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Kishorlal Stores v. Jagannath Bayaji Patil

Bombay High Court
Mar 31, 1943
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Judgment Summary: N.J. Wadia, J.

Factual and Procedural Background

The applicant sued the defendant to recover Rs. 148-6-3 as principal and interest due on a khata in the name of Bayaji Savalaram, the deceased father of the opponent. The Second Class Subordinate Judge of Karad dismissed the suit on the ground that it was barred by limitation, and the District Judge of Satara confirmed that decree on appeal. The last entry in the khata was dated 9 November 1931; the suit was filed on 29 February 1940. The plaintiff's clerk gave evidence that payments were made on 29 July 1935 and 2 June 1936. The trial judge held the khata proved but the claim time-barred under the Dekkhan Agriculturists' Relief Act (the suit being under that Act). The plaintiff sought to rely on s. 20 of the Indian Limitation Act (payments by the debtor) to save limitation; the trial court and the appellate court rejected that plea on the ground that s. 29 of the Indian Limitation Act excluded the application of s. 20 to suits falling under s. 3(w) of the Dekkhan Agriculturists' Relief Act. The applicant filed the present revision application to challenge those rulings. This Court allowed the application, set aside the lower appellate decree and remanded the suit to the trial court for decision according to law.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the payments made by the debtor on 29 July 1935 and 2 June 1936 could be relied upon under s. 20 of the Indian Limitation Act to save the suit from being time-barred where the last khata entry was on 9 November 1931 and the suit was filed on 29 February 1940.
  2. Whether the Dekkhan Agriculturists' Relief Act (specifically s. 72) is a "special or local law" within the meaning of s. 29 of the Indian Limitation Act such that the general provisions of the Indian Limitation Act (including s. 20) are excluded from application to suits falling under s. 3, cl. (w), of the Dekkhan Act.
  3. If s. 29 applies, whether the particular wording of s. 72 of the Dekkhan Agriculturists' Relief Act (which substitutes periods in the schedule to the Indian Limitation Act) should be construed as effecting only a modification of the schedule while leaving the rest of the Indian Limitation Act applicable to such suits.

Arguments of the Parties

The opinion does not contain a detailed account of the parties' legal arguments.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Keshav Krishna Dhopade v. Bhagwan Sambhu Chaudhari Held that under s. 29 of the Indian Limitation Act the benefit of s. 20 cannot be availed of by a plaintiff in a suit falling under s. 3, cl. (w), of the Dekkhan Agriculturists' Relief Act. The Court noted that the lower Courts relied on this decision but observed that that judgment did not consider the peculiar wording of s. 72 (which substitutes periods in the schedule to the Indian Limitation Act rather than creating a self-contained code). The present Court distinguished Keshav Krishna on that basis and did not follow its conclusion.
Srinivasa Ayyangar v. Secretary of State Considered whether a particular provision of the Indian Limitation Act (s. 15, cl. (2)) applied to suits under a special Act (s. 59 of the Madras Revenue Recovery Act); stated the principle that whether the general provisions of the Limitation Act apply depends on whether the special/local Act enacts a complete body of provisions with regard to limitation or expressly excludes the general provisions. The Court relied on this reasoning to support the view that s. 72 of the Dekkhan Act, by substituting periods in the schedule to the Indian Limitation Act and expressly referring to that Act, indicates that the Indian Limitation Act as a whole should apply to suits under s. 3(w) subject to the substitution — i.e., that general provisions (such as s. 20) are not necessarily excluded.
Veeramma v. Abbiah (Madras High Court, Full Bench) — referred to in Srinivasa Ayyangar Earlier full bench authority on the question whether general limitation provisions apply where a special Act prescribes a period; used in the reasoning in Srinivasa Ayyangar about construing special/local Acts to determine whether they exclude the general Limitation Act. The Court referred to the Veeramma decision (via Srinivasa Ayyangar) as part of the established approach that each special Act must be construed to see whether it constitutes a complete code excluding the general Limitation Act; this supported the present Court's conclusion that s. 72 does not constitute such a complete code.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Court proceeded by construing s. 72 of the Dekkhan Agriculturists' Relief Act and the interaction of that section with s. 29 of the Indian Limitation Act. The key points of the Court's analysis were:

  • Recognition that the Dekkhan Agriculturists' Relief Act is a special or local law, and that s. 29 of the Indian Limitation Act generally governs the effect of special/local laws on the application of the Indian Limitation Act.
  • Careful examination of the language of s. 72: the section does not itself state a separate, self-contained period of limitation for the suits in question. Instead, it provides that certain periods shall be substituted in the schedule annexed to the Indian Limitation Act. Thus s. 72 expressly refers to the Indian Limitation Act and effects a substitution in its schedule.
  • Reliance on the principle (as explained in Srinivasa Ayyangar) that the question whether the general provisions of the Limitation Act apply where a special Act prescribes a period depends upon whether the special Act can be regarded as enacting a complete body of provisions with regard to limitation. Each statute must be construed on its own words.
  • Distinguishing Keshav Krishna: the lower Courts followed that decision but, according to this Court, Justice Divatia's judgment did not consider the distinctive wording of s. 72 which substitutes periods in the Indian Limitation Act's schedule rather than creating an independent scheme; therefore Keshav Krishna was not treated as binding in the present circumstances.
  • Policy and purposive considerations: s. 72 was enacted to benefit agriculturists and to mitigate hardship resulting from shorter periods under the ordinary law of limitation. It would be inconsistent with that remedial object to construe s. 72 as depriving agriculturists of the ordinary benefits of the Indian Limitation Act (for example, the benefit of making part payments and thereby extending limitation under ss. 19 and 20), unless the statute's language clearly and unavoidably required such a construction.
  • On this textual and purposive foundation, the Court concluded that s. 72 indicates an intention that the Indian Limitation Act generally continue to apply to suits under s. 3, cl. (w), subject only to the substitution in the schedule effected by s. 72. Consequently, s. 20 of the Indian Limitation Act (regarding payment by the debtor) was available to the plaintiff.
  • Application of the legal conclusion to the facts: because a payment was made on 2 June 1936, limitation should be reckoned from that date under s. 20; the suit filed on 29 February 1940 was therefore within six years and not time-barred.

Holding and Implications

Holding: The application in revision was allowed. The decree of the lower appellate Court was set aside and the plaintiff's suit was remanded to the trial Court for decision according to law. Costs were awarded to the applicant and costs in the lower Courts were made costs in the cause.

Implications: The direct effect of this decision is that the plaintiff may avail himself of s. 20 of the Indian Limitation Act; limitation is to be reckoned from the payment on 2 June 1936 and, on that basis, the suit is in time. The Court's reasoning rests on the construction of s. 72 of the Dekkhan Agriculturists' Relief Act as effecting a substitution in the schedule to the Indian Limitation Act while leaving the remainder of that Act applicable to such suits. The opinion does not articulate broader precedent-making consequences beyond the disposition of this revision: its effect as between the parties is to revive the plaintiff's suit for trial on the merits; the Court construed s. 72 as not excluding the general provisions of the Indian Limitation Act in the circumstances described.

Rule made absolute.

This summary is based exclusively on the content of the provided opinion and does not add facts or arguments beyond those contained in that opinion.

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N.J Wadia, J.:—

This is an application in revision arising out of a suit filed by the applicant against the defendant. The suit was dismissed by the Second Class Subordinate Judge of Karad on the ground that it was barred by limitation and the decree was confirmed in appeal by the District Judge of Satara.

The applicant filed the suit to recover a sum of Rs. 148-6-3 for principal and interest due on a khata in the name of one Bayaji Savalaram, the deceased father of the opponent.

The trial Judge held that the suit Khata had been proved, but that the claim was not in time. The suit was under the Dekkhan Agriculturists' Relief Act. The accounts relied on by the plaintiff showed that the last entry was dated November 9, 1931. The suit was filed on February 29, 1940. The plaintiff's clerk stated in his evidence that the deceased had made certain payments towards the khata on July 29, 1935, and June 2, 1936.

The suit is one falling under s. 3, cl. (w), of the Dekkhan Agriculturists' Relief Act. Section 72 of that Act provides that the period of limitation in the case of such suits is six years. The last entry in the khata is dated November 9, 1931, and the suit having been filed on February 29, 1940, would be time-barred unless the subsequent payments by the debtor on July 29, 1935, and June 2, 1936, could save limitation under s. 20 of the Indian Limitation Act. These payments were made within six years from the date of the last entry in the Khata and the suit was filed within six years from the last of these payments. The learned trial Judge, however, took the view that these payments could not help the plaintiff to bring his suit within limitation because of the provisions of s. 29 of the Indian Limitation Act.

The view taken by both the Courts below is that the Dekkhan Agriculturists' Relief Act is a special or local law within the meaning of s. 29 of the Indian Limitation Act and that therefore the suit must be governed by the provisions of s. 72 of the Dekkhan Agriculturists' Relief Act alone, and the provisions of the Indian Limitation Act would have no application. Section 29, sub-cl. (2), provides that

“Where any special or local law prescribes for any suit, appeal or application a period of limitation different from the period prescribed therefore by the first schedule, the provisions of s. 3 shall apply, as if such period were prescribed therefore in that schedule, and for the purposes of determining any period of limitation prescribed for any suit, appeal or application by any special or local law (a) the provisions contained in s. 4, ss. 9 to 18, and s. 22 shall apply only in so far as and to the extent to which, they are not expressly excluded by such special or local law; and (b) the remaining provisions of this Act shall not apply.”

In Keshav Krishna Dhopade…Plaintiff v. Bhagwan Sambhu Chaudhari…Defendant . sitting singly held that under s. 29 of the Indian Limitation Act, 1908, the benefit of s. 20 of the Act cannot be a vailed of by a plaintiff in a suit falling under s. 3, cl. (w), of the Dekkhan Agriculturists' Relief Act.

The Dekkhan Agriculturists' Relief Act is no doubt a special or local law. The question, however, is whether it is a special or local law which prescribes a period of limitation different from the period prescribed by the first schedule, of the Indian Limitation Act. The language of s. 72 of the Dekkhan Agriculturists' Relief Act is peculiar. The section does not say that the period of limitation, for the suits referred to in the section shall be six years or twelve years as the case may be, but it provides that for the suits mentioned in the section certain periods of limitation shall be deemed to be substituted in the schedule annexed to the Indian Limitation Act for the periods prescribed in that schedule. The Dekkhan Agriculturists' Relief Act therefore does not provide a separate and self-contained body of provisions with regard to the limitation of suits coming under that Act. Section 72 itself expressly makes a reference to the Indian Limitation Act, and by providing that with regard to suits falling under s. 3, cl. (w), of the Dekkhan Agriculturists' Relief Act, certain periods of limitation shall be substituted in the schedule of the Indian Limitation Act for those already provided by that schedule, it clearly indicates that, subject to this one modification, the Indian Limitation Act as a whole shall apply to such suits. If that had not been the intention of the legislature, there was no reason for making any reference to the Indian Limitation Act at all. The section could easily have provided that for suits falling under s. 3, cl. (w), of the Dekkhan Agriculturists' Relief Act, the period of limitation should be twelve years when the suit is founded on a written instrument registered and six years in any other case. The legislature has deliberately not adopted that method, and the only explanation seems to be that it was the intention of the legislature that suits under s. 3, cl. (w), of the Dekkhan Agriculturists' Relief Act, should be governed by the Indian Limitation Act subject to the modification mentioned in the section. In Srinivasa Ayyangar v. Secretary of State, a question arose whether s. 15, cl. (2), of the Indian Limitation Act, IX of 1908, which excludes from the computation of the period of limitation, the time occupied by the notice legally necessary to be issued before instituting certain actions, is applicable to suits brought under s. 59 of the Madras Revenue Recovery Act, II of 1864. In holding that it was applicable, the learned Judges observed that the question whether the general provisions of the limitation act should be applied to cases where a special period of Limitation is prescribed by a special or local Act depends on whether the provisions of such Act can be regarded as enacting a complete body of provisions with regard to limitations of suits coming within the purview of the Act; that the question is whether the special or local Act can be construed as excluding the applicability of the general provisions of the Indian Limitation Act; and that each case would have to be decided on the construction of the particular statute which provides a special period of limitation. In taking this view they referred to an earlier full bench decision of the Madras High Court in Veeramma v. Abbiah.

The Courts below have relied on the decision in Keshav Krishna v. Bhagwan Sambhu.(3) Mr. Justice Divatia in his judgment in that case does not refer to the peculiar wording of s. 72 of the Dekkhan Agriculturists' Relief Act which merely substitutes in the schedule to the Indian Limitation Act a special period of limitation as regards suits falling under s. 3(w) of the Dekkhan Agriculturists' Relief Act and does not lay down an independent and self-contained provision as regards the limitation applicable to such suits. This peculiar phraseology of s. 72 distinguishes it from the provisions in some other special Acts for instance the Indian Registration Act, with regard to which it has been held that the general provisions of the Indian Limitation Act are not applicable because of s. 29 of that Act.

Section 72 of the Dekkhan Agriculturists' Relief Act was enacted for the benefit of agriculturists and was intended to mitigate the hardship caused to agriculturists because of the shorter period provided by the ordinary law of limitation, which compels the money-lender to sue his debtor at very short intervals or to take a fresh bond from him. If it were held that by reason of the provisions of s. 72 of the Dekkhan Agriculturists' Relief Act an agriculturist debtor is deprived of the benefit of the general provisions of the Indian Limitation Act, such as ss. 19 and 20, the result would be that the creditor Would feel compelled to sue before the expiry of six years for the whole amount due, and the debtor would be deprived of the advantage, which the ordinary law of limitation gives him, of making part payment and obtaining an extension of time as regards the rest of the debt. If the provisions of s. 72 of the Dekkhan Agriculturists' Relief Act were such as to indicate clearly that this was the intention of the legislature, the Courts Would of course be bound to give effect to it. But before we put such a construction on the language of the section, we must be satisfied that the section is capable of no other interpretation. In our opinion the language of the section is capable of an interpretation which is more consistent with the general purpose of the Dekkhan Agriculturists' Relief Act, namely to benefit agriculturists and give them greater facilities as regards payment of debts. The language of s. 72 seems to indicate that it was not intended to deprive agriculturists of the benefits of the provisions of the Indian Limitation Act, and it was with this object that instead of making a separate and self-contained provision with regard to the limitation governing such suits the alteration as regards limitation was made by substitution in the Indian Limitation Act itself of a new period of limitation, with the result that in all other matters the Indian Limitation Act as it stands would continue to apply. This conclusion derives support from the fact that in suits under the Dekkhan Agriculturists' Relief Act falling under the clauses of s. 3 other than cl. (w), the ordinary law of limitation as laid down in the Indian Limitation Act admittedly applies. There is no particular reason why the legislature should have desired to deprive only those agriculturists whose cases might fall under s. 3, cl. (w), of the benefits of the Indian Limitation Act.

In our opinion therefore the plaintiff was entitled to the benefit of s. 20 of the Indian Limitation Act and to reckon limitation from June 2, 1936, on which date a certain payment towards the khata, balance was made. If the limitation is reckoned from that date the suit is clearly in time.

The application is, therefore, allowed with costs, the decree made by the lower appellate Court set aside and the plaintiff's suit remanded to the trial Court for decision according to law. Costs in the lower Courts will be costs in the cause.

Rule made absolute.
J.G.R
Indian Limitation Act.Indian Limitation Act.