- Bookmark
- Share
- CaseIQ
Maruti Gurappa v. Krishna Bala
Structured Summary of Opinion — Naik, J.
Factual and Procedural Background
The dispute concerns half shares in survey Nos. 162 and 177. The property originally belonged to defendant No. 3 and two others. On 12 April 1949 defendant No. 3 and two others entered into a written agreement to sell the property to the plaintiff for Rs. 1,600; Rs. 585 was paid on that date and the plaintiff was put in possession.
In May 1949 defendant No. 2 obtained a decree against defendant No. 3, and in execution of that decree the land was sold at auction and purchased by defendant No. 1. Defendant No. 1 sought to recover possession on the basis of the sale certificate; the plaintiff obstructed delivery of possession. Proceedings under Order XXI, Rule 99, Civil Procedure Code were initiated, and after summary inquiry the Court directed the plaintiff to remove his obstruction.
On 2 April 1952 the plaintiff filed a suit under Order XXI, Rule 103, Civil Procedure Code, asserting he was a transferee under a contract of sale, that he was in possession under that contract, and claiming protection under section 53A of the Transfer of Property Act. Defendant No. 3 did not appear and the suit proceeded ex parte against her. The trial Court dismissed the plaintiff's suit. The District Court allowed the plaintiff's appeal and decreed his claim. Defendants Nos. 1 and 2 appealed to this Court.
Legal Issues Presented
- Whether a person who has obtained property under a contract of sale (transferee invoking section 53A, Transfer of Property Act) can maintain a suit under Order XXI, Rule 103, Civil Procedure Code, against an auction purchaser of the same property (i.e., whether the transferee may sue to protect possession rather than only rely on s.53A defensively).
- Whether an auction purchaser in execution can be regarded as a "person claiming under" the transferor within the meaning of the fourth clause of section 53A, T.P. Act (and thus be barred from enforcing rights against the transferee by s.53A).
Arguments of the Parties
Defendants Nos. 1 and 2 (Mr. Guttal)
- The plaintiff who relies on the doctrine of part performance embodied in section 53A cannot maintain an action for enforcement of his claim; section 53A can be used at best as a shield (defensive) but not as a sword (offensive) — the transferee cannot sue to enforce title or to evict.
- Neither the judgment-creditor (defendant No. 2) nor the auction purchaser (defendant No. 1) can be said to be "claiming under" the judgment-debtor (defendant No. 3). The bar in section 53A applies only against the transferor or persons claiming under him; since the auction purchaser does not derive title by agreement or assent from the transferor, s.53A's bar cannot apply to the auction purchaser.
Plaintiff / Respondent (Mr. Pathak)
- A suit under Order XXI, Rule 103, Civil Procedure Code is in substance defensive: when the transferee files such a suit he is resisting the auction purchaser's claim to evict him, and therefore invoking s.53A is permissible even as a plaintiff in that procedural context.
- In a broader sense the auction purchaser must be treated as "claiming from the transferor" within the meaning of that phrase in section 53A, so that the auction purchaser would be debarred from enforcing rights against the transferee who is in possession under the contract of sale.
Table of Precedents Cited
| Precedent | Rule or Principle Cited For | Application by the Court |
|---|---|---|
| Probodh Kumar Das v. Dantmara Tea Co. Ltd. (1939) 42 Bom. L.R. 109, P.C. | Held that s.53A confers no right of action on a transferee; s.53A imposes a statutory bar on the transferor and is available only to a defendant to protect possession. | The Court cited the Privy Council view as a foundational statement of the defensive character of s.53A; but noted the subsequent divergence of High Court authority on whether a transferee may sue under Order XXI, r.103. |
| Bamrao Nilkanth v. Purnanand Saraswati Swarni (1939) 42 Bom. L.R. 501 | Bombay High Court followed the Privy Council's view that s.53A does not confer an active right of action on the transferee. | Referenced as an instance of High Court adherence to the Privy Council principle; used to show the principle is established in some jurisdictions. |
| Ram Chander v. Maharaj Kunwar [1939] A.I.R. All. 611 | Applied s.53A to allow a plaintiff-lessee to maintain a suit for injunction under facts where defendants sought to enforce rights; held plaintiff was protecting his possession and could invoke s.53A. | Cited by the Court as authority supporting the proposition that a suit under Order XXI, r.103 (or analogous proceedings) is defensive in substance and that s.53A may be invoked by a plaintiff in that procedural posture. |
| Firdos Jahan v. Mohd. Yunus [1940] A.I.R. Oudh 1 | Held that a vendee who filed a suit under O.XXI, r.103 to protect possession could invoke s.53A; s.53A's defensive-character principle did not preclude such a suit. | Used as supporting authority for allowing transferees to bring suits under O.XXI, r.103 to protect possession in substance as a defensive action. |
| Achayya v. Venkata Subba Rao [1957] A.I.R. Andhra Pradesh 854 | Held s.53A does not pass title and does not expressly limit the transferee to acting only as defendant; transferee can invoke the protection as plaintiff or defendant provided he uses it as a shield and not as a sword. | Relied upon by the Court as a clear articulation of the rule that a transferee may file suit to protect possession under s.53A so long as the right is used defensively; the Court preferred this view among several High Court authorities. |
| Akram Mea v. Mucpl. Corpn., Secunderabad [1957] A.I.R. Andhra Pradesh 859 | Reiterated the Achayya position on the defensive use of s.53A. | Noted by the Court as supporting the Andhra view which it adopted on the question of O.XXI, r.103 suits being defensive in substance. |
| Pakkirichi Umma v. Kalandan [1954] A.I.R. Mad. 702 | Held that in suits under r.63 or r.103 the transferee may invoke s.53A because the plaintiff in such a suit is in substance defending possession. | Cited by the Court as part of the cluster of High Court decisions (Allahabad, Oudh, Madras, Andhra) favoring the view that O.XXI, r.103 suits are defensive. |
| Uamlaxmi v. Bank of Baroda [1953] A.I.R. Bom. 50 | Observed that a suit under O.XXI, r.103 is for establishing the plaintiff's present right to possession, not for adjudicating sole ownership or title. | Used to support the Court's conclusion that an O.XXI, r.103 suit is essentially to preserve present possession and thus is defensive in character. |
| Padmalabha v. Appalanarasamma [1952] A.I.R. Orissa 143 | Held that s.53A cannot found a cause of action; transferee cannot use the doctrine as a weapon of attack in actions against attaching creditors, because such suits are not between transferee and transferor or any person claiming under the transferor. | The Court discussed this Orissa decision at length and explicitly rejected its reasoning, stating it did not properly consider s.53A in the context of O.XXI, r.103 and placed undue emphasis on registration and title provisions. |
| Audinarayudu v. Mangamma [1943] A.I.R. Mad. 706 (King J.) | King J. held that an auction purchaser is the legal representative of the judgment-debtor and that the expression "claiming under the transferor" in s.53A is wide enough to include a judgment-creditor in certain situations. | The Court considered and rejected King J.'s conclusion that the auction purchaser is the judgment-debtor's representative; the present Court declined to adopt the reasoning that an auction purchaser steps into the shoes of the transferor. |
| Annamalai Mudali v. Ramasami Mudali [1941] A.I.R. Mad. 161 | Authority reflecting the Madras view that the auction purchaser may be regarded as the representative of the judgment-debtor under s.47, Civil P.C. | Referenced in the discussion of Madras precedent; the Court distinguished and did not accept the premise that the auction purchaser is the transferor's representative. |
| Hanmantagouda Nagangouda v. Shivappa Dundappa (District Local Board, Belgium v. Shivappa Dundappa) (1937) 42 Bom. L.R. 1123 | Held that a purchaser at a Court auction in execution who is a stranger is not a representative of either the judgment-debtor or the decree-holder. | Cited by the Court as representing the Bombay High Court view that an auction purchaser is not a representative of the judgment-debtor; Court adhered to this position in concluding the auction purchaser is not "claiming under" the transferor under s.53A. |
| Gangadhwar Dhanjishet v. Balwant Kashirao / Supdusing Daulatsing v. Balwant Kashirao (1939) 42 Bom. L.R. 367; [1940] A.I.R. Bom. 210 | Bombay High Court authorities treating auction purchaser as not representing judgment-debtor/creditor. | Used to demonstrate consistent Bombay High Court practice which the Court followed in concluding the auction purchaser is not a person claiming under the transferor. |
| Narsinhbhat v. Bando Krishna (1918 I.L.R. 42 Bom. 411; S.C. 20 Bom. L.R. 495) | Earlier Bombay decision in the line that auction purchaser is not the representative of judgment-debtor. | Again cited to show established Bombay view relied upon by the Court in its conclusion on the status of auction purchasers. |
Court's Reasoning and Analysis
The Court began by setting out the material portions of section 53A of the Transfer of Property Act (first, third, and fourth paras and the proviso). It accepted the factual predicates: that there was a valid written contract of transfer, that the transferee (plaintiff) was in possession in part-performance of the contract, and that the transferee had expressed willingness to perform his part of the contract.
The Court observed the settled principle (as stated by the Privy Council in Probodh Kumar's case and followed by the Bombay High Court in Bamrao Nilkanth) that s.53A does not itself confer title or an active right of action on the transferee; rather it imposes a statutory bar on the transferor and is intended to protect possession. The Privy Council had held that the transferee's right under s.53A is available only as a defendant to protect possession.
The Court then addressed a sharply divided line of High Court authority on whether a suit under Order XXI, Rule 103 is in substance defensive (and therefore whether a transferee may institute such a suit). The Court reviewed a number of decisions (Allahabad, Oudh, Madras, Andhra) which held that where a transferee comes to court under O.XXI, r.103 he is, in substance, defending his possession and may invoke the doctrine of part performance; these decisions permitted the transferee to bring such proceedings and to rely on s.53A in that procedural posture. The Court cited specific passages (e.g., Ram Chander; Firdos Jahan; Achayya; Pakkirichi Umma) to show that those High Courts considered the procedural nature of the remedy and concluded it is defensive rather than offensive.
The Court rejected the contrary Orissa High Court decision in Padmalabha v. Appalanarasamma which held s.53A could not found a cause of action and that a transferee could not sue against an attaching creditor. The reasoning of the Orissa Court was criticized for unduly focusing on registration and title provisions (sections 49 Indian Registration Act and 54 Transfer of Property Act) which are relevant to title but not to the narrow question of present possession in an O.XXI, r.103 proceeding. The present Court preferred the authorities that treated such suits as defensive in substance.
Having resolved that a suit under O.XXI, r.103 is essentially to protect present possession and is defensive in character (thus permitting a transferee to invoke s.53A in that procedural posture), the Court turned to the second issue: whether an auction purchaser in execution is "a person claiming under" the transferor within the meaning of the fourth clause of s.53A.
The Court recounted the controversy and the legislative history of section 47, Civil Procedure Code. It noted the pre-amendment Explanation and the subsequent amendment by Act No. LXVI of 1956 which made a purchaser at a sale in execution equivalent to a party to the suit for the purposes of s.47, but did not constitute the auction purchaser as the representative of the judgment-debtor. Relying on prior Bombay High Court decisions (for example, Hanmantagouda Nagangouda and earlier Bombay authorities), the Court emphasized that an auction purchaser gets the right, title and interest of the judgment-debtor by operation of the execution process, not by an agreement or assent from the transferor; the auction purchaser does not step into the shoes of the transferor by virtue of any consensual act.
The Court considered contrary authorities (notably King J.'s judgment in Audinarayudu v. Mangamma, which treated the auction purchaser as the legal representative of the judgment-debtor) and explained why it could not accept that view. The Court found it difficult on general principles to hold the auction purchaser to be the transferor's representative or a person claiming under the transferor for the purposes of s.53A.
On this basis the Court concluded that an auction purchaser in execution is not "a person claiming under" the transferor within the meaning of the fourth clause of s.53A and therefore the statutory bar in s.53A does not operate to debar the auction purchaser from enforcing rights against the transferee in possession.
Holding and Implications
Holding: Appeal allowed. The Court held that the auction purchaser in execution is not a person "claiming under" the transferor within the meaning of the fourth clause of section 53A of the Transfer of Property Act. Consequently, the appellate Court's decree in favour of the plaintiff was set aside and the trial Court's dismissal of the plaintiff's suit was restored. There were no orders as to costs.
Implications:
- Direct effect on the parties: The plaintiff's suit (filed under O.XXI, r.103 claiming protection under s.53A) is dismissed and the trial Court's order requiring removal of the plaintiff's obstruction stands restored; the auction purchaser may proceed on the basis of the execution sale certificate.
- On the law: The Court reaffirmed that suits under O.XXI, r.103 are essentially to protect present possession and may be defensive in character (permitting invocation of s.53A in that procedural posture), but clarified that an auction purchaser in execution is not covered by the expression "person claiming under" the transferor in s.53A and therefore is not debarred by that provision.
Order concluding the judgment: "Appeal allowed. The decree of the appellate Court is set aside and that of the trial Court is restored. There will be no orders as to costs."
Naik, J.:— This appeal raises an interesting question of law namely ‘whether the person who has obtained property on the basis of a contract of sale can maintain a suit against an auction purchaser of the same property. The material facts briefly stated are as follows:
The suit property (i.e survey Nos. 162 and 177) (half share) originally belonged to defendant No. 3 and two others. On April 12, 1949, defendant No. 3 and two others entered into an agreement for selling the said property to the plaintiff for a sum of Rs. 1,600. Part of the sale price i.e Rs. 585 was paid on the date of the agreement and the plaintiff was put in possession of the property. In the month of May, 1949, defendant No. 2 obtained a decree against defendant No. 3. In execution of the said decree, the land in suit was sold in auction and purchased by defendant No. 1. Defendant No. 1 started proceedings for recovering possession of the property on the basis of the sale certificate. The plaintiff obstructed the delivery of possession. Proceedings were started by the auction purchaser for removing the obstruction under r. 99 of O. XXI of the Code of Civil Procedure. After summary enquiry, the Court came to the conclusion that the plaintiff was not entitled to continue in possession. The Court, therefore, directed him to remove his obstruction. On April 2, 1952, the plaintiff filed a suit under r. 103 of O. XXI of the Civil Procedure Code contending that he was a transferee under a contract of sale; that he was in possession of the property by virtue of that contract of sale; and that, therefore, he was entitled to protect his possession under s. 53A of the Transfer of Property Act.
2. Defendant No. 3 did not appear and the suit proceeded ex parte against her. Defendants Nos. 1 and 2 contended that the plaintiff cannot maintain any action for the enforcement of his claim under s. 53A of the Transfer of Property Act. The trial Court dismissed the plaintiff's suit. The plaintiff went in appeal to the District Court. The District Court allowed the appeal and decreed the plaintiff's claim. It is against that judgment defendants Nos. 1 and 2 have now come up in appeal. Mr. Guttal for defendants Nos. 1 and 2 urged two contentions before me. Firstly, that the plaintiff who bases his claim on the doctrine of part performance of the contract, embodied in s. 53A cannot maintain an action for protecting his possession. At best he can use the part performance of the contract as a shield. He can never use it as a weapon of offence. Secondly, it is argued that neither the judgment-creditor (defendant No. 2) nor the auction-purchaser (defendant No. 1) could be said to be claiming under defendant No. 3, the judgment-debtor. It is only the transferor or persons claiming under him who are debarred from proceeding to evict the transferee claiming under a contract of sale. Mr. Guttal contended that since the auction-purchaser could not be said to have derived title from the judgment-debtor, the bar imposed by s. 53A cannot apply to him.
3. On the other hand, Mr. Pathak maintains that a suit under r. 103 of O. XXI of the Civil Procedure Code is in the nature of a defensive action. Therefore when the plaintiff maintains an action under r. 103, he is resisting, in substance, the claim of the auction purchaser to evict him on the basis of the auction sale. In regard to the second point, Mr. Pathak argues that in a broader sense the auction purchaser must be treated as claiming from the transferor within the meaning of that expression in s. 53A of the Transfer of Property Act.
4. Before considering the authorities cited, it is necessary to refer to the provisions of s. 53A of the Transfer of Property Act itself. The first para, of that section runs thus:
“Where any person contracts to transfer for consideration any immoveable property by writing signed by him or on his behalf from which the terms necessary to constitute the transfer can be ascertained with reasonable certainty,
and the transferee has, in part performance of the contract, taken possession of the property or any part thereof, or the transferee being already in possession, continues in possession in part performance of the contract and has done some act in furtherance of the contract”.
5. It is not disputed that there is a valid contract of transfer. Nor it is disputed that the transferee is in possession on the basis of that contract. The third para, of s. 53A provides:
“and the transferee has performed or is willing to perform his part of the contract”.
6. The transferee has expressed his willingness to perform his part of the contract in the course of his deposition. It is conceded that the plaintiff's suit for specific performance was barred by limitation at the time of the suit. It is, however, well settled that even if the plaintiff's remedy for specific performance is barred by limitation he has still the right to invoke the protection of s. 53A of the Transfer of Property Act. The fourth para, is relevant and runs thus:
“then, notwithstanding that the contract, though required to be registered, has not been registered, or, where there is an instrument of transfer, that the transfer has not been completed in the manner prescribed therefor by the law for the time being in force, the transferor or any person claiming under him shall be debarred from enforcing against the transferee and persons claiming under him any right in respect of the property of which the transferee has taken or continued in possession, other than a right expressly provided by the terms of the contract.”
7. Then there is a proviso:
“Provided that nothing in this section shall affect the rights of a transferee for consideration who has no notice of the contract or of the part performance thereof”.
8. The first question that arises for consideration is what is the nature of the claim put forward by the transferee under s. 53A of the Transfer of Property Act. In Probodk Kumar Das v. Dantmara Tea Co. Ltd. . 1939 42 Bom. L.R 109, P.C, their Lordships of the Privy Council held that s. 53A confers no right of action on a transferee in possession under an unregistered contract of sale and that the right conferred by s. 53A is a right available only to a defendant to protect his possession. The section imposes a statutory bar on the transferor. It does not confer any active title on the transferee. This view was followed by the Bombay High Court in Bamrao Nilkanth v. Purnanand Saraswati Swarni . 1939 42 Bom. L.R 501.. The principle laid down by the Privy Council in Probodh Kumar's case has been followed by other High Courts in India and is now well settled. There is, however, a sharp conflict of opinion as to whether a suit instituted under r. 103 of O. XXI of the Civil Procedure Code is in the nature of a defensive action or not. In other words the question for consideration is whether such a suit based as it is on the doctrine of part-performance is maintainable. The Privy Council specifically stated that s. 53A does not confer any title on the transferee. It also stated that it does not confer any right of action on a transferee in possession and the only right available to him is to protect his possession as a defendant.
9. The Allahabad High Court had occasion to consider the scope of the Privy Council decision. The facts were as follows in Ram Chander v. Maharaj Kunwar . [1939] A.I.R All. 611..
10. The plaintiff was a lessee of certain properties under a deed of lease which was duly registered but was not signed by either the lessor or the lessee in accordance with the provisions of s. 107 of the Transfer of Property Act. Nevertheless, the plaintiff had obtained possession of the subjects leased. While the plaintiff was thus enjoying the possession, defendants demolished part of the property. Plaintiff brought a suit for injunction restraining the defendants from interfering with any of the right of the plaintiff as lessee of those properties. It was contended by the plaintiff that as he had entered into possession of the properties in terms of the lease executed in his favour and was willing to perform his part of the contract of the lease though it was not completed in accordance with law the defendants were not entitled to eject him otherwise than by due process of law. Upon a question whether plaintiff could rely upon the provision of s. 53A, Held that
“it was defendants who were seeking to enforce their rights under the contract of lease. The plaintiff was only seeking to debar them from doing so and was thus merely protecting his rights. There was therefore nothing in the terms of Sec. 53-A which disentitled the plaintiff from maintaining the suit”.
11. The learned Judges observed that the case before the Privy Council was different from the case on their hands because there (in Probodh Kumar's case), the transferee sought a direct relief in support to his title.
12. The Allahabad view was followed by the Chief Court of Oudh in Firdos Jahan v. Mohd. Yunus . [1940] A.I.R Oudh 1.. In that case a suit was brought by the plaintiff under O. XXI, r. 103 of the Civil Procedure Code, in the following circumstances:
Mt. Firdos Jehan's husband, Sheikh Habibullah, was the tenant of a house in Lucknow which was owned by Dr. Mohmed Yunus, a sub-assistant surgeon in Gonda. In 1936 Dr. Yunus sued Habibullah for ejectment and arrears of rent. In May 1936, a compromise decree was passed according to which Habibullah was to vacate the house by August 31. He did not vacate and on September 17, Dr. Yunus applied for execution of his decree for ejectment. At this stage, Mt. Firdos Jehan, who was living with her husband in the house, appeared on the scene. Her story was that she came to know that Dr. Yunus wanted to sell the house and she got into touch with Dr. Yunus through one Hakim and negotiations were started for purchase of the house. It was eventually agreed that Mt. Firdos Jehan should buy the house for Rs. 7,800, Rs. 500 were paid to Dr. Yuuns as earnest money and the receipt was obtained. She continued in possession under the contract of sale. Dr. Yunus thereafter sold the house to a man named Evas Malli on September 30. He did not inform Evas about the previous agreement. Mt. Firdos having failed in the resistance proceedings, filed a suit under O. XXI, r. 103, of the Civil Procedure Code. It was contended that the suit was not maintainable inasmuch as it was based under s. 53A and s. 53A could only be used by way of defence. This contention was negatived and it was held that although it is a settled law that s. 53A is available by way of defence only, that principle is not applicable to a suit brought by a vendee under O. XXI, r. 103, because the vendee in substance is merely seeking to protect the rights to which he is entitled under s. 53A.
13. A similar case arose before the Andhra Pradesh High Court in Achayya v. Venkata Subba Rao . [1957] A.I.R Andhra Pradesh 854. and the Division Bench comprising Subba Rao C.J and Viswanatha Sastri, J. held:
“Section 53-A does not either expressly or by necessary implication indicate that the rights conferred on the transferee thereunder can only be invoked as a defendant and not as a plaintiff. Under the section no title passes to a transferee. He cannot file a suit for a declaration of his title to the property or seek to recover possession of the same on the basis of any title conferred to him.
But, if the conditions laid down in the section are complied with, it enables the transferee to defend his possession if the transferor seeks to enforce his rights against the property. This statutory right he can avail himself both as a plaintiff and as defendant provided he is using his right as a shield and not as a sword. Or to put it in other words, he cannot seek to enforce his title but he can resist the attack made by a transferor”.
14. This decision was reiterated by the same Court in the case of Akram Mea v. Mucpl. Corpn., Secunderabad . [1957] A.I.R Andhra Pradesh 859..
15. The Madras High Court in the case of Pakkirichi Umma v. Kalandan . [1954] A.I.R Mad. 702. have also taken the view that in respect of suits filed under r. 63 or r. 103, it cannot be said that the plaintiff is using s. 53A as a weapon of offence. At page 703, Ramaswami J. observes:
“The only exception in form, though not in substance, is in cases under the Civil P.C O. 21, R. 63 or R. 103. In such cases the plaintiff will not be necessarily debarred from the benefit of the rule because where by the nature of the case, as disclosed by the pleadings or otherwise, it is apparent that the transferee comes to the Court to defend his possession against invasion of it by the transferor, he is entitled to invoke the doctrine of part performance. The mere position of a party in the heading of a suit would not determine whether he is or is not entitled to the benefits of the section. Since the object of a suit under O. 21, R. 103, Civil P.C would be to protect possession and the capacity in which the plaintiff comes to the Court is in reality a defence and the suit would in reality be part of the same proceedings as those in which the transferee's rights are attacked, the plaintiff can take advantage of S. 53A.”
16. Although there is no direct ruling of the Bombay High Court on this question, this Court has discussed the scope of the provisions of r. 103 of O. XXI, Civil Procedure Code, in a number of decisions. In the case of Uamlaxmi v. Bank of Baroda . [1953] A.I.R Bom. 50, S.C 54 Bom., the division bench observed:
“A suit under O. 21, R. 103 is evidently for the purpose of establishing the right which the plaintiff claims to the present possession of the property…The question is what is the plaintiff's claim to the present possession of the property, not whether he is the sole owner of the property”.
17. It is thus clear that the only right which the plaintiff puts forward in a suit under O. XXI, r. 103, Civil Procedure Code is the right to maintain his present possession. The suit, therefore, is essentially for the purpose of preserving that right. The objective is to maintain his possession undisturbed.
18. As against this preponderance of authorites Mr. Guttal relied upon the solitary ruling of the Orissa High Court in Padmalabha v. Appalanarasamma . [1952] A.I.R Orissa 143.. The decision was taken by a division bench comprising Ray, C.J and Jagannathadas J. They were considering the nature of the suit under O. XXI, r. 63, Civil Procedure Code on the basis of s. 53A of the Transfer of Property Act. The learned Judges posed the question whether it is open to the transferee under a contract of sale to bring a suit based on s. 53A. The learned Judges observed:
“The section can never be availed of as founding a cause of action; and it cannot, therefore, be urged that what is available to the transferee as a defence in a suit in ejectment by the transferee is available to him as a weapon of attack in an action which takes its rise from an invasion of the transferee's rights under the contract. Moreover, a suit by the transferee against an attaching creditor of the transferor under O. 21, R. 63, Civil P.C, is not one between him and the transferor or anybody claiming under the transferor. Hence the transferee as a plaintiff cannot avail himself of the benefits of the doctrine of part performance of contract for sale as against an invasion in his rights by attaching creditor of the transferor.”
19. The learned Judges repelled the argument that the action under O. XXI, r. 63 is in the nature of a defensive action by pointing out that (p. 145):
“…if this were permissible, it would amount to creating an enforceable right or title to immovable property by means of an unregistered contract-deed and thus to reduce to nullity the effect of Section 49, Indian Registration Act….”
20. Thereafter the learned Judges referred to decisions of various High Courts which had held that a suit under r. 63 or r. 103 of the Civil Procedure Code substantially is a defensive action, and observed: (p. 147).
“…while purporting to give effect to S. 53-A, T.P Act they do, in effect, make use of the ‘doctrine of part performance’ as the basis of an action on the analogy of the practice on the equity side in England.”
21. With respect, I am unable to accept the view taken by the Orissa High Court for the simple reason that the learned Judges have not examined s. 53A of the Transfer of Property Act, in the context of O. XXI, r. 103 of the Civil Procedure Code and have laid emphasis upon the provisions of s. 49 of the Indian Registration Act and s. 54 of the Transfer of Property Act which have relevance only on the question of the title. The transfer immoveable properties the value of which is Rs. 100 or more can only be effected, by a registered instrument under s. 54 of the Transfer of Property Act. Section 49 of the Indian Registration Act provides that documents which required compulsory registration are not admissible in evidence in any suit or proceedings for any purpose. The rigour of s. 49 of the Indian Registration Act and s. 54 of the Transfer of Property Act has been partially relieved by the provisions of s. 53A. In the case of a suit filed under r. 103 all that the plaintiff can claim is that he has a right to present possession of the property and the question of title is not relevant. In essence such a suit is defensive in character. I, therefore, prefer to follow the view taken by the Allahabad, Oudh, Madras and Andhra Pradesh High Courts to the view taken by the Orissa High Court on this point.
22. The next and more important point for consideration is whether the auction purchaser can be regarded as a person claiming under the transferor. I have already cited all the relevant clauses of s. 53A of the Transfer of Property Act. The relevant portion of the fourth clause, on the interpretation of which the decision of this turns, runs thus:
“…the transferor or any person claiming under him shall be debarred from enforcing against the transferee and persons claiming under him any right in respect of the property of which the transferee has taken or continued in possession.”
23. The short question for consideration is whether the auction purchaser in execution can be treated as a person claiming under the transferor within the meaning of that expression as used in fourth clause of s. 53A. There was considerable controversy prior to the amendment of s. 47 in the Civil Procedure Code as to whether the auction purchaser could be regarded as a representative either of the judgment-debtor or of the judgment-creditor. The Bombay High Court had consistently taken the view that the auction purchaser is neither the representative of the judgment-debtor nor of the judgment-creditor. Section 47 provides that all questions arising between the parties to the suit in which the decree was passed or their representatives shall be determined by the Court executing the decree and not by a separate suit. The Explanation to s. 47 before it was amended ran thus:
“For the purposes of this section, a plaintiff whose suit has been dismissed, a defendant against whom a suit has been dismissed are parties to the suit”.
24. In Hanmantagouda Nagangouda v. Shivappa Dundappa: District Local Board, Belgium v. Shivappa Dundappa . 1937 42 Bom. L.R 1123., this Court held:
“A purchaser at an auction held by Court in execution of a decree who is a stranger is not a representative of either the judgment-debtor or the decree-holder [judgment-creditor].”
25. This view followed earlier decisions of the Bombay High Court in Gangadhwr Dhanjishet v. Balwant Kashirao: Supdusing Daulatsing v. Balwant Kashirao . 1939 42 Bom. L.R 367, S.C [1940] A.I.R Bom. 210. and in Narsinhbhat v. Bando Krishna . 1918 I.L.R 42 Bom. 411, S.C 20 Bom. L.R 495.. The view taken by some of the other High Courts was to the contrary and it was held that the auction purchaser must be treated as a representative of the judgment-debtor. In order to put the matter beyond the pale of controversy, the Legislature amended the Explanation to s. 47 of the Civil Procedure Code and substituted the following explanation by Act No. LXVI of 1956:
“For the purposes of this section, a plaintiff whose suit has been dismissed, a defendant against whom a suit has been dismissed and a purchaser at a sale in execution of the decree are parties to the suit.
26. It is pertinent to note that the Legislature, by this explanation did not constitute the auction purchaser as the representative of the judgment-debtor. On the other hand they chose the less controversial line by making the auction purchaser in execution as equivalent to a party to the suit. It is difficult, on general principles, to hold the auction purchaser as in any way the representative of the judgment-debtor or a person claiming under the judgment-debtor. It is true that the auction purchaser gets the right, title and interest of the judgment-debtor. But he does not get it by virtue of an act of parties. He does not get the title as a result of an agreement with the transferor. He does not obtain his right in accordance with the wishes of the transferor but contrary to his wishes. In the first place it is clear that the decree holder or the judgment-creditor makes a claim against the judgment-debtor and obtains a decree. After obtaining the decree he gets the property attached in execution. In so far as he proceeds to attach the property in execution he takes a step contrary to the interest of the judgment-debtor and against his consent. When the property is brought to sale, the judgment-creditor himself may purchase the property after securing permission of the Court or a third person may purchase the same. Whether it is the judgment-creditor or a third person who is purchasing the property, it is difficult to hold that either of them steps into the shoes of the judgment-debtor.
27. On this point strong reliance was placed by Mr. Pathak on the decision by King J. in Audinarayudu v. Mangamma . [1943] A.I.R Mad. 706. The facts of the case were that the decree-holder had certain property allegedly belonging to his judgment-debtors attached. Defendant No. 4 intervened with a claim petition in which it was asserted that defendants Nos. 1 and 2 had contracted to sell the property to her and had duly put her in possession. There was thus, what was in effect a plea under s. 53A of the Transfer of Property Act. The District Munsiff dismissed the claim. An appeal was preferred in the District Court and the learned District Judge allowed the plaintiff's claim. Then a second appeal was preferred before the Madras High Court which was decided by King J. sitting singly. The main question that came up for consideration was whether the judgment-creditor could be regarded as claiming under the judgment-debtor. After conceding that the interest of the judgment-debtor and that of the judgment-creditor are distinctly adverse and also after conceding that the judgment-creditor cannot be called a legal representative of the judgment-debtor at the stage in which he is proceeding to attach the judgment-debtor's property, the learned Judge proceeded to consider the eventuality of the property having been sold in auction and on that basis posed the question whether the auction purchaser can be regarded as claiming under the transferor. At p. 707 the learned Judge asserted in somewhat categorical terms: “it can now no longer be denied that the auction purchaser is the legal representative of the judgment-debtor”. This statement is justified on the basis of the view that prevailed in the Madras High Court viz. that the auction purchaser is a representative of the judgment-debtor under s. 47 of the Civil Procedure Code. (Vide Annamalai Mudali v. Ramasami Mudali . [1941] A.I.R Mad. 161, F.B.) According to the learned Judge, as soon as the sale is held, the rights of the judgment-creditor revives, with irresistible force. The learned Judge then proceeded to observe (p. 707):
“…In these circumstances, I prefer to hold that the expression ‘claiming under the transferor’ is wide enough in S. 53A to include a judgment-creditor in the situation in which the appellant in this appeal now stands”.
28. With respect, I cannot accept the view taken by King J. The learned Judge took up the hypothetical case of the proceedings culminating in the sale of the property and on that assumption considered the position of the auction purchaser. On the analogy of the position of the auction purchaser, the learned Judge held that the judgment-creditor also will be included in the expression “claiming under the transferor”. This view is based on the assumption that the auction purchaser is the legal representative of the judgment-debtor, a position which has never been accepted in this Court.
29. The Orissa High Court had occasion to consider this aspect of the matter in the very case to which reference has already been made by me (Padmalabha v. Appdlanarasamma).
30. I have already set out the facts of the case and it is not necessary to repeat them. At para, 30, the learned Judges observed (p. 149):
“There is another reason equally fatal to the plaintiff's suit. His suit is not one between him and the transferor or anybody claiming under him (the transferor). The attaching creditor derives nothing from the judgment-debtors by way of any right to purchase or charge upon the property. He wants to attach the property against the will and consent of the judgment-debtors.”
31. After citing the relevant passage from the judgment of King J. in Audinarayudu v. Mangamma the learned Judge proceeded to observe:
“With great respect, I cannot place myself in the same position as his Lordship, King, J. At the time of attachment, the attaching creditor's purchase, and the sale following it, would be mere expectation. I shall not be understood to accept, without reservation, the view that an auction purchaser in execution of a money decree is in general, a representative of the judgment-debtor.”
32. In my opinion the auction purchaser is not a person claiming under the transferor within the meaning of that expression in para. 4 of s. 53A of the Transfer of Property Act. The result, therefore, is that the appeal succeeds.
33. Appeal allowed. The decree of the appellate Court is set aside and that of the trial Court is restored. There will be no orders as to costs.
34. Appeal allowed.
Alert