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Achyut Gopal Mhetras v. Gopalrao Ramchandra Mhetras

Bombay High Court
Aug 5, 1943
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Judgment Summary: Beaumont, C.J.

Factual and Procedural Background

This is an application to set aside an order made by the First Class Subordinate Judge of Sholapur rejecting an application for leave to sue as a pauper. It was admitted that the plaintiffs are paupers. The learned Subordinate Judge rejected the pauper application on the ground that the plaint disclosed no cause of action. The pauper application was in the form prescribed by Order XXXIII, r. 2, Civil Procedure Code. The opinion also refers to the procedural provisions of Order XXXIII, r. 4 and r. 5 regarding examination under r. 4 and grounds of rejection under r. 5. The Court considered prior authority concerning the scheme of Order XXXIII and addressed whether the Subordinate Judge properly entertained the opponents' arguments on the merits and whether the plaint could be said to disclose no cause of action because it was inconsistent with a prior Full Bench decision.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the Subordinate Judge was entitled, under Order XXXIII r. 4, to hear the opponents on the question whether the plaint disclosed a cause of action, given that the application procedure under r. 4 is ex parte.
  2. Whether a plaint may be held to "disclose no cause of action" merely because it is inconsistent with a decision of a tribunal that is not a final court of appeal (illustrated by the Full Bench decision in Apaji Narhar Kulkarni v. Ramchandra Ravji Kulkarni).
  3. Whether the specific legal point — that a son cannot claim partition against his own father (as decided in Apaji Narhar Kulkarni v. Ramchandra Ravji Kulkarni) — justifies rejecting a pauper application on the ground that the plaint discloses no cause of action.

Arguments of the Parties

The opinion does not contain a detailed account of the parties' legal arguments.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Burjorji Pestonji Baria…(Original ), v. Murlidhar Sidhgopal Avasti…(Original Petitioner), .* The scheme of Order XXXIII and the point that an application dealt with under r. 4 is an ex parte application (the Court may hear the applicant or his agent but is not entitled to have the question argued on merits). The Court relied on this authority to conclude that the learned Subordinate Judge was wrong to hear the opponents on the question whether the plaint disclosed a cause of action.
Apaji Narhar Kulkarni v. Ramchandra Ravji Kulkarni The decision that a son cannot claim partition against his own father. The learned Subordinate Judge relied on this Full Bench decision to hold that the plaint disclosed no cause of action; the Court in the present opinion noted the decision is binding in the Presidency but observed it is not necessarily final and cannot alone justify striking out a plaint as disclosing no cause of action.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Court proceeded as follows:

  • It acknowledged that the plaintiffs are paupers and that their application was in the correct form under Order XXXIII, r. 2.
  • It referred to r. 4, which permits the Court, if it thinks fit, to examine the applicant or his agent regarding the merits and the applicant's property, and to r. 5, which mandates rejection where the allegations do not show a cause of action among other specified grounds.
  • Relying on a recent consideration of the scheme of Order XXXIII (Burjorji Pestonji Baria… v. Murlidhar Sidhgopal Avasti…), the Court emphasized that an application dealt with under r. 4 is ex parte: the Court may hear the applicant or his agent but is not entitled to hear the question argued on the merits by opponents. On that basis the learned Subordinate Judge was wrong to hear the opponents on whether the plaint disclosed a cause of action.
  • The Court noted that, even if the learned Judge erred in hearing opponents, it would not set aside his decision solely for that reason if the decision itself were correct.
  • The learned Judge's substantive ground for rejection was that the plaint was inconsistent with the Full Bench decision in Apaji Narhar Kulkarni v. Ramchandra Ravji Kulkarni, which holds that a son cannot claim partition against his father. The Court observed that while that Full Bench decision is binding in the Presidency, it is not necessarily final and could be reversed by a higher forum (e.g., the Privy Council).
  • The Court reasoned that it is impossible to say that a plaint discloses no cause of action merely because it is inconsistent with a decision of a tribunal that is not the final court of appeal. The same logic applies at each judicial level: a single Judge's decision might be reversed by a Division Bench, a Division Bench by a Full Bench, and a Full Bench by the Privy Council.
  • Accordingly, inconsistency with a non-final authority is not by itself a ground for striking out a plaint as disclosing no cause of action, and the Subordinate Judge's rejection on that basis could not stand.

Holding and Implications

APPLICATION TO SUE AS A PAUPER ALLOWED.

Direct consequences as stated in the opinion:

  • The application to sue as a pauper is allowed; the Subordinate Judge's order rejecting that application is set aside.
  • The respondents are ordered to pay the costs of this application.
  • The costs in the Court below are to be costs in the cause.
  • The Rule was made absolute (the court's order was finalized in favor of the applicants).

On legal effect, the Court expressly held that a plaint cannot be struck out as disclosing no cause of action merely because it is inconsistent with a decision of a tribunal that is not necessarily final; this limits reliance on non-final authorities as sole grounds for rejecting pauper applications for want of a cause of action.

Rule made absolute.

J.G.R.

Show all summary ...

Beaumont, C.J:—

This is an application to set aside an order made by the First Class Subordinate Judge of Sholapur rejecting an application for leave to sue as a pauper.

It is not disputed that the plaintiffs are paupers, but the learned Judge rejected the application on the ground that the plaint disclosed no cause of action. The application was in the correct form under Order XXXIII, r. 2, Civil Procedure Code, and under r. 4 it was open to the Court, if it thought fit, to examine the applicant or his agent regarding the merits of the claim and the property of the applicant, and under r. 5 the Court is bound to reject an application for permission to sue as a pauper upon the grounds specified, one of them being where his allegations do not show a cause of action. This Court recently had occasion to consider the scheme of Order XXXIII, in Burjorji Pestonji Baria…(Original ), v. Murlidhar Sidhgopal Avasti…(Original Petitioner), .* and we pointed out that the application, when dealt with under r. 4, is an ex parte application. The Court can hear the applicant or his agent, but it is not entitled to have the question argued on merits, and the learned Judge in this case was wrong in hearing the opponents on the question whether the plaint disclosed a cause of action. However, if I thought the learned Judge's decision was right, I should not set it aside on the ground that he heard parties whom he ought not to have heard. But the basis on which he held that the plaint disclosed no cause of action was that it is inconsistent with a decision of a Full Bench of this Court in Apaji Narhar Kulkarni v. Ramchandra Ravji Kulkarni.(2) The punt of law is this. The plaintiffs are suing for partition against their father and uncle and those claiming under the uncle, and Apaji Narhar Kulkarni v. Ramchandra Ravji Kulkarni (supra) decides that a son cannot claim partition against his own father. I am told that the decision has been dissented from in other High Courts, but, no doubt, it is a binding authority in this Presidency. But it might be reversed by the Privy Council. It seems to me impossible to say that the plaint discloses no cause of action merely because it is inconsistent with a decision of a tribunal which is not a final Court of appeal. Such a ground would not be a ground for striking out the plaint as disclosing no cause of action. It would be wrong to say that a decision of a single High Court Judge against the plaintiff's claim would justify a Subordinate Judge in saying that the plaint disclosed no cause of action, seeing that the decision of the single Judge might be reversed by Division Bench; and the same principle would apply to the decision of a Division Bench, which might be reversed by a Full Bench, and similarly to the decision of a Full Bench which might be reversed, by the Privy Council. It is impossible to say that the plaint discloses no cause of action merely because it is inconsistent with a decision not necessarily final.

Therefore, the application to sue as a pauper must be allowed. The costs of this application to be paid by the respondents. The costs in the Court below to be costs in the cause.

Rule made absolute.
J.G.R