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Riazur Rahman v. Venkataratnam .

Andhra Pradesh High Court
Feb 23, 1984
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Factual and Procedural Background

This revision petition was filed by a landlord under section 14(3) of the Andhra Pradesh Buildings (Lease, Rent and Eviction) Control Act seeking direction that the electricity service connection, which had been dismantled, be restored. The landlord resisted, arguing that the rent controller lacked jurisdiction because the building was constructed in 1980 and that the dismantling had been carried out by State Electricity Board officials in accordance with rules, placing restoration beyond the landlord's control.

The rent controller found jurisdiction and held that the disconnection was illegal and arbitrary, allowing the petition. On appeal, the appellate authority confirmed the rent controller's order in view of the Supreme Court's striking down of section 32(b) of the rent control act, concluding that the rent control act was applicable and directing restoration of electricity was proper. The present revision petition challenges that outcome; the revisional court considered, among other questions, whether Government Order (G.O.) Ms. No. 636 (dated 29 December 1983, operative from 26 October 1983) exempting buildings for ten years from the act operates retrospectively and whether the government had competence to make the exemption retrospective.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the rent controller had jurisdiction to entertain the petition and whether the disconnection of electricity was illegal and arbitrary.
  2. Whether G.O. Ms. No. 636 (exempting all buildings for a period of ten years from the date on which their construction is completed) operates retrospectively to cover buildings constructed before the date of issue of the G.O.
  3. Whether the State government is competent under section 26 of the Act to issue a notification with retrospective effect in the absence of explicit legislative delegation to that effect.

Arguments of the Parties

Petitioner's (Landlord's) Arguments

  • The petition was resisted on the ground that the rent controller had no jurisdiction because the building was constructed in 1980 (i.e., the landlord asserted the Act did not apply).
  • The landlord contended that the electricity connection had been dismantled by officials of the State Electricity Board as per rules, and the landlord could not be compelled to supply electrical energy since restoration was beyond his control.

Respondent's (Tenant's / intervening counsel's) Arguments

  • The petitioner’s counsel contended that G.O. Ms. No. 636, issued under section 26 and exempting buildings for ten years from the date their construction is completed, covers periods both anterior to and subsequent to the date of issue of the G.O. (i.e., the counsel argued for retrospective effect).
  • The respondent's counsel (supporting the order) argued the G.O. is concerned only with the ten-year span from the date of the issue of the G.O., and further contended that the government is not empowered to give retrospective operation by notification.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Motor General Traders v. State of A.P., AIR 1984 S.C. 121 Struck down section 32(b) of the Andhra Pradesh Buildings (Lease, Rent and Eviction) Control Act as violative of Article 14; criticised the arbitrary classification produced by that provision and recognised that exemption for a limited period may be provided but that the long efflux produced discrimination. The decision motivated issuance of G.O. Ms. No. 636 and the court relied on its ratio to conclude that the rent control act applies (since sec. 32(b) was struck down) and to evaluate the propriety of any retroactive effect claimed for the G.O.
State of Bombay v. Vishnu Ramachandra, AIR 1961 S.C. 307 Where action is taken after an Act comes into force in respect of antecedent facts, it is not necessarily retrospective; the object of protective provisions may justify operation in respect of antecedents without being retrospective. Used to show that application of a statute to antecedent events does not automatically make it retrospective and to inform the court's approach to whether the notification was retrospective.
Mst. Rafiquennessa v. Lal Bahadur Chetri, AIR 1964 S.C. 1511 Protection conferred by an Act upon a tenant who "has actually built" a permanent structure can cover cases where the structure was raised before the Act came into force. Relied upon to illustrate that certain statutory expressions may include antecedent actions without rendering the statute retrospective.
T.K. Lakshmana v. State of Madras, AIR 1968 S.C. 1489 Expressions such as 'has made', 'has ceased', 'has failed', and 'has become' may denote events before or after the coming into force of a statute; the event must have occurred when the action is initiated. Applied as interpretative authority to assess whether phrases like "construction is completed" could include antecedent constructions for the purpose of the notification.
S.N. Kamble v. Sholapur Borough Municipality, AIR 1966 S.C. 538 The expression 'held on lease' is descriptive and applies to lands held on lease prior to or after the coming into force of an Act. Used to support interpretative principles about whether statutory expressions can encompass antecedent facts.
J.N. Sharma v. H.H. Vijaykuverba, AIR 1966 S.C. 1074 The phrase 'when a person dies' may include a person who died before the coming into force of the Act. Relied upon to show the courts' approach to temporal scope of statutory language and inclusion of prior events.
Rai Ramakrishna v. State of Bihar, AIR 1963 S.C. 1667 Legislature is competent to enact laws prospectively or retrospectively and has subsidiary power to validate laws previously held invalid; legislature can cure infirmities by fresh legislation. Invoked to acknowledge the legislature's competence regarding retrospectivity, while distinguishing the executive's limited power to make retrospective notifications in the absence of statutory authorization.
M/s Punjab Tin Supply Co. v. Central Government, AIR 1984 S.C. 87 A notification under delegated power (here s.3) does not clearly indicate exemption for buildings given sewerage or electrical connection prior to the notification date; benefit applies only to those buildings that receive the connection on or after the notification date (i.e., notification not retrospective). The court held this decision squarely applicable: the Punjab Tin Supply Co. case supports the conclusion that the G.O. cannot be construed to grant retrospective exemption to buildings to which the Act already applied prior to the G.O.
I.T. Officer, Alleppey v. M.C. Ponnoose, AIR 1970 S.C. 385 Delegated authorities cannot make rules/regulations with retrospective effect unless the empowering statute expressly or by necessary implication confers such power; legal fictions in statutes cannot be extended to confer retrospective authorisation absent clear statutory language. Applied to conclude that section 26 of the Act does not empower the government to issue notifications with retrospective effect; therefore the G.O. could not validly exempt buildings for periods prior to its operative date.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The court's analysis proceeded in discernible stages, strictly following authorities and the language of the statute and notification:

  1. Jurisdiction and factual conclusion: The rent controller found, and the appellate authority confirmed, that the rent controller had jurisdiction and that the electricity disconnection was illegal and arbitrary. Those concurrent factual findings were treated as not amenable to interference.
  2. Effect of striking down section 32(b): The court noted that the Supreme Court in Motor General Traders struck down section 32(b), which had exempted certain buildings; as a consequence, the Act applies to buildings that earlier might have been excepted by sec. 32(b). This legal backdrop motivated G.O. Ms. No. 636, which sought to exempt buildings for ten years from the date of completion.
  3. Whether the G.O. is retrospective: The core legal question was whether the G.O.'s ten-year exemption can be read to cover buildings constructed before the G.O.'s operative date (i.e., whether it is retrospective). The court considered the nature of the expression used in the G.O.—"the date on which their construction is completed"—and treated that phrase as forward-looking in ordinary meaning.
  4. Precedential guidance on retrospectivity and construction of delegated notifications: The court surveyed a line of Supreme Court authorities demonstrating the principles for construing temporal operation of statutes and subordinate instruments. It relied on decisions showing that (a) certain statutory expressions may include antecedent events for purposes of initiating action without being retrospective; (b) notifications issued by delegates must be construed with care and do not lightly receive retrospective effect; and (c) absent express or necessarily implied delegation, subordinate authorities cannot create retrospective rules or notifications.
  5. Application of Punjab Tin Supply Co. and Ponnoose: The Punjab Tin Supply Co. decision was treated as directly analogous: that notification did not intend to exempt buildings which had already come within the scope of the Act prior to the notification date. The Ponnoose decision was applied to hold that section 26 provides no language authorising the government to exempt buildings for periods prior to the notification; hence retrospective exemption could not be validly conferred by G.O. Ms. No. 636.
  6. Conclusion on retrospective effect: The court concluded that ascribing retroactivity to the G.O. would amount to "ploughing back" the ten-year exemption into the period immediately preceding the notification and would denude a considerable slice of the period which the Supreme Court had found to aggravate discrimination. Therefore, the expression in the G.O. should be read as not covering constructions prior to the G.O.'s operative date.
  7. Final assessment: Because the notification could not be given retrospective effect and the Act applied (following the striking down of sec. 32(b)), the rent controller's and appellate authority's concurrent findings that the disconnection was unjustified stood, and the revisional challenge failed.

Holding and Implications

Holding: Revision petition dismissed.

Implications:

  • The revisional court upheld the concurrent factual findings of the rent controller and the appellate authority that the electricity disconnection was illegal and arbitrary; those findings were not disturbed.
  • The court held that G.O. Ms. No. 636 cannot be read to have retrospective effect to exempt buildings constructed prior to the operative date of the G.O.; consequently, the rent control Act applies to the building in question (consistent with the Supreme Court's striking down of section 32(b)).
  • No costs were awarded ("No costs").
  • The opinion does not purport to lay down any novel precedent beyond applying and distinguishing existing Supreme Court authorities; it confines itself to resolving the dispute between the parties and to the statutory/interpretative question of retrospectivity of the notification.

This summary faithfully reflects the information and reasoning contained in the provided opinion and does not add or infer facts beyond the text.

Show all summary ...

(1) This revision petition arises under the a. P. Buildings (lease, rent and eviction) control act at the instance of the landlord. The petition is field under sec. 14 (3) of the rent control act for a direction to the landlord to restore the electricity service connection which was dismantled arbitrarily. This petition was resisted by the landlord on the ground that the rent controller has no jurisdiction to entertain the application as the building was constructed in the year 1980, and it was also contended that it was dismantled by the officials of the state electricity board as per rules and the landlord can not be compelled to supply electrical energy to the petitioner a* it is beyond his control. The rent controller found that he had jurisdiction to entertain the petition and the disconnection of the electricity was illegal and arbitrary and in this view allowed the petition. On appeal, it was held that in view of striking down of section 32 (b) of the rent control act by the supreme court the rent control act is applicable and the order of the rent controller directing restoration of electricity is confirmed.

(2) The learned counsel for the petitioner contended that g. O. Ms. No 636 dated 2 - 1 - 1984 under sec. 26 of the act exempting all buildings for a period of ten years from the date on which their construction is completed covers the period anterior to the date of issue of g. O. As well as subsequent to the same. The learned counsel for the respondent sought to sustain the order on the ground that the g. O. Is concerned with the span of ten years from the date of the issue of go and in any event the government by issue of notifications not empowered to give retrospective operation.

(3) The g. O. Which controls the decision is as follows : - g. O. Ms. No. 636, general administration (accommodation - a) department. 29th december, 1983 in exercise of the powers conferred by section 26 of the andhra pradesh buildings (lease, rent and eviction) control act, 1960 (andhra pradesh act xv of 1960) the governor of andhra pradesh hereby exempts with effect on and from 26th october, 1983 from the operation of the provisions of the said act - (a) all buildings for a period of ten years from the date on which their construction is completed ; and (b) buildings the monthly rent of which exceeds rupees one thousand. The g. O. Is an inevitable sequel to the decision of the supreme court in motor general traders vs. State of a. P. (1) air 1984 s. C. 121 wherein it is held that sec. 32 (b) of the andhra pradesh buildings (lease, rent and eviction) control act, 1960 exempting all buildings constructed on or after 26th august, 1957 from the operation of the act is in breach of article 14 of the constitution. It is necessary to recapitulate the ratio propounded by the supreme court and it is held as follows at page 126.

"there cannot be any valid justification to apply the apt to a building which is 27 yea's old and not to apply it in the case of a building which is 26 years old. The anomaly that is brought about by sec. 32 (b) of the act would be more pronounced when the state government by a no ification brings the act into force now in any part of the state for tha first time. On such extension of the act, only buildings constructed prior to august, 26, 1957 in that part of the state would become subject to the act and later buildings would still be exempt from its operation. This is a wholly insupportable classification the classification of buildings into two classes for purposes of sec. 32 (b) of the act therefore does not any longer bear any relationship to the object, since the buildings which are exempted have already come into existence and their owners have realised a major part of their investment"
.

The inspiration for g. O. Is the observations of the supreme court at page 31 which are as follows : -

"the incentive to build provides a rational basis for classification and it is necessary, in the national interest, that there should be freedom from restrictions for a limited period of time. It is always open to the state legislature or the state government to take action by amending the act itself or under sec. 26 of the act, as the case may be, not only to provide incentive to persons who are desirous of building new houses, as it serves a definite social purpose but also to mitigate the rigour to such class of landlords who may have recently built their houses for a limited period"
.

It is patent that the issue of notification is designed to refill the vacuum. The essence of the contention of the learned counsellor the petitioner is that the period of ten years stipulated in the g. O. Is two fangled as it is forward looking as well as anterior and the retroactivity is sought to be spelt out. In this context the vital considerations are whether the g. O. Is retrospective and whether the government is competent to give retrospectivity in the absence of specific delegation to that effect by the legislature.

(4) In state of bombay v. Vishnu ramachandra (2) air 1961 s c. 307 the issue is whether a person convicted for theft can be directed to move out of the specified area under sec 57 of the bombay police act, 1951. Which provided that person who has been convicted of certain offence is liable to be moved out. The contention is that as the conviction was before the act the question of removal does not arise. The supreme court held that the object of sec. 57 of the bombay police act, 1951 is to protect the public from the activities of undesirable persons who have been convicted of offences of a particular kind and if the action taken is after the act comes into force for the antecedents the statute cannot be considered as having been applied retrospectively, in mst. Rafiquennessa v. Lal bahadur chetri (3) air 1964 s c. 1511 it was held that the protection from eviction conferred by an act upon a tenant who 'has actually built' a permanent structure on the land of the tenancy was held to cover cases in which the tenant raised the structure before coming into force of the act. In t k. Lakshmana v. State of madras (4) air 1968 s c. 1489 it is held that the words 'has made', 'has ceased,' 'has failed', and 'has become' may denote events happening before or subsequent to coming into force of the statute and that the event must have taken place at the time when action on that score is initiated. In s n. Kamble v. Sholapur borough municipality (5) air 1966 s c. 538 the expression 'held on lease' is descriptive of land and applies to lands held on lease prior to or after coming into force of the act. In j n. Sharma v. H h. Vijaykuverba (6) air 1966 s c. 1074 it is held that the words 'when a person dies' may include a person who died prior to the coming into force of the act. In rai ramakrishna v. State of bihar (7) air 1963 s c. 1667 it is held that the legislature is competent to enact law both prospectively and retrospectively and this power includes the subsidiary or auxiliary power to validate laws which have been found to be invalid and if a law passed by a legislature is struck down by the courts as being invalid for one infirmity or another, it would be competent for the legisleture to cure the said infirmity and pass a velid law.

(5) The retrospectivity cannot be attributed in the absence of explicit provision to that effect by the language employed or transparent intention. The circumstances and antecedent events and the pedigree of the predecessor enactment or provision and the remedy sought to be projected and the object sought to be achieved constituted major role in landing at the inference of retrospective operation. Certain expressions employed in the enactments take in their fold the antecedent actions for initiating action under the act without giving the colour of retrospective effect. The provocation for the notification tion is blotting out sec. 32 (b) of the act exempting the buildings constructed subsequent to 1957 and the exemption for limited period is conceived without bordering on discrimination to provide incentive to the builders. The supreme court held that the exemption which ip valid for a short period initially snowballed into a vice of discrimination by efflux of long period namely 26 years and the period of ten years, immediately preceding the date of the judgment formed part of the said - period of 26 years and contributed to the vice. If the retrospective operation is assumed it will be tentamount to making inroads into this prohibitive or vulnerable period of ten years and the ploughing back for ten years results in denuding the considerable slice of the period in respect of which the supreme court held that discrimination is aggravated. Further the expression 'construction is completed' is forward looking only and is not susceptible of covering the constructions before coming into force of the g o. In this context, it is profitable to refer to the decision of the supreme court in m/s. Punjab tin supply co, v. Central government (8) air 1984 s c. 87. The validity of the notification dt. 31 - 10 - 1973 issued by the chief commissioner, union territory of chandigarh pursuant to sf c. 3 of east punjab urban rent restriction act exempting every building constructed in the urban area of chandigarh for a period of five years from the respective dates applicable to it from the operation of the act is challenged by the tenants on the ground that it is ultra vires sec. 3 of the act and in any event not retrospective. The purport of the notification is that all buildings are exempt for a period of five years from the date of seweage connection or electrical connection. The contention of the landlords is that all buildings which were given seweage connection or electrical connection within five years prior to 31 - 1 - 1973 should be considered to have been exempted from the operation of the act for a period of five years from the respective dates applicable to them. The supreme court held that the notification is in conformity with sec. 3 of the act and in the context of considering the retrospective effect it is held as follows at page 94 :

"in these cases the document which has got to be construed is a notification issued under s. 3 of the act by the chief commissioner who is only a delegate of the legislature. It is to be noted that there is no dispute that as soon as the act came into force on november 4, 1972 all the buildings which had been constructed prior to that date came within the scope of the act. The act also applied to all the buildings which were constructed thereafter and before january 31, 1973 on which date the notification was issued. The point for consideration is whether on the issue of the notification ob january 31, 1973 any such building to which the act already applied was taken out of the operation of the act. A reading of the notification does not clearly indicate that the chief commissioner intended to grant exemption in respect of any of the buildings constructed prior to jan. 31, 1973". Again it is held as follows at page 95 : "on a careful consideration of the question we feel that the benefit of the notification cannot be extended to buildings which were given the seweage connection or electrical connection or which were occupied, as the case may be, prior to january 31. 1973. Those buildings are governed by the provisions of the act and any decrees passed in respect of them are governed by sec. 13 of the act. The notification applies only to those buildings which are given sewerage connection or electric connection or which are occupied, as the case may be, on or after january 31, 1973".

This decision squarely applies to the situation in the instant case. The provisions of the act would have been applicable to all buildings but for sec. 32 (b) which carved out an exception in respect of the buildings constructed on or after 26th august, 1957. The effect of striking down sec. 32 (b) is that clause (b) is wiped out and it should be deemed that it was not in the statute and all buildings constructed after 26th august, 1957 are attracted by the provisions of the act. To ascribe retroactivity to the notification is tantamount to lifting the buildings constructed in the span of ten years, before the issue of notification, to which the act already applied.

(6) Another formidable aspect for consideration is whether the government is competent to issue notification with retroactivity. In this context it is useful to refer to the decision of the supreme court in i. T. Officer, alleppey v. M. C. Ponnoose (9) air 1970 s c. 385. In this case the tahsildar appointed tax recovery officer attached the shares of the assessee pursuant to the certificate forwarded by the income tax officer. The very same shares were attached by the decree holder who obtained a decree against the assessee. The decree holder filed a writ petition challenging the action of the tahsildar attaching the shares and selling them for satisfaction of the arrears sec 2 (44) defines the "tax recovery officer" including the collector. Additional collector and any gazetted officer of the central government or the state government authorised by the central government or state government and this new definition for the original definition of the tax recovery officer was introduced by the finance act which came into force from 1 - 4 - 1962. The notification was issued by the central government on 14 - 8 - 1963 authorising the revenue officials including the tahsildar to exercise the powers of the tax recovery officer and regarding applicability it is stated :

"this notification shall be deemed to have come into force on the first day of april, 1962".

The tahsildar effected the attachment of the shares subsequent to 14 - 1962 and prior to 14 - 8 - 1963. On the date of attachment he was not a tax recovery officer but the powers were conferred on him by notification dated 14th august, 1963. The question for determination is whether the state government could invest the tahsildar with the powers of a tax recovery officer with effect from a date prior to the date of the notification i. E. , retroactively or retrospectively it is held as follows at page 387.

"the parliament can delegate its legislative power within the recognised limits. Where any rule or regulation is made by any person or authority to whom such powers have been delegated by the legislature it may or may not be possible to make the same so as to give retrospective operation. It will depend on the language employed in the statutory provision which may in express terms or by necessary implication empower the authority concerned to make a rule or regulation with retrospective effect. But where no such language is to be found it has been held by the courts that the person or authority exercising subordinate legislative functions cannot make a rule, regulation or bye - law which can operate with retrospective effect"
.

It is further held as follows at page 388:

"it may next be considered whether by saying that the new definition of "tax recovery officer" substituted by s - 4 of the finance act 1963 "shall be and shall be deemed always to have been substituted"

It could be said that by necessary implication or intendment the state government had been authorised to invest the officers mentioned in the notification with the powers of a tax recovery officer with retrospective effect. The only effect of the substitution made by the finance act was to make the new definition a part of the act from the date it was enacted. The legal fiction could not be extended beyond its legitimate field and the aforesaid words occuring in sec. 4 of the finance act 1963 could not be construed to embody conferment of a power for a retrospective authorisation by the state in the absence of any express provision in section 2 (44) of the act itself

". It has to be considered whether the government is empowered to issue notification pursuant to sec. 26 of the act with retro - operation. Sec. 26 is as follows: '26. Notwithstanding anything in this act, the government may by notification in the andhra pradesh gazette, exempt, subject to such conditions and terms, if any, as they may specify in the notification, any building or class of buildings from all or any of the provisions of this act"
. There is absolutely no semblance of delegation of power to the government to exempt the buildings for the period prior to the date of notification. In the natural course of events the question of negating the application of the act does not arise when the act already applied. The government cannot issue notification with retroactivity in the absence of any delegation of such power by the act.

(7) The rent controller and the appellate authority as well on an apprisal of the facts and circumstances held that disconnection of electricity is not justified and such concurrent findings are not amenable to interference.

(8) In the result, revision petition dismissed. No costs.