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State v. Memon Mohmad Husain Ismail
Factual and Procedural Background
This reported portion of the judgment (delivered by Patel, J.) concerns the admissibility of certain documents and statements in a criminal matter. The court considers the admissibility of exhibit 29 (containing admissions and statements made by the accused) and statements of the accused reproduced in the panchnama (exhibit 54). The opinion records that the facts of the case were set out earlier in the judgment but those factual details are not reproduced in this report. The proceedings include at least two appeals: an appeal by the accused and an appeal by the State. The reported excerpt concludes with the disposition: the accused's appeal was dismissed and the State's appeal was allowed. The remainder of the judgment is noted as "not material to this report."
Legal Issues Presented
- Whether exhibit 29 (statements and admissions made by the accused) is admissible in evidence — in particular, whether it is admissible under s. 8 of the Indian Evidence Act and whether it is excluded by s. 25 of the Evidence Act or by s. 162 of the Criminal Procedure Code.
- Whether statements of the accused reproduced in the panchnama (exhibit 54) are admissible under s. 27 of the Indian Evidence Act, specifically whether the section requires that the person giving the information must already be an "accused" and must be "in the custody of a police officer" at the time the information is given.
Arguments of the Parties
Accused's / Defence Arguments
- An objection was raised to the admissibility of exhibit 29 when it was produced; this objection was renewed at the hearing of the appeal (the Court notes that the renewal was "not very serious").
- The learned counsel for the defence argued that s. 27 of the Indian Evidence Act requires that, for the exception to apply, (a) the person giving the information must be an accused at the time of giving the information, and (b) the person must be in the custody of a police officer at that time. If either of these conditions is not satisfied, the defence argued, the statement cannot be admitted under s. 27. The defence relied on Deonandan Dusadh v. King-Emperor and Jalla v. Emperor in support of the proposition that a person who was not an accused at the time of making the statement cannot rely on s. 27.
Other / State's Arguments
The opinion does not contain a detailed account of the State's or prosecution's submissions on these specific admissibility points in the reported excerpt.
Table of Precedents Cited
| Precedent | Rule or Principle Cited For | Application by the Court |
|---|---|---|
| Pakala Narayana Swami v. The King-Emperor (1939 L.R. I.A. 66) | Definition of "confession" versus "admission": a confession must admit the offence in terms or substantially all the facts constituting the offence; an incriminating admission may not amount to a confession. | The court relied on this authority to conclude that exhibit 29 did not amount to a confession; therefore s. 25 (which bars proof of confessions made to police officers) did not exclude exhibit 29. |
| Sital Chandra v. State [1956 A.I.R Cal. 82] | Principle concerning statements made to police prior to commencement of investigation and applicability of s. 162 Cr.P.C. | Used to support the conclusion that exhibit 29, having been made to police before the investigation commenced, was not hit by s. 162 Cr.P.C. and was therefore admissible on that ground. |
| Deonandan Dusadh v. King-Emperor (1928 I.L.R. 7 Pat. 411) | Authority relied upon by defence for the proposition that, under s. 27, the maker of the statement must be an accused at the time of making the statement. | The court examined this authority (and related cases) but did not accept the narrow construction urged by the defence as conclusive; instead the court analysed the full-bench authorities and legislative history before reaching its conclusion. |
| Jalla v. Emperor ([1931] I.L.R. Lah. 278) | Another authority cited by counsel for the proposition that s. 27 requires the maker to be an accused when making the statement. | Considered in the course of evaluating the competing constructions of s. 27; used as part of the background of case law the court reviewed before rejecting the strict meaning urged by defence. |
| Queen-Empress v. Babu Lal (1884 I.L.R. 6 All. 509) (Full Bench) | Full‑bench consideration of whether s. 27 is a proviso/qualification to s. 26 alone or to both ss. 25 and 26, and differing judicial views on the scope of s. 27. | The court analysed the full-bench opinions and concluded that the authority could not be treated as establishing the narrow construction urged by defence; the full-bench showed differing views and did not uniformly support the proposition that a maker must already be an accused. |
| Emperor v. Cunna…Accused (1920 22 Bom. L.R. 1247) | Discussion of s. 24 of the Evidence Act and the applicability of that section to confessions made by a person who later becomes an accused. | The court used the treatment of s. 24 in this case to argue for consistent interpretation of similar wording in s. 27: that the phrase "a person accused of any offence" can include a person who becomes subsequently an accused at the time the statement is tendered in evidence. |
| Santokhi Beldar v. King Emperor (1932 I.L.R. 12 Pat. 241) | Authority supporting the view that where a person goes to a police officer, makes a disclosure and is not free to move thereafter, he may be deemed to be in custody for purposes of the provision. | The court accepted and applied the ratio of this case as an alternative basis for admitting the statements under s. 27 even if the text "in the custody of a police officer" were strictly read. |
| Legal Remembrancer v. Lalit Mohan Singh Boy (1921 I.L.R. 49 Cal. 167) | Another authority used to support the proposition that a person who voluntarily makes a disclosure to police may be regarded as being in custody (for the purposes of the relevant provision). | The court cited and followed this case, treating it with Santokhi Beldar as supporting admission of discovery statements in circumstances where the maker was not formally arrested but was effectively not free to move. |
Court's Reasoning and Analysis
The court's analysis proceeds in two main strands corresponding to the two admissibility questions.
1. Admissibility of exhibit 29
- The court observed that exhibit 29 contained admissions and statements made by the accused and that an objection to its admissibility had been raised when it was produced and renewed at the hearing.
- First, the court considered s. 8 of the Evidence Act and concluded that exhibit 29 would be admissible as showing the conduct of the accused subsequent to the death of the deceased.
- The defence contention that s. 25 (which bars confessions made to police officers) would exclude the document was examined. The court applied the definition from Pakala Narayana Swami and emphasized that s. 25 operates only when the material is a “confession.” Because a confession must admit the offence in terms or substantially all facts constituting the offence, an incriminating admission which does not amount to a confession is not excluded by s. 25.
- Applying that principle, the court concluded exhibit 29 was not a confession within s. 25 and therefore s. 25 did not exclude it from evidence.
- Finally, the court considered s. 162 Cr.P.C.; relying on Sital Chandra the court accepted that because the statement in exhibit 29 was made to police before the commencement of the investigation, s. 162 could not be invoked to exclude it. On these bases the court held exhibit 29 admissible.
2. Admissibility of statements in the panchnama under s. 27
- The defence argued that s. 27 requires that (a) the maker of the information be an accused at the time of giving it, and (b) be in the custody of a police officer at that time. The court carefully reviewed authorities cited by the defence (including Deonandan Dusadh, Jalla, and the full-bench Queen-Empress v. Babu Lal) and found the authorities did not uniformly sustain the narrow construction urged.
- The court compared the wording of s. 27 with s. 24 (which uses precisely similar words) and noted precedents construing s. 24 to apply to confessions made by persons who became subsequently accused. The court reasoned that identical phrases in related sections should be given the same meaning.
- The court also examined legislative history. It reproduced s. 150 of the Cr.P.C. (1861) and noted that in 1869 an amendment (Act VIII of 1869) added the words "or in the custody of a police officer" after "a person accused of any offence." This history led the court to conclude that when the section was enacted the intention was to make discovery statements admissible even if a person were in custody, and that a sensible reading permits the section to cover persons who later become accused or those not in custody at the time of statement.
- The court offered two permissible interpretive approaches to resolve the textual difficulty: (a) regard the custody words as not intended in the restrictive sense (i.e., treat them as superfluous for the purpose of excluding otherwise admissible discovery statements), or (b) read into the text the words "even if" before "in the custody of police" so the section would make statements admissible notwithstanding custody.
- As an alternative route, even if those textual modifications were not permissible, the court held the facts fell within the ratio of Santokhi Beldar and Legal Remembrancer v. Lalit Mohan Singh Boy, where the courts had concluded that a person who comes to the police, discloses an offense and who is thereafter not free to move must be deemed to be in police custody for the purposes of the provision. Accordingly, in either interpretive approach the statements leading to discoveries were admissible under s. 27.
- In short, the court concluded that the words "a person accused of any offence" in s. 27 can include a person who becomes subsequently an accused at the time the statement is tendered in evidence and that the custody requirement should not be read so narrowly as to exclude discovery statements which the section was intended to admit.
Holding and Implications
Core Rulings:
- Exhibit 29 is admissible. The court held that exhibit 29 was admissible under s. 8 of the Evidence Act, was not a confession within the meaning of s. 25 and therefore not excluded by that section, and was not excluded by s. 162 Cr.P.C. because it was made prior to the commencement of the investigation.
- Statements recorded in the panchnama (exhibit 54) leading to discovery are admissible under s. 27. The court held that the phrase "a person accused of any offence" in s. 27 may include a person who becomes subsequently an accused and that the custody requirement should not be read so strictly as to defeat the purpose of s. 27; alternatively, the facts fell within authorities treating a person who voluntarily gives such information to police and is no longer free to move as being effectively in custody.
- Appeal dispositions: Appeal by the accused was dismissed. Appeal by the State was allowed.
Implications
Direct consequences for the parties in this reported portion are that the challenged statements (exhibit 29 and the panchnama statements relied on under s. 27) were held admissible, and the appeals were disposed of as indicated above. The opinion also contains a reasoned interpretation of s. 27 (and related provisions, including s. 24 and s. 25) explaining that the statutory wording should be read in a manner consistent with the sections' purposes and with earlier statutory practice (Cr.P.C. 1861 and its amendment). The court also relied on established authorities to conclude that discovery statements made to police may be treated as admissible even where the maker was not formally an accused at the time of the statement or where the maker was not formally under arrest but was not free to move after the disclosure.
Patel, J.:— [His Lordship after setting out the facts of the case, proceeded.] Before dealing with the evidence, at this stage I might dispose of the contention with regard to the admissibility of exh. 29 containing some admissions and of statements made by the accused and reproduced in the panchnama regarding the discovery of the body. So far as the question of exh. 29 is concerned, an objection to its admissibility was raised at the time when that document was put in and has been renewed in this Court at the time of arguments, though not very seriously. It would appear that the said statement would be admissible under s. 8 of the Evidence Act as showing the conduct of the accused subsequent to the death of the deceased in any event. It would also appear that it is not hit by the provisions of s. 25 at all in this case. In order that s. 25 should be operative to prevent an admission being received in evidence, it must amount to a confession, for it is provided therein that no confession made to a police officer shall be proved as against a person accused of any offence. It has been observed in Pakala Narayana Swami v. The King-Emperor . 1939 L.R 66 I.A 66. (p. 81):—
“…a confession must either admit in terms the offence, or at any rate substantially all the facts which constitute the offence. An admission of a gravely incriminating fact, even a conclusively incriminating fact, is not of itself a confession,…”
2. This being so the statements in exh. 29 not being confession, cannot be excluded by provisions of s. 25 of the Evidence Act. It would further appear that since this statement happens to have been made to the Police prior to the commencement of the investigation in the case it could not possibly be hit by s. 162 of the Criminal Procedure Code: vide Sital Chandra v. State . [1956] A.I.R Cal. 82.. We are, therefore, of the view that exh. 29 is admissible not being a confession. With regard to the panchnama exh. 54, or what will be more appropriate to state the statements of accused reproduced in the panchnama or deposed to by witnesses which are sought to be proved, it is argued that these are not admissible under s. 27 of the Indian Evidence Act. The learned counsel argues that s. 27, which says:
“…when any fact is deposed to as discovered in consequence of information received from a person accused of any offence, in the custody of a police officer,…”
3. Would show that the information must be given or a statement must be made by a person who at that time is accused of any offence and is in the custody of the police. If these two conditions are not satisfied then even if it satisfied the other conditions of the section it is not admissible. For the proposition that at the time of making the statement he must be an accused person the learned counsel has relied on Deonandan Dusadh v. King-Emperor . 1928 I.L.R 7 Pat. 411. and Jalla v. Emperor . [1931] I.L.R Lah. 278.. In Deonandan Dusadh v. Emperor, it was held that a statement made by a person who was not accused of an offence at the time of making the statement, was not admissible under that section. In coming to this conclusion reliance was placed on the case of Queen-Empress v. Babu Lal . 1884 I.L.R 6 All. 509. F.B. which is a full bench case. The question referred to the full bench was whether or not s. 27 was a qualification to both ss. 25 and 26 or only to s. 26. It appears there was some difference of opinion in the cases decided in that Court; in one of the cases Mr. Justice Mahmood had held that s. 27 was merely a proviso or a qualification to s. 26 and had no bearing on s. 25; and which resulted in making every statement made to a police officer inadmissible in evidence even if it satisfied the conditions laid down in s. 27. The other view was that it was a proviso to both ss. 25 and 26. The majority of the Judges constituting the full bench-held that s. 27 was applicable as a proviso to both ss. 25 and 26. Mr. Justice Oldfield does not construe the section in this manner, nor does Mr. Justice Brodhurst. It would appear that the learned Judge states at p. 519, after giving an illustration of a person immediately after committing a murder going to the police station and giving himself up to the police officer and making a statement before that officer and his subordinates of all the facts and pointing out the body of the victim and giving up the weapon with which he had committed the murder, that s. 27 would still be applicable to a case like that. The learned officiating Chief Justice held that s. 27 is applicable as a proviso to both ss. 25 and 26, and Mr. Justice Duthoit expressed a general opinion without expressing any opinion as to the construction of s. 27 itself. It is only Mr. Justice Mahmood who construed s. 27 in the manner suggested while dealing with the argument as to whether it is a qualification to s. 26 or to s. 25 as well. That case, therefore, cannot be regarded as an authority for the suggested, construction. The Lahore case seems to construe the section in the same way.
4. In S. 24 of the Evidence Act, words precisely similar to those used in s. 27 are used; it refers to a confession made by an, accused person and if the contention that is now made is accepted it might introduce a great deal of injustice to persons accused of an offence, because all confessions made by a person before he became an accused, would be admissible even if they were obtained by inducement, threat or promise. Section 24 is considered in the case of Emperor v. Cunna…Accused. . 1920 22 Bom. L.R 1247.. Sir Lallubhai Shah at page 1261, says that section will be applicable to a confession made by a person, who becomes subsequently accused of an offence. The other Judges in effect accept this, but they differed from the learned Chief Justice on the question of fact as to whether the confessions were made by inducement, threat or promise. The phrase has been used in both sections and it must be interpreted in the same manner in both sections. No possible reason can be suggested why it should have a different meaning. We are, therefore, of opinion that the words information received from “a person accused of any offence” in s. 27 cannot be read to mean that he must be an accused when he gives the information but would include a person if he became subsequently an accused person, at the time when that statement is sought to be received in evidence against him.
5. So far as the further requirement of being in the custody of the police is concerned the words of the section are there. The object and reason of the rule, which excludes confessions and statements as inadmissible in evidence if they are made in the presence of or to police officers or where investigation is going on, is that there is likelihood of their having been obtained by unjustifiable means. The reason of the exception contained in s. 27 would appear to be that though they might have been improperly obtained, if a discovery of facts is made then there is great likelihood of the statements being true, and if this is so, it is difficult to see the reason or the sense of the rule requiring that when that statement is made the person who makes that statement should and ought to be in custody before it could be received in evidence. If the reason of admitting this statement is what I have stated before, it would be touch more likely to be true when made by a person who is not in custody as it would be without any pressure at all and being voluntary cannot offend any rules of moral justice. One way out of the difficulty of the words in the statute would be to disregard those words as being superfluous and not intended by the Legislature in the sense in which they appear and that is the justifiable procedure. The other way is to read the words “even if” before the words “in the custody of police” which is also permissible to give sensible meaning to the section. James Stephen, the draftsman of the indian evidence act, in his Introduction to the indian evidence act while discussing confessions at page 165 of the 1892 edition (which is a reprint of the 1872 edition) says:—
“Admissions in reference to crimes are usually called confessions. I may observe upon the provisions relating to them that sections 25, 26, and 27 were transferred to the Evidence Act verbatim from the Code of Criminal Procedure, Act XXV of 1861.”
6. Section 150 of the Criminal Procedure Code, Act XXV of 1861, reads as under:—
“When any fact is deposed to by a police officer as discovered by him in consequence of information received from a person accused of any offence, so much of such information, whether it amounts to a confession or admission of guilt or not, as relates distinctly to the fact discovered by it, may be received in evidence.”
7. It appears in 1869 in Act VIII of 1869 this section was modified by the addition of the words “or in the custody of a police officer” after the words “a person accused of any offence”. If the intention was to reproduce the provisions contained in s. 150 of the Criminal Procedure Code, 1861, it is apparent that the intention was to make the statements admissible even if a person were in custody. It appears, therefore, that it would be the better way of reading the provisions of the section which course is permissible in order to make the meaning of the section sensible. See Maxwell on Statutes pp. 236, 237 (9th edn.). If that is the correct view, then all these statements were made as a result of which facts mentioned were discovered and would, therefore, be admissible in evidence.
8. Even assuming however that it will not be permissible to disregard the words of the section or read “even if” as suggested then, we are clearly of the view that the case falls within the authority of cases Santokhi Beldar v. King Emperor . 1932 I.L.R 12 Pat. 241. and Legal Remembrancer v. Lalit Mohan Singh Boy . 1921 I.L.R 49 Cal. 167., with the conclusion of which we agree.
9. The ratio of those cases is that where a person goes to a police officer and makes a statement which shows that an offence has been committed by him, he accuses himself and though he is formally not arrested, since he is not free to move wherever he likes after disclosure of the information to the police he must be deemed to be in custody of the police.
10. [The rest of the judgment is not material to this report].
11. Appeal by accused dismissed.
12. Appeal by State allowed.
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