- Bookmark
- Share
- CaseIQ
Smt. Katori Devi v. Nawab Singh & Others
Factual and Procedural Background
This case arises from an agreement to sell executed by Lochan Singh in favour of respondent-plaintiff Nawab Singh on 1 July 1995. Lochan Singh died before the sale-deed could be executed. For specific performance, Nawab Singh filed Original Suit No. 141 of 1996, impleading Lochan Singh's mother, Ramshree, as defendant (being Lochan Singh's legal heir). During the pendency of the suit, Ramshree purportedly executed a sale-deed in respect of the same property in favour of Katori Devi and Sushila Devi. Ramshree later died and her grandson Shanker (a minor and an orphan) was substituted as defendant through his sister Babali.
Notices were issued to the substituted minor through Babali. Because Babali initially did not respond, the plaintiff applied for appointment of an advocate as guardian for Shanker under Order XXXII Rule 3 of the Code of Civil Procedure (application identified as paper no. 98-A). Before formal orders were passed on that application, Babali appeared, filed written submissions, and contested the suit on behalf of Shanker. The trial court decreed the suit by judgment and decree dated 31 January 2007. Shanker (through Babali) and the subsequent purchasers, Katori Devi and Sushila Devi, filed Civil Appeal No. 13 of 2007, which the first appellate court dismissed by judgment and order dated 31 May 2008.
The present matter is a second appeal filed by one of the subsequent purchasers, Katori Devi. Shanker, via his guardian Babali, is impleaded as a pro forma respondent. The appellant challenges the judgments and decrees below on the ground that no formal order was made under Order XXXII Rule 3/Order XXXII Rule 4(4) appointing a guardian for the minor defendant; therefore, Babali allegedly lacked authority to represent Shanker and the decrees are claimed to be null and void.
Legal Issues Presented
- Whether the failure to have a formal order passed on the plaintiff's application (paper no. 98-A) under Order XXXII Rule 3 / Order XXXII Rule 4(4) of the Code of Civil Procedure, appointing a guardian for the minor defendant, renders the trial and appellate court decrees null and void.
- Whether a natural guardian (here, the minor's sister Babali) who appears and contests the suit on behalf of a substituted minor can validly represent the minor's interests without a prior formal appointment order under Order XXXII rules (including Rule 4A), such that the absence of a formal order on the guardian-appointment application is fatal to the decree.
- Whether an objection based on procedural non-compliance (non-passing of an order on a guardian-appointment application) is a technicality that may be rejected where the minor's interests were in fact represented and no evidence shows the guardian acted adversely to the minor.
Arguments of the Parties
Appellant's Arguments
- The appellant contends that although an application was made under Order XXXII Rule 4(4) of the Code of Civil Procedure, the court did not pass any order appointing a guardian for the minor defendant Shanker.
- The appellant argues that because no guardian was formally appointed under Order XXXII Rule 3, Babali had no right to represent Shanker and therefore the decree passed against the minor is null and void.
- Learned counsel for the appellant further contended that there must be a court order permitting the natural guardian to represent the minor's interests.
- The appellant placed reliance on several precedents in support of these contentions (listed below).
Respondent / Defendants' Position (as recorded)
- The record shows that Babali appeared on behalf of the minor, filed a written statement, and actively contested the suit and the subsequent appeal; no objection to her substitution or representation was raised by parties at the relevant times.
- The first appellate court held that Babali, as the sister and natural guardian in whose custody the minor was residing, was not shown to have an adverse interest and was looking after the minor's interest; accordingly, the objection about non-passing of the guardian-appointment application was too technical to defeat the decree.
- It is recorded that the minor Shanker did not pursue any further appeal against the first appellate court judgment, permitting that order to become final.
Table of Precedents Cited
| Precedent | Rule or Principle Cited For | Application by the Court |
|---|---|---|
| Ram Chandra Arya v. Man Singh, AIR 1968 SC 954 | Relied upon by learned counsel for the appellant (authority concerning guardianship/representation issues). | The Court found this and similar judgments relied upon by the appellant to be distinguishable on the facts, because the scope of Order XXXII Rule 4A was neither under consideration nor examined in those decisions. |
| Sri Arjun Singh v. IInd Addl. Civil Judge, Aligarh, Civil Misc. Writ Petition No. 45549 of 1993 (decided 20 Dec 1993) | Relied upon by learned counsel for the appellant. | The Court regarded this decision as distinguishable for the same reason: Order XXXII Rule 4A was not considered in that case and thus the decision did not govern the present facts. |
| Gurpreet Singh v. Chatterbhuj Goel, AIR 1992 Punjab & Haryana 95 | Relied upon by learned counsel for the appellant. | The Court treated it as distinguishable because the intent and scope of Order XXXII Rule 4A were not examined in that case. |
| Bachcha v. Lakhpali Devi, 1972 AIR (All) 513 | Relied upon by learned counsel for the appellant. | The Court held this precedent to be distinguishable for the reasons stated above (Order XXXII Rule 4A not considered in those authorities). |
| Jai Jai Ram Manohar Lal v. National Building Material Supply, (1969) 1 SCC 869 : AIR 1969 SC 1267 | Principle that substantial justice should not be defeated by technicalities. | The Court cited this authority to support the view that procedural technicalities should not be permitted to defeat substantial justice; this principle was applied to characterize the appellant's objection as hyper-technical. |
| Ghanshyam Dass v. Dominion of India, (1984) 3 SCC 46 | Support for the primacy of substantial justice over mere procedural technicalities. | The Court cited this authority alongside Jai Jai Ram to reinforce that procedure should not be allowed to obstruct substantial justice and applied that reasoning to reject the appellant's technical objection. |
Court's Reasoning and Analysis
The court analyzed the dispute by first identifying the procedural posture: substitution of the minor Shanker through his sister Babali; issuance of notices; plaintiff's application (paper no. 98-A) under Order XXXII Rule 4(4) read with Section 151 CPC for appointment of a guardian; Babali's subsequent appearance, filing of written statement, and active contesting of the suit; decree by the trial court; dismissal of the first appeal.
The Court reproduced the relevant provisions as they stand in the State of Uttar Pradesh — Order XXXII Rules 3, 4 and 4A — and read them conjointly. From that reading the Court distilled the following legal propositions (as recorded in the opinion):
- The Court is obliged, as a first step, to appoint a person declared to be guardian of a minor by a competent authority. If no such guardian exists, or if the Court considers that such guardian should not act, it must appoint the natural guardian if qualified, or the person in whose care the minor is, or another suitable person (or an officer of the Court in default).
- Order XXXII Rule 4A operates as an enabling provision permitting representation by the natural guardian or other suitable person when appropriate; it does not convert the procedural mechanism into a strict prerequisite where the natural guardian already represents the minor and there is no challenge to that representation.
Applying these principles to the facts, the Court noted:
- Shanker was an orphan in the care of his real sister Babali, who was the person through whom Shanker was substituted and in whose custody he was residing.
- No objection was raised to the substitution of Shanker through Babali at any time; Babali appeared and actively protected and represented Shanker's interests by filing written statements and contesting the suit and the appeal.
- Because the natural guardian (Babali) was already representing the minor and there was no evidence that she had an adverse interest or was not acting in the minor's best interests, the Court deemed the failure to pass a formal order on paper no. 98-A (the guardian-appointment application) immaterial in the circumstances.
- The Court characterized the appellant's objection about the non-passing of the guardian-appointment order as "hyper technical" and held that such procedural formalities cannot be used by a third party to defeat a lawful decree when the minor's interests were in fact represented and protected.
- The Court also observed that the judgments relied upon by the appellant were distinguishable because they did not consider or examine the intent and scope of Order XXXII Rule 4A as applicable in the State of Uttar Pradesh.
- Finally, the Court recorded that Shanker did not challenge the first appellate court's judgment by filing a further appeal, allowing that judgment to become final between the plaintiff and Shanker.
Holding and Implications
Holding: The second appeal is DISMISSED.
Implications:
- The decrees and judgments of the trial court and the first appellate court stand as rendered; the objection based on non-passing of an order on the guardian-appointment application (paper no. 98-A) was rejected as being hyper-technical in the factual matrix of this case.
- The Court concluded that where a natural guardian already represents a minor and there is no evidence that the guardian is adverse to the minor's interest, the absence of a formal court order under Order XXXII Rule 3 or on an application under Order XXXII Rule 4(4) does not automatically render the decree void.
- The Court recorded that no substantial question of law arises from the second appeal. The decision does not purport to set a novel precedent beyond applying the statutory scheme (Order XXXII Rules 3, 4 and 4A as applicable in Uttar Pradesh) and established principles favouring substantial justice over procedural technicalities.
Arun Tandon, J.:— Heard learned counsel for the appellant.
2. This is defendant's second appeal.
3. One Lochan Singh executed an agreement to sell in favour of respondent-plaintiff Nawab Singh on 1st July, 1995. Before the sale-deed could be executed in terms of agreement to sell, Lochan Singh expired. For specific performance of the contract, Nawab Singh filed original Suit No. 141 of 1996, impleading the mother of Lochan Singh, namely, Ramshree, as the defendant being the legal heir of Lochan Singh. In between, said Ramshree is stated to have executed a sale-deed in respect of same property in favour of Katori Devi and Sushila Devi. During the pendency of the suit, said Ramshree also expired and in her place, an application for substitution of grand-son of Ramshree namely, Shanker, who was minor at the relevant time, and was orphan, as his mother and father pre-deceased the grand mother, was filed through his sister, namely, Babali. On the substitution application, notices were issued. It appears that natural guardian, Babali did not respond to the notice and therefore, an application was made by the plaintiff for appointment of an advocate as Guardian to Shanker under order of the Court with reference to the provisions of Order XXXII Rule 3 of the Code of Civil Procedure. Before formal orders could be passed on the application, Babali responded and appeared to protect the interest of her minor brother. She appeared before the trial court and filed her written submissions. She also contested the proceedings in the suit filed by Navab Singh. The suit was ultimately decreed under judgment and decree dated 31st January, 2007. Not being satisfied, Shankar through his sister Babali as well as subsequent purchasers, namely, Katori Devi and Sushila Devi filed Civil Appeal No. 13 of 2007. The appeal filed has also been dismissed by the first appellate court vide judgement and order dated 31st May, 2008. Hence the present second appeal.
4. This present second appeal has been filed by subsequent purchaser of the property in question, namely, Katori Devi only. Shanker through his guardian, Babali has been impleaded as proforma respondent no. 2.
5. On behalf of the appellant, judgment and orders of the courts below are being challenged on the ground that despite application having been made under Order XXXII Rule 4(4) of the Code of Civil Procedure, no orders on the applications were passed by the court concerned appointing a guardian for the minor defendant, Shanker and Smt. Babali therefore, had no right to represent the interest of Shanker. The decree was passed against the minor in absence of any guardian having been appointed under Order XXXII Rule 3 of the Code of Civil Procedure and therefore be declared as null and void.
6. I have considered the submissions made by the learned counsel for the appellant and have examined the records of the present second appeal.
7. The trial court framed issue no. 9 for deciding as to whether the suit as filed by the plaintiff is hit by Order XXXII Rule 3 of the Code of Civil Procedure or not.
8. This Court finds that suit was instituted against Smt. Ramshree. After her death, Shanker, who was minor was substituted through her real sister. Notices were issued to the substituted legal heir through Babali. However, Smt. Babali did not respondent. Plaintiff therefore, made an application under Order XXXII Rule 4(4) read with Section 151 of the Code of Civil Procedure for a guardian being appointed for Shanker. Before orders could be passed on the said application, Smt. Babali appeared as the Guardian of Shanker and filed her written statement, she also contested the proceedings. At no point of time, any objection was raised by the appellant qua substitution of Shanker, who was minor through her real sister in whose custody, he was residing. The suit was decreed by the trial court vide judgment and decree dated 31st January, 2007. Against the said decree, civil appeal no. 13 of 2007 was filed by Shanker through her sister along with Smt. Katori Devi and Smt. Sushila Devi and the plaintiff was impleaded as respondent in the appeal. The first appellate court considered the objection with regard to the orders under Order XXXII Rule 4(4) having not been passed on the application made by the plaintiff being paper no. 98-A and held that present appeal itself has been filed by Shanker through her natural guardian as the sister and at no point of time, any objection was raised, even when substitution was directed and amendments were made in the plaint itself before the trial court. The Court, therefore, held that in these circumstances, it cannot be said that sister was not looking after the interest of her minor brother or that she had any adverse interest in the property vis-a-vis minor brother Shanker. The first appellate court therefore, held that objection in that regard by the appellant was too technical in nature and cannot be used as a tool to defeat the lawful decree of the court below.
9. Before this Court the same plea has been raised qua orders being not passed on application being paper no. 98-A made under Order XXXII Rule 3 & 4 of the Code of Civil Procedure and therefore, the judgement and decree of the courts below be declared null and void.
10. This Court may record that Shanker has not chosen to file any appeal against the judgement and decree of the first appellate court and he has permitted the order become final.
11. For appreciating the controversy, it would be worthwhile to reproduce Order XXXII Rule 3, 4 and 4A as substituted in the State of Uttar Pradesh, which reads as follows:
“ORDER XXXII
SUITS BY OR AGAINST MINORS AND PERSONS OF UNSOUND MIND
3. Guardian for the suit to be appointed by Court for minor defendant. — (1) Where the defendant is a minor the Court, on being satisfied of the fact of his minority, shall appoint a proper person to be guardian for the suit for such minor.
(2) An order for the appointment of a guardian for the suit may be obtained upon application in the name and on behalf of the minor or by the plaintiff.
(3) Such application shall be supported by an affidavit verifying the fact that the proposed guardian has no interest in the matters in controversy in the suit adverse to that of the minor and that he is fit person to be so appointed.
(4) No order shall be made on any application under this rule except upon notice to any guardian of the minor appointed or declared by an authority competent in that behalf, or, where there is no such guardian, [upon notice to the father or where there is no father, to the mother, or where there is no father or mother, to other natural guardian] of the minor, or, where there is [no father, mother or other natural guardian], to the person in whose care the minor is, and after hearing any objection which may be urged on behalf of any person served with notice under this sub-rule.
[(4A) The Court may, in any case, if it thinks fit, issue notice under sub-rule (4) to the minor also.]
[(5.) A person appointed under sub-rule (1) to be guardian for the suit for a minor shall, unless his appointment is terminated by retirement or removal or death, continue as such throughout all proceedings arising out of the suit including proceedings in any Appellate or Revisional Court and any proceedings in the execution of a decree.]”
4. Who may act as next friend or be appointed guardian for the suit. —(1) Any person who is of sound mind and has attained majority may act as next friend of a minor or as his guardian for the suit:
………………
HIGH COURT AMENDMENTS
Allahabad. — (a) In Order XXXII, for rule 4, substitute the following rule, namely: —
“4.(1) Where a minor has a guardian appointed or declared by competent authority no person other than such guardian shall act as next friend, except by leave of the Court.
(2) Subject to the provisions of sub-rule (1) any person who is of sound mind and has attained majority may act as next friend of a minor, unless the interest of such person is adverse to that of the minor, or he is a defendant, or the Court for other reasons to be recorded considers him unfit to act.
(3) Every next friend shall, except as otherwise provided by clause (5) of this rule, be entitled to be reimbursed from the estate of the minor any expenses incurred by him while acting for the minor.
(4) The Court may, in its discretion, for reasons to be recorded, award costs of the suit, or compensation under Section 35A or section 95 against the next friend personally as if he were a plaintiff.
(5) Costs or compensation awarded under clause (4) shall not be recoverable by the guardian from the estate of the minor, unless the decree expressly directs that they shall be so recoverable.”
4A. (1) Where a minor has a guardian appointed by competent authority no person other than such guardian shall be appointed his guardian for the suit unless the Court considers, for reasons to be recorded, that it is for the minor's welfare that another person be appointed.
(2) Where there is no such guardian or where the Court considers that such guardian should not be appointed it shall appoint as guardian for the suit the natural guardian of the minor, if qualified, or where there is no such guardian the person in whose care the minor is, or any other suitable person who has notified the Court of his willingness to act or failing any such person, an officer of the Court.
Explanation. — An officer of the Court shall for the purposes of this sub-rule include a legal practitioner on the roll of the Court.”
12. From conjoint reading of Order XXXII Rule 3, 4 and 4A as applicable in the State of Uttar Pradesh, it would be apparently clear that if there is no guardian appointed by a competent authority and the Court considers that such guardian should not be appointed, or the Court feels that such appointed guardian should not act as the guardian for the minor in the suit, the natural guardian of the minor, if qualified or where there is no guardian, person in whose care the minor is, or nay other suitable person, who has notified the Court of his willingness to act or failing any such person, an officer of the Court can be appointed as the Guardian. What follows from the aforesaid is that the Court is under legal obligation to appoint the person declared to be the guardian of the minor by a competent authority at the first instance and if no such appointed guardian is available or when the Court finds that such appointed guardian should not act, it has to appoint the natural guardian of the minor, if qualified, and where there is no such guardian the person in whose care the minor is as the guardian.
13. In the facts of the present case, it is apparently clear that the minor Shanker was in the care of his real sister as the father and mother had predeceased the grand parents. Further the minor was impleaded through is real sister and no objections were filed to such impleadment at any point of time by the respondent-defendants. Suit was contested all along and having lost before the trial court. Civil appeal was also preferred through the same guardian, namely, his real sister. The civil appeal has also been dismissed. The Subsequent purchaser, who has preferred the second appeal objects to the acting of the real sister as the guardian.
14. In the facts of the present case the Court records that the real sister had right to act as the guardian of the minor brother in view of Order XXXII Rule 4A of the Code of Civil Procedure and therefore it is in this background that appropriate orders were not passed on the application being paper no. 98A, as the real sister responded after substitution to represent the interest of minor brother, Shanker. It is legally to be presumed that she was authorised by the Court to act as such. In the opinion of the Court, objection now raised by co-defendant is hyper technical in nature and the courts below are legally justified in rejecting the same.
15. On a simple reading of the aforesaid provision, this Court may record that it is only an enabling provision, which permits the representation of the minor in a suit, in case it is found that natural guardian is not representing the interest of minor to the best of his interest or they have interest themselves in the dispute in question. Such enabling provisions cannot be read so as to suggest that if interest of minor is already represented by a natural guardian, even then an application under Order XXXII Rule 3 of the Code of Civil Procedure is required to be filed and any orders on such application are mandatory. If the interest of minor is protected by a natural guardian and there is no challenge either by the minor or by the plaintiff to such representation of the minor by the natural guardian, the provisions of Order XXXII Rule 3 of the Code of Civil Procedure will have no application.
16. Learned counsel for the appellant contends that there has to be an order by the Court, permitting the natural guardian to represent the interest of the minor.
17. I am of the considered opinion that such orders are procedural in natural and cannot be permitted to be used to defeat the judgment and decree of the Court at the behest of a third person, who is neither the minor nor his guardian of the minor, more so when there is nothing on record to establish that the natural guardian was not acting in the best interest of the minor or that she had some interest in the suit proceedings.
18. Learned counsel for the appellant has placed reliance upon the following various judgements in support of the case:
(1) Ram Chandra Arya v. Man Singh Reported in AIR 1968 SC 954,
(2) Sri Arjun Singh v. IInd Addl. Civil Judge, Aligarh passed in Civil Misc. Writ Petition No. 45549 of 1993, decided on 20th December, 1993,
(3) Gurpreeet Singh v. Chatterbhuj Goel, reported in AIR 1992 Punjab and Haryana 95,
(4) Bachcha v. Lakhpali Devi, reported in 1972 AIR (All) 513.
19. The judgements relied upon by the learned counsel for the appellant are clearly distinguishable in the facts of the present case, wherein the intent and scope of Order XXXII Rule 4A of the Code of Civil Procedure was neither under consideration nor has been examined.
20. It is settled law that all Courts of law are established for furtherance of interest of substantial justice and not to obstruct the same on technicalities. Reference —Jai Jai Ram Manohar Lal v. National Building Material Supply, (1969) 1 SCC 869 : AIR 1969 SC 1267, wherein it has been held that if substantial justice and technicalities are pitted against each other, the cause of substantial justice should not be defeated on technicalities. No procedure in a Court of law should be allowed to defeat the cause of substantial justice on some technicalities. Reference-Ghanshyam Dass v. Dominion of India, (1984) 3 SCC 46.
21. This Court may record that the findings recorded by the courts below in respect of right of Babali to represent Shanker under the impugned judgment has become final between the plaintiff and defendant-Shanker, as he has not chosen to file any second appeal.
22. No other point was pressed. No substantial questions of law arises. The second appeal is dismissed.
Alert