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Vishnumoorthi Bhagwatha And Another v. Rudra Shedthi And Another

Karnataka High Court
Jul 12, 1973
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Structured Summary of the Opinion (Malimath, J.) — Revision Petition against Order dated 22 November 1972

Factual and Procedural Background

The plaintiffs (petitioners) instituted a suit for possession (O.S. No. 411 of 1958), claiming ownership of the suit land and alleging that the mother of defendants 2 and 3 was a permanent tenant who, in breach of a lease covenant prohibiting alienation, had alienated her interest in favour of defendant No. 1. The plaintiffs sought possession against "all or any of the defendants who may be found to be in actual possession."

During the pendency of the suit defendant No. 1 died. The legal representatives of defendant No. 1 were not brought on record within the prescribed time and, as a consequence, the suit abated as against defendant No. 1; an application to set aside that abatement was dismissed. Defendants 2 and 3 filed an interim application contending that, because the right to sue did not survive in their favour once defendant No. 1's legal representatives were not on record, the entire suit had abated. The learned Principal Munsiff at Coondapur, by order dated 22 November 1972, held that the entire suit had abated. The plaintiffs filed the present revision petition challenging that order.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether, when one of several defendants dies and the deceased defendant's legal representatives are not brought on record within the prescribed time, the entire suit abates or only the suit as regards the deceased defendant.
  2. Whether the right to sue survived in favour of defendants 2 and 3 such that the suit could proceed against them notwithstanding the death of defendant No. 1 and non-impleading of his legal representatives.
  3. Whether the High Court has jurisdiction to entertain the revision petition, or whether the order under challenge is a decree appealable to the Civil Judge under Section 96 of the Code of Civil Procedure (i.e., whether revision is maintainable).

Arguments of the Parties

Petitioners' (Plaintiffs') Case and Arguments

  • The plaintiffs asserted ownership of the suit land and that defendants 2 and 3 succeeded to the interest of their mother (the lessee).
  • They alleged that during the lessee's lifetime she alienated her tenancy interest in contravention of the lease covenant, and that defendants 2 and 3 claim under that alienation (to defendant No. 1), giving the plaintiffs a cause of action for possession against those who are in actual possession.
  • The plaintiffs opposed the interim application by defendants 2 and 3 that the entire suit had abated; they sought to continue the suit so far as it related to defendants 2 and 3 if those defendants were in possession.

Defendants' (Respondents') Case and Arguments

  • Defendants resisted the suit by contending that defendant No. 1 had released his interest in favour of defendants 2 and 3, and thus there was no breach of the lease covenant giving rise to a right in the plaintiffs to a decree for possession.
  • After defendant No. 1's death and failure to bring his legal representatives on record, defendants 2 and 3 argued (by interim application) that the entire suit had abated because the cause of action did not survive in their favour.

Counsel's Submission on Maintainability

  • Shri B.P. Holla urged that if the High Court had no jurisdiction to entertain the revision petition (because an appeal lay), the bona fide merits of the petitioners' case would not justify interference by this Court in revision.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
State of Punjab v. Nathu Ram (Supreme Court) The Supreme Court's statement that Order 22 R.4 (CPC) does not provide for abatement of proceedings against co-respondents of a deceased respondent; that the term "abatement" has been loosely applied and that, where the appellate (or suit) proceedings cannot be properly constituted without necessary parties, the remedy is dismissal rather than abatement. The decision also explains the test for when Court can proceed against surviving parties and when it must dismiss. The Court relied on this precedent to explain that (a) abatement under Order 22 applies only as to the deceased party, (b) where the right to sue does not survive as to the remaining defendants the suit must be dismissed for want of necessary parties, and (c) consequently an order so operating is a decree appealable under Section 96 CPC rather than a mere non-appealable interlocutory order.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The court considered two layers of inquiry: (A) the substantive correctness of the learned Munsiff's conclusion that the entire suit abated; and (B) whether this Court had revisional jurisdiction over the order challenged.

A. On the merits, the learned Munsiff had held that because the legal representatives of defendant No. 1 were not brought on record and the right to sue did not survive in favour of defendants 2 and 3, the whole suit had abated. The High Court judge disagreed with that conclusion for the following reasons set out in the opinion:

  • The suit was framed for possession "against all or any of the defendants who may be found to be in actual possession." As such, if defendants 2 and 3 (or either of them) were in possession and the plaintiffs established their entitlement to possession as against them, the Court could make a decree as to those defendants despite the non-impleading of defendant No. 1's legal representatives.
  • Thus, the absence of legal representatives of defendant No. 1 did not invariably prevent adjudication of rights as between the plaintiffs and defendants 2 and 3; it depended on facts (for example, who was in possession and whether the plaintiffs proved their entitlement against those defendants).
  • Accordingly, the judge concluded that the learned Munsiff had taken a clearly wrong view on the merits in treating the matter as one where the rights could not at all be adjudicated in the absence of defendant No. 1's legal representatives.

B. On maintainability, the court turned to procedural law and the nature of the order under challenge:

  • If the order under revision is in substance a decree (i.e., a decision finally determining the rights of the parties), then an appeal, not revision, is the proper remedy. Section 96 CPC gives a right of appeal to the Civil Judge from a decree of the Munsiff, and a second appeal (where permissible) to the High Court.
  • Order 22 CPC was examined: abatement under that provision operates as regards a deceased party alone; courts have sometimes loosely said co-defendants' proceedings "abated" but that is not technically correct. Where the right to sue does not survive in favour of other defendants, the correct consequence is dismissal for want of necessary parties because the matter cannot be properly adjudicated in their absence.
  • The Court relied on the Supreme Court's decision in State of Punjab v. Nathu Ram (extracting its reasoning) to reinforce that: (i) abatement applies only to the deceased party; (ii) the Court may proceed as to other parties where it can properly adjudicate without the deceased party; and (iii) it must dismiss where the absence of necessary parties makes adjudication impossible or would lead to inconsistent or ineffective orders.
  • Applying those principles, the High Court concluded that although the Munsiff used the expression "abatement" as to defendants 2 and 3, the real effect of his order was to dismiss the petitioners' suit for want of necessary parties (the legal representatives of defendant No. 1), because the right to sue did not survive in favour of defendants 2 and 3.
  • Because the order under revision must be construed as a decree dismissing the suit for want of necessary parties, it was appealable under Section 96 CPC. Consequently, the revision petition in this Court was not maintainable as an alternative to the appeal which should have been filed in the Court of the Civil Judge.

The Court also noted equitable considerations: the petitioners had bona fide pursued their remedy in revision under a reasonable belief that revision was competent, in part because the Munsiff's language misled them. The petitioners were not to be penalised for this mistake.

Holding and Implications

Holding: The High Court held that the revision petition is not maintainable because the order of the learned Munsiff, although expressed as one of "abatement" as against defendants 2 and 3, is in substance a dismissal of the petitioners' suit for want of necessary parties (the legal representatives of the deceased defendant No. 1) and therefore constitutes a decree appealable under Section 96 of the Code of Civil Procedure. As a result, the proper remedy is an appeal to the Civil Judge under Section 96 CPC rather than revision in the High Court.

Implications and direct effects:

  • The revision petition was ordered to be returned to the petitioners so that it may be presented as a memorandum of regular appeal in the Court of the Civil Judge, accompanied by the appropriate court-fee.
  • The petitioners are entitled to make an appropriate application for condonation of delay in the appellate forum; the Court expressed no doubt that such an application will be dealt with in accordance with law.
  • No costs were awarded against the petitioners.

The opinion does not purport to set out any novel legal principle beyond applying existing law (including the Supreme Court authority cited) to the facts and procedural posture; the decision's practical effect is to direct the petitioners to prosecute an appeal before the Civil Judge rather than to entertain the revision petition in this Court.

Show all summary ...

Malimath, J.:— This revision petition is by the plaintiffs against the order made by the Principal Munsiff at Coondapur, dated 22nd November, 1972, holding that the entire suit O.S No. 411 of 1958 brought by the plaintiffs-petitioners has abated, as the petitioners did not bring the legal representatives of the deceased first defendant on record within the prescribed time and as the right to sue did not survive in favour of respondents defendants 2 and 3.

2. The petitioners instituted the suit for possession. Their case is that they are the owners of the suit land and that the mother of defendants 2 and 3 was a permanent tenant. One of the conditions of a permanent lease is that the lessee is not entitled to transfer or alienate the rights of permanent tenancy in favour of third parties and that the lesser would be entitled to resume possession of the land in the event of the lessee transferring or alienating has interest in contravention of the aforesaid clause. The case of the plaintiffs is that after the death of the mother of defendants 2 and 3, it is defendants 2 and 3 who have succeeded to her interest. It is further alleged that during the life time of the mother of defendants 2 and 3, who is the lessee she, in contravention of the aforesaid clause, alienated her interest in favour of defendant No. 1 and that therefore the same has given rise to a cause of action in favour of the plaintiffs for securing a decree for possession. The defendants resisted the suit by taking the stand that the first defendant has released his interest, in favour of defendants 2 and 3 and that, therefore, there is no breach of any covenant of the lease, entitling the plaintiffs to a decree for possession. It may be mentioned at this stage that the prayer in the suit is for possession against all or any of the defendants who may be found to be in actual possession of the suit property. Defendant No. 1 died during the pendency of the suit and as his legal representatives were not brought on record within the prescribed time, the suit abated as against the first defendant. It was submitted that the application filed for setting aside the abatement was also dismissed.

3. Defendants 2 and 3 filed interim application and prayed that the Court should hold that the entire suit even as against them has abated on the ground that the cause of action has not survived in their favour, the suit having abated as against defendant No. 1. That application was opposed by the petitioners. The learned Munsiff by his order dated 22nd November, 1972, has held that the entire suit O.S No. 411 of 1958 has abated. It is the said order that is challenged by the petitioners in this revision petition.

4. I have heard Shri N. Santhosh Hegde as well as Shri B.P Holla, both on the merits and in regard to the maintainability of the revision petition. The learned Munsiff has taken the view that, as right to sue did not survive in favour of defendants 2 and 3, the suit has abated as a whole, the legal representatives of defendant No. 1 not having been brought on record within the prescribed time. I find it difficult to agree with this conclusion of his. The suit, as already mentioned is one for possession against all or any of the defendant who may be found to be in possession. If defendants 2 and 3 or any of them is in possession and if the plaintiffs establish their case entitling them to secure possession from defendants 2 and 3, the Court can undoubtedly make a decree in favour of the plaintiffs, in spite of the fact that the legal representatives of defendant No. 1 have not been brought on record. If, however, the Court comes to the conclusion that defendants 2 and 3 are not in possession or that, the plaintiffs failed to establish that they are entitled to secure a decree for possession from defendants 2 and 3, the suit may have to be dismissed. This is, therefore, not a case where one can say that in the absence of the legal representatives of defendant No. 1 the rights of the parties cannot at all be adjudicated upon. I am, therefore, of the opinion that on merits, the Court below has taken a clearly wrong view.

5. But, it was urged by Shri Holla that if this Court has no jurisdiction to entertain the revision petition, the fact that the petitioners have a good case will not justify this Court in interfering with the order made by the learned Munsiff. It is therefore that I am required to examine the question regarding maintainability of the revision petition.

6. If the order under revision is a decree, then the same would be appealable to the Court of the Civil Judge under Section 96 of the Code of Civil Procedure and a second appeal would lie against the decree of the Civil Judge, to this Court. In that event, it is obvious that the revision petition would not be competent, in as much as the High Court can exercise its revisional powers only in cases in which no appeal lies to it either directly or indirectly. It is, no doubt, true that the order under revision does not, in express terms, state that the suit of the petitioners is dismissed against respondents-defendants 2 and 3. The Court has held that the suit has abated as against defendants 2 and 3. If we examine the provisions of Order 22 of the Code of Civil Procedure, it would be clear that a suit can abate in respect of a party who is dead and whose legal representatives are not brought on record within the prescribed time. If, therefore, one of the several defendants dies and his legal representatives are not brought on record, the suit abates only so far as that party is concerned. The consequence that flows as a result of the abatemet of the suit as against one of the defendants in the event of the right to sue not surviving in favour of other defendants is not of abatement of the suit against other defendants. When a right to sue does not survive as against other defendants, the suit becomes incompetent for want of necessary parties. The suit in those circumstanues has to be dismissed on the ground that necessary parties, whose presence is necessary before the Court for adjudication, of the matter in controversy, are not before the Court. The Courts have loosely used the expression “abatement” against surviving defendants also, though that is not the correct expression to be used, as observed by the Supreme Court in State Of Punjab v. Nathu Ram(1). The relevant paragraphs 4 to 6 in the said judgment may be extracted with advantage:

“(4) It is not disputed that in view of O. 22, R. 4, Civil Procedure Code, hereinafter called the Code, the appeal abated against Labhu Ram deceased, when no application for bringing on record his legal representatives had been made within the time limited by law. The Code does not provide for the abatement of the appeal against the other respondents. Courts have held that in certain circumstances, the appeals against the co-respondents would also abute as a result, of the abatement of the appeal against the deceased respondent. They have not been always agreed with respect to the result of the particular circumstances of a case and there has been, consequently, divergence of opinion, in the application of the principle. It will serve no useful purpose to consider the case. Suffice it to say that when O. 22, R. 4 does not provide for the abatement of the appeals against the co-respondents of the deceased respondent there can be no question of abatement of the appeals against them. To say that the appeals against them abated in certain circumstances, is not a correct statement. Of course, the appeals against them cannot proceed in certain circumstances and have therefore to be dismissed. Such a result depends on the nature of the relief sought in the appeal.

(5) The same conclusion is to be drawn from the provision of O. 1, R. 9 of the Code which provides that no suit shall be defeated by reason of the misjoinder or non-joinder of parties and the Court may, in every suit, deal with the matter in controversy so far as regards the rights and interest of the parties actually before it. If follows, therefore, that if the Court can deal with the matter in controversy so far as regards the rights and interest of the appellants and the respondents other than respondent, it has to proceed with the appeal and decide it. It is only when it is not possible for the Court to deal with such matters, that it will have to refuse to proceed further with the appeal and therefore dismiss it.

(6) The question whether a Court can deal with such matters or not, will depend on the facts of each case and therefore no exhaustive statement can be made about the circumstances when this is possible or is not possible, It may however, be stated that ordinarily the considerations which weigh with the Court in deciding upon this question are whether the appeal between the appellants and the respondents other than the deseased can be said to be properly constituted or can be said to have all the necessary parties for the decision of the controversy before the Court. The test to determine this has been described in diverse forms. Courts will not proceed with an appeal (a) when the success of the appeal may lead to the Court's coming to a decision which be in conflict with the decision between the appellant and the deceased respondent and threfore which would lead to the Court's passing a decree which will be contradictory to the decree which had become final with respect to the same subject matter between the appellant and the deceased respondent; (b) when the appellant could not have brought the action for the necessary relief against those respondents alone who are still before the Court and (c) when the decree against the surviving respondents, if the appeal succeeds, be ineffective, that is to say, it could not be successfully executed.”

It is clear from the decision of the Supreme Court that, if the Court comes to the conclusion that the right to sue does not survive in favour of the other defendants, the suit has to be dismissed for want of necessary parties before the Court. In such curcumstances, it is not proper for the Court to declare that the suit has abated as against the other defendants. The situation in a case like this will be the same as in a suit brought by the plaintiff against one or some of the defendants, without impleading the necessary parties. If the necessary parties are not before Court in the suit filed by the plaintiff, the decree that the Court can make is to dismiss the suit for want of necessary parties. The same will be the consequence that has to flow when the suit abates as a result of the death of one of the defendants and the right to sue not surviving in favour of the remaining defendants. If a suit is dismissed for want of necessary parties to the suit, the said decision amounts to a decree, as it finally determines the rights of the parties and the said decree would be appealable under Section 96 of the Code of Civil Procedure. The same would also be the position in a case like this, where the suit abates against the first defendant and the right to sue does not survive in favour of the remaining defendants.

7. As the expression “abatement” has been loosely employed, as can be seen from the various decisions of the Courts in India, what has to be looked into is the real substance of the matter and not the expression employed by the Courts. Though the Court below has held that the suit has abated as against defendant 2 and 3, the clear effect of the same is of dismissal of the petitioners' suit for want of necessary parties, viz., the legal representatives of deceased defendant No. 1, the right to sue not having survived in favour of defendants 2 and 3. If the order under revision is so construed as having the effect of a dismissal of the petitioners' suit for want of necessary parties, the decision of the Court below would be a decree which is appealable under Section 96 of the Code of Civil Procedure. In that view of the matter, the proper remedy of the petitioners was to prefer an appeal against the decision of the court below, in the Court of the Civil Judge under Section 96 of the Code of Civil Procedure.

8. The above discussion will necessarily lead to the conclusion that this revision petition is not maintainable. I have no doubt in my mind that the petitioners have bona fide pursued their remedy in a wrong forum, viz., this Court. Instead of filing an appeal before the Court of Civil Judge, the petitioners have, under a bona fide impression that a revision is competent, filed this revision petition. The petitioners cannot be blamed for approaching this Court instead of prefering an appeal to the Court of Civil Judge. The wordings employed by the Court of first instance themselves were responsible for this situation. Instead of the Munsiff holding that the suit has abated against defendants 2 and 3, if he had dismissed the suit on the ground that the necessary parties are not before him, the petitioners would have been posted with the information that a decree dismissing their suit has been passed and that the remedy available to them is to prefer an appeal to the Court of Civil Judge. The petitioners, in these circumstances, should not be penalised for no fault of theirs in approaching this Court in revision, instead of filing an appeal to the Court of the Civil Judge.

9. For the reasons stated above, I direct that the memorandum of revision petition be returned to the petitioners for being presented as a memorandum of regular appeal in the Court of the Civil Judge, accompanied by appropriate Court-fee, the petitioners shall be entitled to make an appropriate application for condonation of delay and I have no doubt that the application will be dealt with in accordance with law. No costs.