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Emperor v. Anant Narayan Kulkarni Accused.

Bombay High Court
Jul 17, 1944
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Judgment Summary — Sen, J.

Factual and Procedural Background

This is a reference from the Additional Sessions Judge, Belgaum, concerning proceedings in which an accused, an officiating Kulkarni of Kongnoli village (Chikodi taluka), was committed for trial on an offence under Section 409, Penal Code, 1860. The material factual narrative in the opinion is as follows:

  • In June 1941 the Mamlatdar of Chikodi taluka visited the village. Before his arrival a clerk had requested the Kulkarni to bring his account books; the Kulkarni left and did not immediately return. A Police Patil recovered the account books from the Chavdi.
  • Inspection disclosed that a large balance of recovered land revenue had not been accounted for. On further inspection the Mamlatdar found a total apparent misappropriation of Rs. 655-0-6.
  • The accused produced Rs. 642 and the remaining Rs. 13-0-6 were recovered under a warrant issued under the Land Revenue Code.
  • Two complaints were filed in the Court of the Resident Magistrate, First Class, Hukeri: one alleging breach of trust in respect of Rs. 10 and Rs. 40 (and forging two village-form receipts), and the other alleging criminal breach of trust regarding Rs. 572-15-8. The Resident Magistrate recorded the evidence in both matters together and committed the accused to Sessions on both.
  • In Sessions Case No. 17 of 1943 the accused was tried on the first complaint (Rs. 10 and Rs. 40 and alleged forgeries). The offence under S.409 was tried with a jury and the offence under S.466 with assessors; the jury returned a unanimous verdict of not guilty and the assessors agreed — the accused was acquitted on both counts.
  • The present case (the second matter) proceeded before another Sessions Judge. The accused claimed to be tried under Section 271 and simultaneously applied contending that the present proceedings were barred under Section 403 and that he was therefore entitled to an acquittal. The Additional Sessions Judge considered that while Section 403 did not strictly apply in terms, it would be undesirable for the accused to undergo a second trial and made a reference under Section 438 to the High Court recommending quashing of proceedings and acquittal.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the present trial (the second trial) was barred by Section 403 of the Criminal Procedure Code or by the related principle of autrefois acquit (or its extension in the interests of justice), and whether the proceedings should be quashed and the accused acquitted.
  2. Whether the Additional Sessions Judge was entitled, after the accused had claimed to be tried under Section 271, to make a reference under Section 438 to the High Court (i.e., whether Section 272 compels immediate trial or must be read subject to Section 438).
  3. Whether the splitting of the prosecution into two separate trials (first trial on certain items and offences, second trial on remaining items) was improper or justified (for instance, to avoid misjoinder), and whether such splitting could render the second trial oppressive or impermissible.

Arguments of the Parties

Accused's Arguments (Mr. Jahagirdar)

  • Relied on authorities supporting the view that where a gross sum is involved, there should generally be a single trial covering the defalcation period and a second trial in respect of items within that period may be barred — citing 17 Cr. L.J 301.
  • Pointed to prior decisions (including 57 Cal. 174 and A.I.R 1938 Cal. 697) that the prosecution knew the gross sum from the outset, that sanction for prosecution had been obtained for the whole amount (Rs. 655-0-6), and that evidence in the magistrate's court was recorded side by side — arguing the accused could and should have been tried once under Section 222.
  • Contended that the Assistant Public Prosecutor admitted there was no new evidence to be produced at the second trial that was not produced at the earlier trial.
  • Emphasized that the jury had unanimously acquitted the accused in the earlier trial; relied on the dictum of Subrahmania Ayyar J. in 29 Mad. 126 (p. 138) that the principle of autrefois acquit may be extended when the interests of justice require it.
  • Relied on authorities condemning the splitting of prosecutions into multiple trials as harassing and improper (A.I.R 1938 Cal. 697 was cited on this point).

Government Pleader's Arguments

  • Contended the Additional Sessions Judge was not entitled to refer the matter after the accused had claimed to be tried, because Section 272 requires the Judge to proceed to select jurors and try the case once the accused has claimed trial.
  • Argued that Section 272 must be read in conjunction with Section 438, but maintained that the stage at which the accused made his application was too late to avail him — relying on Weir's report of Criminal Misc. Petn. No. 127 of 1902 where the High Court refused to quash proceedings as the reference had not been made before trial commencement.
  • Relied on A.I.R 1926 Cal. 410 as a case where, because the trial proceeded to conviction, an application to quash the committal was too late.
  • Maintained that splitting the prosecution into two trials may have been justified to avoid misjoinder (first trial involving Ss. 409 and 466 for two items, second trial involving only S. 409), citing dicta in 41 Bom. L.R 981 and 60 Bom. 148 at p. 159.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
17 Cr. L.J 301 That the intention of Section 222 CrPC is that one trial should cover misappropriation of a gross sum during the defalcation period, and a subsequent trial for other sums in the same period may be barred by Section 403. Noted by the court as an authority relied upon by the accused; contrasted with other authorities taking a different view.
12 Bom. L.R 2262 (also referenced elsewhere as 12 Bom. L.R 226) Technical view: a previous acquittal does not necessarily bar a second trial for misappropriation of other items during the same period; a subsequent conviction can be lawful. Recorded by the court as an existing contrary view and as the view taken by this Court in an earlier case; acknowledged but not treated as decisive here.
50 Cal. 6323 (also referenced as 50 Cal. 632) Held that where the subject-matter of a later charge was not included in the gross sum charged in an earlier trial (from which the accused was effectively acquitted), a second trial for that separate item was competent. Noted by the court as an authority supporting competency of a subsequent trial when the item was not included in earlier charge; used to show divergence in authorities.
57 Cal. 174 Recognized divergence of opinion; Mukerji J. observed that even if Section 403 may not strictly apply, there is abundant authority that a second trial in similar circumstances ought to have been prevented; suggested early application to High Court could have succeeded. Discussed at length; the court found the circumstances of the present case analogous in some respects (prosecution knew gross sum, evidence recorded together, early application) and relied on the reasoning in this line of authorities in support of quashing the second trial.
2 A.L.J 6735; 49 Cal. 9246; 7 C.W.N 4937; 5 C.W.N 728 Authorities cited in Mukerji J.'s judgment supporting the view that second trials in similar circumstances should be prevented. Mentioned as part of the body of authority cited in 57 Cal. 174; the High Court treated these as supportive precedents in the line of cases that militate against permitting multiple trials in respect of a single gross defalcation where injustice or harassment would result.
A.I.R 1938 Cal. 6979 Held that splitting a prosecution into multiple trials can be improper and harassing where the matters are practically indistinguishable and the method adopted by prosecution causes repeated proceedings against accused. Relied upon by the accused; the court cited Henderson J.'s condemnatory remarks about multiplicity of trials and considered this authority persuasive as to the undesirability of splitting prosecutions in a way that causes harassment.
29 Mad. 12610 (p. 138) Dictum of Subrahmania Ayyar J. that the principle of autrefois acquit may be extended where interests of justice require, even if the plea is not strictly available. The court expressly adopted this principle and applied it to the facts, concluding that the second trial should be prevented on grounds of justice and fairness.
Weir's report: Criminal Misc. Petn. No. 127 of 1902 (as reported in Weir's Code of Criminal Procedure, vol. II, p. 262) High Court refused to quash committal where the reference was not made before commencement of trial; "too late to quash the proceedings." Relied upon by the Government Pleader to argue the accused's application was too late; the court distinguished the present facts, noting the accused had not actually been tried in Sessions Court and therefore the case was different.
A.I.R 1926 Cal. 41011 Where trial proceeded to conclusion and conviction, quashing committal was held to be too late; non-compliance with committal formalities was not sufficient ground to set aside conviction in that context. Relied upon by the Government Pleader as analogous authority for lateness; the court distinguished it because the present case had not proceeded to a Sessions trial conclusion or conviction.
41 Bom. L.R 9812; 60 Bom. 14813 (p. 159) Dicta suggesting splitting of trials may be arguable where misjoinder would otherwise result; used to justify separate trials in some circumstances. Relied upon by the Government Pleader to argue the splitting here could have been appropriate; the court noted this point but ultimately found other material considerations weighed in favour of quashing the second trial.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The court's analysis proceeded in several discrete steps, each applying statutory provisions and the cited authorities to the facts before it:

  1. Jurisdictional question: The Government Pleader argued Section 272 compelled the Sessions Judge to proceed to trial once the accused claimed to be tried. The court held Section 272 is applicable but must be read subject to Section 438 (which permits the Sessions Judge to report to the High Court after examination of the record). The High Court's wide revisionary powers under Section 439 and power to quash commitment under Section 215 meant a reference under Section 438 was permissible in appropriate cases.
  2. Timing/lateness objection: The Government Pleader relied on authorities where intervention was too late because the Sessions trial had proceeded to conclusion. The court distinguished those authorities on the facts: in the present case the accused had not yet been tried before the Sessions Court on the second complaint (he had only claimed to be tried and made his application promptly upon being brought to trial). Therefore the "too late" authorities were inapplicable.
  3. Divergence of authority and principle: The court reviewed a body of precedents taking differing views — some authorities (e.g., 17 Cr. L.J 301) favor barring subsequent trials by reference to Section 403/Section 222 principles, while others (e.g., 12 Bom. L.R 2262 and 50 Cal. 6323) permitted subsequent trials in various circumstances. The court acknowledged these conflicting lines of authority and analysed them against the present case's particular facts.
  4. Consideration of the prosecution's conduct and the accused's position: The court emphasized several material facts: the prosecution knew the gross sum from the outset; sanction for the prosecution had been obtained for the entire amount of Rs. 655-0-6; evidence in the magistrate's court had been recorded for both matters side by side; the accused had applied at the earliest possible stage after being sent for trial; the jury in the earlier trial had been unanimous in acquittal; and the accused had in fact produced/paid the whole amount involved. The Assistant Public Prosecutor's admission that there was no fresh evidence to be produced at the second trial was also noted.
  5. Harassment and risk of inconsistent verdicts: The court accepted the view (reinforced by authorities such as A.I.R 1938 Cal. 697) that splitting prosecutions into multiple trials can be oppressive and harassing where the matters are essentially the same and where the prosecution's method risks repeated trials and cumulative punishments. Even acknowledging that the prosecution may have had arguable grounds (e.g., to avoid misjoinder), the court found the practical considerations—unanimous earlier acquittal, prior payment, lengthy prior trial, and the risk of inconsistent jury outcomes—militated strongly against allowing a second trial.
  6. Application of equitable doctrine: The court applied the dictum in 29 Mad. 126 that the principle of autrefois acquit may, in proper circumstances, be extended in the interests of justice even where the plea is not strictly available. On the facts, the court concluded that the interests of justice required preventing the second trial.

Holding and Implications

Holding: The reference was accepted. The court quashed the committal order and the subsequent proceedings in the Court of the Additional Sessions Judge and directed that the accused be acquitted and discharged.

Implications (direct effect): The immediate consequence is that the accused is acquitted and discharged, and the committal and trial proceedings in respect of the second complaint are quashed. The court's decision rests on the particular facts and equitable considerations summarised above; no broader rule or new statutory interpretation beyond the application of existing authorities and the equitable extension of autrefois acquit in the interests of justice was proclaimed in this opinion.

Reference accepted.

Show all summary ...

Sen, J.:— This is a reference from the Additional Sessions Judge, Belgaum, with regard to a sessions case in his own Court to which the accused has been committed for an offence under S. 409, Penal Code, 1860, and he has recommended that the proceedings of the case be quashed and the accused acquitted. The material facts are these. The accused was an officiating Kulkarni in the village Kongnoli in Chikodi taluka in 1941. The Mamlatdar of Chikodi taluka arrived at the said village on 17th June, 1941. Before his arrival, one of his clerks had reached the village and had asked the Kulkarni, the accused, to bring his account books for inspection. The Kulkarni left but did not return. The Police Patil was then sent to find him but he also could not find the accused. The Patil then brought the account books from the Chavdi and the clerk, on inspecting them, found that a large balance of land revenue which had been recovered had not been accounted for in the accounts. The Mamlatdar, on arriving at the village, again inspected the accounts. The next day the accused appeared before the Mamlatdar and made certain statements. The Mamlatdar found that a total amount of Rs. 655-0-6 appeared to have been misappropriated. The accused produced an amount of Rs. 642 and the balance of Rs. 13-0-6 was recovered from him by means of a warrant issued under the Land Revenue Code. On these facts, two complaints were filed against the accused in the Court of the Resident Magistrate, First Class, Hukeri. In one complaint, it was alleged that the accused had committed a breach of trust in respect of two sums, one of Rs. 10 and the other of Rs. 40, between 19th March and 19th June, 1941 and it was further alleged in that complaint that the accused had also forged two counterfoil receipts in the village form No. 9. The other complaint, which forms the basis of the present case, was with respect to criminal breach of trust in respect of the sum of Rs. 572-15-8 committed between 25th April and 19th June, 1941. The learned Resident Magistrate heard the evidence in both the cases at the same time and committed the accused to the Sessions Court in both. The accused was first tried in respect of the offence with regard to Rs. 10 and Rs. 10 in sessions Case No. 17 of 1943. The charge in that case was that during the period from 19th March, 1941 to 19th June, 1941, the accused had misappropriated the two sums, Rs. 10 and Rs. 40, and forged two receipts with respect to those amounts. The offence under S. 409 was tried with a jury and that under S. 466 with the aid of assessors. The jurors returned a unanimous verdict of not guilty and the assessors also gave a similar opinion in respect of the offence under S. 466. In the result, the accused was acquitted on both the counts.

2. In the present case the trial was before another Sessions Judge. The accused was asked under Sec. 271 whether he was guilty of the offence charged, or claimed to be tried. He claimed to be tried and at the same time made an application contending that the present proceedings were barred under S. 403 and that he was, therefore entitled to an acquittal. The learned Sessions Judge has come to the conclusion that the wording of S. 403 does not in terms apply to the facts of this case as the accused is now Standing his trial for an offence which is different from the offence for which he was tried in sessions case No. 17 of 1943, but that though it would be technically correct for him to proceed with the trial, it would be extremely undesirable that the accused, who could have been tried for all the offences committed by him, should have to undergo a second trial. For this proposition he has relied on a number of authorities. He has also held that it is open to him in a case of this nature to make a reference under Section 438 of the Cr PC, for the orders of the High Court, with a recommendation that the proceedings may be quashed and the accused acquitted.

3. Mr. Jahagirdar on behalf of the accused has relied on most of the authorities cited by the learned Additional Sessions Judge in Support of his contention that it should be held that the trial of the accused for the second time in the Sessions Court is improper in the circumstances of this case. In 17 Cr. L.J 301 it was held that the intention of the Legislature in enacting Section 222 of the Cr PC, was that where there was to be a trial for misappropriation of a gross sum, there should be only one trial for such an offence committed within the period covered by the defalcation, and that, therefore, where a person was tried and convicted for misappropriating certain sums of money during a certain period and was again put on trial in respect of certain other sums of money alleged to have been misappropriated during the same period, the subsequent trial was barred by S. 403 of the Code. As against this decision of the Madras High Court, we have the somewhat technical view adopted by this Court in 12 Bom. L.R 2262. There the accused was tried for the offence of criminal breach of trust as a public servant in respect of Rs. 12 odd, and was acquitted of the offence. He was again tried for the same offence in respect of another item of Rs. 19 odd, misappropriated during the same period as that to which the Rs. 12 related, and was convicted. On appeal, the Sessions Judge acquitted the accused on the ground that his previous acquittal was a bar to the second trial. It was held by this Court that the previous acquittal did not, under the circumstances, operate as a bar to the accused's conviction at the second trial and the order of acquittal was reversed. The accused having already been convicted, all that this Court held in that case was that his conviction in a second trial was not illegal. That is the view that has been also taken by the learned Additional Sessions Judge; and Mr. Jahagirdar also has not urged that the second trial of the accused in the present case would be barred under Section 403 of the Cr PC. In 50 Cal. 6323 the accused was first tried under S. 409 of a charge of criminal breach of trust in respect of Rs. 18,924-4-0, committed during the period between 1st October 1921 and 1st March 1922. The charge was withdrawn by the public prosecutor, with the result that in law it amounted to an acquittal of the accused. Thereafter the accused was prosecuted for criminal breach of trust in respect of Rs. 100 which had not been included in the sum of Rs. 18,924-4-0, alleged to have been misappropriated within the period covered by the charge in the first trial. There was a difference of opinion between the two Judges of the High Court who heard the matter as to whether the provisions of section 403 of the Cr PC, were a bar to the second trial. The third Judge to whom the case was referred held, following 12 Bom. L.R 226, that the essence of the offence being the misappropriation, and not the time within which it took place, and the subject-matter of the present charge not having been included in the gross sum in respect of which the accused had been charged in the earlier trial, the second trial was competent. In 57 Cal. 174 the facts were somewhat different. The accused was charged in the Police charge sheet with criminal breach of trust in respect of a gross sum of Rs. 3651-5-3, but he was tried with respect to three particular items out of the said sum and was convicted. Thereafter, there was a second trial in respect of three other items also included in the gross sum mentioned above, and he was again convicted. The High Court noticed the divergence of judicial opinion as shown in 17 Cr. L.J 30 on one hand and 12 Bom. L.R 226 and 50 Cal. 632 on the other. In that case the prosecution from the beginning knew perfectly well what was the gross sum in respect of which the accused had committed the criminal breach of trust. Mukerji J. said:

“Though Section 403 of the Cr PC, may not strictly apply in its terms to a case like the present, still there is abundant authority for the view that a second trial, in circumstances such as these, ought to have been allowed to be held;”

4. And he cited several decisions in support of this view, viz., 2 A.L.J 6735, 49 Cal. 9246, 7 C.W.N 4937 and 5 C.W.N 728. He was of opinion that if the accused had moved the High Court at an early stage for stopping his second trial, he would have found no difficulty in getting an order in his favour. As, however, the second trial had also terminated, the order made was that the conviction should be upheld but that the sentence should be reduced to a day's rigorous imprisonment. In the present case also, the prosecution knew from the very beginning what was the gross sum in respect of which the accused was alleged to have committed the offence. Government's sanction was obtained for the prosecution of the accused in October 1941. It was in respect of the whole amount of Rs. 655-0-6; and in the committing Magistrate's Court, as I have already stated, the evidence in both the cases was recorded side by side. The accused has moved the Sessions Court as soon as possible after he was brought to that Court for trial. Mr. Jahagirdar has, therefore, contended that the principle in 57 Cal. 17 should apply and that the proceedings should be quashed and the accused acquitted. One other case he has relied on is A.I.R 1938 Cal. 6979. In that case there were two accused persons charged with conspiracy to commit criminal breach of trust and also criminal breach of trust with regard to specific sums of money. When the case came on for trial the prosecution split up the case to be tried into four separate trials. In the first case, both the accused were found guilty under S. 409 and, in the second trial also, the two accused were convicted under the said section. It was held that though on a technical ground the two conspiracies of which the accused were found guilty were not the same, yet it was really impossible to distinguish them and that further the method of splitting up the charges as adopted by the prosecution was improper. Henderson J. remarked (p. 698):

“We cannot imagine a more harassing method of proceeding with the prosecution than that adopted in this case. Three items might have been selected as the subject-matter of separate charges. Then it would have been possible upon a verdict of guilty to impose a sentence that would be sufficient. There would then have been no necessity for proceeding with the trial of any more charges. We entirely disapprove of this method of proceeding with an indefinite number of trials and imposing sentences to take effect one after the other.”

5. The facts of the present case on which Mr. Jahagirdar has relied, are: (1) that the prosecution knew all the facts of the case from the beginning; (2) that the accused could have been tried in one trial under Section 222 of the Cr PC; (3) that the Assistant Public Prosecutor has admitted that there is no evidence to be produced at the second trial which has already been produced at the earlier trial; and (4) that the jury have unanimously found the accused not guilty, the Judge also being of the same opinion, in the earlier trial. Finally, Mr. Jahagirdar has relied on a dictum of Subrahmania Ayyar J. in 29 Mad. 12610 (p. 138):

“Nor is authority wanting for the view that even where the plea of autrefois acquit is not technically available, the principle of it is available for the accused when the interests of justice require its extension in his favour.”

6. The learned Government Pleader has argued, in the first place, that the Additional Sessions Judge was not entitled to make this reference, for, under Section 272 of the Cr PC, after the accused had claimed to be tried, there was no option to the Judge but to proceed to choose jurors and to try the case. Section 272 is no doubt applicable, but it must, in our opinion, be read subject to the provisions of S. 438 under which the Sessions Judge may, if he thinks fit, on examination of the record of any proceedings, report for the orders of the High Court the result of such examination; and the High Court has wide powers of revision under S. 439 and would be in a position to quash the commitment of the accused under Section 215 of the Cr PC. Secondly, the Government Pleader has argued that the stage at which the accused made his application was too late and that, therefore, such application could not avail the accused. He has relied on Weir's Code of Criminal Procedure, vol. II, page 262, where a case is reported (Criminal Misc. Petn. No. 127 of 1902) in which the High Court refused to make an order under S. 215 as the reference before them had not been made before the commencement of the trial in the Sessions Court. Their Lordships said:

“We find from the record that the accused was put on a trial, that he pleaded not guilty and that he was tried with the aid of assessors, under these circumstances, it is now too late to quash the proceedings.”

7. The facts in that case were obviously not similar to those in the present case. As the accused in the present case has not actually been tried in the Court of Session, we do not think that the application made before the Additional Sessions Judge was too late. The learned Government Pleader has also relied on A.I.R 1926 Cal. 41011, where it was alleged that the trial before the Sessions Court had been vitiated by an irregularity in the committal proceedings and the High Court was invited to quash the committal proceedings. The trial in the Sessions Court had proceeded to its conclusion and the accused had been convicted. It was held that the application was made too late and that even if the provisions of section 208 of the Cr PC, had not been strictly followed in the committing Magistrate's Court as alleged, that would not be a sufficient ground for setting aside the conviction. The facts of that case, again, cannot be said to be similar to those of the present case. The learned Government Pleader has next contended that the prosecution split up the case into two trials because otherwise there would have been a misjoinder, the first trial being under Ss. 409 and 466 in respect of two items and the second case being in respect of an of offence under S. 409 alone, with no offence under S. 466. Reliance has been placed on certain dicta by Wassoodew J., in 41 Bom. L.R 9812 and on 60 Bom. 14813 at p. 159 and it has been contended that in view of these authorities it was at least arguable that there should be two trials, that this was accordingly done and that the object of the prosecution in the present case was not, therefore, to harass or to oppress the accused. It is contended, therefore, that the holding of the two separate trials of the accused should not be held to be improper. It may be that some such ground as is advanced by the Government Pleader prevailed with the authorities in splitting up the prosecution into two trials. But the material considerations in this case are: That the jury have unanimously held the accused not guilty in the earlier trial and the accused has once been acquitted; that the accused has in fact paid the whole amount involved in the two trials; that he has already suffered one lengthy trial; and that it is undesirable that in the second trial there should be any risk of the jury's taking a view different from that taken by the jury in the first trial.

8. In these circumstances, we think the principle enunciated by Subrahmania J., in 29 Mad. 126 applies to the facts of this case and that the second trial of the accused should be prevented. We, therefore, accept the reference and quash the committal order as well as the proceedings in the Court of the Additional Sessions Judge and direct that the accused be acquitted and discharged.

9. Reference accepted.