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Mrinal Kanti Das & Ors. Petitioner v. The State Of West Bengal & Ors.
Structured Summary of the Opinion — Biswanath Somadder, J.
Factual and Procedural Background
Three hundred ten individuals, described as unemployed youths who had registered with the relevant employment exchange, jointly filed a writ petition seeking, inter alia, (a) a writ in the nature of mandamus directing respondents (including the District Primary School Council, Malda) to rescind or cancel the selection process for the post of Primary School Teacher under the jurisdiction of the Malda District Primary School Council; (b) certiorari calling for the original records; and (c) prohibition against further actions not warranted by statute. A preliminary objection was raised by counsel for respondent nos. 1, 2, 3 and 6 that each petitioner had an independent cause of action and that the petitioners had improperly joined together without paying requisite court fees. The petitioners' counsel countered that they were poor, unemployed, unable to pay the deficit court fees, and that all had been sponsored by the employment exchange in 2006 for recruitment to the post of Assistant Teacher, constituting a common cause of action. The Court considered these submissions and the petition record and delivered the opinion summarized below.
Legal Issues Presented
- Whether three hundred ten individuals with no jural relationship among them can properly join together as co-petitioners in a single writ petition challenging the selection process for recruitment to primary school teaching posts.
- Whether joinder of multiple petitioners in the present factual matrix can be used to avoid payment of individually payable court fees.
Arguments of the Parties
Respondents' Preliminary Objection (Respondent Nos. 1, 2, 3 and 6)
- Each writ petitioner has an independent cause of action and therefore should not have been joined together in one petition.
- The petitioners joined together without paying the necessary court fees, and that alone warrants dismissal.
- Relied on the Supreme Court judgment in Mota Singh v. State of Haryana (1980 (Supp) SCC 600) to support the position that separate causes of action require separate court fees and separate petitions.
Writ Petitioners' Arguments
- The petitioners are extremely poor, unemployed and unable to pay the deficit court fees.
- All petitioners had been sponsored by the concerned employment exchange in 2006 for recruitment to Assistant Teacher posts under the District Primary School Council, Malda, and therefore they share a common cause of action making joinder maintainable.
Table of Precedents Cited
| Precedent | Rule or Principle Cited For | Application by the Court |
|---|---|---|
| Mota Singh v. State of Haryana, 1980 (Supp) SCC 600 | Principle that several persons having separate and independent causes of action, without any legally subsisting jural relationship among them, cannot join together in a single petition to avoid payment of individually payable court fees; each petition is separate for the purpose of court fees. | The Court relied on Mota Singh to hold that the 310 petitioners, who submitted documents on diverse dates and lacked a jural relationship inter se, could not properly join as co-petitioners merely because they were unemployed and had been sponsored by the employment exchange. The Court quoted and applied the passage warning against treating unrelated persons as having a common cause merely because they use the same forum. |
| Parul Debnath & Ors. v. Union of India & Ors., 2006 (3) CHN 462 (Division Bench) | Considered a factual situation where 130 writ petitioners were working as Home Guards; the Division Bench declined to require each petitioner to pay separate court fees because the Single Judge had not held that they were not entitled to join. | The Court referred to this decision but found it inapplicable to the instant case because, on the facts before it, there was "simply no existence of any jural relationship" among the 310 petitioners; furthermore, the Division Bench in Parul Debnath did not take into account Mota Singh. |
Court's Reasoning and Analysis
The Court proceeded through the following analytical steps, using only the facts and legal materials discussed in the opinion:
- The Court first considered the preliminary objection that the 310 petitioners had no jural relationship and had joined together without paying requisite court fees. This objection was supported by the respondents' reliance on Mota Singh.
- It noted the petitioners' response that they were poor, unemployed, and sponsored by the employment exchange in 2006, asserting a common cause of action.
- On perusal of the writ petition and accompanying material, the Court observed that the petitioners had submitted documents and biodata on diverse dates, and therefore there was no jural relationship inter se among them. The only commonality was their unemployment and being sponsored by an employment exchange.
- The Court concluded that mere common status as unemployed and being sponsored by the employment exchange was insufficient ground to permit joinder of 310 unrelated persons as co-petitioners in a single writ petition.
- Applying the principle of Mota Singh, the Court emphasized that unrelated persons with independent causes of action cannot avoid individual court fee obligations by uniting in a single petition; the Mota Singh passage was cited and treated as directly supporting dismissal of the joinder.
- The Court considered but distinguished Parul Debnath (2006 (3) CHN 462), finding it inapplicable because that decision turned on the Single Judge not having held that the petitioners could not join, and because that Division Bench had not considered Mota Singh; thus it did not persuade the Court to reach a different conclusion.
- On this basis, the Court formed the view that joinder of petitioners 2–310 was improper and that the petition could not proceed on behalf of all 310 joined petitioners without addressing the court fee issue and the lack of a jural relationship.
Holding and Implications
Holding:
The writ petition is dismissed as against writ petitioner nos. 2 to 310 and shall survive only in respect of writ petitioner no. 1.
Implications:
- Direct effect on the parties: Only writ petitioner no. 1 will continue as the petitioner in the matter; the petition will proceed and be heard as that petitioner's case alone.
- Procedure going forward: The matter is listed to appear for further consideration the following week under the same heading, now limited to petitioner no. 1.
- Broader implications: The opinion applies established principles from Mota Singh regarding joinder and court fees to the facts of this case. The opinion does not state that it establishes any new precedent; its decision is presented as an application of existing authority to the particular facts (no broader change in law was announced in the text of the opinion).
Biswanath Somadder, J.:— Three hundred ten individuals, claiming to be unemployed youths having registered their names in the concerned employment exchange, have joined together to file the instant writ petition praying, inter alia, for the following reliefs:
“a) A writ of or in the nature of Mandamus do issue commanding the respondents, their agents and servants particularly the District Primary School Council, Malda, being respondents no. 4 and 5 to rescind, cancel and withdraw the entire selection process for the post of Primary School Teacher under the jurisdiction of Malda District Primary School Council forthwith.
b) A writ of or in the nature of Certiorari do issue calling upon the respondents and each of them to certify and transmit to this court the original records of the case before this Hon'ble Court so that conscionable justice may rendered to the petitioner by passing an appropriate order; 23.3.10 (SKB)
c) A writ of or in the nature of Prohibition do issue prohibiting upon the respondents and each of them either by themselves or through their men, agents, assigns, subordinates from exercising further not warranted under the statute.”
A preliminary point has been taken by the learned advocate representing the respondent nos. 1, 2, 3 and 6 who submits that each writ petitioner has his own independent cause of action, yet they have joined together to file the instant writ petition, without even paying the necessary court fees and on this ground alone the instant writ petition is liable to be dismissed. In this regard, he relies on a judgment of the Supreme Court in the case of Mota Singh v. State of Haryana reported in 1980 (Supp) SCC 600.
On the other hand, learned advocate appearing on behalf of the three hundred ten writ petitioners submits that his clients are extremely poor and unemployed and they are not in a position to pay the deficit court fees. Moreover, he submits that all the writ petitioners were sponsored by the concerned employment exchange in the year 2006, for the purpose of recruitment to the post of Assistant Teacher in Primary School under the District Primary School Council, Malda. Such being the position, he submits that they have a common cause of action and as such the writ petition is maintainable in its present form.
After considering the submissions made by the learned advocates for the parties and upon perusing the instant writ petition, it appears that the writ petitioners had submitted their documents and testimonials along with the bio-data forms before the concerned District Primary School Council on diverse dates. There exists no jural relationship, inter se, the writ petitioners. The only common thread for joining as co-petitioners appears to be their status of being unemployed youths whose names were sponsored by the concerned employment exchange for recruitment to the post of Assistant Teacher in Primary Schools under the District Primary School Council, Malda. In my opinion, having regard to the facts and circumstances as stated above, this is not enough for the writ petitioners to join together as co-petitioners and instituting the instant writ proceeding in the absence of any jural relationship between them. In the case of Mota Singh and others (supra), the Supreme Court was considering the question of whether legally payable court fees could be evaded by truck owners who simply joined as co-petitioners by stating in their petition that they were plying their trucks for transport of goods and had a liability to pay the tax impugned. The Supreme Court while directing the office to scrutinize afresh each of the cases referred to in the office report and ascertain whether requisite court fees had been paid in each of them also observed, inter alia, as follows:
“………….But it is too much to expect that different truck owners having no relation with each other either as partners or any other legally subsisting jural relationship of association of persons would be liable to pay only one set of court fee simply because they have joined as petitioners in one petition. Each one has his own cause of action arising out of the liability to pay tax individually and the petition of each one would be a separate and independent petition and each such person would be liable to pay legally payable court fee on his petition. It would be a travesty of law if one were to hold that as each one uses highway, he has common cause of action with the rest of truck pliers.”
In the backdrop of the above observations made by the Supreme Court, the view of this Court, as enumerated above, stands fully justified.
At this stage, it may not out of place to refer to a Division Bench judgment of this Court in the case of Parul Debnath & Ors. v. Union Of India & Ors.. reported in 2006 (3) CHN 462. The Court, while considering an appeal preferred by the writ petitioners who were working as Home Guards in the Andaman and Nicobar Home Guard Organization under the Andaman and Nicobar Administration, on the facts of that case observed, inter alia, that there was no need to direct the one hundred thirty writ petitioners to pay court fees for each of them since it had not been held by the learned Single Judge that all the writ petitioners were not entitled to join in one writ petition. The Division Bench judgment, in my view, is wholly inapplicable since the learned Single Judge in that case had not held that one hundred and thirty persons were not entitled to join in one writ petition, whereas in the facts and circumstances of the instant case there is simply no existence of any jural relationship inter se the writ petitioners, as observed hereinabove. Moreover, the Division Bench in Parul Debnath's case (supra) did not take into consideration the judgment of the Supreme Court of India in Mota Singh's case (supra), which has been discussed hereinbefore.
For reasons stated above, in my view, the writ petition is liable to be dismissed as against writ petitioner nos. 2 to 310 and shall survive in so far as writ petitioner no. 1 is concerned. The writ petition shall now be heard as a petition of the writ petitioner no. 1.
Let this matter appear for further consideration next week under the same heading.
BISWANATH SOMADDER, J.
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