Vechalapu Ramulu v. Vechalapu Appalanaidu

Kumarayya, J.:-

(1) This appeal is from the judgment and decree of the additional district judge, visakhapatnam, in a. S, no. 65 of 1961, affiriming the judgment and decree of the districr munsiff, chodavaram, in o. S. No. 330 of 1957 whereby the claim of the plaintiffs for declaration of their permanent rights of occupancy in the suit lands and for recovery of possession and of kist amounts and other arrears has been decreed.

(2) The plaintiffs and the defendants have the same surname. All of them are velamas by caste and residents of deekshitulu agraharam in veeravilli taulk of visakhapatnam district. It is common ground that bhamidipati bapanna and bhamidipati suryanarayana had each one pathika (1/4th) and yanamandram kameswararao had two pathikas (2/4) of wet and dry lands situated under nakkellavani cheruva of deekshitula agraharam village, which had become an 'estate' by reason of the madras estates land (third amendment) act of 1936. According to the plaintiff's, the 1st plaintiff, the father of the 2nd plaintiff and the father of the 3rd plainliff obtained lease of the said lands from the above land holders in or about the year 1917 and since then had been enjoying the said lands paying cists to the members of the family of the inamdars. In or about the year 1932, they put the defendants in possession of the suit lands,which cons:st of only one pathika belonging to bhamidipati bapanna, melwaramdar, under and agreement that they should cultivate the lands as sub - tenants and should pay kist to them at the rate of rs. 60 per year. Of the three other pathikas, the plaintiffs reserved one pathika for their own cultivation and leased out one pathika to vechalapu sanyasulu and another to vechalapu sanni, on the same conditions. We are not however, concerned with these pathikas for the purposes of the present proceeding. All these people were cultivating the said lands and paying rents regularly up to 1949. On april 13,1949, however, a fresh kadapa was executed by the defendants' family manager, vechalapu pedda buddeppa, and also vechalapu sanyasulu and vechalapu sanni, agreeing to pay kist at an enhanced rate of rs. 80/ - per pathika. The amount was agreed to be paid by kartika suddha 15 of the year 1949 - 50. After executing this lease deed, the defendants did not prove themselves as true as their word. They failed to pay the agreed lease amount. When demands were made they bided their time and finally denied the very right of the plaintiff's setting up occupancy rights in themselves.

(3) The plaintiffs, therefore, filed the suit for delivery of possession and recovery of rent and also damages for use and occupation for the period subsequent to the stipulated period of lease. The suit, of course, was confined to one pathika in possession of the defendants. The defendants denied that they were inducted into possession of the suit lands by the plaintiffs as tenants or were paying any amount by way of rent to them. According to them, vechalapu buddeppa, sanni and sanyasulu and one appalanaidu were brothers and were in possession of lands, known as nakkellavari cheruvu and dowikam, from a long time. They partitioned these lands among themselves. After this partition, the family members of the defendants sub - divided among themselves the lands which had come to their share. Each branch thus has been separately cultivating its respective share and enjoying the same to the knowledge of all the inamdars and the plaintiffs. They were pooling together the kists and paying the consolidated amounts to the inamdars. The plaintiffs' family purchased in 1912 a portion of the agraharam known as nakkellavari istuva. The 2nd plaintiff's sister also purchased from the inamdars some land and the plaintiffs and the 2nd plaintiff s sister were thus cultivating the land, one vrithi in extent.

(4) These lands have nothing to do with the suit lands which the defendants have been cultivating for yearss and which were included in nakkellavari cheruvu istuva. The defendants contend that the plaintiffs have no right to the lands in their possession nor are they (the defendants) the sub - tenants of tiie plaintiffs in fact, they as tenants of the inamdars, have acquired indefeasible occupancy rights in the said lands. The allegations in the plaint that the defendants had paid kist to the plaintiffs till 1949 and thereafter, on their behalf, pedda buddeppa executed a kadapa, are not true. Buddepa was not the family' manager or agent of the defendants and therefore, even if the kadapa was executed by him, it does not bind the defendants. There was no legal necessity to enter into such a transaction. The suit is liable to be dismissed. On these pleadings the trial court framed as many as 11 issues. On the material on record it reached the conclusion that the defendants were the tenants of the plaintiffs; that the kadapa dated 13th april, 1949. Is true and binding on the defendantsjthat as they were inducted into possession by the 1st plaintiff and fathers of plaintiffs 2 and 3, they are estopped from denying the title of the plaintiffs by reason of the operation of the doctrine of estoppel and consequently the plaintiffs are, entitled to possession and other reliefs claimed by them. On appeal, the learned additional district judge agreed with the conclusions reached by the trial court and dismissed the appeal. The defendants have now come to this court in second appeal.

(5) The main points raised by the learned counsel for the appellants, sri p. Kodandaramayya, are that the civil court has no jurisdiction to declare occupancy rights or to pronounce on the question as to which of the parties is a lawful ryot, as these matters are within the exclusive cognizance of the spe. Cial forums under the provision of sec. 56 of the estates abolition act, and the jurisdiction of the civil court is therefore barred. It was further urged that at any rate, on the date when the village had become an estate, the defendants were in possession of the lands and hence they had obtained occupancy rights and their possession cannot, therefore be interfered with, nor can a plea of estoppel be set up against them. We now proceed to consider how far these pleas are tenable. The first ground relates to jurisdiction. The contention is that as the dispute as to who is a lawful tenant is exclusively determinable by special tribunals under the clear provision of section 56 of the estates abolition act, the suit for that purpose in a civil court is necessarily barred. It is not easy to see why a suit, otherwise competent, instituted for several reliefs which cannot be granted by the special tribunals, should be considered to be beyond the cognizance of the civil court merely because a certain question within the cognizance of the special tribunal is incidentally an issue in the suit. In chigurupati venkatasubbiah v. Ravi punnayyd, which was an action for ejectment and recovery of mesne profits against the sub - tenants holding over, the defence was raised that the original lessor, the predecessor - in - interest of the plaintiff, was the pattadar benami for the landholder and hence the lease in reality was by the landholder and not by the tenant and consequently the lessees being the tenants of the landholder and not sub - tenants had aquired indefeasible rights of permanent occupancy, and therefore, the suit was beyond the cognizance oi the civil court. This plea was tried as a preliminary issue and was found against the defendants by the trial court. When the matter came up to the high court in appeal, chandra reddy j. (as he then was) , observed thus :

"the civil courts can certainly take cognizance of suits in whicn the title to the holding forming part of an estate is put in issue. Further, the relief of possession and mesne profits cannot oe granted by the settlement officer they being beyond his competence, and within the purview of civil courts. The principle is now firmly established that the jurisdiction of civil courts is not excluded when special forums could not grant certain prayers. See swaminatha v. Asan (i. L. R. 1947 mad. 505) and sukh dev v. Vasu dev (a i. R. 1955 all. 594). In my opinion, the ratio of this doctrine is that a plaintiff cannot be required to split up his cause of action and seek redress partly in a civil court and partly before a special tribunal. There is no reason why he should be compelled to choose different forums to get different reliefs. It may also be mentioned that the defendants impugn the validity of the tenancy on the ground that the lease being for more than one year ought to have been registered. All those are not points which could be decided by the settlement officer. Consequently, the plaintiffs are entitled to bring the suit in a civil court having regard to the nature of the prayers and the trial court was justified in giving the decision on this issue against the defendants"

The learned judge further observed that sec. 56 contemplates a summary inquiry as may be seen from the rules framed thereunder and the dispute envisaged therein is in regard to grant of ryotwari patta under sec. 11 of the estates abolition act. It follows from the above observations that if a civil action is brought claiming various reliefs, which cannot be granted by the settlement officer or the tribunal, merely because a question within the cognizance of the settlement officer or the tribunal is incidentally involved, the jurisdiction of the civil court to completely adjudicate upon all paints involved in the suit is not barred. This decision was later considered by a division bench of this court in paidi peda appanna v. Mocherla srirammurty in that case the defendants pleaded that the plaintiff was the landholder, that he was but a ryot under him and that after the passing of the madras estates reduction of rent act (xxx of 1947) , neither the plaintiff had. Any right to collect rent from him nor the district munsiff's court had jurisdiction to entertain the suit. The trial court came to the conclusion that the plaintiff was a ryot of the suit lands and that the defendant was only a tenant under him and in that situation the rent reduction act did not apply to the suit lands. On appeal, a further point was raised that by reason of the provisions of section 56 of the estate; (abolition and conversion into ryotwari) act, the suit was not maintainable. The learned subordinate judge observed that the defendant falsely sett'ng up in defence occupancy rights without any basis therefor, could not non - suit the plaintiff, a lawful ryot of the lands, and therefore, sec. 56 would not come into operation.

(6) The division bench accepted the rinding of fact reached by both the courts on the basis of evidence which was overwhelming and found that the plaintiff was a ryot under the zamindar and that the defendant was only a tenant under the plaintiff. Even so the learned judges held that sec. 56 provides for an original authority and also an appellate tribunal to try specified disputes and makes their orders final, the reliefs claimed in the case viz,, (1) recovery of rent and (2) determination as to who was lawful ryot,being within the exclsive jurisdiction of the special forums as envisaged by sec. 56, these questions cannot be agitated in a civil suit. In this view they allowed the appeal and directed the plaint to be returned. It is significant however that while dealing with the observations of chandra reddy j. (as he then was, in the aforementioned case, their lordships observed thus:

"we are not now concerned with a case where the plaintiff seeks for reliefs which cannot be given under the act. We need not therefore, consider the question of the procedure to be followed in such cases where some reliefs fall directly under sec. 56 and some outside its scope. But, if the learned judge meant to lay down that the civil court is not barred even in respect of a dispute between two persons claiming to be lawful ryots, with great respect, we cannot agree with that view."

This decision came up for consideration before another division bench of this court in pillutla nurasimhayya v. Molakalapalli perayya. The question involved m that case was whether having regard to the frame and purport of the suit, it was cognisable by a civil court in view of the provisions of the estates) abolition and conversion into ryotwari) act (xxvi of 1948). Learned judges in this connection considered the above decision (paid pedda appanna v. Mcherla sri ram murty. They did not agree with the learned judges who decided the above mentioned case that the reliefs sought for in that case could be granted under the act. They were of the view that they could be given only by the civil court. They, however, agreed that the dispute might arise between the lessor and lessee both claiming to be a ryot in respect of a holding, raising thus the question as to who the lawful ryot of the holding was. Such a dispute, of course, was to be tried by the settlement officer. But they observed at the same time that it was reasonable to support that it was the person who raised the dispute that had to came before the settlement officer. We may refer to the following observations of the learned judges in this behalf. - 'but it is reasonable to suppose that it is the person who raises a dispute who has to go before the settlement officer and it is not easy to see how a tenant in the position in which the appellant in the case was, could escape investigation by the civil court of his liability by merely raising such a dispute. The learned judges also remarked that if the settlement officer decides that the tenant is not a lawful ryot within the meaning of the madras estates land act, the dispute as to quantum of rent may not fall under the section althoughy they did not say what is to happen in that contingency.

(7) They seem to have thought that because in order to give the relief that the plaintiff claimed, it was incidentaly necessary to decide the question as to whether the plaintiff was a ryot entitled to the holding and that question has to be determined by the settlement officer the civil court should return the plaint. With great respect to the learned judge, it seems to us that the civil court would have jurisidiction to decide every question that has to be determined in order that it might grant a party a relief which it is quite competent to grant. Indeed this position seems to have been recognised by the learned judges themselves in the earlier part of their judgment. " after thus observing, the learned judges, on the particular facts of the case before them, came to the conclusion that the suit as framed was not cognizable by the civil court as it had no jurisdiction to give a declaration as to a right the determination of which is expressly committed to the offices and the tribunlal appointed under the act, and the suit must therefore fail. In another case mahalahshmi v. Ammaymmma decided by a division bench consisting of chandra reddy c. J. And mohamed ahmed ansari j. , wherein the reliefs claimed were ejectment and recovery of rent against a tenant holding over and the question of jurisdiction was raised, the view expressed in ghigurupati venkatasubbiah v. Ravi punruyya was reiterated and reference was also made to paidi peda appanna v. Mocherla sri ramamurti which according to the learned judges,was in no way opposed to the view taken in ghigurupati venkatasubbaiah v. Ravi punnayya and it was observed that some of the reliefs asked for by the plaintiff were such that the civil court could not be precluded from entertaining the suit which contained prayers for such reliefs and hence the suit was within the cognizance of the civil court. Rao gopal rao v. Official receiver, eluru is again a case decided by a division bench of this court, consisting of chandra reddy c. J. And satyanarayana raju j. (as he then was). The facts of that case were that respondents 3 to 5. Who claimed to be lawful ryots in respect of suit lands, had applied to the settlement officer and were granted rough pattas. The official reciever who represenced the insolvent landholder, allowed the decision of the settlement officer granting rough pattas to become final. Not merely this but also thereafter when he made application to the estates abolition tribunal vizianagaram, he applied only for apportionment of compensation amuont which means that the insolvent, whom he represented, was entitled only to melwaram rights in the lands in question. Having acted thus eventually he claimed totality of rights in the property in respect of which respondents 3 to 5 had set up that they had kudiwaram rights and were lawful ryots. It was held that the question involved was cognizable by the ssttlemant officer as it was within the exclusive jurisdiction of the tribunals created under the estates abolition act and therefore was outside the cognizance of civil courts

(8) In this connection the learned judges considered the decisions in appanna v. Sri ramamurthy and chigurupati venkatasubbaiah v. Ravi punnayya and observed that there is nothing in the latter decision which runs counter to the principle laid down by them. In sajjaginjala peddi nagi reddy v. Changari obula reddy jaganmohan reddy j, (as he then was) , following the decisions in chigurupati venkatasubbaibh v. Rani punnayya and mahalakshmi v. Ammayamma observed that possession and possessory title with a declaration of title or the grant of possesion where he is entitled to possossion are not matters. Which are within the competence of any of the authorities specified in the madras estates abolition act and that civil courts are not barred from taking cognizance of the matters which cannot be decided by tribunals like a settlement officer, and the settlement officer cannot pronounce upon the validity of resumption proceedings that had taken place already. We were also referred to the case pachai amal v. Anguswami graman decided by the madras high court in the in this case also reference was made to appanna v. Sri ramamurthy chigurpathi venkatasubbinh v ravi punnayya. The learned judge opned that the question whether the civil court is impliedly barred from taking cognizance of certain matters must be decided on the particular circumstances of each case. The principles which emerge from the above discussion may be stated thus 1 to pronounce en the question of jurisdiction, the nature of the suit has to be first determined, the substsnce of the plaint has to be kept in view regard being, had to the averments in the plaint, the alleged cause of action and the reliefs claimed therein. 2. Under sec, 9, c. P. C, civil courts have jurisdiction to try all suits of civil nature except those the cognizance wherof is either expressly or impliedly barred, the bar created by any statute is confined to the clear language intendmeut of that statute. The exclusion, therefore, has to be normally gathered from the words used in the statutory provision on which the plea is rested. The scheme, the relevant provisions and the object and purpose of the statute are also of no less significance in this behalf. So then, whenever a plea is raised before a civil court that its jurisdiction is excluded either expressly or by necessary implication to entertain a claim of civil nature, the court naturally feels inclined to consider whether the alternative remedy prescribed by the special statute is sufficient or adequate of course when the exclusion is in terms provided, consideration of the scheme of. That statute and adequacy or sufficiency of the remedies provided by it may not be decisive nor of much relevance. But when exclusion is pleaded as a' matter of necessary implication, such considerations are of supreme importance; nay,in certain circumstances,they are decisive. Sse kamala mills limited v. State of bombay 3. When a statute confers power oniany person for public purposes from which an individual may receive an injury and the mode of redressing the injury is indicated in the statute, the jurisdiction of the ordinary, courts in that behalf is ousted. 4. Further, where a special tribunal out of the ordinary course is appointed by an act to determine questions as to rights which are the creation of that act, the tribunal's jurisdiction to determine those qiestions is exclusive except so far as is otherwsie provided for neeessarity implied. Vide parld peda appanna v mocherla sriiramamurty and rao gopal rao v. Official reciver eluru 5. The jurisdiction at the inception of the suit depends upon the averments made in the plaint and is not ousted by the defendant saying something in his defence. It is to be determined having regard to the question what in substance the plaintiff's case is; of course, not how he has camouflaged his case. If he chooses his foram and files a suit, he will get relief from the forum chosen only if he establishes the correctness of his case and if he frames his suit in a manner not warranted by the facts and goes :for relief to a court, which cannot grant him that relief on the true facts, he will have bis suit dismissed. Vied raizada topandas v. M/s goraokhram gokal chand 6. Jurisdiction ofth e civil court is not excluded when special forums could not grant reliefs prayed for in a civil suit, as the plaintiff cannot be required to split up his cause of action and seek iredress partly in a evil court and partly in a special tribunal. "the mere fact that certain question falling within the exclusive determination of the special tribunal incidentally falls for consideration while judging the - truth or falsity of the defence set up will not exclude the jurisdiction of the civil court. Nor the pleas which are palpably baseless and unnecessarily taken in the case can affect the jurisdiction of the civil court which it otherwsie has. ' in fact, the civil court has jurisdiction to decide every question that has to be determined in order that it may grant a party a relief which it is quite competent to grant. Vide chigurpathi vtnkala subbiah v. Ravi punnyya mahalakhasmi v. Ammayyamma pillutla narasimayya v. Molakatapalli peraypa. In the light of the above principles we have to judge the question of jurisdiction in this case. The case of the plaintiff as we have seen, rests mainly on the bais that they are tenants having taken the lands on tease from the landholders, and the defendants are their sub - tenants who were regularly paying them rents up to 1949 and who, after the termination of the lease, are continuing in possession without making any payments for their use and occupation of the lands and are now interested in denying the right. It is clear that the avermentspoint out that the case is essentially one brought for recovery of possession of the suit lands and also amounts payable for use and occupation thereof of course, the reliefs claimed contain a further prayer for a declaration of the plaintiff's permanent occupancy rights also. But the primarye object of the suit is to recover possession and the amounts and not the grant of patta. Further, the suit is not against the landholder against whom the tenant may set up a claim that he has acquired rights of occupancy in the land. Inasmuch as the defendants are denying their rights, they seem to have included the relie for declaration of permanent occupancy rights of cpurve if the suit against the defendant was mainly and essentially for declaration of rights of occupancy,inasmuch as it would nacessarily involve the question who is the lawful ryot. Which question for purposes of the estates abolition act is material for grant of patta,the suit,would not have been within the cognizance of the civil court but only of the special tribunal contemplated by s. 56 of the estates abolition act. But the suit as filed contains other reliefs for which alone,strictly speaking, they have come to the civil cojrt. So then, the question of being a ryot raised by the defendants is merely a collateral issue to be incidentallyed consided in order to ascertain whether the defence if well - founded or is on the other hand, put forward only to put the case. Beyond the jurisdiction of the civil court. Certainly a suit otherwise well within the cognizance of a civil court cannot be put beyond it by reason of some baseless or illfoundeddefence. Nor can a plaintiff be non suited by defences palpably wrong and obviously unwarunted by the admitted or proved circumstances of the case. Obviously enough, once it is proved that the defendant! ware inducted into possession for the first time by the 1st plaintiff and the fathers of plaidtiffs 2 and 3, and not by the landholder as they claim, and were continuing as the tenants of the plaintiffs up to the date when they started denying their right, the question of their being ryots would not arise. But if, on the other hand, the case of the plaintiffs that the defendants took the lands from their possession as their tenants is disproved, the civil suit must fail. It is clear at the same time that) the jurisdiction of the civil courts to inquire into these two matters, viz. , delivery of possession and recovery of rent, is not excluded as the special forum cannot grant such reliefs nor is it excluded merely because a defence has been set up that the defendants are lawful ryots even though there may be no foundation therefore in that they were not tenants of the landholders. As has been held] in sajjaginjala pedda nagi reddy v. Changari chinna obula reddi the jurisdiction of a civil court to entertain a suit in regard to other matters cannot be taken away merely because in deciding sach matters, the court has to incidentally decide a matter which is within the jurisdiction of the tribunals under the estates abolition act. See also ramaswami aiyanagar v. Govinda iyer where it has been held that if a claim is partly within the jurisdiction of the rrgular court and partly within the jurisdiction of the small causes court, a suit for the consolidated amount can be filed in the regular court. See also pillurla narasimhayya v. Molakalapalli perayya where it was held that the civil court would have jurisdiction to decide every question that has to be determined in order that it might grant a party a relief which it is quite competent to grant. The jurisdiction of the civil court in relation to the above questions, therefore, cannot be open to doubt. It is manifest that the suit is essentially in ejectment of a tenant and recovery of rent of the amounts due for use and occupation of the lands. Both these questions are beyond the cognizance of any special forum and are within the cognizance of the civil courts. Both the courts have found that the 1st plaintiff and the fathers of plaintiffs 2 and 3 got landl from the land holders on lease, that they were in actual enjoyment of the same for years thereafter, that the defendants were inducted into possession by them as lessees that they were payirg renl up to 1949 and that a kadapa was executed in that year. These findings are based on evidence both oral and documentary, which is clinching. It is therefore, fairly established that the defendants are lessees of the plaintiffs and their present possession is attributable to the plaintiffs and not in any sense of the term, to the landholders. In that case, the defendants are precluded from denying the right of the plaintiffs and further they cannot successfully set up any claim of acquisition of occupancy rights which could ordinarily be acquired by a tenant from the landholder. The village in which these lands are situated has become an estate only by reason of the madras estates land (third amendment) act, 1936. It is true that these lands were then in actual possession of the defendants but the fact that at that time the defendants, and not the plaintiffs, were in actual possession of that holding makes no difference in as much as that possession was on behalf of the plaintiffs. It has been observed by sadasiva aiyar j. In rt. Kakariapalli pothu raju where the defendant holds possession as sub - lessee under the kudiwaram tenant, his possession at the time of the parsing of the estates land act must be treated as the possession of the kudiwaramdar himself and such possession cannot give him independent kudiwaram right in the land even if the zamindar gave the patta direct to him. He observed further that the provisions of sec. 6 of the estates land act, which confer such rights, will act in favour of the kudiwaramdar, if at all the kudiwaramdar is obliged to invoke these provisions in support of his title. This rule has been followed in re. Lakshminarayana where the learned judge observed that the possession of the sub - lessee must be treated as the possession of the kudiwaram tenant himself. It is also important to note that sec. 19 of the estates land act provides: "except as otherwise specially provided in this act, the relations between a ryot and his tenants, or between a landholder and a tenant of his private lands and the rights of any other owners of land, are not regulated by the provisions of this act. " it is plain that unless otherwise specifically provided in the act, the relations between a ryot and his tenants will not be affected or regulated by the estates land act. Be it noted, sect 6 confers occupancy rights in ryoti land. It gives rights to those ryots who were in possession at the time of the passing of the act or who were thereafter admitted by the landholder to possession of ryoti land situated in the estate of such land - holder. The term 'ryot' as defined in sec. 3 (15) of the estates land act means a person who holds for the pur. Pose of agriculture ryoti land in an estate on condition of paying to (he landholder the rent which is legally due upon it. The explanation reads thus:

"a person who has occupied ryoti land for a continuous period of twelve years shall be deemed to be a ryot for all she purposes of this act."

'ryotiland also' has been defined as meaning cultivable land in an estate other than private land. It does not include certain lands of the description given, in clauses (a) , (b) and (c) of see. 3 (16) of the estates land act. In order to qualify oneself to be a ryot, it is necessary that he should hold ryoti land in an estate for purposes of agriculture and further, on condition of paying to the landholder a rent. It contemplates a privity of contract between the landholder and the ryot. All these conditions are satisfied in the case of the plaintiffs. The explanation no doubt says that a person who occupied ryoti land for a contiguous period of 12 years shall be deemed to be a ryot for all the purposes of the act. Even assuming that explanation to a substantive provision may sometimes as well operate as an exception to that clause, as contended for on behalf of the appellants the explanation may be taken to mean that a person, who is not a ryot, is deemed to be so for the purposes of the act if he has occupied ryoti land for a continuous period of 12 years. In that view it may be said that a fiction has been introduced in the explanation to bring him within the meaning of a ryot, provided the occupation was on his own account and not on behalf of any tenant. That is what can be said to be implied ia the explanation. Thus a person who holds the ryoti land for purposes of agriculture on the basis of a contract from the landholder is a ryot. Further a person who had occupied on his own account even adversely to the landholder for a continuous period of 12 years also is a ryot according to the explanation. Once the latter comes within the meaning of the deeming provision in the explanation, his liability to pay rent also in respect of the land in bis possession would not be open to doubt for, having regard to the provisions of sec 4, the landholder is entitled to collect rent in respect of ryoti land in possession of a ryot. Be that what it may it is a mistake to believe that both the plaintiffs and the defendents can be ryots for this holding. Certainly, the defendants cannot he ryots when their possession is on behalf of the plaintiffs and is in the eye of law constructive possession pf the plaintiffs themselves and further the plaintiffs were already ryots in relation to the holding. As observed by horwill j. In guttula masenu v. Madipalli bhavaraju the purpose of the explantion was to give occupancy rights only to a person who was able to prove occupation for 12 years, where there was no osher ryot already having occupancy rights in the land. The legislature did not intend by that explanation to deprive ryots of their occupancy rights in order to give them to otheis. We respectfully agree with this proposition as it accords with reason and appeals to common sense. So then, when once it 5s clear that the defendants were holding the lands on behalf of the plaintiffs and the possession of the defendents for purposes of sec, 6 as well is possession of the plaintiffs, the question of the defendants being ryots does not arise at all. As the defendants possession enures for the benefit of the plaintiffs for purposes of sec. 6, it is the plaintiffs and not the defendants who are entitled to the benefit conferred by the statute. It is then argued chat as the piaintiffs got melwaram rights in the suit lands, the defendants, as aginst them, are ryots in relation to this holding. There is nothing to bear out the contention that the plaintiffs got landholder's interest in the suit lands. Reliance is placed on the testimony of the 3rd plaintiff which is not unequivocal in this behalf. In fact, far from admitting that the one pathika that they purchased belonged to b bapanna, he has categorically denied it. It is true that a portion of nakkalavari istuva was purchased by the plaintiffs' family. Further as the defendants' writen statement shows the plaintiffs' sister purchased some other portion of the land. Bui the defendants themselves stated in their written statement that those lands had nothing to do with the suit lauds. The suit lands represent b. Bapanna's interest which the plaintiffs do not claim to have purchased nor ss there any evidencte to show that they purchased the same. That is not the case of the defendants either in view of their written statement. In these circumstances, reliance on the 3rd plaintiff's testimony does not advance the case of the defendants any further. That apart, aa the courts below have held, even if it be assumed that the plaintiffs got the landholder's interest, after they got occupancy right, the right of occupancy could not be lost by reason of the express provisions of sec. 6 - a. In this behalf, we have been referred to two decisions of the madras high court. In ganjain manikyamba v. Pasala mallayya, a division bench of the madras high court held that a person who owns the kudiwaram already, and to whom the melwaram right is subsequently transferred, does not become a landholder, and his suit for rent is maintainable in a civil court. While deciding so, the learned judge held that sec 8 must be read subject to the explanation to sec. 6 of the estates land act. In coming to the above decision, they followed the full bench case in marina veeraswami v boyinapally venkatarayudu, where it was held that a person who was already the owner of the kudiwaram right and to whom the zamindar granted the melwaram sub - squently was not a person holding an estate or part thercof,and was also not a person entitled to collect the rent by virtue of a transfer from the owner of his predecessor - in - title within the meaning of s. 3 (5) of the estates land act,and therefore he did not acquire the status of a landholder in consequence of the grant by the zamindar and his suit was maintainable in the ordinary civil court against his tenants for recovery of rent. In matimuthu pillai v. Krishna joshi. It was held that where a person own. Ing kudivaram acquires an interest in the melwaram, quoad his holding, there is no coalescence of the two interests under s. 8 (1) of the estates land act but he still continues to hold the ryoti interest in the land. In express terms s. 6 - a, estates land act, states that there is no merger in cases of acquisitions of melwaram interests by a kudiwaramdar. If merger be negatived, the interests must continue to be separate aod held under distinct titles. Nor is there any possibility of invoking any common law doctrine of merger in such cases.

(9) Reliance of the appellants on the decisions in thota seshayya v. Madabhushi vedanta narasimha charyulu, and abdul rahim rowther v. Swaminatha qdayar, is of no avail as they do not lay down a proposition different from the one laid down in ganjain manikyamba v, rasala mallayya, or the full bench decision referred to therein. Those decisions rest on altogether differents facts and circumstances.

(10) The result of the above discussion is that so far as the reliefs in relation to possession and recovery of amounts due fur use and occupation are concerned) the suit ia the civil court was maintainable in law as the cognizance thereof was not govrned by any special law. The relief with regard to declaration of occupancy right may stand on a different footing. But inasmuch as the essential reliefs could be granted without any declaration cf the kind, the suit for the reliefs other than declaratory was maintainable. Ignoring the relief of declaration of occupancy rights, the relief of possession and recovery of amounts could be granted by the civil court, as discussed above. We, therefore, should uphold the judgments of both the courts in relation to the reliefs of possession and recovery of amounts. The relief of declaration as a substantive relief, cannot bs granted so as to give a right of patta for purposes of sec11 of the estates (abolition and conversion into ryotwari) act. The decree in that behalf is set aside subject to above modification, the second appeal is dismissed with costs. M. K. R. Appeal dismissed.

(11) Section 11,12 and 56scopesuit for recovery of possession and profitsjurisdiction of civil court whether barred c. P. C. Sec. 9. 1. To pronounce on the question of jurisdiction, the nature of the suit has to be first determined. The sabstsnce of the plaint has to be kept in view regard being had to the averments in the plaint, the alleged caused of action and the reliefs claimed therein.

(12) Under see. 9, c. P c. Civil courts have jurisdiction to try all suits of civil nature except those the cognizance wherof is either expressly or impliedly barred. The bar created by any statute is confined to the clear language or intendment of that statute. The exclusion, therefore, has to be normally gathered from the words used in the statutory provision on which the plea is rested. The scheme, the relevant provisions and the object and purpose of the statute are also of no less significance in this behalf. So then, whenever a plea is raised before a civil court that its jurisdiction is excluded either expressly or by necessary implication to entertain a claim of civil nature, the court naturally feels inclined to consider whether the alternative remedy prescribed by the special statute is sufficient or adequate. Of course, when the exclusion is in terms provided, consideration of the scheme of that statute and adequacy or sufficiency of the remedies provided by it may not be decisive nor of much relevance. But when exclusion is pleaded as a matter of necessary implication, such considerations are of supreme importance; may,in certain circumstances,they are decisive. See kamala mills limited v. State of bombay (a. I. R. 1965 s, c. 1942)

(13) When a statute confers power on any person for public poses from which an individual may receive an injury and the mode of redressing the injury is indicated in the statute, the jurisdiction of the ordinary courts in that behalf is ousted.

(14) Further, where a special tribunal out of the ordinary course is appointed by an act to determine questions as to rights which are the creation of that act, the tribunal's jurisdiction to determine those questions is exclusive except so ar far is otherwsie provided for necessarily implied.

(15) The jurisdiction at the inception of the suit depends upon the averments made in the plaint and is not ousted by the defendant saying something in his defence. It is to |?be determined having regard to the question what in substance the p'aintiff's case is; of '; course, not how he has camouflaged his case. If he chooses his foram ; pur and files a suit, he will get relief from the forum chosen only if he establishes the correctness of his case and if he frames his suit in a manner not warranted by the facts and goes for relief to a court, which cannot grant him that relief on the true facts, he will have his suit dismissed. Vied raizada topandas v. M/s goraokhram gakal chand (a. I. R. 1964 s. C. 1348).

(16) Jurisdiction of the civil court is not excluded when special forums could not grant reliefs prayed for in a civil suit, as the plaintiff cannot be required to split up his cause of action and seek redress partly in a civil court and partly in a special tribunal. The mere fact that certain qaestion falling within the exclusive determination of the special tribunal incidentally falls for consideration while judging the truth or falsity of the defence set up will not exclude the jurisdiction of the civil court. Nor the pleas which are palpably baseless and unnecessarily taken in the case can affect the jurisdiction of the civil court which it otherwsie has. In fact, the civil court has jurisdiction to decide every question that has to be determined in order that it may grant a party a relief which it is quite competent to grant. Held on facts:so far as the reliefs in relation to possession and recovery of amounts due for use and occupation are concerned, the suit in the civil court was maintainable in law as the cognizance thereof was not govered by any special law. The relief with regard tq declaration of occupancy rights may stand on a different footing. But inasmuch as the essential reliefs could be granted without any declaration of the kind, the suit for the reliefs other than declaratory was maintainable. Ignoring the relief of declaration of occnpancy rights, the relief of possession and recovery of amounts could be granted by the civil court. Appeal against the decree of the court of the additional district judge visakhapatnam in appeal suit no. 65 of 1961 preferred against the decree of the court of the district munsiff of ghodavaram in original suit no. 330 of 1957.