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Utility Articles Manufacturing Co. v. Raja Bahadur Motilal Bombay Mills, Ltd.

Bombay High Court
Mar 23, 1943
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Factual and Procedural Background

This appeal arises from a decision by Mr. Justice Chagla concerning whether Section 110 of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882, applies to a monthly tenancy. The tenancy originated from a letter dated August 1, 1941, which confirmed terms agreed on July 30, 1941. The tenancy involved certain rooms in the Mills Building at Tardeo rented at Rs. 250 monthly, payable at the end of each month, with a clause requiring either party to give one clear month's notice to terminate the tenancy.

On January 29, 1942, the landlord’s solicitors wrote to the tenants to determine the tenancy by the end of February 1942, requesting possession thereafter. The tenants challenged the validity of this notice, particularly whether it was a proper notice to quit and whether it complied with the requirements of Section 110 of the Transfer of Property Act.

The trial court held that Section 110 did not apply to monthly tenancies and that the notice was valid. This appeal challenges that decision.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether Section 110 of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882, which governs the computation of time in leases, applies to a monthly tenancy.
  2. Whether the notice given by the landlord’s solicitors constituted a valid notice to quit under the terms of the tenancy agreement and applicable law.

Arguments of the Parties

Appellant's Arguments

  • The notice dated January 29, 1942, was not a valid notice to quit because it merely conveyed instructions received by the solicitors rather than an actual determination of tenancy.
  • The notice was defective because it expired at the end of the month (February 28/29) rather than on the first day of the month, as required by Section 110 of the Transfer of Property Act.
  • Section 110 applies to all leases, including monthly tenancies, and thus the day of commencement must be excluded in computing the lease term and notice period.
  • Reliance on Section 105 of the Transfer of Property Act to argue that all leases must be for a term or in perpetuity, implying monthly tenancies are subject to the same rules.

Respondent's Arguments

  • The notice was a valid notice to quit because the language used would reasonably be understood by tenants as terminating the tenancy.
  • The tenancy was a periodical tenancy from month to month, not a lease for a fixed term, and thus Section 110 does not apply since the time is not limited by the lease but by the notice to quit.
  • The parties intended the tenancy to commence on August 1, 1941, with rent payable monthly at the end of each calendar month, and the notice period was one clear calendar month as per the agreement.
  • Section 110 applies only where the lease limits the time, which is not the case for periodical tenancies that continue until notice is given.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Queen's Club Gardens Estate, Ltd. v. Bignell Explanation of the nature of periodical tenancies; that each period is an accretion to the original tenancy and that notice must expire with the original tenancy period. The court relied on this precedent to clarify that a monthly tenancy is a periodical tenancy not limited by the lease itself but by notice, hence Section 110 does not apply.
Dixon v. Bradford and District Railway Servants' Coal Supply Society Authority for the proposition that a notice to quit must expire with the expiration of the tenancy period. Used to support the principle that the notice period must align with the tenancy period.
Benoy Krishna Das v. Salsiccioni Consideration of application of Section 110 to leases and monthly tenancies; distinction between fixed-term lease and subsequent monthly tenancy. The court found that the Privy Council applied Section 110 only to the fixed-term lease, not to the monthly tenancy, and thus the case did not support extending Section 110 to monthly tenancies.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The court examined the language of the tenancy agreement and the notice to quit. It rejected the appellant’s argument that the notice was merely informational, interpreting the phrase “we are instructed to determine the tenancy” as a clear determination of tenancy. The court analyzed the meaning of “one clear month’s notice” in the context of a tenancy starting on the first of the month, concluding it referred to a calendar month.

Central to the analysis was whether Section 110 of the Transfer of Property Act applied to a monthly tenancy. The court explained that Section 110 applies only where the lease limits the time, i.e., a fixed-term lease. In contrast, a monthly tenancy is a periodical tenancy that continues indefinitely until notice is given. The court relied on authoritative precedents clarifying that each period in a periodical tenancy is an extension of the original tenancy, not a new lease, and therefore the time is not limited by the lease itself but by the notice to quit.

The court found no direct authority applying Section 110 to monthly tenancies and distinguished the Privy Council decision in Benoy Krishna Das v. Salsiccioni, which applied Section 110 only to the fixed-term lease preceding the monthly tenancy. The court agreed with the trial judge’s conclusion that Section 110 does not apply to monthly tenancies.

Accordingly, the notice given, expiring at the end of February, was valid and complied with the contractual requirement of one clear calendar month’s notice.

Holding and Implications

The appeal is DISMISSED with costs.

The court held that Section 110 of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882, does not apply to monthly tenancies, which are periodical tenancies continuing until terminated by notice. Consequently, a notice to quit expiring at the end of a calendar month, given in accordance with the tenancy agreement, is valid. This decision affirms the distinction between fixed-term leases and periodical tenancies in the application of statutory provisions governing computation of time. No new precedent was established beyond confirming the inapplicability of Section 110 to monthly tenancies in these circumstances.

Show all summary ...

Beaumont, C.J:—

This is an appeal from a decision of Mr. Justice Chagla raising the important question whether s. 110 of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882, applies to a monthly tenancy. The facts can be stated shortly.

The tenancy was created by a letter, dated August 1, 1941, signed by the parties. It starts by reciting that terms had been agreed on July 30. Then cl. 1 is in these terms:

“It is agreed that you shall be taking the first and second floor north wing rooms adjoining the main central hall in our Mills Building at Tardeo from August 1, 1941, at a monthly rent of Rs. 250 payable at the expiry of each month.”

The only other relevant clause is clause 9, which provide that either side will give one clear month's notice to determine the tenancy.

On January 29, 1942, the landlord's solicitors wrote to the tenants in the following terms:

“Our clients Messrs. The Raja Bahadur Motilai Bombay Mills Ltd. instruct us to state that you are in possession and occupation of a portion to with the first and second floors and ‘three corridor rooms’ on the north side of their premises at Tardeo as tenants under them on a monthly rent of Rs. 340.

“We are instructed to determine the said tenancy with the expiry of the month of February 1942 and to call upon you to quit and deliver vacant possession of the said premises on the expiry of the said month of February 1942 and to intimate to you that in default our clients will be constrained to institute proceedings against you in ejectment.

The question is whether that is a good notice to quit. Mr. Coltman's first point is that it is not a notice to quit at all. His contention is that it merely conveys to the tenants a piece of news, in which they may or may not be interested, as to the instructions which the solicitors have received from their clients; that the letter says “We are instructed to determine the tenancy”, but does not say “We determine the tenancy”. In my opinion, there is no substance in that argument. One has to see what that notice would mean to the tenants who received it, and it seems to me that the expression “we are instructed to determine the tenancy” merely means “on the instructions of our clients we determine the tenancy.” That is the only rational meaning which can be given to the expression, and the meaning is emphasized by the threat of instituting proceedings, with which the notice concludes. It can hardly be supposed that the landlords' solicitors were writing merely to inform the tenants what instructions their clients had given.

A more serious objection is that the notice expiring with the month of February is a bad notice, because the notice must expire on the 1st of the month, and not on the last day of the month. Reading the letter of August 1, 1941, apart from the Transfer of Property Act, it seems to me that the month referred to in cls. 1 and 9 is an English calendar month. The arrangement had been arrived at the end of July, and the tenancy is to start from August 1, the rent to be payable at the expiry of each month. That looks to me as if it is to be a monthly tenancy from the first of the calendar month, the rent being payable at the expiration of the calendar month. And when cl. 9 says that either side will give one clear month's notice to determine the tenancy, I should say that means a calendar month's notice. It is difficult to see what the expression “one clear month's notice” means, if it does not mean a calendar month's notice. Does it mean, four weeks' or thirty days' notice, or what?. I think the rational meaning to give to such an expression in a tenancy commencing from the first of the month is that it means that one clear calendar month's notice is to be given. The notice in fact was given on January 29, and was to expire at the end of February, so that it was a notice for the clear month of February.

But then, it is said that meaning cannot be given to the letter of agreement because of the provisions of s. 110 of the Transfer of Property Act. The first paragraph of that section reads: “Where the time limited by a lease of immoveable property is expressed as commencing from a particular day, in computing that time such day shall be excluded. Where no day of commencement is named, the time so limited begins from the making of the lease.” In this case, no doubt, the time is expressed as commencing from a particular day, that is from August 1, and if the section applies, then that day is to be excluded, and a notice to quit will have to be given expiring on the first day of the month, and not on the last day.

The real question is whether in the case of a monthly tenancy such as this it can be said that time is limited by a lease. The nature of a periodical tenancy, whether yearly or monthly or weekly, has been explained in many cases, and I may refer to the judgment of Mr. Justice Salter in Queen's Club Gardens Estate, Ltd. v. Bignell as containing a very clear exposition of the law based on old cases. He points out that a characteristic of a periodical tenancy is that as each period commences, it is not a new tenancy; it is really an accretion to the old tenancy. A monthly tenancy, that is a tenancy subject to a month's notice, creates in the first instance a tenancy for two months certain. But as soon as the third month commences, that is not a new tenancy; it turns the original tenancy into a three months' tenancy, and when the fourth month begins, the tenancy becomes a four months' tenancy, and so an so long as the tenancy continues, until, that is to say, notice to quit is given. One result of that doctrine is that a notice to quit must always expire with the expiration of the period of the original tenancy. Of course, the rule is subject to any contract the parties may make between themselves. But a provision, as in clause 9 of this agreement, that either side will give one clear month's notice to determine the tenancy does not, in my opinion, affect the rule that the notice must expire with the expiration of the tenancy. That has not been disputed in this case, and there is a clear authority for the proposition in Dixon v. Bradford and District Railway Servants' Coal Supply Society.

Now, that being the nature of a periodical tenancy, can one say that in such a tenancy time is limited by a lease? It seems to me that one cannot say that the lease limits the time; the time is limited by the notice to quit. Until the notice to quit is given, the tenancy continues from month to month. In my opinion the agreement of August 1, 1941, did not, within the meaning of s. 110, limit the time of the lease. It is curious that there is no authority directly upon this point. We have not been referred to any case in which s. 110 has been definitely applied to a monthly or other periodical tenancy, nor, on the other hand, have we been referred to any case in which the section has been held not to apply to such, a tenancy. Both sides have relied on a decision of the Privy Council in Benoy Krishna Das v. Salsiccioni. But the case, to my mind, really does not help either side. In that case there was a lease for four years on June 1, 1921, and on the expiration of that lease the tenants continued in occupation, and on February 1, 1928, the tenants gave notice to terminate the tenancy, which had become a monthly tenancy, and the notice stated that it was one month's clear notice to take effect from that date, and that possession would be given up on March 1. The Privy Council held that to be a good notice. Mr. Coltman says that the Board applied the provisions of s. 110 to a monthly tenancy; but, in my opinion, they did not do that. They, no doubt, applied the provisions of s. 110 to the four-year lease, and they held that, having regard to s. 110, such lease expired at midnight on June 1, 1925, so that the subsequent monthly tenancy began on June 2, 1925, and could be determined by a notice expiring on the first day of the month, and, therefore, the notice expiring on February 1, 1928, was a good notice. But the Privy Council only applied s. 110 to the monthly tenancy for the purpose of determining when it commenced. On the other hand, Sir Jamshedji Kanga contends that the case helps him, because the Privy Council held that the monthly tenancy commenced on June 2, 1925, and that it was properly determined by a notice which expired on the first of the month, so that they did not exclude June 2 from the computation of the monthly tenancy. But the answer to that is that s. 110 only applies where the time limited by a lease is expressed as commencing from a particular day, and in that case there was no provision that the monthly tenancy was to commence from June 2. Therefore, the case really does not help.

Mr. Justice Chagla held that s. 110 did not apply to a monthly tenancy, and that the notice to quit was good. In my judgment that decision is right.

The appeal, fails, and must be dismissed, with costs including costs reserved.

Kania, J.:—The terms of the arrangement on which the appellants were given the property on lease are set out in the letter dated August 1, 1941, which confirms the arrangement orally made between the parties on July 30.

Two points were raised in this appeal. The first is about the terms of the notice, and, whether the same amounts to a notice to quit at all. I agree with the conclusion of the learned trial Judge and with what has been stated by the learned Chief Justice in his judgment on the point, and have nothing more to add.

The second point is whether s. 110 of the Transfer of Property Act applies to the tenancy in question. The learned trial Judge has held that it does not. Mr. Coltman strongly relied on s. 105 for the contention that every lease must be for a term or in perpetuity; no other kind of lease is recognised by the Transfer of Property Act. But a periodical lease does not infringe that section at all. Indeed, it is recognised as one of the leases under s. 105. Section 106 of the Transfer of Property Act further provides that a lease of immoveable property, in the absence of any contract or local law or usage to the contrary, shall be deemed to be from year to year, if the lease is for agricultural or manufacturing purposes, or from month to month terminable on the part of either the lessor or lessee by fifteen days' notice expiring with the end of the month of the tenancy. There, again, a periodical lease from month to month is covered and it is not outside the operation of that section. Section 110 opens with, the words “Where the time limited, by a lease of immoveable property is expressed as commencing from a particular day, in computing that time such day shall be excluded”. Section 110, therefore, is included in the Act for the purpose of computing time where the time is limited by the lease. If the words “time limited” were not important, there was no necessity to include them in the section. Those words, therefore, clearly indicate that every lease, which is included under s. 105 of the Transfer of Property Act, is not necessarily one covered by s. 110. Otherwise I do not see any reason why the Legislature should have included in this particular section those two words which have not been used in any of the preceding sections. Again notice may be taken of cls. (a) and (b) of s. 111, where provision is made for the determination of a lease where the time is limited by the lease. It is expressly provided that in such cases by the efflux of the time limited, the lease comes to an end. It is material to bear in mind these provisions of the Transfer of Property Act in order to fully appreciate the correct nature of a monthly tenancy.

The judgment of Mr. Justice Salter in Queen's Club Gardens Estates, Ltd. v. Bignell, clearly lays down the nature of these periodical tenancies. It is clear that such periodical tenancies do not come to an end by the efflux of time, for the simple reason that the time is not limited by the original lease itself. It commences with the month, and without any further action on the part either of the lessor or lessee continues till either party determines it by giving one month's notice. It is again material to note that the tenancy during the second and third or fifteenth month is not a new tenancy. It is always considered as a part of the original tenancy. It will be wrong to contend that when the tenancy commenced, the term was one month or two months, if without any action on the part of any party it (the original tenancy) continued, say for fifty years, if no one gave a notice terminating the tenancy before that. It may thus continue for an almost indefinite time, but might be brought to an end by either party, without the consent of the other party. I therefore agree that s. 110 is, in terms, inapplicable to periodical tenancies, and in this case the monthly tenancy was a periodical tenancy.

That leaves the question what was the agreement between the parties, apart from the meaning sought to be imposed on the wording of the letter by reading s. 110? It seems to me clear that the parties had arranged on July 30 for a lease which was to commence on August 1. The provision that rent was to be paid at the expiry of each month, and the provision for one clear month's notice to determine the lease contained in the letter indicate that the month contemplated was the English calendar month. Any other argument will open up difficult questions about the duration of the month, or when the notice would come to an end. For instance, why should it not be considered a lunar month? It seems to me, therefore, that the clear intention of the parties was to treat this as a tenancy commencing on August 1, and the whole argument raised on behalf of the appellants is based on what I should say an inadvertent use of the word “from” in this letter.

I agree, therefore, that the appeal should be dismissed with costs.

Per Curiam. Negative certificate under s. 205 of the Government of India Act granted.

Stay granted until the end of April; but that is peremptory.

Attorneys for appellants: Messrs Ghulamali Noorani & Co.

Attorneys for respondents: Messrs Nanu, Hormusji & Co.

Appeal dismissed.
A.J.P