Judgement

This bunch of appeals raise common questions of law and facts. Therefore, they are disposed of by a common judgment. In fact, the evidence in O.P. No. 274/82 (against which A.S. No. 397/85 arises) was recorded with consent of both parties and the judgment therein dated April 23, 1984 formed the basis for determination of the market value by the Court of all the lands under acquisition which were acquired for a public purpose.

2. The procedure provided in Part III of the Land Acquisition Act (Act I of 1894), for short, "the Act", foor the company was adopted in acquiring a total extent of Ac 2,058-23 cents in Chilamakur village and adjacent villages for establishment of the cement factory by M/s. Coromandal Fertilizers Ltd., Secunderabad. Notification under S.4(1) of the Act was published in regard to Reach No. XVI on July 13, 1981. The entire extent of land was divided into 59 reaches for the administrative convenience; the land bearing Survey Nos. 1293 to 1302, admeasuring about Ac 43-23 cents in Award No. 3/832 was acquired. Similar is the case with respect to other reaches. The Land Acquisition Officer determined market value between Rs. 8,000/- to Rs. 10,000/- per acre. On protest by the claimants, the Land Acquisition Officer made a reference to the civil court under S.18(1) of the Act. The civil court enhanced the market value uniformly at the rate of Rs. 2,000/- more per acre with usual solatium and interest. Assailing the legality thereof, this bunch of appeals has been filed.

3. Sri Gopal Rao, learned counsel for the appellants raised four-fold contentions. The first contention is that the court below enhanced the market value at Rs. 2,000/ -more per acre on the ground that the lands are possessed of adaptability for exploitation of minerals; therefore that formed the basis. The Land Acquisition Officer determined the market value taking into account the potential value as commercial purpose viz., extraction of lime stone for manufacturing cement. The Court below, therefore, cannot use again as a part thereof adaptability as a separate item for enhancement of the market value. The next contention is that the claimants merely stated that they are the owners of the lands; they made no plea that they are owners of sub-soil rights and without any pleading or proof thereof the Court below is devoid of jurisdiction to go into that aspect. Thirdly it is contended that no separate claim in that regard as required under Section 9 read with Section 25(2) was made for mineral rights. Therefore, the court below has exceeded its jurisdiction in enhancing the market value on that ground. Lastly it is contended that there is no valid reference under Section 18; the claimants merely wrote a letter like Ex. A-3 stating that they protest for determination of the market value. They did not seek any specific reference under Section 18(1) nor furnish any particulars the basis for making reference in support thereof. Therefore, the Court cannot go into those questions as it is not a court of original jurisdiction but is a special Court under the Act. These contentions are resisted by Sarva Sri Sadasiva Reddy, V.L.N.G.K. Murthy and Subrahmanya Narsu, learned counsel for the claimants.

4. The first question, therefore, is whether it is incumbent upon the claimants to plead and prove that they are the owners of the sub-soil mineral rights. In Chimanlal v. Spl. Acquisition Officer, Poona, AIR 1988 SC 1652 Thakkar, J. sepaking for the court held that the court has to treat the reference as an original proceeding before it and determine the market value afresh on the basis of the material produced before it. The claimant is in the position of a plaintiff who has to show that the price offered for his land in the award is inadequate on the basis of the material produced before the Court. Thereby, it is settled law that the claimant is a plaintiff and the reference is an original proceeding to determine the market value afresh. It is for the claimant to produce the material evidence for enhancement. It is now well settled by catena of decision of the Supreme Court, etc., Dilawarsab v. Spl. L. A. Officer, AIR 1974 SC 2333 that the best material is the documentry evidence of sales of similar lands at about the time of the notification under Section 4(1) and too much reliance on oral evidence on behalf of the claimants about the income from the lands is not a valid bais. Therefore, the claimants have to plead and prove that the market value determined by the Land Acquisition Officer is inadequate and the market value of the land is much more than what was offered in the award by the Land Acquisition Officer. The immediate question is, what is the nature of the pleadings the claimants have to adumbrate. In a case where the acquisition is of a land, every claimant has to set up the nature of interest he holds as required under Section 9 of the Act. Section 9(2) of the Act provides that the notice shall state the particulars of the land so needed and shall require all persons interested in the land to appear personally or by agent before the Collector at a time and place therein mentioned and to state the nature of their respective interests in the land and the amount and particulars of their claims to compensation. The contention of Sri Gopal Rao, is that the particulars of their claim for compensation must be specific with reference to all their claims and in these cases, the claimants have not pleaded anything about their sub-soil mining rights and the absence thereof militates against the claimants and the Court below in its absence cannot consider such a claim. I find it difficult to give acceptance to the contention. R. W. 1, the claimant K. Gangi Reddy, in his evidence has stated thus :

"I am owner of the acquired lands. They were acquired by the Land Acquisition Officer for purposes of construction of cement factory by Coromandal Fertilizers Limited, Secunderabdd .Lime stone is available in the acquired land. The acquired lands yield a net annual income of Rs. 50,000/- if lime stone mine is worked in the same. The acquired lands yield commercial crops. The said crops fetch an annual income of Rs. 2,000/per acre ...."

In the cross-examination, he admitted that he did not obtain licence from the Government to extract the minerals and that he was paying land revenue to the Government and he was raising dry crops in the acquired lands prior to the acquisition. There is no dispute raised when he was cross-examined that he is not the owner of the sub-soil rights and those rights are vested in the State. The Andhra Pradesh (Andhra Area) Land Registration Regulation, XXVI of 1802) requires that the Collectors of Zilas shall keep public registers, according to the forms prescribed by the Board of Revenue for the purpose of registering the landed property paying revenue to Government within their respective zilas and. shall enter all transfers of land from one proprietor to another, which said registers shall be open at all times to the inspection of persons concerned in seeing them. Consequences of transfers of land without registration which are adumbrated in Section 3 thereof are not material. Therefore, merely because the land is registered for purposes of transfer intervivos, that does not automatically posit that the owner of the land acquire his title to the property by only pattas granted by the State. The reliance placed on para 3 of the Board Standing Orders by Sri Gopal Rao is of little assistance. Therein, it is obligated for assessment of the patta lands for payment of Zamabandi and additional assessment is to be made in case minerals are found in the land. It is for the purpose of collecting land revenue. It is far from saying that the owner of the acquired title only under a patta under the B.S. O. and his title to the land is traceable only thereunder. We cannot assume or draw any such presumption that the claimants in these cases are only pattadars and that pattas were granted to them by the Government subject to certain conditions. When R.W. 1 asserted his title as owner, his attention was not drawn to the nature of ownership he had. In Raja Anand v. State of U.P., AIR 1967 SC 1081 while considering the right of the owner who had title under a Sanad, their Lordships of the Supreme Court, speaking through Ramaswami, J. held thus (at p. 1088) :-

"Prima facie the owner of a surface of the land is entitled exjure to everything beneath the land and in the absence of any reservation in the grant minerals necessarily pass with the rights to the surface. In other words, a transfer of the right to the surface conveys right to minerals underneath unles there is an express or implied reservation in the grant. A contract, therefore, to sell or grant a lease of land will generally include mines, quarries and minerals beneath or within it."

There, it is settled law that prima facie, the owner of the surface land is entitled to exjure, in the absence of any restriction or statutory reservation to the sub-soil mineral rights, surface rights encompasses the mineral rights therein. In State of Mysore v. Swamy Satyanand, AIR 1971 SC 1569 relied on by Sri Gopal Rao, the question that arose was whether the respondent was entitled to subsoil rights by virtue of the patta granted by the Jagirdar, and is entitled to compensation for the acquired land including the minerals. In that context, Mitter, J. speaking for the Court surveyed the case law starting from Hari Narain Singh v. Sri Ram Chakravarthi, AIR 1931 PC 133*. The cases referred to therein are all relating to either leases or grants. In that context it was held thus (at p. 1547) :

*[ or (1910) 37 and App 136 (PC) ..Ed.]

"What has to be considered in each case is the purpose for which the lands are leased or an interest created therein with all the caluses which throw any light on the question as to whether the grantor purported to include his rights to the sub-soil in the grant when there was no express mention of it. If the lease shows that the purpose of the grant was to allow the user of the surface only it would be wrong to presume sub-soil rights were also covered thereby."

The patta in that case had demonstrated that what was granted is only right to cultivation - to graze cattle thereon. Therefore it was held that that sub-soil rights were not granted under the patta. So, the decision therein is of little assistance to the facts in this case, when the claimants-respondents have asserted their rights in the acquired lands as owners thereof. The ownership includes bundle of rights inchzding sub-soil rights unless that right is expressly taken away or restricted by any statutory provision has been brought to my, notice. Therefore, I have little hesitation to hold that when the respondent-claimants assert that they are the owners of the land, their ownership includes the sub-soil rights to the minerals and therefore there is no need to make a specific pleading or proof that they are the owners of the sub-soil rights and that they are entitled to lay claim for compensation, including sub-soil mineral rights.

5. The next question that there is no specific averment either in the application pursuant to the notice under Section 9(1) of the particulars of their right to compensation including sub-soil mineral right and in its absence the Court is devoid of jurisdiction to grant any amount as compensation towards sub-soil mineral rights, is untenable. It is true that there is no specific averment made in the application or claim statement made in the Court below that the claim for enhancement for special adaptability of the lands for mineral purposes and the compensation is to be awarded on that basis. Sri Gopal Rao placed reliance on Gobardhan Mahto v. State Of Bihar., AIR 1979 SC 1246 wherein the facts are that pursuant to the notice given under Section 9, the appellant merely stated that there was a deep wide well in the land and he did not lay any claim for compensation to the well nor sought any specific amount in that regard. The District Court awarded compensation for the well. On appeal, the High Court held that since no claim was made, by operation of sub-section (2) of Section 25, the appellant is not entitled to any specific amount other than was awarded by the Land Acquisition Officer while considering that question, the Supreme Court, speaking through Chandrachud, C.J. held thus (at p. 1247) :

" ..He did not ask for any specific amount as representing the value of the well. The learned District Judge would appear to have overlooked the provisions of Section 25(2) and in any case his judgment does not show that he had come to the conclusion that the appellant was prevented by any sufficient reason from making a claim for compensation in respect of the well."

Undoubtedly, in case where a specific amount is sought to be claimed as value for compensation unless that is claimed, Section 25(2) prohibits the Court to grant any amount in excess of the offer in the award. In view of the amendment brought to S.25 under the Amendment Act of 1983, the law laid down earlier would be only a relic of the past. The need to make an application claiming a specific amount is obliterated. But we have to consider the law then applicable to the facts and the effect thereof. In Revenue Divisional Officer v. Appalaswami, AIR 1967 Andh Pra 56 this Court has considered the effect of sub-sections (2) and (3) of S. 25 and after considering the entire case law on this aspect, it was held (at p. 58) :

"In other words, the effect of Section 25(2) and (3) is that without sufficient cause, if Section 9(2) is not complied with, an absolute bar arises as to the obtaining of a greater sum than what is awarded by the Collector. The rigour of S.25(2) of the Act is migrated by Section 25(3). According to it, if the Court is satisfied that there was sufficient reason for the appellants lapse under Section 9, the Court can award a sum in excess of the sum awarded by the Collector. Thus, the court on being satisfied about the bona fides of the claimants conduct, can remove the penalty imposed by Section 25(2) and grant compensation in excess of what has been awarded by the Land Acquisition Officer."

In that case, claim was laid without any specific amount mentioned and this Court held that it is sufficient compliance of S.9(2) and the need to specify a particular amount is not an impediment to claim higher compensation. I respectfully agree with the ratio. This ratio was commended by V.G. Ramachandran in his Law of Land Acquisition Compensation, Vth Edition, Volume 1, page 572. In fact, in Gobardhan Mahtos case, AIR 1979 SC 1246 (supra), Chandrachud, C. J. has taken the view that if there is satisfactory explanation for omission to make claim, the Court is free to consider the claim and mitigate the hardship in not claiming compensation and the court is free to exercise its jurisdiction to award higher compensation. Therefore, I cannot agree with the learned counsel that the decision in Appalaswamis case, AIR 1967 Andh Pra 56 (supra) is no longer good law. It still holds the field and the Supreme Court did not intend to lay the law that the Court is devoid of jurisdiction to consider even in the absence of any specific amount in respect of any particular item when that to general claim was made in respect of all interests. Therefore, the absence of separate claim for sub-soil rights (mineral rights) in his land and they are capable of adaptability to commercial purpose, viz., exploitation of minerals for manufacturing cement, is not an impediment in their way for the Court below to consider the claim of the respondent for grant of compensation in that regard.

6. The next contention is that the Land Acquisition Officer has taken the potential value - the sub-soil right into consideration and has already granted the market value between Rs. 8,000/- to Rs. 10,000/- and therefore the grant of Rs. 2,000/- more by him, as a separate component is invalid in law. There are two facets in the argument. If a separate claim is laid for sub-soil rights apart from the surface land certainly Sri Gopal Rao is justified in raising that question. In Gajapathiraju v. Rev. Divl. Officer, AIR 1939 PC 98, Lord Romer speaking for the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council considered the question of valuation of the market value consisting of several components and held that the land possessed of no particular value like shares or market for sugar or other like commodity. In the case of land, its value in general can be measured by a consideration of the prices that have been obtained in the past for land of similar quality and in similar positions, and this is what be meant in general by "the market value" in Section 23. But, some times, it happens that the land to be valued possesses some unusual, and it may be, unique features, as regards its position or its potentialities. In such a case the arbitrator in determining its value will have no market value to guide him, and he will have to ascertain as best he may from the material before him, what a willing vendor might reasonably expect to obtain from a willing purchaser, for the land in that particular position and with those particular potentialities. For the land is not to be valued merely by reference to the use to which it is being put at the time at which its value is to be, determined - being the date of notification under S.4 (1) but also by reference to the use to which it is reasonably capable of being put in the future. The Land Acquisition Officer including the Court cannot determine by figment of imagination of the valuation of they land. In that case, the question for consideration was whether separate valuation can be given to the drinking water spring available in the land under acquisition. While considering that question, it was further held at page 109 thus :

"In these circumstances the possibility of the appellants water being made available for the harbour by anyone other than the Harbour authority was altogether negligible, and the only enhancement in the value to the appellant of his land by reason of its special adaptability as a water supply was the sum that the Harbour Authority, as a willing purchaser would have been willing to give in excess of the lands `Poramboke value. Their Lordships, have given their reasons for thinking, contrary to the view taken by the High Court, that such sum must be taken into consideration in fixing the compensation payable to the appellant, and that such sum is not to be treated as being a negligible one merely because the Harbour Authority was the only possible purchaser."

Thereby it is held that the special adaptability of the particular special features available in the land could also be, taken into account in determining the market value as a component of potential value of the land. This view was also reiterated by the Division Bench: of the Madras High Court in Raghunatha Row v. Secretary of State for India, ILR 44 Mad 264: (AIR 1921 Mad 324), wherein Oldfield, J. speaking for the Court held thus:

"If the land has what we may call an adventitious value, that is, something beyond its mere agricultural or normal value (and that is a marketable value in this case that persons wishing, for a purpose for, which the land is peculiarly applicable; to purchase that land would give a higher price for that land), then the arbitrator has a fair right to take that into consideration it is a matter no doubt contingent, but still it is a matter which is not to be ignored or put out of consideration by an arbitrator."

In that case, the mining quarry was acquired and the special adaptability for the quarrying was an element taken into consideration in fixing the compensation in spite of the fact that no one but the local authority for which acquisition was made ever made any demand as a quarry. In Daya Khushal. v. Asst. Collector, Surat, AIR 1914 Bom 284, a Division Bench of Bombay High Court also laid the same test of special adaptability as a component in fixing the market value. In Addl. Spl. L. A. Officer v. P. Anantha Bat, AIR 1972 Mys 313, Venkataramaiah, J. (as he then was) speaking for the Division Bench has also held in the context of estimating the value of the quarry that the special adaptability is one of the components for fixing the market value.

7. Thus, I hold that in determining the market value of the land, the Court is entitled to go into the special adaptability as one of the components for determination of the market value of the land but it cannot award the market value separately for the sub-soil rights. Thus, Anantha Bhats case is an authority for the later proposition.

8. The question, therefore, is whether the Court below has awarded separately a sum of Rs, 2,000/- towards sub-soil rights? I am of the view on consideration of the facts, and circumstances and the reasoning of the Court below, that the Court has taken this factor as one of the components for enhancement of the market value of the land but not separately for the sub-soil rights. The appellant has misconstrued the reasoning of the Court below in granting the market value for subsoil rights. Considered from this perspective, I find no illegality, in considering the special adaptability of the lands possessed of the mineral rights as a component in determining the market value. The undisputed evidence of R.W. 1 establishes that the lands are possessed of sub-soil minerals. The very establishment of the factory is to exploit the mineral - lime-stone for manufacturing cement. Therefore, it is implicit from the very acquisition itself that the lands are capable of exploiting sub-soil minerals. Thereby, I have little hesitation to reject the contention of the appellants that the Court below granted separately Rs. 2,000/- towards mineral rights.

9. The last contention that the reference under S. 18(1) of the Act is bad, is also devoid of force. It is no doubt true, in Mohd. Hasnuddin v. State of Maharashtra, AIR 1979 SC 404, relied on by Sri Gopal Rao, it was held that the reference under S.18 must be a valid reference. But the ratio therein does not apply in the light of the facts obtainable in this case. After following the procedure under Ss. 9 and 10 and making an award under S.11, the Collector is enjoined under subsection (2) of S.12 thus :

"The Collector shall give immediate notice of his award to such of the persons interested as are not present personally or by their representatives when the award is made."

Under S.31(1), the Collector shall tender payment of the compensation awarded by him to the persons interested entitled thereto according to the award and shall pay to them unless prevented by the circumstances enumerated therein. Sub-section (2) thereof provides :

"If they shall not consent to receive it, or if there be no person competent to alienate the land, or if there be any dispute as to the title to receive the compensation or as to the apportionment of it, the Collector shall deposit the amount of the compensation in the Court."

The first proviso to sub-section (2) postulates that any person admitted to be interested may receive such payment under protest, as to the sufficiency of the amount; Provided also that no person who has received the amount otherwise than under protest shall be entitled to make an application under S.18. Thereby the proviso gives a right to the claimant to receive the amount under protest if he is of the view that the market value determined by the Collector is insufficient and that thereupon he shall be entitled to make an application under S.18. Otherwise he is precluded to make an application. Section 18 provides thus :

"18. Reference to Court :

(1) Any person interested who has not accepted the award may, by written application to the Collector require that the matter be referred by the Collector for the determination of the-Court, whether his objection to the measurement of the land, the amount of the compensation, the persons to whom it is payable or the apportionment of the compensation among the persons interested.

(2) The application shall state the grounds on which objection to the award is taken."

(Provisos are not necessary. Hence omitted.)

Thereby it is seen that when an award has been made under S.11 and notice is issued under S.12, the claimant or the person interested is entitled to accept the award without any protest and receive the compensation. If he finds that the market value determined in the award is not sufficient, then he is entitled to receive the compensation under protest and make an application under S.18 seeking reference to the Civil Court on his objection as to the amount of compensation; etc.... It is not the case that any specific form has been provided for in making the application. In the application made under Ex. A-3 which is in the vernacular language and the translation thereof reads that he mentions the Survey Nos., the extent of the land acquired for establishing the factory, the amount determined by the Land Acquisition Officer and he states that the market value determined by him is not in consonance with the prevailing market value of Rs. 20,000/- per acre which he claimed for; therefore, he is receiving the amount under protest and he also claims that the compensation is to be determined. For that he agrees.

10. The essential requisites for a reference under S.18 are that the claimant or person having interest, must object to the offer made in the award - either of the extent of the land or the determination of the market value thereof and the application should be made within the prescribed limitation unless satisfactory explanation is given as to the circumstances under which the application could not be made within six weeks from the date of the Collectors award or within two months from the date of service of notice under S. 12(2). In Md. Hasnuddin v. State of Maharashtra, AIR 1979 SC 404, the question arose was whether the Court on reference under S.18, could go behind the reference and find whether the reference was made within the limitation. Section 14(1) of the Hyderabad Land Acquisition Act, 1303 F. (equivalent to S.18(1) of the Act) prescribes the limitation. The facts in that case are - instead of making an application for reference an application to review the award was made, alternatively, the claimant expressed his intention to seek his remedy in a Court of law. On that basis, the Collector declined to make a reference. Subsequently, on May 14, 1962, an application was made for reference, relying upon S.14 of the Limitation Act, 1963. Then, explaining all the circumstances, without giving any finding, the Collector made a reference to the Civil Court. On a preliminary objection raised by the Government it was held that S.14 of the Limitation Act does not save the limitation; the reference is time barred; there is no good faith in seeking to condone the delay. That was upheld by the Civil Court and the High Court. On appeal, the Supreme Court, speaking through Sen, J. considered the entire case law and divergence of opinions of various High Courts and held that the Collector under S.18 acts as a statutory authority; he has a duty to make a reference on fulfilment of the conditions laid down thereunder; the Collector may have to determine judicially whether the person making an application was represented or not; whether notice in the award under S.12(2) was served and what period of limitation applies and whether the application made in those circumstances was within time. These are pre-requisites and in that regard it was held that a written application is a first condition before accepting the award he must also state the nature of objection and tile time within which the application shall be made. Those conditions are matters of substance and their observance is a condition precedent to the Collectors power of reference. Ii is the duty of the Court to see that the reference made to it by the Collector under S. 18 comply with the conditions laid down therein so as to give the Court jurisdiction to hear the reference. In that context, the Court is not acting as a Court of Appeal but is to decide the validity of the reference and to see whether the reference is proper reference according to the provisions of the Act. It was further held that it is a basic and preliminary duty to which no Tribunal can possibly avoid. The Court has therefore, jurisdiction to decide whether the reference was made beyond the period prescribed by the proviso to sub-section (2) of S.18. If it finds that it was so made, decline to answer the reference. This ratio does not militate against the nature of the protest made by the claimant while receiving the compensation paid under the award under protest. In Krishnammal v. Collector, AIR 1927 Mad 282, the objection raised by the claimant was - "I will not receive the amount but will contest the matter in the District Court". The Court held that from the spirit of the objection, it is clear that the claimant is seeking a reference under S. 18 and that therefore the reference is a valid reference. In Peace Memorial Association v. Collector, Anantapur, AIR 1964 Andh Pra 264, Gopalrao Ekbote, J. (as he then was) was to consider a question that the claimant received the amount sent through cheque under protest and he endorsed on the receipt thus : "The dispute may kindly be referred to the Court of law". It was contended that the details required under law have not been given and therefore it is not a valid reference. While considering the law from that perspective, it was held that the claimants only complaint was that the quantum of compensation was not adequately fixed; he was demanding at a particular rate and he was granted at a lesser rate. In his request which he made in the endorsement on the receipt, it is stated that he received the amount under protest which "necessarily implied that he was not satisfied with the quantum of compensation fixed and that it is only for that purpose he wanted the reference to be made. The ground on which reference was sought, therefore, was clear in his request. It is not necessary under the section for him to give details of the grounds on the basis of which he wants the Collector to make a reference. It is enough if the written application discloses the ground which he wants to agitate before the Civil Court. In this case no party is in doubt about the quantum of compensation as lie was not satisfied with it. That is why he received the amount under protest." I respectfully agree with the ratio laid down therein.

11. In Venkatasami Naidu v. State of Madras, AIR 1964 Mad 434, the Division Bench was to consider the same question. The facts therein were that the claimants wrote a letter to the Land Acquisition Officer expressing their extreme disappointment on the amount fixed as compensation and stated that the amount of compensation which includes the value of the site as well as the standing trees was very low and requested thus:

"We hereby make known to you that we are not in a position to accept that amount as compensation."

The contention was that the application was not in the proper form, therefore, exercise of discretion by the Collector declining to make a reference is valid in law. The learned single Judge and also the Division Bench did not accept that stand and held thus (at p.435):

"The appellants having expressly stated that they are not accepting the compensation, we have no hesitation in holding that the implication of that letter is that they have asked for a reference under S.18 of the Act."

The writ of mandamus was accordingly issued to make a reference.

12. In Md. Golam Ali v. Land Acquisition Officer, AIR 1969 Cal 221, the facts are that while receiving the amount, on the back of the receipt, the appellant made an endorsement in the words thus: "Under protest". The question was whether it is a proper reference under S.18. The Division Bench considering the question, held that the receipts of payment which were ultimately given were endorsed on the back of those applications and in the circumstances, such receipts must be related to the applications themselves and must be held to be linked with the same and cannot but be held to be receipts under protest. The Collector, accordingly, was held to have committed illegality of his jurisdiction in refusing to make a reference. In P. Chandrasekhara v. Collector, ILR (1966) 2 Mad 428, the question was whether a mere objection to the award (viz., "I do not accept the award given by you. I request you therefore to refer the matter to the Court...") could amount to specification of the grounds of objection also; and the Court thought, With reference to the claim statement filed during the award enquiry, that the objection was to the adequacy of compensation. Failure to specify the grounds of objection in the request for reference was overlooked by applying the theory of substantial compliance. The same view was taken in Kelappan v. State of Kerala, 1968 Ker LT (SN) 7, where Govindan Nair, J. held on similar facts thus :

"The fact that there is no specific prayer in the application that a reference should be made, is not sufficient t o nullify the petitioner and reject the application. It is the substance of the application and not the form that must be looked into."

In Annamma Chacko v. Land Acquisition Officer, 1981 Ker LT 36, the claimants filed an application objecting to the adequacy of the compensation and requested for a reference to the Court. Subsequently, the amount awarded was withdrawn without registering a formal protest. When the L.A.O. declined to make a reference, Khalid, J. (as he then was) did not approve of this stand and held as follows :

"The Act clothes the authorities with powers which an ordinary citizen does not have. The properties belonging to the citizens are compulsorily acquired by resort to provisions of the Act ..Therefore those who are deprived of property should be permitted to make liberal use of the relevant provisions of the Act to secure reasonable compensation. A rigid approach to the provisions of the Act is neither helpful nor desirable. Adequate and reasonable compensation to which such persons are entitled, should not be denied to them on hypertechnical pleas."

The ratio in those cases squarely applies to the facts in this case and I respectfully agree with the ratio. When the petitioner expressly stated his intention in Ex. A-3 that the determination of the compensation is not adequate - when the amount awarded is Rs. 8,000/- and odd and the prevailing market value is Rs. 20,000/- he received the amount under protest. Therefore, he sought for a reference by implication.

13. In State v. C.R. Viran, AIR 1984 Ker 229 on which strong reliance was placed by Sri Gopal Rao, far from helping the appellants, it supports the ratio referred to in the above cases. The facts therein are that the claimant on receipt of the notice, sent a letter to the Special Tahsildar, thus (at p. 231)

"I do not admit the sufficiency of the amount awarded. I make it clear that I am proposing to receive such amount of compensation under protest as to the sufficiency of the amount. Therefore, on 7-3-1973 the date fixed as per the notice of award under S.12(2) of Act 21 of 1961, I will be presenting myself before you to receive under protest as to sufficiency of the amount of compensation tendered, by you and I request you to make available the amount immediately."

The contention was that this is not a valid reference. While considering the question of validity of the reference from the above facts, while reviewing the case law, in paragraph 11, it was held, (at p. 235)

"Thus the written application need not be one couched in formal terms: it maybe in the form of a letter or an intimation. It need not contain a formal player to make a reference under S.20 (equivalent to S.18): but it should contain at least a statement or suggestion that the claimant is looking forward to an adjudication by Court. It should also be possible, for the Collector from a fair reading of the communication, to discern on what ground the award is being objected to. Substantial compliance may be sufficient in these regions of forth, but compliance there must be, intelligible arid clear. It cannot be a matter of pure conjecture, of a plying patent omissions, or of discovering something where nothing exists. This is the limit within which the quaint dichotomy of strict law and liberal construction could be preserved."

On the facts in that case, it was held that it is not a valid reference. I respectfully agree with the ratio laid down, but the conclusion reached on those facts, I express my inability to subscribe to the view.

14. Thus, it is settled law that when the claimant received the amount offered under the award under protest and expresses his intention that the compensation determined is not adequate and commensurate to the prevailing market rate, it is implicit therefrom that the applicant is seeking a reference under S.18 (sic) of the claimant satisfied the statutory requirement - making an application in writing and expressed his disagreement with the determination of the market value by the L.A.O. It is implicit that he requests a reference under S.18(1). Substantial compliance is the requirement and is a condition precedent. Despite the omission of the material details in the application there is sufficient compliance with S.18(1). Therefore, it is a matter to be adjudicated in the Civil Court and the Collector is enjoined to make a reference under S.18(1). The details thereof could be supplied in a regular application to be made in the Court which is in the nature of a plaint, supplementing the omissions, if any, in the application. The above ratio is in no way conflict with the law nor their Lordships of the Supreme Court in Mohd. Hansuddins case AIR 1979 SC 404. (supra) intend to lay down any contra ratio. It does not militate against the above ratio nor stands overruled, as contended by Sri Gopal Rao.

15. Despite the question not being specifically raised in the grounds of appeal, I permitted Sri Gopal Rao to argue the point as it is a pure question of law. Therefore, the application to raise an additional ground is accordingly ordered. But in the light of the, above discussion, I have no hesitation to reject the contention that the reference under S. 18(1) is invalid.

16. It is next contended that the Civil Court itself has pointed out while disallowing the costs in that regard that the respondents under S.27(2) have committed error in not specifically raising the point. Therefore, the Court below having noticed that the application is not consistent with S.18(1) ought to have rejected the reference. I find no force in the contention. It is the substance of the matter and not the form that constitute is material factor and therefore the mere omission to mention the details in the application Ext. A-3 does not take away the jurisdiction of the Civil Court nor the Civil Court lacks jurisdiction to go into the merits and answer the reference.

17. It is next contended that the Civil Court gave no grounds for enhancing Rs. 2,000/- more per acre without any satisfactory reasons. Therefore, enhancement of the amount of Rs. 2,000/- is arbitrary.

18. It is true as rightly conceded by the learned counsel for the claimants that the order does not contain any specific reasons. But it is implicit from the order that the learned Subordinate Judge was conscious of the fact that the lands are possessed of potential value for commercial exploitation of the mineral deposits in the sub-soil and that was the component taken into account in increasing the additional sum of Rs. 2,000/- as compensation in addition to the compensation already offered, by the Land Acquisition Officer. Therefore, merely because no specific reasons have been given, it cannot be said that it is illegal. Thus considered, I find that the order of the Civil Court is not vitiated by any error.

19. It is next contended that from stage to stage the claimants have developed the claims from Rs. 4,500/- to Rs. 20,000/- and documents have been brought into existence only to increase the value the enhanced value does not reflect the market value and the Company is prepared to surrender the lands to the claimants. I find no force in the contention. Possession was already taken and therefore there is no scope for de-notification and divesting the right, title and interest in the lands acquired.

20. The further contention that the Civil Court having rejected all the sale deeds, has arbitrarily enhanced the market value is also devoid of force. It is true that the Civil Court has not placed reliance on the sale deeds produced by the claimants as comparable sales of the prevailing market value. But as already said special adaptability of the lands for commercial exploitation of the mineral deposits is a factor to be taken into account for enhancing the market value. It is one of the components of the bundle of rights or interests in the acquired lands. Therefore, increase of Rs. 2,000/- more cannot be said to be arbitrary, unjust or unfair. In fact, R.W.1s evidence that the value of the minerals to be exploited is more than Rs. 50,000/- has not been shaken in the cross-examination. Thus considered, granting a partly sum of Rs. 2,000/- more cannot be said to be arbitrary. Accordingly I hold that the order of the Civil Court is not vitiated by any error of law or fact warranting interference.

21. It is stated by Sri Gopal Rao that the validity of S.30 of the Amendment Act 68 of 1984 is now pending before the Constitution, Bench. The claimants are entitled to all the benefits of the Amendment Act 68 of 1984 depending on the decision of the Supreme Court. If the Supreme Court holds that S.30 of the Amendment Act is ultra vires of the Legislature or other reasons, it is open to the appellants to make an application to amend the decrees as regards the enhanced solatium, interest, etc.

22. The appeals are accordingly dismissed but in the circumstances, without costs.

Appeals dismissed.