Rule 4, that would exclude the general provision of addition of party made in Order 1 Rule 10 (2) of the Code of Civil Procedure. 18. Recently in Bhagwan Swarup and others v. Moot Chand and others, AIR 1983 SC 355, the Supreme Court was called upon to consider the scope of Order 1 Rule 10 and Order XXII Rule 4 of the Code of Civil Procedure. In that case, the heirs of the deceased respondent no. 1 who had not been impleaded within time by the appellant of the appeal before the Supreme Court, had applied under Order 1 Rule 10 for being brought on the record. The Supreme Court held that as the appellant had not moved the High Court within time by filing an application under Order XXII Rule 4, the limitation for taking action under the-said provision having since expired, the consequence could not be circumvented by resort to the provision of Order 1 Rule 10. In the Supreme Court, the learned Judges constituting the Bench gave two judgments However, both of them were agreed to the result of the appeal. Dealing with the argument about the scope of Order XXII Rule 4, being specific, Hon’ble D. A. Desai,’ J. observed: “There is some force in the contention that when a specific provision is made as provided in Order XXII Rule 4, resort to the general provision like Order 1 Rule 10 may not be appropriated.” As the heirs and legal representatives of the deceased Respondent no. 1 had themselves applied for being brought on record, the learned Judges held, on the facts of that case, that they could be brought on record in place of the deceased. 19. Hon’ble A.N. Sen, J., approved the view of the High Court with regard to non-maintainability of the application under Order 1 Rule 10. C.P.C. by observing: “The application made by the heirs of the deceased for substitution under Order 1 Rule 10 C.P.C. is indeed misconceived and has been rightly held to be so by the High Court.” Both the learned Judges appear to be of the same opinion that the substitution application moved by the appellant to bring on record the heirs of the deceased respondent no. 1, in the background of the facts of that case, was entitled to be allowed. On this basis, the abatement was set aside and the substitution application was allowed. 20. It is incorrect to argue, as was done by the learned counsel appealing for the respondent No. 1 that the Supreme Court had allowed the application under Order 1 Rule 10 (2) of the Code of Civil Procedure and had directed for substitution despite that the appeal had abated. The Supreme Court did not do anything of this sort. Both the learned Judges were of the same opinion that the application under Order 1 Rule 10 (2) was not maintainable. They took note of the fact of moving of the application by the heirs for being impleaded or added as a party, while dealing with the prayer for setting aside the abatement made by the appellant of the case. They did not add the heirs under Order 1 Rule 10 (2) of the Code of Civil Procedure. 21. Great emphasis was laid by the learned counsel for Respondent No. 1 that as Hon’ble D. A. Desai, J. had allowed the application of the heirs and legal representative made under Order 1 Rule 10 (2) of the Code of Civil Procedure, the learned Judge should be deemed to have accepted that the said provision was applicable even to a case where abatement had taken place. He submitted that to this part of the Judgment, Hon. A.N. Sen, J. had concurred. This does not appear to us to be correct reading of the decision of the Supreme Court. They did make a mention of the application made by the heirs and legal representatives under Order 1 Rule 10 (2) of the Code of Civil Procedure, but only for a limited purpose. They allowed the substitution application made by the appellant and in allowing the same this fact had been noted. Obvious it is that if the appellant would not have applied under Order XXII Rules 4 and 9 of the Code of Civil Procedure, and further would have not prayed for condonation of delay, the heirs of the deceased could not be brought on record simply on the basis of their application. 22. The question whether the heirs of a deceased could be brought on record by a Court in exercise of its inherent power, came to be considered by the Supreme Court in Rameshwar Prasad v. Shambehar Lal, AIR 1963 SC 1901. The Supreme Court held: “When the legal representatives of the deceased appellant and the surviving appellants were negligent in not taking steps for substitution, the Court is not to exercise its discretion in favour of such a party. The discretionary power cannot be exercised to nullify the effect of the abatement of the appeal so far as Kedar Nath is concerned...............” 23. Order 1 Rule 10 (2) of the Code of Civil Procedure is also discretionary and preserves the power of the Court to add a person as party in cases where interest of justice may require it to do so. If such a power is permitted to be exercised to substitute the heirs of the deceased defendant, that will necessarily result in nullifying the consequence of abatement in which the heirs were not brought on record and no explanation had been offered for not doing so. This can be done only in accordance with the provision prescribed in Order XXII Rules 4 and 9 of the Code of Civil Procedure and section 5 of the Limitation Act. 24. In Union of India v. Ram Charan, AIR 1964 SC 215, the Supreme Court held that the Court is not to invoke its inherent powers under Section 151 of the Code of the Civil Procedure for the purposes of impleading the legal representatives of a deceased respondent, if the suit had abated on account of the appellant not taking appropriate steps within time to bring the legal representatives of the deceased party on the record and when its application for setting aside the abatement is not allowed on account of its failure to satisfy the Court that there was sufficient cause for not impleading the legal representatives of the deceased in time and applying for the setting aside of the abatement within time. 25. In Mohan Raj v. Surendra Kumar, AIR 1969 SC 677, the Supreme Court was called upon to consider the question whether a person, not impleaded as a party in an election petition, could be added by the Court by resort to Order 1 Rule 10 (2) C.P.C. The Supreme Court negatived the argument, by holding that when the Act made a person a necessary party and provided that the petition would be dismissed if such a party was not joined, the power of addition of party by applying Order VI Rule 17, and not Order 1 Rule 10 of Code of Civil Procedure, could not be possible. 26. In Khalil Ahmad v. Additional District Judge, Gorakhpur, (supra), the various aspects relevant to decide the question of applicability of Order 1 Rule 10 (2) of the Code of Civil Procedure to a case where abatement has taken place, were not brought to the notice of the learned Judges. Being of the opinion that the addition of parties under Order 1 Rule 10 of the Code of Civil Procedure is one of discretion, the Court held that this provision.could be applied even to a case where abatement has taken place and the heirs of the deceased can be brought on the record. It is true that Order 1 Rule 10 (2) is a discretionary provision, but that does not mean “that the Court is free to add a person as a party in any case it likes to do so. A Court entrusted with a discretion is required to direct itself properly in law. It must call its own attention to the matters which it is bound to consider and exclude from its consideration matters which are irrelevant Order 1 Rule 10 (2) reads as under: -- “The Court may at any stage of the proceedings either upon or without the application of either party, and on such terms as may appear to the Court to be just, order that the name of any party improperly joined, whether as plaintiff or defendant, be struck out, and that the name of any person who ought to have been joined, whether as plaintiff or defendant, or whose presence before the Court may be necessary in order to enable the Court effectually and completely to adjudicate upon and settle all the questions involved in the suit, be added.” The aforesaid provision confers power on the Court to strike out a party from the array if he is found to be unnecessary or improperly joined whereas it can direct for addition of a party whose presence is thought necessary by the Court in order to effectually decide the questions involved in the suit. 27. Razia Begum v. Sahibzadi Anwar Begum and others, AIR 1958 SC 886 was not a case where abatement had taken place because of the deceased defendant had not been brought on the record. In that case, Court allowed the addition of a party as one of the defendants on the finding that the same was likely to be helpful for finally adjudicating upon the right of the parties. This case arose out of a suit for declaration that the plaintiff was the legally wedded wife of the defendant. The Court held that the result of a declaratory decree on the question of status would affect not only the parties only before the court, but generations to come, and in view of that consideration, the application made under Order 1 Rule 10 (2) was allowed. A decision is an authority for what it decides. The controversy in the said case was different. While dealing with the power of the Court in a revision under Section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure, the Supreme Court remarked, “that the question of addition of parties under Rule 10 of Order 1 of the Code of Civil Procedure is generally not one of initial jurisdiction of the Court, but of a judicial discretion which has to be exercised in view of all the facts and circumstances of a particular case..................” 28. For the view that “Order 1 Rule 10 (2) does not apply to such a case as the present, we find support from the decisions reported in V.N. Bandekar v. M/s. Janardan G. Thaly. & Co., AIR 1979, Goa, page 8 State Trading Corporation of India Ltd. v. V.K.V. Vaidyalingam and others (supra), Sisir Kumar Tarafdar v. Manindra Kumar Biswas (supra) and Jamuna Rai and others v. Chandradip Rai, AIR 1961, Patna page 178: 29. Our attention was drawn to a case of the Privy Council reported in Mahomedally Tyedally v Safiabai, AIR 1940 PC 215, where although the application for bringing on the record the heirs and legal representatives of the deceased defendant had not been made by the plaintiff, but still the Court allowed addition of those heirs under sub-role (2) of Rule 10 of Order 1. This case is clearly distinguishable and does not lend any assistance to the argument of the opposite party No, 1. In that case, a Mohammedan brought a suit against his co-heirs for administration. One of the defendants, who had the same interest and was in the same position as other plaintiffs, died and no application was made by the plaintiff to bring his heirs on the record It was held that the suit for administration did not come to an end by reason of abatement as against the deceased defendant, because the learned Judges said that it not uncommonly happens, in a suit for administration, that for one reason or another a, particular interest is not represented before decree, but is either provided for by the decree, or is asserted at a later stage under the decree, or is given effect by a party being permitted to attend certain accounts and enquiries so as to be bound by the result. 30. Here in this case we are not concerned w th an administration suit. In that suit, no abatement had taken place. To such a suit Order 1 Rule 10 (2) may be applied. It is since not possible exhaustively to lay down a list of those suits where abatement does take place and to which Order 1 Rule 10 (2) could be applied, despite death of one of the parties, we refrain ourselves from doing so. Broadly speaking, in the suits where abatement does not take place -- Order 1 Rule 10 (2) can be applied if interest of justice requires. Order XXII Rule 12 of the Code of Civil Procedure provides that nothing in rules 2, 4 and 8 shall apply to proceedings in execution of a decree or order. On account of this Rule, there is no question of execution proceedings abating. The Allahabad High Court has farther amended this Rule by providing that rules 3, 4 and 8 would not apply to proceedings in the original courts taken after the passing of the preliminary decree, where a final decree also requires to be passed. To such a case also, one can imagine that Order 1 Rule 10 (2) can be applied. We, however, guard ourselves by saying that these observations made by us should not be read as-applicable to appeals preferred against the orders passed in the proceedings referred to above. 31. For what we have said above, we find it impossible to hold that resort to Order 1 Rule 10 (2) can be had by a party when the suit has abated on account of his failure to bring the legal representatives of the deceased on the record and when the application for setting aside the abatement is not allowed. 32. Nothing w s shown to us on the merits of the case which could establish that the learned Munsif erred in holding that the application for substitution was filed beyond time and sufficient cause for setting aside the abatement had not been made out. The finding given on the application under section 5 of the Limitation Act against the respondent No. 2 also could not be assailed. 33. Consequently, the revision is allowed. The judgment and order of the court below dated 31st January, 1978 is set aside, and the suit is declared to have abated as against the deceased defendant No. 1. [Revision allowed] _____________