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Dodda Brahmanandam v. State Of A.P Rep. By Its Secretary For Law Department, Hyderabad And Others

Andhra Pradesh High Court
Nov 20, 1985
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Summary of the Opinion

Factual and Procedural Background

The writ petition was filed by Dodda Brahmanandam, an accused in Sessions Case No. 92/1983 pending before the Assistant Sessions Judge, Addanki, Prakasham District. He challenged the appointment of the 2nd respondent, Sri M. Ramaiah Choudary (advocate, Chirala), as special public prosecutor under section 24(8) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973, to conduct PRC No. 2/82 before the Munsif Magistrate, Addanki. The defacto complainant (the petitioner's wife) was impleaded as the 3rd respondent.

Key factual matrix as set out in the opinion: the petitioner and the 3rd respondent were married in 1973; an alleged incident on 22-11-1981 led to a complaint by the 3rd respondent's father and filing of a chargesheet (Crime No. 84/81) and subsequent proceedings as PRC No. 2/82. The petitioner alleged that the 2nd respondent sought appointment as special public prosecutor and that there were connections between the 2nd respondent and the complainant’s family; the petitioner made representations to police and government officials objecting to the 2nd respondent's appointment.

The government initially appointed Sri B. Hanuma Reddy as special public prosecutor by Government Order dated 4-11-1982. After further representations and communications (including representations by the 3rd respondent and a recommendation from the Superintendent of Police, Ongole), the government issued G.O. Ms. No. 130 Law dated 6-8-1983 appointing the 2nd respondent in supersession of the earlier appointment. The petitioner challenged that appointment by writ petition. The government and respondents filed counters justifying the appointment. The writ court heard arguments and examined documentary material including reports from the Sessions Judge and the District Collector.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. What are the duties of a public prosecutor vis-à-vis the accused?
  2. Whether an accused has locus standi to object to the appointment of a particular person as special public prosecutor under section 24(8) of the Code of Criminal Procedure on the ground of a reasonable apprehension of bias?

Arguments of the Parties

Petitioner's Arguments

  • The 2nd respondent sought appointment as special public prosecutor despite being closely connected to the complainant's party and having acted as counsel for the de facto complainant in court applications (e.g., adjournment petitions), creating a reasonable apprehension of bias.
  • The 2nd respondent had allegedly prevailed on police to lodge a charge sheet before investigation was complete; the crime branch had dropped the investigation.
  • The 2nd respondent was alleged to have collected money from the complainant's party promising to secure his appointment and to obtain convictions, and was alleged to have a reputation for manipulating and foisting cases.
  • The petitioner sought direction that some other public prosecutor (not the 2nd respondent) be appointed to conduct the prosecution.

Respondents' / Government's Arguments

  • The government filed a counter justifying the appointment of the 2nd respondent and relied on the recommendations and communications (including a recommendation from the Superintendent of Police, Ongole) that led to G.O. Ms. No. 130 Law dated 6-8-1983.
  • The 2nd and 3rd respondents filed counters defending the legality and propriety of the appointment. (The opinion records that counters were filed and that counsel for the respondents were heard.)
  • It was argued on behalf of the 3rd respondent that continuation of Sri B. Hanuma Reddy as special public prosecutor was undesirable because his senior (Sri S. Dasaradharama Reddy) had been engaged as defence counsel for other accused; and it was also stated that the term of Sri B. Hanuma Reddy had expired (though the petitioner disputed extension of that term).

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Halsbury's Laws of England (4th ed., vol. 11, Crim. Law, para 283; vol. 3, Barristers, para 1140) Prosecuting counsel should regard themselves as ministers of justice and not as mere advocates; must not inflame jury; must exhibit facts fairly and not seek conviction at all costs; duty to be present throughout trial. Used to define the duties of a public prosecutor and to support the conclusion that the prosecutor is quasi-judicial and must act impartially.
R v Thursfield (1838) 8 C & P 269 Counsel for the prosecution must be an assistant to the court in furtherance of justice and not act as counsel for any particular person or party. Relied upon to emphasize the public prosecutor's duty to assist the court rather than to act for private interests.
R v Puddick (1965) 4 F & F 497 Public prosecutor's comments about an accused's failure to call witnesses can be unfair; prosecuting counsel must make out the case by clear evidence beyond reasonable doubt. Quoted to illustrate limits on prosecution argument and the requirement that prosecution not make unfair comments that prejudice the accused.
R v Berens (1865) 4 F & F 842 Prosecuting counsel should assist the judge in fairly putting the case before the jury and act with a quasi-judicial responsibility. Accepted as supporting the minister-of-justice role of prosecutors and their quasi-judicial position.
R v Banks (1916) 2 K.B. 621 = (1916) 17 All E.R. 356 Accepted observations in R v Puddick concerning prosecutors' role and duties. Followed as part of the body of law describing prosecutorial duties.
R v House (1921) 16 Cr. App. R. 49 (CCA) Prosecutors must not appeal to racial or religious prejudices or make improper generalisations; misconduct vitiates the trial. Applied to stress that prosecutorial impropriety can vitiate proceedings and justify quashing convictions.
R v Superman (1935) 25 Cr. App. R. 109 Prosecution must fairly and impartially exhibit all facts; Crown's interest is truth and justice, not simply conviction. Quoted to reinforce the prosecutor's duty to stand on the real strength of the case and not rely on collateral matters.
R v Maxwell (1934) 24 Cr. App. R. 152 Policy of criminal law to observe every rule in favour of the prisoner; breach may lead to quashing conviction. Quoted to underline the protective policy of criminal procedure in favour of accused persons.
R v Neal (1949) (2) All E.R. 438 If irregularity comes to counsel's notice before verdict, it should be brought to the court to permit remedy (e.g., discharge jury). Used to show prosecutorial duty to inform court promptly of irregularities rather than reserve matters for appeal.
Abbott v Refuge Assurance Co. Ltd. (1961) (3) All E.R. 1074 (Ormerod L.J.) When conducting a prosecution counsel owe a duty to the court and, if satisfied there is no evidence, should ask to withdraw the prosecution. Referred to in support of the proposition that prosecutors owe duties to court and truth, and must act when no case exists.
R v Kashinath Dinker (8 Bom. H.C.R. 126) Illustration of Indian authorities following the principle that the public prosecutor guides the prosecution and should not be the private complainant's advocate. Referred to indicate Indian case law aligning with the minister-of-justice concept of prosecutors.
Sardarilal v The Crown (AIR 1923 Lahore 234) Indian precedent following principles about the duties of public prosecutors. Used as part of the supporting body of Indian authorities on prosecutorial duties.
Anant Wasudeo v Emperor (AIR 1924 Nag. 243) Indian precedent on public prosecutor's role and duties. Referred to as supporting authority for the court's summary of prosecutorial duties.
Ramakistiah v State of A.P. (AIR 1959 A.P. 659) Public prosecutor is to guide prosecution and the role cannot be entrusted to an advocate appointed on behalf of a private complainant. Applied as a direct authority for the principle that the public prosecutor must not be the private complainant’s advocate; supports court's conclusion about disqualification.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The court approached the matter in two stages corresponding to the two main issues set out by the parties.

1. Duties of a public prosecutor: The court surveyed authoritative statements (Halsbury's and numerous English and Indian cases) to extract core principles. It concluded that a public prosecutor is not an advocate for the private complainant or the police but is a representative of the State and part of the court, occupying a quasi-judicial position described as a "minister of justice." The court emphasised that a prosecutor's duty is to assist the court in arriving at the truth, to present all material facts fairly and impartially, to refrain from advocacy that inflames or prejudices, and not to seek convictions at all costs. The court noted ancillary duties such as informing the defence of relevant material and being present throughout the trial.

2. Locus standi of the accused to object to appointment of a particular special public prosecutor: The court rejected the extreme contention that an accused has no standing to object to the appointment of a particular person. It reasoned that if a person being appointed as prosecutor has already acted as counsel for the de facto complainant, or manifestly identifies with the complainant's side, it would create a reasonable apprehension in a reasonable person that such a prosecutor could not act disinterestedly for both prosecution and the accused. The court invoked the maxim that "justice should not only be done but should manifestly and undoubtedly be seen to be done" (citing R. v. Sussex, Ex parte McCarthy) to underscore the need to avoid appointments that create an appearance of bias.

Applying these principles to the facts, the court noted that the 2nd respondent had twice filed adjournment applications in the proceedings describing himself as the counsel for the 3rd respondent (the de facto complainant). One of these applications included allegations that the petitioner had committed offences under the Penal Code and the Dowry Prohibition Act. Even assuming other allegations against the 2nd respondent were untrue, the court held that because he had identified himself as counsel for the complainant he was disqualified from occupying the quasi-judicial, trust-based role of special public prosecutor in relation to the accused. The court found that a reasonable apprehension of bias had arisen in the minds of the accused and that the government's appointment of the 2nd respondent was therefore illegal.

The court expressly relied on the surveyed authorities to derive the prosecutor's duties and to justify the proposition that an accused may object to an appointment which gives rise to a reasonable apprehension of bias. The court did not decide the correctness of earlier appointments of Sri B. Hanuma Reddy, deeming that question unnecessary for disposing of the petition.

Holding and Implications

Holding: The writ petition is allowed. The court held that the government acted illegally in appointing the 2nd respondent, Sri M. Ramaiah Choudary, as special public prosecutor to conduct the case in question. The court directed that it was desirable to appoint a special public prosecutor who was not practising in Prakasam District to avoid further complications and delay. No costs were awarded.

Implications:

  • Direct effect on the parties: The appointment of Sri M. Ramaiah Choudary as special public prosecutor was declared illegal by the court and the writ petition was allowed; a different person (preferably not practising in Prakasam District) should be appointed to conduct the prosecution. No costs were imposed on the petitioner.
  • Broader implications: The opinion reiterates established principles concerning the duties of public prosecutors and affirms that an accused may challenge the appointment of a special public prosecutor on grounds of reasonable apprehension of bias. The decision applies established authorities rather than creating a novel legal principle; the court did not state that it was laying down a new precedent beyond its application of existing law to the facts before it.

Note: This summary is confined to and derived exclusively from the contents of the provided opinion. No information beyond the opinion's text has been added.

Show all summary ...

(1) This writ petition raises the question as to the duties of a public prosecutor and also a question as to the locus standi of an accused to object to the appointment of a particular person as special public prosecutor under section 24 (8) of the criminal procedure code, on the ground of reasonable apprehension of bias on the lattor's part.

(2) The petitioner, dodda brahmanandam, is the accused standing trial in sessions case no. 92/1983 on the file of assistant sessions judge addanki, prakasham district. He is questioning the appointment of the 2nd respondent herein, sri m ramaiah choudary, advocate, chirala as a special public prosecutor, under section 24 (8) of the code of criminal procedure, 1973 to conduct prosecution in p r c no. 2/82 pending before the munsif magistrate, addanki, prakasham district. The defacto complainant who is the petitioner's wife is now impleadedas the 3rd respondent in the writ petition.

(3) It is necessary to state the following facts: the petitioner and the 3rd respondent were married on 17 - 5 - 1973 on 25 - 11 - 1981 the 3rd respondent's father gave a report alleging that his son in - law (the writ petitioner) and the writ petitioner's mother beat his daughter (3rd respondent) and tried to kill her (3rd respondent) on 22 - 11 - 1981 the local police filed a charge sheet in crime no. 84/81. The matter was taken up as p r c no 2/82 by the munsif magistrate, addanki - it is the petitioner's case that as that stage the 2nd respondent sri m. Ramaiah choudary, advocate of chirala attempted to get himself appointed as special public prosecutor and that on 13 - 11 - 1981 'the 3rd respondent submitted a representation to the government to appoint the 2nd respondent as special public prosecutor on the plea that the assistant public prosecutor was not favourably inclined towards her. There upon, the petitioner submitted a representation to the director general of police, hyderabad on 10 - 12 - 81 sitting that the complainant viz, his father - in - law, is a very powerful man in the village of yenamadala, that sri m ramaiah choudary, advocate (2nd respondent) who is also from the village is a close friend of the petitioner's father - in - law, that with the assistance of the said advocate the 3rd respondent was taken to chirala hosppitat instead of chilakaluripeta hospital which is nearer that a certificate was obtained regarding some alleged injury on the neck of the 3rd respondent, and that lot of publicity was given in the local news papers about the alleged incident dated 22 - 11 - 1981. He also further stated that his father - in - law gave a false report three days after the alleged incident to the police only with a view to humiliate the petitioner and his family. He also referred to certain disputes in the panchayat elections, which, according to him, were the cause for the complaint.

(4) The collector and district magistrate, ongole, passed an order on 15 - 10 - 1982 appointing the additional public prosecutor of ongole. One b hanuma reddy, as a special public prosecutor to conduct the prosecution in p r c no. 2/82. It is the petitioner's case that the 2nd respondent and the 3rd respondent then attempted to have the appointment of the said b hanuma reddy cancelled. There is a representation by the petitioner to the district magistrate and collector that the 2nd respondent prevailed on the inspector of police, addanki and got a charge sheet filed in p r c no. 2/82 even before the investigation was completed by the crime branch. According to him, the crime branch had dropped the investigation. The petitioner further stated that the 2nd respondent who is an advocate at chirala was collecting huge amounts from the complainant's party promising them that he would be appointed as special public prosecutor to conduct the case and that he will go to any extent to get the petitioner and other accused convicted. The petitioner also alleged that the entire case was foisted against him at the instance of the 2nd respondent who, according to him, was known for his capacity for bringing and suppressing and also foisting criminal cases, and that he was in the good looks of the police. The petitioner further alleged that the 2nd respondent was trying to get himself appointed as special public prosecutor in the case and that the prc was the out - come of the latter's manipulation. The petitioner prayed that the government may direct any public proaecutpr in the state to conduct the prosecution other than the 2nd respondent.

(5) The government issued g 0 rt no. 286 law dated 4 - 11 - 1982 appointing sri b. Hanuma reddy additional public prosecutor, ongole, to conduct p r c no, 2/82. The said order is passed under rule 56 of the a p law officers (r c r) rules, 1967 and the preamble to this order refers to the letter of the collector dated 19 - 10 - 1982

(6) It appears that the 3rd respondent sent another petition on 26 - 1 - 1983 requesting that the 2nd respondent may be appointed as the special public prosecutor. While the said representation was pending, the 2nd respondent filed an application, describing himself as advocate for the 3rd respondent, under section 309 cr p c for adjournment of the case. The case was adjourned to 21 - 3 - 1983 subject to the objections of the defence counsel. The objections of the defence counsel which are endorsed on the above petition dated 14 - 2 - 83 are to the effect that the 2nd respondent who filed the application for the 3rd respondent as her counsel could not appear on behalf of the prosecutor and that the allegations in the petition are invented for the purpose of obtaining an adjournment, and that the 2nd respondent was not eligible to be appointed as a special public prosecutor.

(7) On 15 - 2 - 1983. The writ petitioner submitted a representation to the hon'ble chief minister stating that the 2nd respondent and his junior advocate kept back the witnesses from attending the court on 14 - 2 - 83 with a view to harass the petitioner and the other accused, that the 2nd respondent was giving out that he is getting orders in his favour for conducting the prosecution in the case, that the circle inspector is a puppet in the hands of the 2nd respondent and his junior and did not get summons served on the witnesses. He, therefore requested that an enquiry may be conducted into the matter. Copies of the said representation were submitted to the law minister, andhra pradesh, to the deputy inspector general of police, guntur, to the superintendent of police, ongole and to the district collector, ongole. It appears that the district collector referred the matter to the learned sessions judge at ongole,

(8) The record produced by the government before me discloses that the learned sessions judge reported to the district collector on 24 - 3 - 1983 that, having regard to the allegations in the case, it was not desirable to appoint the 2nd respondent as a special public prosecutor in this case the district collector who accepted the said recommendation, submitted his report to the government on 3 - 4 - 1983 against the appointment of the 2nd respondent on that basis the government issued government memo no. 11024/l/82 - 2 dated 27 - 4 - 1983 stating that the request of the 3rd respondent for the appointment of the 2nd respondent as a special public prosecutor in p r. C no. 2/82 before the munsif magistrate, addanki in the place of sri b. Hanuma reddy who was previously appointed as special public prosecutor, cannot be complied with. It was also specifically stated that the 2nd respondent also cannot be appointed as a second spscial public prosecutor in the case and that the 3rd respondent was at liberty to engage the services of a private advocate at her expense under the general supervision of the special public prosecutor already appointed.

(9) At that stage, the 3rd respondent appears to have put in another petition on 2 - 5 - 1933 again requesting that the 2nd respondent be appointed as a special public prosecutor. It is again important to note that on 7 - 6 - 83 the and responoent sri m. Ramaiah choudary, describing himself as an 'advocate' for the defacto complainant - petitioner filed another application for an adjournment under section 309, cr. P. C. Stating that the petitioner and others were guilty of the offences under sections 307 and 341, i. P. 0 and sea. 4 of the dowry prohibition act, that the case was committed to the court of session as p. R. C. 2/82 and ultimately registered as sessions case no. 82/83 and that the 3rd respondent cannot repose any confidence in sri r. Satyanarayana, the additional public prosecutor and that he has no locus standl to conduct the prosecution in view of the orders of the government in g. O. Rt, no 283 dated 4 - 11 - 1982 and the governmant memo dated 27 - 4 - 1983 appointing sri 3. Hanuma reddy additional public prosecutor as a special public prosecutor. It was further stated that as sri b. Hanuma reddy 19 not present in the court ths court may adjourn the case till the second week of july, 1983. On thisapplicationthecase was adjourned. It is the petitioner's case that the allegation in this petition that sri r. Satyanarayana could not conduct the case was falsely made even though the respondents 2 and 3 knew that the said sri r satyanarayana was never appointed as a special public prosecutor.

(10) After the matter was thus adjourned the government appear to have referred the matter to the superintendent of police. Ongola, and the latter gave a recommendation on 29 - 6 - 1983 to the effect that as there are apprehensions in the mind of the 3rd respondent that the additional public prosecutor may help the accused and as per the request of the 3rd respondent, the 2nd respondent, sri m. Ramaiah choudary, may be appointed as the special public prosecutor. Accordingly the government issued the impugned g 0. Ms. No. 130 law dated 6 - 8 - 1983 appointing the 2nd respondent as the special public prosecutor to conduct the case, in supercession of the earlier orders appointing sri b. Hanuma reddy as special public prosecutor. It is this order of the government that is assailed by the petitioner.

(11) A counter has bean filed on behalf of the government justifying the appointment of the 2nd respondent and by the 2nd and 3rd respondents also to the same effect. I have heard the learned counsel for the petitioner sri m, chandra - sekhara rao, the learned government pleader for the "1st respondent, sri m. Ramaiah, advocate for the 3rd respondent and sri b. V. Subbaiah, advocate for the 2nd respondent.

(12) During tha course of arguments if is brought out by the counsel for the 3rd respondent that while sri b. Hanu. - na reddy was initially appointed as special public prosecutor, his senior one sri s. Dasaradharama reddy was engaged as defence counsel for tha accused nos. 2 and 3 who are the father and mother of the petitioner and that it was not desirable for the said sri b. Hanuma reddy to be continued as special public prosecutor it is also stated that the term of the said sri b. Hanuma reddy has since expired. It is however argued for the petitioner that the term of the said sri b. Hanuma reddy was extended till 11 - 4 - 1984.

(13) The questions that arse for consideration this petition are :

(1) what are the duties of a public prosecutor vis - a - vis the accused? (2) whether the accused has no locus standi to object to a particular person to be appoined and special public prosecutor under sec. 24 (8) , cr. P. C. On the ground of reasonable apprehension of bias on the part of the latter?

(14) In halsbury's laws of end - land (4th ed, vol. 11, crl. Law para 283) it is stated that the prosecuting counsel should regard themselves a ministers of justice, assisting in its administration rather than as'advorates ; and accordingly should not employ language likely to inflame the jury against the accused it is also stated (para 295) that the prosecuting counsel may comment on the evidence of the accused, if he has given evidence, but he may not comment on the failure of fhe accused or the wife or husband of the accused, to give evidence, nor should he comment on the failure of the accused to call other witnesses unless that, the circumstances are such that it might be fairly expected that those witnesses could and would be called. It is further stated (halsbury's laws of england, 4th ed vol. 3 barristers, para 1140) that the duty of prosecuting counsel is fairly and impartially to exhibit all the facts to the jury and that it is not his duty to obtain a conviction at all costs ,' and that he should not urge any argument which does not carrry weight in his own mind or omit matters that are important or favourable to the interests of the accused. Prosecuting counsel should not attempt to persuade the court by advocacy to inflict a severe sentence or contradict a plea in mitigation unless invited by the court to assist it. Prosecuting counsel has also a duty to be present throughout the trial and he should not absent himself without leave of the court.

(15) It is stated in r. Vs. Thursfield

(1) (1838) 8 c8p 269 that it is the duty of the counsel for the prosecution to be an assistant to the court in fhe furtherance of justice and not to act as counsel.

For any particular person or party.

(16) In r vs. Puddick (2) (1965) 4 f and f 497 the accused was charged of havina raviseda girl when she was alone. The public prosecutor, while summing up, observed that the accused railed no witnesses, and that if he is permitted, it it would virtually amount to conviction of the girl for, perjury crompton, j. Observed that such an observation of the public prosecutor was not fair to the accused. The public prosecutor was bound to rneke out a cafe against the accused, by clerar evidenre. Bevond reasonable doubt and an accused had a right to insist that this had not been done and to urge, without calling witnesses, that the evidence as it steed, was not sufficient to commit him. In many cases, he could not call witnesses and if was only in cases where be fairly might be expected to do so, that the observation was at all fair against him. In a case like the one in that matter, the comment that the prisoner would call othar witnesses was unfair as nobody else was, even according to the prosecution, present at the time of the offence. If the accused was held not guilty, it did not mean that the complainant was guilty of oerjury. It only meant that the offence was not proved beyond reasonable doubt. Crompton j. Oberved :

"i hoae that in the exercise of the privilege granted by the new act to counsel for the prosecution of summing up the evidence, they will not eeass to remember that counsel for the prosecution in such cases are to regard themselves as ministers of justice, and not to strugale for a conviction."

And the accused was acquitted. Blackburn. J. Said in r vs. Berens (3) (1865) 4 f and f 842 (at 852)

"it had always hitherto been the supposition in the administration of criminal justice, as a general rule, that the prosecuting counsel was in a kind of judicial position that while he was there to conduct his case, he was to do it at his discretion: but with a feeling of responsibility - and as if trying to obtain a verdict, but to assist the judge in fairly putting the case before the jury and nothing more. And the course of criminal justice would go on as it ought to do, the prosecuting counsel regarding himself really as pan of the court, and acting in a quasi judicial capacity."

In r vs. Banks (4) 1916 (2) k. B 621 = (1916) 17 all e. R. 356 avory, j. Accepted the observations of crompton, j. In r vs. Puddick (2).

(17) In rvs. House (5) (1921) 16 cr. App. R 49 (c c a) it was held by lord chief justice sankey that it was a misdirection to tell the jury, in general terms that an affirmative is stronger than negative evidence and that counsel for the prosecution ought not to appeal to the religious or racial prejudices. There, the counsel for the prosecution stated that is was a clear case of despoiling of the egyptians by the israelites and of the british seamen falling into the hands of these sharks and that they were brutes, coming from no where, robbing the british subjects. It was held that this criticism by the counsel was highly improper and ought to have been checked at that time, and that it was impossible to say that it could not have influenced the jury. The whole trial was vitiated. The conviction was quashed.

(18) In r vs. Superman (6) (1935) 25 cr. App. R. 109 lord chief justice hewart observed :

"it cannot be too often made plain that the business of counsel for the grown is fairly and impartially to exhibit all the facts to the jury. The crown has no interest in procuring a conviction. The only interest is that the fight person should be convicted, that the truth should be known, and that justice should be done. It would be deplorable if any counsel for the crown should refuse to stand on the real strength of his case and think that he can srrengthen and support it by things colletaral in a manner contrary to the letter and spirit of english law. By so doing, he can only weaken his case and may prevent a verdict which ought, otherwise to be obtained."

The learned judge quoted the observations of lord chancellor, lord sankey in another case in rvs. Maxwell (7) (1934) 24 crl. App. R. 152 (at 176) which read as follows :

''it must be remembered that the whole policy of criminal law nas been to see that as against the prisoner every rule in his favour is obseived and that no rule is broken so as to prejudice the chance of the jury fairly trying the true issues. The sanction for the observance of the rules of evidence in criminal cases is that, if they are broken in any case, the conviction may be quashed. ''

(19) Again in r vs. Neal (8) 1949 (2) all e. R. 438 lord goddard observed that if some irregularity came to the knowledge of the counsel before the verdict is returned, he should bring it to the attention of the court at the earliest possible moment so that the presiding judge may consider whether or not to discharge the jury without giving a verdict. Matters of this sort ought not to be held in reserve with a view to taking them before the appellate court when it may be too late to remedy the mistake. In that case the jury was wrongly given permission to leave the court to have luncheon together and they did so.

(20) Ormerod, l j. Said in abbott vs. Refuge assurance co. Ltd. (9) 1961 (3) all e. R. 1074 that the prosecuting counsel, when conducting; a prosecution, were acting for the crown and owed a duty to the court and if satisfied that there was no evidence against an accused, were to ask leave to withdraw the prosecution, and, this course not having been taken by the experienced counsel who appeared in the case, the court would not find that there had not been reasonable and probable cause for resisting the submission that there was no case against the accused.

(21) The above principles have been followed in india (vide r vs. Kashinath dinker (10) 8 bom. H c r 126 (fb) sardarilal vs. The crown (11) a i r 1923 lahore 234 anant wasudeo vs. Emperor (12) a i r 1924 nag. 243. The public prosecutor it has been held, is to guide the prosecution and the same cannot be entrusted to the advocate appointed on behalf of the private complainant. (ramakistiah vs. State of a. P. (13) a i r 1959 a. P. 659.

(22) From the aforesaid rulings, the following principles ean be summarised. The prosecuting counsel stands in a position different from that of an aavocate who represents the eomplaiant. He does not represent either the defacte complainant or the police. He is a representative of the state and is part of the court and in that sense called a minister ef justice. His function is to assist the court in arriving at the truth. It is not his duty to obtain a conviction at any cost but simply to lay before the court the whole of the facts of the case and the law. The state too has no interest in procuring a conviction. Its only interest is that the guilty must be punished and justice should be done, it is regarded as proper for the prosecution to acquaint the defence as to any relevant information so that the defence may have the opportunity to use it if they so desire and so that no unfairness is meted out to the accused, (see also kenny's out lines of criminal law, 19th ed. (1966) p. 611 - 612). The position of the prosecutor is thus quasi judicial and one of trust. I hold en the first point accordingly.

(23) On the second point, the question is whether the accused can raise a reasonable apprehension of bias against a particular person appointed as a special public prosecutor under section 24 (8) of the code of criminal procedure.

(24) I am unable to accept the extreme argument for the respondents that the accused has no locus standi to raise such an objection. For example, if a particular person has already been working as a standing counsel or advocate for the defacto - complainant will it be fair to appoint him as a public prosecutor ? will he give an impression to any reasonable man that he would work disintere. Stedly for the prosecution as well as for the accused. In my opinion, not.

(25) It is well - settled that justice should not only be done but should manifestly and undoubtedly be seen to be done, (per lord hewart c. J. In r. Vs. Sussex, exp. Me carthy (14) 19241. , k. B. 256, 259. There a solicitor was acting for a client who was suing a motorist for damages. The solicitor was also acting clerk to the justices before whom the same motorist was convicted of dangerous driving and he retired with them when they were considering their decisions. The fact that the clerk's firm was acting against the interests of the convicted motorist in other proceedings was held to invalidate the conviction, even though it was proved that the justices had not in fact consulted the clerk and that he had scrupulously refrained from saying anything prejudicial.

(26) The same in my opinion applies to the case of a public prosecutor who is part of the court and is expected to ant qussi - judicially while discharging his duties for the state as well as towards the accused.

(27) Or the facts of the present case the second respondent had earlier filed twe applications in court for adjournment describing himself as the counsel appointed by the 3rd respondent. I am prepared to assnmethat the various other allegations made by the petitioner against the second respondent are not true. Bat even so enee he has identified himself as the counsel for the defaeto - eomplainant, he had clearly disqualified himself from being placed in a position of trust and confidence so far as the accused are concerned. A reasonable apprehension has certainly arisen in the minds of the accused that the second respondent would not act with that impartiality which is expected of him. In fact, in one of the adjournment petitions under the second respondent's signature, he clearly alleged that the petitioner has committed the offences under the penal code and the dowry prohibition act. I, therefore, hold on the second point that the government acted illegally in appointing the 2nd respondent as special public j prosecutor. 27. It is not necessary for me to go into the question whether the earlier appointments of sri hanuma recfdi are correct or not.

(28) Before parting with ths case, i may state that the court in which we sit is a temple of justice and the advocate at the bar, as well as the judge upon the bench, are equally ministers in that temple. The object of all equally should be the attainment of justice. The advocate is retained by his client, yet he has a prior dnd perpetual retainer on behalf of truth and justice and there is nothing, not even the crown that can discharge him from that primary and paramount retainer. (per crampton j. In r vs 0. Connell (15) (1844) 7 ir. L, r. 261 at 311 - 312.

(29) The writ petition is accordingly allowed. I am also of the view that it is desirable to appoint a person not practising in prakasarn district es the special public prosecutor in this case to avoid any further cornplications and daisy in the trial. No costs. Advocate lea rs,250/ -.