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Punya Prasad Sankota And Another v. Balvadra Dahal And Another

Sikkim High Court
May 8, 1984
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Factual and Procedural Background

The Judicial Magistrate refused to allow the accused to contradict prosecution witnesses with reference to previous statements recorded by the police, on the ground that those statements were not recorded in the course of any investigation under Chapter XIV of the Criminal Procedure Code, 1898, and therefore did not attract S. 162(1) of the Code. The accused moved the Court of Session in revision. The Sessions Judge, under S. 438 of the Code, reported the case to the High Court. The High Court heard counsel and the records and accepted the revision, setting aside the Magistrate's order dated 31-7-1982.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether previous statements recorded by the police but not in the course of an investigation under Chapter XIV fall within S. 162 of the Code.
  2. If S. 162 does not apply, whether those statements are then available to the accused under the Evidence Act (e.g., S. 145, S. 155(3), S.157, S.159) for purposes of contradiction, impeachment, corroboration or refreshing memory.
  3. Whether a previous statement otherwise covered by S. 162 ceases to be so if it is signed in violation of S. 162(1).

Arguments of the Parties

The opinion does not contain a detailed account of the parties' legal arguments.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Tahsildar Singh v. State of Uttar Pradesh, AIR 1959 SC 1012 : (1959 Cri LJ 1231) Clarification (sealed by the Supreme Court) of when omission in previous statements may amount to contradiction. Cited as part of the settled law on the scope of using previous statements to show contradiction or omission.
Dahyabhai v. State of Gujarat, AIR 1964 SC 1563 : (1964 (2) Cri LJ 472) Followed Tahsildar Singh on the question of omission and contradiction. Noted as following the principle in Tahsildar Singh regarding contradiction by omission.
Shyamlal v. King-Emperor, AIR 1949 All 483, Para 31 : (50 Cri LJ 719) Support for the proposition that "investigation under this Chapter" in S. 162 excludes investigations under other Chapters of the Code. Referred to in support of the conclusion that investigations under S. 202 (Chapter XVI) are excluded from S. 162's ambit.
Abdul Majid v. King (AIR 1950 Cal 165) : (51 Cri LJ 680) Holds that a statement otherwise covered by S. 162 continues to be governed by S. 162 even if the maker has signed it in violation of S. 162(1). Cited for the proposition that improper signatures do not remove a statement from S. 162's governance; the court observed it but declined to pursue the issue because S. 162 was found not to apply in the present case.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Court accepted that the police investigation in the case was ordered under S. 202 (Chapter XVI), not under S. 156(3) (Chapter XIV). It reasoned that S. 162 expressly confines itself to "investigation under this Chapter" (i.e., Chapter XIV where S. 162 appears) and therefore excludes investigations ordered under other Chapters such as S. 202 in Chapter XVI. Relying on the Allahabad Full Bench decision in Shyamlal v. King-Emperor as supportive authority for that exclusion, the Court concluded that the statements recorded in the course of the S. 202 investigation did not fall within S. 162.

The Court then analysed the legal consequence of S. 162 not applying: the prohibition in S. 162(1) against using such statements does not operate, and the previous statements become usable for purposes allowed under the Evidence Act. The Court identified the specific provisions under which such previous statements may be used when the maker is examined as a witness: S. 145 (contradiction), S. 155(3) (impeachment of credit), S. 157 (corroboration) and S. 159 (refreshing memory). The Judicial Magistrate erred by refusing the accused the right to contradict or cross-examine the witnesses with those statements after concluding S. 162 did not apply; instead, those statements should have been available under the Evidence Act.

The Court also addressed, and briefly resolved, the subsidiary question whether a signature on a statement (despite S. 162(1) prohibiting signing) removes the statement from S. 162. Citing Abdul Majid v. King, the Court observed that a statement otherwise covered by S. 162 continues to be governed by it notwithstanding such a signature; however, since the statements here were held not to be within S. 162, the Court did not further pursue that issue.

Holding and Implications

REVISION ALLOWED; the impugned order of the Judicial Magistrate dated 31-7-1982 is set aside.

Direct effect: The accused are entitled to cross-examine and contradict prosecution witnesses with reference to their previous statements recorded by the police in the S. 202 investigation; those statements are usable under the Evidence Act provisions noted (S. 145, S. 155(3), S. 157, S. 159). The opinion does not purport to lay down any broader new precedent beyond applying the existing principles to these facts.

Show all summary ...

Bhattacharjee, J.:— The learned Judicial Magistrate refused to allow the accused to contradict the prosecution witnesses with reference to their previous statements recorded by the police on the ground that such statements were not recorded by the police in the course of any investigation under the provisions of Chap. XIV of the Cr. P.C 1898, and, therefore, could not attract the provisions of S. 162(1) of the Code, under the proviso whereof the accused is entitled to contradict the prosecution witnesses with reference to their previous statements only when those are recorded by the police in the course of any investigation under Chap. XIV of the Code. In Sikkim. Cr. P.C of 1973 has not yet been extended and we are still governed by the earlier Code of 1898. But it may be noted that the provisions of S. 162 of the new Code of 1973 are almost verbatim reproduction of the provisions of S. 162 of the Code of 1898, save for the new Explanation added to the section in the Code of 1973: the new Explanation, however, has not introduced any new principle, but has endeavoured to set at rest the sharp cleavage of opinion among the different High Courts, sought to be sealed by the Supreme Court in Tahsildar Singh v. State of Uttar Pradesh, AIR 1959 SC 1012 : (1959 Cri LJ 1231), followed in the Dahyabhai v. State of Gujarat, AIR 1964 SC 1563 : (1964 (2) Cri LJ 472), as to when an omission to state a fact or circumstance in the statements recorded may also amount to contradiction.

2. The learned Judicial Magistrate having denied to the accused the right to contradict the prosecution witnesses with reference to their previous statements recorded by the police, the accused moved the Court of Session in revision and the learned Sessions Judge has, under S. 438 of the Code, reported the case for orders of this Court as he was of the opinion that if, as held by the Judicial Magistrate, the previous statements were not recorded in the course of any investigation within the meaning of S. 162, then the statements would all the more be available to the accused under S. 145, Evidence Act to contradict the makers of those statements when deposing as witnesses. Having heard the learned counsel for the petitioners and the respondents and also the learned Government Advocate and having gone through the records ourselves, we have no doubt that the revision must be accepted and the order of the learned Judicial Magistrate must be set aside.

3. Both the Courts have accepted, and so have all the learned counsel appearing before us, that the investigation by the police in this case was not ordered under S. 156(3), whereunder the Magistrate empowered under S. 190 can proceed to order investigation before taking cognizance of the case, but was ordered under S. 202 of the Code, where under a Magistrate oilier than a Magistrate of the third class may before issuing process and in order to decide as to whether process should be issued, may direct an investigation to be made by any police officer for the purpose of ascertaining the truth or falsehood of the complaint. Such a investigation under S. 202, which occurs in Chap. XVI, is obviously not an investigation within the meaning of S. 162 which expressly refers and confines itself to “investigation under this Chapter”, meaning thereby the Chap. XIV wherein S. 162 occurs. It is, therefore, obvious that the statements recorded in the course of such an investigation, even though recorded by a police officer, would not come within the purview of S. 162. The expression “investigation under this Chapter” in S. 162 would obviously exclude all investigations under any provision in any other Chapter of the Code and would accordingly exclude the investigation under S. 202 in Chap. XVI or investigation under S. 196-B in Chap. XV and, therefore, any statement, whether recorded by a police officer or not, in any such investigation would not be a statement to which the provisions of S. 162 would apply. Though no citation should be necessary for so obvious a proposition, yet reference may be made to the Full Bench decision of Allahabad High Court in Shyamlal v. King-Emperor, AIR 1949 All 483, Para 31 : (50 Cri LJ 719). The learned Judicial Magistrate, therefore, was right in holding that since these statements were not recorded in the course of any investigation under Chap. XIV, S. 162 could not be attracted to the statements recorded in such investigation.

4. But what the learned Judicial Magistrate failed to notice was that if S. 162 did not apply to these statements recorded by the police for their not having been recorded in the course of any investigation under Chap. XIV, then the prohibition against the use of any such statement as enacted in S. 162(1) also would not apply and, therefore, such statements would be available for any purpose for which they are allowed to be used under the law. The learned Judicial Magistrate ought to have noted that when the maker of previous statement is examined as a witness such previous statement can be used under the provisions of the Evidence Act to contradict him under S. 145, to impeach his credit under S. 155(3), to corroborate his testimony under S. 157 and to refresh his memory under S. 159 of that Act. Once the learned Judicial Magistrate round S. 162 to be out of the way and did not find any other provision of law to stand in the way, he ought to have realised that the previous statements of the witnesses were available for the purpose of cross-examination, contradiction, corroboration and refreshing of memory of the witnesses under the provisions of law noted above. It is not, as the learned Judicial Magistrate thought, that a previous statement recorded by a police in order to be available to contradict the evidence of the maker, must be recorded in the course of an investigation under Chap. XIV and that only when so recorded they can be used for the purpose of contradicting a witness under the proviso to S. 162(1). On the other hand, when such statement is not so recorded in the course of any investigation under Chap. XIV, and, therefore, such statement does not attract S. 162, the right to use such previous statement becomes much wider, because while a previous statement covered by S. 162(1) can be used only to contradict the maker under the proviso thereto, a previous statement not covered by S. 162 can be used for cross-examination, contradiction, corroboration and also refreshing the memory of the maker of the statement when deposing as a witness.

5. One word more. Statements recorded by the police during the course of the investigation in this case were signed by the makers and a question accordingly cropped up during the arguments that whether a statement, though otherwise covered by S. 162, would cease to be so because of such signatures made or obtained in violation of S. 162(1) providing that no such statement shall be signed by the person making it.

6. Whatever may be the effect of the violation of this prohibition, and whether or not such signature would give rise to the impression that the maker of the statement being thus tied to a signed statement may not be a free and a reliable witness, there should be no doubt that a statement otherwise covered by S. 162 would continue to be governed thereby notwithstanding such infraction. That is also what appears to have been decided in the Calcutta decision in Abdul Majid v. King (AIR 1950 Cal 165) : (51 Cri LJ 680). But since the statements in this case have been held to be covered by S. 162 for not having been recorded in the course of any investigation under Chap. XIV, this question need not be pursued any further.

7. We accordingly accept and allow the revision and set aside the impugned order of the learned Judicial Magistrate dt. 31-7-1982, refusing the accused the right to cross-examine the prosecution witnesses with reference to their previous' statements recorded by the police. Records to go down at once.

8. Revision allowed.