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Mohamad Tayum v. Union Of India And Others

Bombay High Court
Jul 8, 1976
Smart Summary (Beta)

Factual and Procedural Background

Two special civil applications were filed challenging orders of removal from service passed by the Divisional Superintendent, Bombay Division, Western Railway (respondent No. 3). Both petitions were heard together by DESHPANDE V.S., J.

First case: The petitioner was a Ticket Collector serving on Western Railway, posted at Dadar Station (island platform No. 2/3, night shift) on 3-2-1976. Vigilance Branch Inspectors were reportedly present near the exit gate at about 5:00 p.m. The petitioner was alleged to have accepted 50 paise from certain passengers for allowing them to pass with unbooked luggage. The inspectors submitted a report the same day to the Divisional Superintendent.

Second case: The petitioner was a Travelling Ticket Examiner posted at Churchgate and, on 10-12-1975, worked as Sleeper Coach Conductor in a class sleeper coach (No. 2077) on 1 Down Gujarat Mail (Ex Bombay Central to Ahmedabad). A Vigilance Inspector conducting a secret watch observed a passenger at Palghar apparently hand over something to the petitioner and later occupy one of two vacant ladies' quota berths. The inspector reported the matter to respondent No. 3 on 12-12-1975.

Relying on the vigilance reports, respondent No. 3 concluded that the petitioners had accepted illegal gratifications and removed them from service with immediate effect. He dispensed with issuing show-cause notices and holding inquiries under sub-rule (ii) of Rule 14 of the Railway Servants (Disciplinary and Appeal) Rules, 1968 (corresponding to the proviso to Article 311(2) of the Constitution). The removal orders were dated 7-2-1976 (first case) and 27-12-1975 (second case). The petitioners challenged these orders by way of special civil applications.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the impugned orders of removal, which dispense with show-cause notices and inquiries under sub-rule (ii) of Rule 14 (corresponding to the proviso to Article 311(2)), were legally justified on the facts of these cases.
  2. Whether the petitions are maintainable in view of the availability of an appellate remedy under the Rules (i.e., whether the petitioners should first have availed the statutory appeal).
  3. What is the proper scope of judicial review of a disciplinary authority's satisfaction that holding an inquiry is "not reasonably practicable" under Rule 14(ii) / Article 311(2) proviso.

Arguments of the Parties

Appellants' (Petitioners') Arguments

  • Mr. I.S. Khemani argued that the circumstances in these cases did not justify dispensing with show-cause notices and the inquiries required by Rules 9 to 13 of the Railway Servants (Disciplinary and Appeal) Rules, 1968.
  • He submitted that the removals without providing the opportunity contemplated by Article 311(2) and the mandatory Rules constituted a breach of constitutional and statutory safeguards and were therefore liable to be quashed.

Respondents' Arguments

  • Mr. C.J. Sawant raised a preliminary objection on maintainability: the petitioners had not availed the statutory appeal; thus the extraordinary jurisdiction of the High Court should not be invoked.
  • He contended that the authority to decide whether inquiry was "not reasonably practicable" lies with the dismissing authority, and the Court should not substitute its judgment for that of respondent No. 3.
  • The specific grounds relied upon by respondent No. 3 for dispensing with inquiry (as presented in the record and advanced by Mr. Sawant) were: (1) bribe-giving passengers could not be procured to give evidence because they themselves were guilty; (2) no other corroboration was available so examining Vigilance Inspectors would not advance the matter beyond their reports; (3) insisting on corroboration would let corrupt employees go free; and (4) exposing Vigilance Inspectors as witnesses would destroy their effectiveness for future detection of corruption.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Baburam v. Zila Parishad, A.I.R. 1969 S.C. 556 Supports judicial intervention where orders are passed in total disregard of principles of natural justice or statutory rules. The Court relied on the ratio to overrule the preliminary objection on maintainability and to justify judicial review of respondent No. 3's decision to dispense with inquiry where there was total disregard of procedural safeguards.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The court proceeded on the constitutional and statutory framework: Article 311(2) prevents removal or dismissal of a public servant for misconduct without giving a reasonable opportunity to show cause; the Railway disciplinary rules under Article 309 provide the detailed procedure (Rules 9–13) for such opportunity. Rule 14(ii) corresponds to the proviso to Article 311(2) and permits the dismissing authority to dispense with inquiry only if holding an inquiry is found "not to be reasonably practicable."

The court framed the central question as whether the factual circumstances in these two cases attracted the contingency under Rule 14(ii) so as to justify dispensing with the inquiry. It examined the specific grounds relied upon by respondent No. 3 (and set out in the record and counsel's submissions) and evaluated them as follows:

  1. On the assertion that bribe-givers could not be procured as witnesses because they were themselves guilty and would be unwilling to implicate the acceptor: the court accepted that bribe-givers may in a sense be complicit, but rejected the assumptions that (a) they will necessarily be unwilling to speak later and (b) their evidence can never carry weight. The court observed that bribe-givers often do come forward, their evidence is admissible in departmental proceedings (which are free from Evidence Act technicalities), and their testimony can be acted upon without corroboration if it inspires confidence.
  2. On the contention that no other corroboration was available and that examining the vigilance inspectors would be idle: the court found this unsustainable. Given the public setting (a station exit gate or a coach), there were likely other independent witnesses present who could corroborate or contradict the inspectors' account. There was no indication that attempts were made to contact or secure evidence from such persons. The court criticized the absence of any effort to collect other material and observed that even a single reliable witness (including the author of the report) can be examined and relied upon in departmental proceedings.
  3. On the fear that insistence on corroboration would let corrupt employees go free: the court explained that the need for corroboration depends on the quality and reliability of existing material. Where material is unequivocal and reliable, corroboration may be unnecessary; where it is unreliable or inadequate, the delinquent is entitled to be cleared. Absence of other material does not by itself render inquiry "impracticable." The court emphasized that anxious desire to eradicate corruption cannot justify arbitrary conclusions of guilt.
  4. On the argument that exposing Vigilance Inspectors as witnesses would destroy their efficacy: the court held that the record did not disclose the nature or extent of the inspectors' duties nor any insurmountable difficulty in using other evidence. While exceptionally privileged or one-sided reports may exist in rare situations, these two cases did not present such exceptional circumstances. The court held the fear of respondent No. 3 to be misplaced and noted that other evidence could have been collected even if the identity of inspectors had to be protected.

The court further observed that reliance on mere detective reports for dismissal demands exceptional justification, and that dispensation of the show-cause and opportunity part of adjudication under Rule 14(ii) does not relieve the authority from the obligation to investigate and adjudicate the charges. The practice in these cases — acting on vigilance reports without attempts to verify or collect fuller facts — betrayed a failure to appreciate the true scope of Rule 14(ii) and the importance of procedural safeguards. The court reiterated that the authority's satisfaction on impracticability is amenable to judicial review and must be reasonable, not superficial or based on misconceived notions.

Finally, the court addressed the context of Emergency and administrative zeal against corruption. While acknowledging the laudable object of eradicating corruption, the court stressed that constitutional safeguards under Article 311 remain operative and must be respected; Emergency did not suspend Article 311 or authorize reinterpretation to erode safeguards.

Holding and Implications

Core Ruling: Rule made absolute; the orders of removal in both cases are quashed.

Direct consequences and remedial directions contained in the opinion (as expressly stated):

  • The orders of removal passed by respondent No. 3 in both matters are quashed.
  • The court recorded that this quashing does not prevent respondent No. 3 from collecting further required material and holding fresh inquiries if he so advises.
  • The petitioners are to receive costs from the respondents (the opinion directs that the petitioners will get their costs from the respondents).

Broader implications: The decision reiterates that Rule 14(ii) / proviso to Article 311(2) is an exception to the rule of holding inquiries and must be strictly found to exist; the authority's satisfaction about impracticability is subject to judicial review. The opinion emphasizes that even during Emergency the protections of Article 311 remain in force and cannot be diluted by administrative urgency. The opinion did not itself purport to lay down a novel precedent beyond applying these principles to the facts before the court.

Show all summary ...

Cases referred:

1. Baburam V. Zila Parishad. A.I.R. 1969 S.C. 556

Advocates appeared:

I.S. Khemani with B.R. Malik, for petitioner.

C.J. Sawant and J.H. Parekh, for respondents.

Per DESHPANDE V.S., J.:- These two special civil applications raise a common question of law and can be disposed of by a common judgment. The petitioner in the first case has been serving in the Western Railway as a Ticket Collector. On 3-2-1976 he was posted at Dadar Station at Exit gate on the island platform No. 2/3 at night shift. The Vigilance Branch Inspectors also appear to have been present near the said Gate at about 5.0 p.m. The petitioner is alleged to have accepted 50 Paise, as illegal gratification, from certain passengers each for allowing them to pass with their unbooked luggage. The Inspectors submitted their report on that very day to the Divisional Superintendent, Bombay Division, Bombay Central, Western Railway, Bombay, the respondent No. 3 herein.

2. The petitioner in the second case was posted as a Travelling Ticket Examiner at Churchgate Station. On 10-12-1975 he was working as a Sleeper Coach Conductor of the and Class Sleeper Coach No. 2077 on 1 Down Gujarat Mail, Ex Bombay Central to Ahmedabad. A Vigilance Inspector entered the coach to keep a secret watch on the activities of the petitioner at the Bombay Central finding that several passengers, in need of the reserved accommodation, had surrounded and followed him in the coach in spite of his declaration that no berth was vacant. All such passengers got down at Palghar. Two berths in Ladies quota were, however, vacant. Another passenger entered the said coach at Palghar. The said passenger was seen having a talk and handing over something to the petitioner. The passenger was also subsequently found to have occupied one of the ladies berths. The Inspector, thinking that it was a case of corruption, submitted a report to that effect to respondent No. 3 on 12-12-1975.

3. Relying on these reports, the Divisional Superintendent, i.e. respondent No. 3, concluded that the petitioners had accepted amounts as illegal gratifications and were guilty of such serious misconduct as to render their further retention in service undesirable. He was also further satisfied that in the circumstances of these cases it was not reasonably practicable to hold an inquiry, in the manner provided in the Rules, i.e. Rules 9 to 13 of the Railway Servants (Disciplinary and Appeal) Rules, 1968, hereinafter referred to as the Rules. He accordingly directed removal of the petitioners from service with immediate effect, dispensing with the issuing of the show cause notice and the inquiry, under sub-rule (ii) of Rule 14 of the said Rules. The order in the first case was passed on 7-2-1976 and that in the second case on 27-12 1975.

4. Mr. Khemani, the learned advocate appearing for the petitioners, contends that circumstances in these cases do not afford any legal justification for dispensing with the show cause notice and enquiry as required under Rules 9 to 13, by recourse to rule 14 of the Rules and the removal of the petitioners from service in gross violation of Article 311 (2) of the Constitution and in breach of the mandatory Rules, is liable to be quashed.

5. Mr. C. J. Sawant, the learned counsel for the respondents, raised a preliminary objection to the maintainability of these petitions, contending that the remedy of the appeal provided under the Rules and specifically indicated in the impugned orders, was not availed of Mr. Sawant contends that there is no reason why the petitioner should be allowed to invoke the extra ordinary jurisdiction of this Court, when the very grievances could have been disposed of by the appellate authority. Now, it is hot that the contention of Mr. Sawant is without some substance. This Court is extremely slow in interfering with orders, which can be effectively challenged by recourse to the available statutory remedies. However, the rigor of this rule is relaxable in cases where the impugned orders are shown to have been passed in total disregard of the principles of natural justice or statutory rules to that effect. The ratio of judgment of the Supreme Court reported in the case of (Baburam V. Zila Parishad)1, A.I.R. 1969 S.C. 556 relied on by Mr. Khemani does support his contention to the above effect. This preliminary objection is thus liable to be overruled.

6. Now, in cases of service contracts between any master and servant, there is no security of service, and the doctrine of hire and fire operates effectively. However, our Constitution affords some degree of security to the public servants, and. Article 311 (2) prevents removal or dismissal of any public servant for any misconduct without giving him a reasonable opportunity to show cause against the proposed removal or dismissal. This necessitates enquiry even so,, the founding fathers engrafted a proviso to Article 311 (2) indicating the contingencies in which obligation to give such an opportunity is liable to be dispensed with. The Rules framed under Article 309 of the Constitution to effectuate the above constitutional mandate, provide an elaborate procedure for, such an opportunity and also for the contingencies when the same can be dispensed with. Rule 14 (ii) corresponds to Article 311 (2) proviso, clause (b). It is thus no doubt open to the dismissing authority under Rule 14 (ii) to dispense with enquiry required under Rules 9 to 13, if holding of such enquiry is found not to be reasonably practicable. This is what respondent No. 3 has done.

7. The real question that falls for consideration is whether the circumstances in, these two cases attracted the contingency conceived under Rule, 14 (ii), to justify dispensing with the inquiry required under rules 9 to 13 of the rules. Mr. Khemani contends that eves if the circumstances relied on by respondent No. 3, are assumed to be correct, the same cannot, warrant the conclusion that holding of enquiry was not, reasonably practicable, and justify the dispensation with the inquiry, required to be held by way of safeguard to the public servant before he is dismissed from service. Now, the circumstances, relied on by respondent No. 3, in his orders., and his affidavits in reply, and by Mr. Sawant before us are:

(1) that it was not possible to get the bribe giving passengers to give

evidence against the delinquents in view of their being guilty of the offences themselves;

(2) As no other corroboration is available, holding inquiry by examining the Vigilance In Spectors would be idle, as it would not take the matter any further than their reports

(3) Insistence on corroboration would result in corrupt employees going free; and

(4) On being examined as a witness in the enquiry his effectiveness as Vigilance Inspector would cease thereafter and the modus operandi reported to for arresting corruption would become ineffective.

(8). Now, the first circumstances is Founded on three-fold assumptions, i.e. (a) the bribe giver is equally guilty along with the acceptor thereof; (b), he would be reluctant to implicate him after having benefited by the favour sought in consideration of the bribe given; and (c) evidence of an accomplice like, him would not carry any weight. There cannot be any quarrel with the first assumption. The two other assumptions are not well founded and are contrary to the legal provisions, actual experience and long practice. Bribes are mostly given under compulsions of the moments and bribe givers rarely decline to make clear breast of every thing, as soon as the opportunity arises thereafter. Favour received on payment of bribe seldom creates any sense of gratitude and the bribe givers rarely get more than what they are entitled to as of right even on payment of bribes. Even in cases of bribe givers getting undeserving benefits, one can not assume unwillingness to disclose the truth without making any attempt to make them speak. Instances of even such persons coming forth to disclose the truth are not wanting. There is also no inflexible rule that the word of bribe givers can never carry weight, it being dependant on variety of factors. Their evidence is admissible even in law and can be acted upon even. Without any corroboration, if it can otherwise inspire confidence. This is all the more so in departmental proceedings which are free from technicalities of the Evidence Act. Thus of the three-fold assumptions, first one is correct, but thoroughly irrelevant and second and third assumptions are wholly misconceived.

9. Coming to the question of the availability of other corroborative evidence, it is difficult to see why no other witness could have been available either to prove the facts independently or corroborate the Vigilance Inspectors. In the very nature of things, many more persons must have been present at the exit gate at the Dadar Station or in the compartment at Palghar, at the relevant time. Many of them could have easily seen or heard what Vigilance Inspector claims to have heard or seen. Some of these, at any rate, can easily be presumed to be disinterested and independent. At any rate, there is nothing to indicate that none of them could see or hear or that none had in fact so done or were unwilling to so say or depose. There was thus no basis for assumption that no other witness to corroborate the inspectors could be available. This is the indication of the total in application of the mind by the respondent No. 3, Secondly, surrounding circumstances can also afford as much corroboration as the direct word of those who have seen of heard along with the inspectors. These are thus the cases in which no attempt whatsoever appears to have been made to contact others and collect any other evidence before or after the receipt of the report. Thirdly, there is no rule that one witness such as the author of the report alone cannot be examined and relied on even when he is found reliable.

10. It is also not correct to assume that examination of author of the report as witness cannot carry the matter any further. The importance of cross-examination seems to have been totally lost sight of. The delinquent can always elicit answers from him either to explain the allegations made by placing them in proper context, or to demonstrate the bias, misconception or misunderstanding, or the interest of the author in trumping up a false case and prove their falsity in cases where the same are untrue. He can prove the falsity of their case by producing his evidence in rebuttal. He may fail, if the allegations are true. Enquiry cannot be held to be impracticable merely because do investigation whatsoever was made or because of the unfounded belief that the author of the report may have nothing more to add in his evidence. Such contemplated impracticability cannot be equated with the reluctance or failure to collect the necessary material either due to the incompetence or misconceptions or other kinds of lapses of the departmental machinery itself.

11. Third circumstance is equally misconceived and involves an element of fallacy. Proof of the guilt depends on the quality of material. The need for corroboration arises only when the existing material is shaky or unequivocal. Guilt can be established even from the unblemished deposition of Vigilance Inspectors alone. Evidence is to be weighed and not counted. If the existing material is unreliable or even unequivocal, the delinquent is entitled to be cleared of the charges. It is as good as the total lack of the material. Any amount of anxiety to eradicate corruption cannot justify the conclusion of guilt in any arbitrary manner when the available material is unreliable or far too inadequate to found such conclusion. It is an error to assume any public servant to be corrupt, merely on suspicion or even on strong feeling of the authority. In such a case it is equally fallacious to assume that corrupt employee goes free. Even the reasons for the unreliability or inadequacy of the material are not relevant in this context. In such a case the authority owes to the delinquent, the administration and to himself a duty to give a clean chit to the delinquent. Where adequate material exists, further investigation can be dispensed with as an idle multiplicity thereof, and waste of time can be avoided where more material of better quality cannot be traced. Even so, absence of any other material for corroboration by itself cannot rends an opportunity and enquiry impracticable.

12. Respondent No. 3 then also seems to have been obsessed with the fear that they would cease to be of any use as detectives on exposing the identity of the Vigilance Inspectors. The material before us does not indicate the nature and extent of their functions and duties and we would prefer not to express any opinion on the advisability of relying on them. Three clauses of the proviso to Article 311 (2) and corresponding Rule 14 presumably do not rule out relying on one-sided reports from privileged sources, disclosures of which is liable to be withheld. There may be rare such cases where collection and production of other material and giving an opportunity to the delinquent is rendered impossible due to insurmountable difficulties and compulsive urgency of the situations. It is unnecessary to go into the question when these exceptional situations can arise Suffice it to note that the two cases under consideration do not fall under any such exceptional situations and the fear of respondent No. 3 is wholly misplaced. As discussed earlier, other evidence in those cases could have been collected, if it was necessary to withheld the identity of the Vigilance Inspectors.

13. Respondent No. 3 also speaks of some modus operand for detection of such offences by a secret watch. The material before us is bereft of the necessary details thereof to facilitate examination and comments. Reliance on the mere detective reports for dismissal of Government servants involving penal consequences requires the existence of some exceptional situation. If the manner in which respondent No. 3 has dealt with in these cases is indicative of this modus; it contemplates acting on the reports of the detectives without even the semblance of any attempt to get full facts or verify their accuracy. The reports contain impressions and inferences from sketchy pictures rather than the necessary facts. He has almost yielded his judgment to those of the reporters. The detection of every misconduct or an offence must be followed by investigation and adjudication, if the dismissals are not be matters at the whim or caprice or sweet will of the authorities. The dispensation of enquiry in exceptional situations under (he proviso to Article 311 (2) and Rule 14 goes to eliminate only part of the adjudication process confined to the show cause notice and opportunity part thereof. It does not relieve the authority of his obligation to investigate end adjudicate even after hearing of the delinquent is dispensed with. The modus operandi adopted thus is erosive of the security of the servants as also the rule of law. Rather than eradicate corruption, it may encourage it, and also the whispering campaign and then resultant sense of insecurity amongst the employees. The circumstances relied on for making recourse to Rule 14 (ii) thus are as much either misconceived or irrelevant, as also the modus operandi.

14. Mr. Sawant contends that in either case the decision as to the impracticability of the enquiry and reasonableness thereof is left to the dismissing authority. It will not be open for this Court, contends Mr. Sawant, to substitute its own decision or judgment in place of thereof, arrived at by him bonfire. That such a decision is left to such an authority is, no doubt, true. But it is not immune from the judicial review of this Court if and when challenged. We have discussed and indicated how the considerations weighing with the respondent No. 3 are misconceived and irrelevant. Such decision deprives the public servant of the constitutional protection to his tenure of service as also to his good name and reputation. The safeguards provided against wrongful dismissal are as much in the interest of the delinquent as of the good administration. That respondent No. 3 or the reporting inspectors may have acted without malice and with lofty motives is besides the point. The readiness with which the respondent No. 3 proceeded to act under Rule 14 (ii) and rely on the reports of the Vigilance Inspectors in both the cases betrays lack of appreciation of the true scope of Rule 14 (ii), the importance of the procedural safeguards afforded to the public servants and the responsibility of the disciplinary authority as adjudicator in such matters. Impartibility of enquiry may result from the peculiarity of the incident in particular or of the situation existing in general, making it impossible or useless to collect or produce any other material, and give opportunity and hearing to the delinquent. Reasonableness of such impartibility shall have to be tested by balancing it against the constitutional safeguards secured for the public servants. No inflexible test of impracticability or its reasonableness can be evolved. This can admit of no hard and fast rules. Proper investigation and fair enquiry is expected to be the rule, and dispensation thereof, an exception, to be resorted to only when collection and production of evidence and enquiry is not possible. The decision arrived at by respondent No. 3 is liable to be ignored, being superficial and based on irrelevant and misconceived notions.

15. It may be that in the wake of Emergency, Railway administration is trying to take effective and immediate steps to improve its tone and the action taken by respondent No. 3 is only a part of this campaign to eradicate the, corruption. With the laudable object with which the action is taken by respondent No. 3, there can hardly be any quarrel. There is also no doubt that corruption is rampant in our public life and situation calls for immediate drastic action with some sort of missionary zeal. However, any action taken for its. eradication has got to be in a disciplined manner and accord with the laws of the land. As discussed earlier, provisions of Article 311 as also the rules in dispute, requiring inquiry before the person concerned is condemned as corrupt, are engrafted with a view to afford security to the public servants: Security to the public servants is as much important to the society as the protection of the Society itself against the misconduct of such servants. Any attempt to whittle down such security or dispensation of the safeguards will not be justified unless the circumstances enumerated in the proviso to Article 311 (2) and incorporated under Rule 14 (ii) are strictly found to exist. In spite of Emergency and suspension of right to enforce fundamental rights, safeguards under Article 311 are not suspended, nor the provisions are amended. There is no warrant to interpreter the provisions differently from how the same could have been interpreted before Emergency. In fact, it is difficult to know, what the cases of corruption has directly to do with the situation which necessitated the proclamation of Emergency. Urgency to remove corruption is one thing while urgency to remove the supposedly corrupt officer is quite different thing. Implications and the requirements of the two are different. Tendency to find an alibi in Emergency for every lapse and omission has got to be discouraged. It is an error to search for some nexus with Emergency in areas where the authors of the Emergency themselves have, in their wisdom, hesitated to tread. In this view of the matter, the orders of removal in both the cases are liable to be quashed. This, however, will not prevent respondent No. 3 from collecting more required material and holding the inquiry afresh, if he is so advised.

16. Rule is accordingly made absolute.

17. The petitioners will get their costs from the respondents.

Rule made absolute.

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