(1) The revision petition is directed against the judgment passed by the principal subordinate judge, narasaraopet in c. M. A. No. 37/1974 confirming the order of eviction passed by the rent controller narasaraopet in a b. A. No. 16/1972.

(2) The respondent is the landlord who filed the eviction petition on two grounds viz. Personal requirement and wilful default.

(3) Regarding personal requirement he contends that he is carrying on business in hides and skins in a house situated in a residential locality and the inhabitants in the locality have been raising objections for the said business and hence he wants to shift the same to the building in which the premises of the revision petitioner is situated and that building is suitable for the business which he is carrying on and he has already got evicted the tenants in the occupation of the first and second floor and the revision petitioner did not vacate when he intimated him the purpose for which he wants him to vacate and unless the entire building is secured it is not possible for him to carry on his business and the requirement is, therefore, bonafide.

(4) Regarding wilful default, the respondent - landlord contends that the petitioner tenant never paid; rents regularly and used to pay at inregular intervals and by the date of the notice for eviction was issued - the petitioner was. Due to pay the arrears to the tune of rs. 105/ -.

(5) The revision petitioner contends that the alleged personal requirement is, not bonafide and that he did not commit any wilful default. Regarding personal requirement, he contends that the landlord has some other buildings and he is, therefore, not entitled to seek eviction of the premises in his occupation. Regarding wilful default, the tenant contends that the rate of monthly rent is rs. 50/ - and hence the landlord did not choose to collect or receive the rents every month and allowed the amounts to be accumulated so that he can realise the rents in lump sum and he was receiving the amounts in lump sum and there are no arrears to be paid by the date of eviction petition and hence he did not commit any wilful default.

(6) The rent controller as well as the appellate authority did not accept the defence pleaded by the tenant and held thar the tenant committed willful default and the requirement of the landlord is bonafide. Sri p. V. R. Sarma, the learned counsel for the revision petitioner assails both the findings in this revision. He contends that the requirement is not at all bonafide as the premises in the occupation of the tenant is a small one and it is not sufficient for the alleged business to be carried on by the landlord.

(7) Regarding the wilful default, the learned counsel for the petitioner contends that the decision of the division bench of this court in vasudeva vs misra bai (1973 - 11 a. P. L. J. 429) did not take into consideration the decision is sharfanji vs. Ramaiah (1958 - 11 an w. R. 321) on which sharfuddin ahmed. J. , relied and the ruling of the madras high court in l. Subbayya vs. The subordinate judge vijayawada (air 1951 madras. 864) relied; on by sriramulu, j , in n. Lakshminarasaiah vs. Krishna (1972 aplj 123) related to the old madras rent control act in which there was no expression 'wilful default' and) the landlord was entitled to evict under that act if there was mere default. But the amended act provided, the expression "wilful default" for evicting the tenant and the same expression is provided in the andhra pradesh rent control act and the difference between the two diclslons relied upon by sharfuddin ahmed, j. , and sriramulu, j. Were not brought to the notice of the division bench and hence the matter should be referred to the full bench for an authoritative pronouncement on this aspect. He. Therefore, contends that there is no wilful default in the case on hand.

(8) Regarding the requirement of the landlord, the contention of the tenant that the landlord has other buildings and hence he does not require the premises in the occupation of the tenant is untenable. The landlord may have other buildings. But he feels that they are not suitable for the purpose of his business in hides and skins and it is the building in which the premises in the occupation of the tenant is situated alone is quite suitable and he has already evicted the tenants from the first and second floor and unless the entire building is made available he cannot carry on his business. The fact that he is carrying on business in hides and skins is not in dispute. In such a case if the building in which he is carrying on business in hides and skins is situated in residential locality it is natural for the residents of the locality to raise objection and it is absolutely necessary for the landlord to find out suitable building for his business and the building in the occupation of the tenant is therefore quite suitable. Hence the tenant is not entitled to say that the requirement is not bonafide. It is usual for the tenants to say that the landlord has some other buildings and he can run his business in those buildings which are available. Such a contention cannot be permitted. It is for the landlord to choose which of the buildings that belong to him is useful for the business which he is carrying on. The tenant is not entitled to dictate terms to the landlord. The choice is entirely left to the landlord and he need not be guided by the suggestions of tenant in choosing, which of the buildings is suitable for carrying on his business. The tenant has no such right as it would work hardship detrimental to the rights and interests of the landlord. The landlord proposes to shift his business from the existing building into the building in which the premises in the occupation of the tenant is situated, unless the entire building is made available, he cannot run his business and hence the requirement is bonafide.

(9) Regarding the default, the evidence brought on record is clear enough to show that the payment of rent is not made every month by the tenant as per the terms of the rental agreement. On the other hand, it is proved beyond doubt that the tenant was paying rents at irregular intervals at his convenience.

(10) Merely because the landlord received the rents without protest, though paid by the tenant at irregular intervals, will not the default amount to wilful default? there is, of course, difference between default and wilful default and the tenant is entitled to offer explanation as to how and why the default is unavoidable. The consistent conduct of the tenant in paying the rents at irregular intervals contrary to rental agreement and not on account of the conduct of the landlord makes the default wilful default. If the explanation given by the tenant is not satisfactory, the default amounts to wilful default. The tenant offered explanation that the landlord allowed him to accumu/ate the arrears for certain period and he was collecting the accumulated arrears in lumpsum at irregular intervals and the defau't, therefore, cannot be treated as wilful default. But the landlord categorically denied the contention of the tenant. He stated as p. W. 1 that he never told him that the rate of rent being small, he should pay in lump - sum once in ten months or so. There is no iota of evidence to support the tenant's case, mere receipt of the rents paid by the tenant at irregular intervals does not give rise to an inference that the landlord himself required the tenant to pay the rents in lumpsum, such an inference is undoubtedly unwarranted under law. The division bench in vatudeva vs. Misra bai (1973 - 11 a. P. Lj. 429) laid down eight principles. The 6th principle is to the effect that it is for the tenant to establish that he is prevented from discharging the obligation of paying or tendering the rent to the landlord, and as such the conduct of the landlord in the matter of collecting the rent on previous occasions at irregular intervals without protest is not mateaial, especially, when he chooses to file an application for evic. Tlon. The 7th principle is to the effect that there cannot be an agreement to pay the rent at irregular intervals, unless there is proved to be one for showing that the default is not a wilful one. The 8th principle is to the effect that if there is a conscious violation of the obligation to pay the rent and if there is a supine indifference exhibited on the part of the tenant in the matter of payment of rent as agreed to that constitutes wilful default.

(11) Judged from these principles, the burden is cast on the tenant to prove with positive evidence that the landlord prevented him from making payments of rent as per the terms of the rental agreement. The landlord did not admit that he required the tenant to make payments at irregular intervals and he did not like to receive the rent if paid at the end of every month. The tenant did not place any material to show that he paid the rents every month and the landlord refused to receive the same at the end of every month. Merely because the landlord was receiving the rents paid by ths tenant at irregular intervals, it cannot be said that the landlord asked the tenant to make payments at irregular intervals. There is a legal obligation on the part of the tenants to pay the rents every month within the period prescribed under law under section 10 (2) (i) and (ii) of the andhra pradesh buildings (lease, kent and eviction) control act and when he failed to make payments every month within the time permitted by law continuously for number of months. It amount! to wilful default and the acceptance by the landlord of the amounts so paid does not alter the tenants agreement. The receipt of rents by landlord even if paid by the tenant at irregular intervals should be taken to mean that he was receivftlng the rents without prejudice to his rights. In such a case the plea of the tenant that jhe is not a wilful defaulter is untenable.

(12) It is true that the decision relied on by sriramulu, j. , in l. Subbayya vs. The subordinate judge, vijayawada (air 1951 madras 864) dissenting from the decision of sharluddln ahmed, j. , in ramarathnamma vs. R. Panayxa (5) 1966 (1) an. W. R. 183 is one that was rendered on the term of 'default' as provided in the original act. I. E. Prior to the amended madras rent control act and the decision relied upon by sharfuddin ahmed. J', dealt with wilful default added in the amended ace and there was difference in the basis on which the two decisions were rendered and this difference was not brought to the notice of the division bench. But the division bench in fact considered the question of wilful default and also the effect of payment of rent by the tenant at irregular intervals and the acceptance of the same by the land lord independent of the decision on which sriramulu, j, and sherfuddin ahmed, j. , relied. The division bench examined the entire question afresh independent of those decisions with reference to several decisions referred to in the judgment of the division bench and formulated the eight principles. Thus the contention of the learned counsel for the petitioner that the division bench did not take into consideration the two decision, relied upon by sriramulu, j. And sharfuddin ahmed j. ,is of no consequence.

(13) Now the decision of the division bench on this question is an authority and the explanation offered by the tenant should be examined in the light of the principles laid down by the division bench. I have already shown above that the explanation offered by the tenant does not deserve to be given weight and hence the default in payment of rents at irregular intervals contray to the terms of the rental agreement and contrary to section 10 (2) (i) of the act amounts to wilful default.

(14) In view of my above discussion, i am not able to hold that the concurrent findings given by the courts below are improper. Thus i find no merits in the revision petition. It is, therefore, dismissed with costs.

(15) Time for vacating the premises, three months from today.