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Kisan Supdu Ingale v. The Bhusawal Borough Municipality
Summary of Legal Opinion — Chainani, C.J.
Factual and Procedural Background
The petitioner is employed in the Carriage and Wagon Depot of the Central Railway at Bhusawal, which lies within the Bhusawal Borough Municipality governed by the Bombay Municipal Boroughs Act, 1925. Section 73 of that Act lists taxes a municipality may impose. Entry 60 in List II of the Seventh Schedule to the Constitution empowers the State Legislature to impose a tax on "professions, trades, callings and employments." In 1959 the Bhusawal Municipality decided to impose such a tax and framed rules and by‑laws which were sanctioned by the State Government on 22 June 1960. Clause (c) of rule 3 of the Bhusawal Trade, Professions, Callings and Employments Taxes Rules required persons holding offices of profit for not less than four months in a year to pay the tax, subject to caps specified in Schedule A (generally a maximum of Rs. 10 per year except certain categories with different caps; aggregate cap referred to of Rs. 250 per annum in the rule clause).
On 17 October 1962 the petitioner was called upon by the Chief Officer of the Municipality to pay Rs. 6 as tax for 1962–1963. The petitioner did not pay, and a union of railway employees made representations which were unsuccessful. The petitioner thereupon instituted the present special civil application challenging the validity of the tax and of the notice requiring payment.
Legal Issues Presented
- Whether the municipal tax on "professions, trades, callings and employments" (as levied by the Bhusawal Municipality under the Bombay Municipal Boroughs Act, 1925) validly includes a tax on services in which a person is employed to work for another (i.e., employees in private or government service).
- Whether the delegation of power by the State Legislature to municipalities to fix and levy such a tax is unconstitutional for excessive delegation (absence of legislative policy, guidelines or limits — i.e., whether the power is unfettered).
- Whether the imposition of the tax on the petitioner (a railway employee at Bhusawal) results in unreasonable discrimination contrary to Article 14 of the Constitution because some other municipalities where railway employees work have not imposed a similar tax.
Arguments of the Parties
Petitioner's Arguments (as presented by Mr. Ramamurthy)
- The Municipality is not competent to levy a tax on employments that are services in which a person works for another; the word "employments" should be construed ejusdem generis with "professions, trades and callings" and restricted to employments akin to professions, trades or callings (i.e., excluding ordinary service/employment for another).
- There has been excessive delegation by the State Legislature: while authorising municipalities to levy the tax, the Legislature has not laid down policy or guidance; municipalities may fix any rate they deem proper, leaving the power unfettered and thus unconstitutional.
- There is unreasonable discrimination (Article 14): other municipalities where railway employees work have not imposed a similar tax, so imposing it at Bhusawal discriminates against railway employees there.
The opinion does not contain a detailed account of the Municipality's or other respondents' separate, specific legal arguments in reply; instead the Court addresses and rejects the petitioner's contentions in its reasoning.
Table of Precedents Cited
| Precedent | Rule or Principle Cited For | Application by the Court |
|---|---|---|
| Waliati Ram v. Rupar Municipality, [1960] A.I.R. Punj. 669 (Punjab High Court) | Held that words like "professions, trades, callings and employments" in a municipal taxing provision should be construed broadly; an employee in private employment could be regarded as carrying on a "profession or calling" for taxation purposes. | The Court relied on this decision to support the view that "employments" (and the other words in entry 60) are used broadly and overlap; thus a service in which a person works for another falls within entry 60 and is taxable. |
| Hirabhai Ashabhai v. State of Bombay, 1954 56 Bom. L.R. 1035 | Considered whether empowering a municipal body to fix a water rate without a legislative ceiling was an impermissible delegation; held that linkage between rate and cost/municipal purpose was enough to validate the delegation. | The Court cited this case to illustrate that delegation to municipal authorities to fix rates is permissible where the statute implies a relation between rate and municipal needs/costs; used to reject the claim of utterly unfettered delegation. |
| Sarat Chandra v. Calcutta Corporation, [1959] A.I.R. Cal. 36 (Single Judge) and Calcutta Corporation v. Sarat Chandra, [1959] A.I.R. Cal. 704 (Division Bench) | Debate on whether empowering the Corporation to prescribe license fee rates with State Government approval was excessive delegation; single judge held invalid, Division Bench split: Das Gupta C.J. (invalid), Bachawat J. (valid delegation). | The Court noted the Division Bench's split and expressly agreed with Bachawat J.'s reasoning that delegation was permissible for local self government purposes; used this to support the constitutionality of delegation to municipalities. |
| Western India Theatres v. Municipal Corporation, Poona, 1959 61 Bom. L.R. 954, S.C. | Upheld delegation to municipalities to impose certain taxes; gave three reasons: (1) municipality cannot impose a tax the Legislature itself could not; (2) tax must be for purposes of the municipal Act and reasonably related to municipal duties; (3) taxing power subject to approval by Governor in Council (safeguards). | The Court regarded this Supreme Court decision as removing doubt about excessive delegation and relied upon it to hold the delegation under the Bombay Municipal Boroughs Act to be constitutionally permissible. |
Court's Reasoning and Analysis
The Court proceeded through a structured three‑fold analysis corresponding to the petitioner's main challenges.
-
Meaning of "professions, trades, callings and employments":
The Court examined ordinary dictionary meanings (Oxford English Dictionary and Webster's) of "profession," "trade," "calling" and "employment." It observed that the first three are themselves broad and would encompass any occupation by which livelihood is earned. The Court rejected the contention that "employments" should be narrowly read ejusdem generis to exclude ordinary service. It reasoned that words in a constitutional entry are not to be treated as terms of art or rendered redundant; the four expressions overlap and were deliberately used broadly to ensure comprehensiveness. The Court concluded that "employments" includes service or occupations in which a person works for another and in which an employer‑employee relationship exists; therefore a tax on such service can be imposed under entry 60 of List II in Schedule VII.
The Court supported this view by referring to the Punjab High Court decision in Waliati Ram v. Rupar Municipality which had similarly construed the expressions broadly to include employees in private employment.
-
Excessive delegation challenge:
The Court addressed the argument that the State Legislature had excessively delegated taxing power by not prescribing policy/guidelines and by leaving municipalities unfettered. It identified several constitutional and statutory restraints that limit municipal power:
- Article 276 places an upper monetary limit (stated in the opinion) on the rate (cannot exceed Rs. 250 per annum in the relevant context).
- The municipal power to levy such taxes is for purposes of the municipal Act and must bear some reasonable relation to the duties and needs of the municipality; a tax must serve municipal purposes.
- Statutory procedural safeguards: section 75 of the Bombay Municipal Boroughs Act requires a municipality to invite and consider objections from inhabitants and to submit objections and modifications to the State Government; no tax can be imposed without State Government sanction. These procedural limits constrain municipal discretion.
The Court relied on precedent (Hirabhai Ashabhai v. State of Bombay and the Division Bench decision in Calcutta Corporation v. Sarat Chandra, as well as the Supreme Court decision in Western India Theatres v. Municipal Corporation, Poona) to hold that delegation to municipalities to fix rates for local purposes is constitutionally permissible where the rate must reasonably relate to municipal needs and subject to the statutory and executive safeguards. The Court concluded that the delegation in the Bombay Municipal Boroughs Act to levy a tax on professions, trades, callings and employments is not unconstitutional.
-
Alleged discrimination (Article 14):
The Court rejected the contention of unreasonable discrimination because other municipalities had not imposed a similar tax. It noted that the Bhusawal tax is levied broadly on all employed persons (including private service), not solely on railway employees, and that each municipality must decide which taxes to levy and at what rates having regard to local conditions. The mere fact that some other municipalities have not levied the tax does not suffice to show contravention of Article 14.
After considering and rejecting all grounds advanced by the petitioner, the Court held there was no substance in the challenges.
Holding and Implications
Holding: RULE DISCHARGED; the petition/application fails. The Court dismissed the special civil application challenging the tax and the notice; the rule was discharged and there was no order as to costs.
Implications
- Direct effect on the parties: The petition challenging the municipal tax and the notice to the petitioner was dismissed; the rule was discharged. The Court made no order as to costs.
- Scope and precedent: The opinion applies established principles about the broad construction of "professions, trades, callings and employments" in taxation entries, and about permissible delegation to municipal authorities where statutory and constitutional limits and procedures exist. The Court relied on existing High Court and Supreme Court authorities; the opinion itself does not purport to set a new, distinct precedent beyond applying those authorities to the facts before it.
Chainani, C.J:— The petitioner is employed in the Carriage and Wagon Depot of the Central Railway at Bhusawal. This Railway Depot is situated within the limits of the Bhusawal Borough Municipality. This Municipality is governed by the Bombay Municipal Boroughs Act, 1925. Section 73 of this Act specifies the taxes, which a municipality may impose. sub-section (1) of this section states that subject to any general or special order, which the State Government may make in this behalf, and to the provisions of ss. 75 and 76, a municipality may impose for the purposes of this Act any of the following taxes, namely:—…
(xiv) any other tax which under the Constitution the State Legislature has power to impose in the State.
2. Section 75 lays down the procedure which a municipality has to follow before imposing a tax. One of the taxes which the State Legislature has power to impose is a tax on professions, trades, callings and employments under entry No. 60 in List II in the Seventh Schedule to the Constitution. In 1959 the Bhusawal Municipality decided to impose this tax. It framed rules and bylaws for levying this tax. These rules and by-laws were sanctioned by the State Government on June 22, 1960. Clause (c) in r. 3 of the Bhusawal Trade, Professions, Callings and Employments Taxes Rules, states that.
“every person who holds any office of profit under any Government or any body or authority either private or public or under any individual within the local area for not less than four months in any year shall pay the tax every year on employment at the rate specified in Schedule A; provided that the total amount payable in respect of any company or person to the Municipality by way of the tax shall not exceed Rs. 250 per annum.”
3. The rates of tax are specified in Schedule A to the Rules. Except in the case of owners of cotton ginning and pressing factories, in whose case the maximum tax payable is Rs. 100, the maximum tax which any other person is liable to pay under these rules is Rs. 10 per year. On October 17, 1962, the petitioner was called upon by the Chief Officer of the Municipality to pay Rs. 6, being the amount of the tax for the year 1962–1963 due from him. The petitioner did not pay this tax. A Union of the railway employees made representations against this tax to the Municipality, but it did not succeed. The petitioner then filed the present special civil application, in which he has challenged the validity of the tax as well as of the notice issued to him by the Chief Officer calling upon him to pay the tax. Mr. Ramamurthy on behalf of the petitioner has first urged that the Municipality was not competent to levy a tax on any employment in the nature of service, in which a person is employed to work for another. He has contended that the word “employments” should be construed ejusdem generis with the other words mentioned in entry 60 in List II in Schedule VII to the Constitution, professions, trades and callings and that it means “such employments which are akin to or in the nature of professions, trades and callings”. We have carefully considered this argument, but we do not think that there is much merit in it. If entry 60 was intended to include every occupation other than service, it is difficult to see why the word “employments” was used at all. The words are used in an entry in the Constitution. Every word must, therefore, be deemed to have been used with some object and no word can be held to be redundant. The words “profession, trade and calling” are also general words, which according to the dictionary have wide meanings. “Profession” as defined in the Oxford English Dictionary means.
“a business or profession that one publicly avows; the occupation which one professes to be skilled in and to follow; a vocation in which a professed knowledge of some department of learning or science is used in its application to the affairs of others or in the practice of art founded upon it; in a wider sense: any calling or occupation by which a person habitually earns his living.”
“Trade” according to the same dictionary means
“the practice of some occupation, business, or profession habitually carried on, especially when practised as a means of livelihood or gain; a calling; now usually applied to mercantile occupation and to a skilled handicraft, as distinct from a profession, and especially restricted to a skilled handicraft as distinguished from a professional or mercantile occupation on the one hand, and from unskilled labour on the other.”
“Calling” is defined in the same dictionary as meaning
“position, estate, or station in life; rank; ordinary occupation, means by which livelihood is earned; business, trade.”
4. Any occupation by which livelihood is earned would, therefore, fall within the words “professions, trades and callings”. Consequently, even if we were to accept the argument that the word “employments” must be construed ejusdem generis and that it draws its meaning from these words, it will be difficult to hold that service, in which a person is employed to work for another, would not be employment within the meaning of entry 60 in List II in Schedule VII to the Constitution.
5. In this connection I may refer to the decision of the Punjab High Court in Waliati Ram v. Rupar Municipality . [1960] A.I.R Punj. 669.. Section 61 of the Punjab Municipal Act empowered a municipal committee to levy a tax on persons practising any profession or art or carrying on any trade or calling in the municipal area. The section in terms did not empower a municipal committee to impose a tax on employments. The question which arose for consideration by the Punjab High Court was whether a person employed in private employment of a Bus Syndicate could be said to be carrying on a profession or calling and whether he was consequently liable to the tax imposed under s. 61 of the Act. It was argued that “employment” was not covered by the other three expressions used in the section, profession, trade or calling. This argument was negatived and it was held that as the words were used in an entry in the Constitution, they must be construed in their widest amplitude and that consequently the person employed by the Bus Syndicate must be held to have been carrying on a profession or calling. At page 672 it was observed:
“…It is very difficult to hold that the framers of the Constitution while using these words were using them as terms of art. The object of the entry is to enable the State Legislature to tax persons, who are carrying on any ‘professions’, ‘trades’, ‘callings’ and ‘employments’…These four words do not seem to be used in a mutually exclusive sense. These words overlap one another and appear to have been used by way of abundant caution in order to make these provisions broadbased and comprehensive….the object of putting them all together is to ensure that no particular category of persons is being eliminated.”
“Employment”, according to the same Oxford English Dictionary means
“the service (of a person); a person's regular occupation or business; a trade or profession.”
6. Another meaning of this word given in the Dictionary is “an official position in the public service.”
7. In Webster's Dictionary some of the meanings of the word “employment” given are:
“Activity in which one engages and employs his time and energies; work (as customary trade, craft, service or vocation) in which one's labour or services are paid for by an employer; the state of being employed.”
8. Employment therefore is also a word of wide import and the object of including this word also in the relevant entry in the Constitution evidently was to bring within the scope of this entry every activity or occupation, in which a person engages in order to earn a livelihood, whether it be trade, business, profession or service. In any case the word “employments” would include service or occupation, in which a person works for another and in which there is a relationship of employer and employee. A tax on service, in which the petitioner is employed, could, therefore, be imposed under entry 60 referred to above.
9. The next ground of attack is that there has been excessive delegation by the State Legislature, inasmuch as while authorising the municipalities to levy this tax, the Legislature has not laid down any policy or rules of guidance which a municipality should follow in levying the tax. It has been argued that the power conferred on municipalities is not regulated or controlled in any manner, that it has been left to the municipalities to levy the tax at any rate they deem proper and that, consequently, s. 73 of the Act, in so far as it empowers a municipality to levy this tax, is unconstitutional. Entry 5 in List II of the Seventh Schedule to the Constitution, in so far as it is relevant, reads:
“Local Government, that is to say, the constitution and powers of municipal corporations… for the purposes of local self-government…”
10. This ??? is ??? vide in its ??? and art. 216(3) of the Constitution read power given to the Municipality to levy a tax on processions, trades callings and employments is not absolute or uncontrolled, as has been argued. The maximum rate at which the tax can be levied is determined by art. 276 of the Constitution and it cannot exceed Rs. 250 per annum. The tax can be levied only for purposes of the Act, that is, in order to enable the Municipality to discharge the obligations imposed upon it by the Act. It must, therefore, have some relation to the needs and requirements of the Municipality. The circumstances and conditions of municipalities vary. In fixing the rate of tax the capacity of those on whom the liability will fall to bear the burden has to be taken into consideration. A rate of tax which residents of a large and prosperous city may be able to bear may be too heavy for people residing in a small town. Every town and city is also growing and as the duties and responsibilities of a municipality increase the need for additional taxation will arise. It is probably on account of these and other similar considerations that it has been left to each municipality to decide the rate at which it should levy the tax. Since, however, the rate of tax is to be determined having regard to the resources required by a municipality for performing its statutory duties, it cannot be said that the power given to a municipality to fix the rate is entirely unfettered or uncontrolled.
11. In Hirabhai Ashabhai v. State of Bombay . 1954 56 Bom. L.R 1035., the challenge was to s. 169 of the Bombay Municipal Corporation Act, which empowers the Municipal Commissioner to charge for water according to measurement at such rate as shall from time to time be prescribed by the Standing Committee in this behalf. Whereas in the case of some other taxes such as the general tax and the halalkhor tax, the Act has specified the maximum rate at which the tax can be levied, no limit has been prescribed in regard to the water rate. It was, therefore, contended that s. 169 was invalid as “the Legislature had given no indication of its policy as to the ceiling of the rate which can be charged for the supply of water” and as “it was left entirely to the absolute and unfettered discretion” of the Corporation. This argument was not accepted, as it was held that the Legislature intended that there should be relationship between the rate charged and the cost of providing a water supply.
12. It may also be pointed out that before a municipality imposes any tax, it has to follow the procedure laid down in s. 75. It has to invite objections from the inhabitants of the Municipal Borough to the levy of the tax. It is required to take into consideration any objection which any inhabitant of the Municipal Borough may raise to the imposition of the tax or to the amount or rate proposed or to the classes of persons or property to be made liable thereto or to any exemptions proposed and unless it decides to abandon the proposed tax, it has to submit such objections with its opinion thereof and any modifications proposed in accordance therewith to the State Government. No tax can also be imposed without the sanction of the State Government. Limitations have, therefore, been placed on the powers of a municipality and it does not enjoy absolute powers in this behalf.
13. Mr. Ramamurthy has relied on the decision of a single Judge of the Calcutta High Court in Sarat Chandra v. Calcutta Corpn. . [1959] A.I.R Cal. 36., that s. 229 of the Calcutta Municipal Act, which empowers the Municipal Corporation to levy a license fee on certain classes of advertisements “at such rate and in such manner and subject to such exemptions as the Corporation may prescribe by rules with the approval of the State Government,” was invalid. There was an appeal against this decision. The appeal was heard by a Division Bench of the High Court, see Calcutta Corporation v. Sarat Chandra . [1959] A.I.R Cal. 704.. The two learned Judges who heard the appeal differed on the question whether the delegation made by s. 229 of the Calcutta Municipal Act was constitutionally permissible. Das Gupta C.J held that the legislation in so far as it left the determination of the rate of the tax to the Corporation with the approval of the State Government was beyond the limits of permissible delegation and was invalid. Bachawat J. took a different view and held that the legislation was valid. At p. 714 Bachawat J., observed:
“The Calcutta Municipal Act…is a law with regard to Local Self Government. It provides for the municipal affairs of Calcutta including levy and collection of taxes by the Corporation of Calcutta…It empowers the Corporation of Calcutta to prescribe the rate of taxation by rules with the approval of the State Government. Subject to such approval the Corporation may fix such rate as it thinks fit. The object of the section is to increase the resources of the Corporation. The Legislature intended that the rate would be so fixed as would best serve that purpose. The Corporation is expected to impose such taxation as may be necessary or expedient for the fulfilment of the several duties imposed on it by the Act. The power of taxation is given for purposes of Local Self Government. Such a delegation is permissible in law.”
14. With respect, we agree with these observations.
15. Any doubt on the question of the tax being ultra vires on the ground of excessive delegation by the State Legislature of its powers is removed by the decision of the Supreme Court in Western India Theatres v. M'pal Corp., Poona . 1959 61 Bom. L.R 954, S.C.. In that case the Supreme Court had to consider the validity of cl. (xi) in sub-s. (1) of s. 59 of the Bombay District Municipal Act. This clause empowered a Municipality to levy any other tax, to the nature and object of which the approval of the Governor in Council shall have been obtained prior to the selection contemplated in sub-cl, (i) of cl. (a) of s. 60. The Supreme Court held that the delegation of power to impose the tax could not be struck down as being in excess of the permissible limits of delegation of legislative functions. The Supreme Court has given three reasons for arriving at this conclusion. The first is that the municipality could not impose any tax which the Provincial Legislature could not itself impose. Secondly, s. 59 authorised the Municipality to impose the taxes therein mentioned for the purposes of the Act and the Municipality could therefore levy taxes only for implementing those purposes and for no other purpose. The tax to be imposed must, therefore, have some reasonable relation to the duties cast on the Municipality by the Act. Thirdly, the taxing power of the Municipality was subject to the approval of the Governor in Council.
16. For similar reasons, we must hold that the delegation of the power to the municipalities governed by the Bombay Municipal Boroughs Act to impose a tax on professions, trades, callings and employments, is not unconstitutional.
17. The last argument which has been advanced by Mr. Ramamurthy is that as the other municipalities in which railway employees work have not imposed a similar tax, there is unreasonable discrimination against the railway employees working at Bhusawal. This argument is without any substance.
18. The tax is levied by the Bhusawal Municipality not only on persons, employed in the railway, but also on all employed persons including persons employed in private service. Consequently, it cannot be said that the railway employees alone have been selected for the purpose of imposing the burden of tax upon them. Section 73 of the Municipal Boroughs Act specifies several taxes which every municipality is competent to impose. Each municipality has, therefore, to decide, having regard to the conditions prevailing in its municipal area and other circumstances, what taxes and at what rates it should impose. The mere fact that some other municipalities have not levied a similar tax will not, therefore, be a sufficient ground for holding that art. 14 of the Constitution has been contravened.
19. These are all the grounds on which the validity of the tax has been questioned. For the reasons which I have given, we see no substance in them. The application, therefore, fails. Rule discharged. No order as to costs.
20. Rule discharged.
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