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In The Goods Of Meghraj Kothari v. Gopi Devi Memani

Calcutta High Court
Aug 21, 1961
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Factual and Procedural Background

This opinion concerns an application for grant of probate of the will of Meghraj Kothari, who died on 18 April 1953. The petitioners are Meghraj's three brothers — Chunilal, Hiralal and Kanhaiyalal — who are named as executors in a will dated 6 October 1952. The will states the testator had one daughter (Gopi Devi Memani), a lunatic wife, and that the testator had taken in adoption one Giridharilal (the eldest son of Chunilal). The will purportedly disposes of the testator's self-acquired property, leaving the residue to the adopted son after providing for two marriage expenses (daughters of Chunilal) and a legacy of Rs. 5,000 to Ramkrishna Mission Vidyapith, Deoghur. The will mentions certain deposits belonging to a joint firm and records that some gifts had been made to the daughter and adopted son.

The petition for probate was ready on 15 May 1953 but was presented on 17 June 1953. The estate was valued in the affidavit of assets at Rs. 100,382/8/6 (net value after funeral expenses Rs. 98,382/8/6). Gopi Devi Memani, the testator's only daughter, contested the will: she denied execution of the will, denied the adoption of Giridharilal, and disputed the valuation. She also applied for Letters of Administration on 16 May 1953 on the basis that the testator died intestate.

Two contentious proceedings were pending: (1) the application for probate by the three brothers, and (2) the application for Letters of Administration by the daughter. During the probate proceedings there were multiple interlocutory applications (including for appointment of an administrator pendente lite, custody of the testamentary instrument, permission to take photographs, and a proposed chemical examination). The Court ordered the testamentary document kept in its custody and allowed photographs; chemical examination was reserved.

After the hearing began, the propounders (through the learned Standing Counsel) informed the Court they would not proceed further or call evidence to prove the will, on the ground that continuing the litigation would be disproportionate to the estate's value and costs already incurred. The propounders produced a written instrument purporting to renounce executorship dated 17 August 1961.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether probate ought to be granted to the executors when the propounders decline to proceed with the application and refuse to tender evidence in proof of the will.
  2. Whether an executor who has intermeddled with the estate or proceeded with an application for probate may renounce executorship so as to render his own application for probate abortive (i.e., effect and permissibility of renunciation under Sections 229 and 230 of the Indian Succession Act) — although the Court expressly declined to decide this question in the present stage.

Arguments of the Parties

Propounders' (Executors') Arguments (as advanced by the learned Standing Counsel)

  • Under Sections 229 and 230 of the Indian Succession Act an executor is entitled to renounce executorship at any time prior to the grant of probate; this right exists even if the executor has taken the oath, and even if he has intermeddled with the estate.
  • English procedure and practice (to the extent inconsistent) are not decisive for India; the cited English and other authorities support the proposition that renunciation is available even after intermeddling in some precedents.
  • Pursuing the matter to final adjudication would be uneconomical: the executors had already spent substantial sums (said to exceed Rs. 50,000) and further costs would exceed the estate's value, so they had decided not to proceed and to renounce executorship so that other legatees (including charity beneficiaries) are not prejudiced.
  • One branch of argument (as noted earlier in proceedings by Mr. Hazra) was that the daughter had no legal interest on intestacy because the widow (not a lunatic from birth) would be the sole heir — though that position was raised in earlier pleadings and comment rather than as the central argument at the dismissal stage.

Caveatrix / Opponent's Arguments (as advanced by Mr. S. Roy and others for Gopi Devi Memani)

  • The will may not have been executed by the deceased; the adoption and valuation were denied; the caveatrix had applied for Letters of Administration on the basis of intestacy.
  • An executor who has intermeddled with the estate ought not to be permitted to renounce and thereby avoid proving the will; the executors, having acted as executors for years, intermeddled, prevented the heir from possession and compelled the daughter to incur large expenses — equity and justice require that they should not be allowed to renounce to evade litigation.
  • The purported written renunciation was not proved (no evidence that signatures were those of the executors) and the executors had not orally renounced before the Court.
  • Some of the authorities relied upon by the propounders were decisions in other jurisdictions or in contexts outside the testamentary jurisdiction of the High Court and therefore did not control the present matter.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Brojolal Banerjee v. Sharajubala Debi, ILR 51 Cal 745 (AIR 1924 Cal 864) Cited as authority permitting renunciation; Court noted this Calcutta case as an instance where renunciation was allowed (on compromise among parties). The Court observed that this was the only cited case where an applicant for probate was allowed to renounce, and that the allowance was in the context of a compromise among all interested parties. The Court noted this case but did not treat it as authorising renunciation against the opposition of a caveator in the present facts.
Mohamidu Mohideen Hadjiar v. Pitchey, 1894 AC 437 Cited (Judicial Committee decision) as suggesting an executor may renounce even after intermeddling (case from Ceylon). The Court recorded that this decision seemed to suggest renunciation after intermeddling and that some Indian decisions had cited it with approval; the Court did not decide the point here.
Jagadish Chandra v. Upendra Chandra, 48 Cal WN 294 Cited among authorities regarding renunciation and testamentary procedure. Mentioned by counsel and noted by the Court as one of several decisions; the Court did not rely on it to decide the renunciation question.
Mordaunt v. Clarke, (1868) 1 P and D 592 Cited as an authority in the broader discussion of executor conduct and renunciation. Noted among the authorities cited by counsel; no specific adjudicative reliance was placed on it in the opinion.
Jnanendra Nath v. Jitendra Nath, 32 Cal WN 108 (AIR 1928 Cal 274) Cited in the context of precedent on testamentary matters and renunciation/intermeddling. Referred to by counsel and recorded by the Court as part of the authorities; the Court did not decide the legal question on the basis of this case.
48 Cal WN 436 (as cited in the opinion) Cited in the list of reported decisions referenced by counsel. Listed among authorities relied on by counsel; no separate application of its rule was articulated by the Court in the opinion.
Gaziram Bania…Accused v. Emperor, AIR 1947 Cal 40 Cited among reported authorities relied upon by counsel in submissions. Referenced in counsel's list of cases; the Court did not base its ruling on this authority in the present order.
In the Goods of Narendra Narayan Roy, 50 Cal WN 126 Cited as part of a group of decisions considered by counsel. Noted by the Court as one of several cases cited; the Court did not decide the renunciation question with reference to it.
Commr. of Income-tax, Bombay v. Western India Turf Club Ltd., AIR 1928 PG 1 Cited by counsel among authorities in argument. Included in the list of decisions cited; no specific application to the Court's decision was recorded.
Mirza Kusratulani v. Peara Saheb, 32 Ind App 244 (P.C.) Cited as a precedent in the submissions on renunciation and related principles. Mentioned by counsel; the Court recorded it among authorities but did not base its order upon it.
Khairati Kam, In the matter of, AIR 1931 Lah 476 Cited among Indian decisions on testamentary matters and renunciation/intermeddling. Referred to by the Court as one of the decisions; the Court did not rely on it to decide the central question at this stage.
ILR 51 Cal 749 (as cited in the opinion) Mentioned in the opinion as an ILR report; context in the opinion contrasts it with ILR 51 Cal 745. The Court noted that except for the case reported in ILR 51 Cal 749 / ILR 51 Cal 745 (reference in the text), the executor in other cited cases was not proved to have intermeddled; the Court did not otherwise rely on this citation to decide the issue.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Court narrowed the immediate question to whether probate should be granted to the executors in terms of the petition for grant, given that the propounders refused to proceed further or tender evidence in support of the will. The Court explained:

  1. The propounders' present position — that they will not tender evidence and have produced an instrument purporting to renounce executorship — makes it impossible for the Court to grant probate in their favour; when an applicant declines to proceed with proving a will, the appropriate order is dismissal of that application.
  2. The Court stated that the motives of the propounders for withdrawing (as advanced by the Standing Counsel) or the caveator's contentions about the motive are irrelevant to the narrow procedural decision whether to grant probate when no evidence will be tendered.
  3. Although the Standing Counsel raised the legal question whether an executor who has intermeddled may renounce under Sections 229 and 230 of the Indian Succession Act (and cited a range of authorities on that point), the Court found it unnecessary to decide that broader question for the purpose of disposing of the present application.
  4. The Court further observed that the purported written renunciation produced by the propounders was not proved: there was no evidence that the signatures on the document were those of the executors, nor was there an oral renunciation before the Court. Therefore, even the fact of renunciation (separate from its legal effect) had not been established according to law.
  5. Given the propounders' refusal to call evidence and the absence of proved renunciation, the only appropriate procedural disposition was to refuse the grant (i.e., dismiss the probate application). The Court directed that the renunciation document be kept with the record but made no adjudication on its validity.
  6. The Court addressed costs: the propounders (who appeared to oppose the grant and then withdrew) must pay the costs of parties appearing to oppose the grant, including reserved costs and costs of taking photographs and making reports. The Court certified the case for three counsel.

Holding and Implications

Holding: The Court's operative decision was to refuse the grant of probate. The core ruling is expressed as:

APPLICATION DISMISSED

Implications and consequences (as stated in the opinion):

  • Direct effect on parties: The petition for probate by the three brothers is dismissed; probate is refused to them on the present application because they declined to proceed with proof of the will.
  • Costs: The propounders must pay the costs of the opposing parties (including reserved costs, if any) and the costs associated with taking photographs and producing the report. The matter was certified for three counsel.
  • Renunciation instrument: The purported written renunciation was directed to be kept with the Court records but the Court made no adjudication on its validity and expressly refrained from deciding the broader legal question of the permissibility/effect of renunciation in the circumstances described.
  • Broader precedent: The Court did not lay down any new legal precedent on whether an executor who has intermeddled may renounce; the specific legal question as to the effect of intermeddling on the right to renounce was left undecided in this judgment.
KE/M/K.S.B
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THE COURT

1. This is an application for the grant of probate of the will of Meghraj Kothari, who died on April 18, 1953. The applicants are the three brothers of Meghraj, namely, Chunilal, Hiralal and Kanhaiyalal. They are named as executors in the will which is dated October 6, 1952. The will recites that the latter had only one daughter who has already been married and had no son. The testator's wife is a lunatic. The will further recites that for spiritual benefit the testator had duly taken in adoption one Giridharilal, the eldest son of his brother Chunilal. The testator purports to make a testamentary disposition of his self-acquired properties only. Giridharilal, described as the adopted son, has been given the residue of the estate after payment of the marriage expenses of two daughters of Chunilal and a legacy of Rs. 5000/- to Ramkrishna Mission Vidyapith, Deoghur. The will records that:

“I have given some ornaments and moneys to my daughter and I have a desire to give further ornaments and moneys to her out of my personal estate. I have also given some shares to my adopted son Giridharilal.”

2. Nothing has been given to the daughter by the will. Nor do I find any bequest in favour of the widow. The executors have not been directed to make provision for the maintenance and residence of the lunatic wife. There is an expression of desire, however, on the part of the testator that the adopted son should, out of his properties, pay Rs. 250/- per month for the maintenance of the testator's lunatic wife. The last paragraph of the Will records that Rs. 50,000/- deposited with the National Handels Bank N.V is not the testator's money but belongs to the joint firm of Kanindan Rawatmull, who are to get it back after his death. The three brothers and a son of a pre-deceased brother are the attesting witnesses. The Will does not appear to have been prepared by a solicitor. The paper on which to Will is written is such that the caveatrix is entitled to make comment and her counsel did make comment on it. The petition for the grant of probate was ready on May 15, 1963. It was not, However, presented till June 17, 1953. The reason given by learned counsel for this delay is that the executors did not get the valuation of the estate till sometime after May 1953. It appears from the Registrar's certificate annexed to the petition that ad valorem fee was paid on June 2, 1953. In the affidavit of assets the estate has been valued at Rs. 1,00,382/8/6. After deducting Rs. 2000/- on account of funeral expenses, the net value of the estate is stated to be Rs. 98,382/8/6.

3. Gopi Debi Memani, the only daughter of Meghraj, is contesting the Will. In her affidavit she denied (a) that Meghraj executed the Will, (b) that Giridharilal is the adopted son, and (c) that the valuation of the estate is not what is alleged in the affidavit. She contended that as the sole heiress she had made an application for the grant of Letters of Administration of the estate on May 16, 1953. Her application for grant was being congested by the propounders of this Will and an affidavit to that effect has been affirmed on June 11, 1953. Comment is made by Mr. Hazra, learned counsel appearing for the propounder, that in law she has no interest whatsoever. The heir of the testator, on intestacy, is his widow. It is nobody's case that the widow was a lunatic right from birth. Therefore the widow is the sole heiress on intestacy to the complete exclusion of the daughter.

4. There are, therefore, two proeedings pending in this Court in the above goods. One is the application for the grant of probate of the will made by the three brothers and the other is an application for the grant of Letters of Administration to the estate filed by the daughter Gopi Devi Memani on the basis that Meghraj died intestate in due course, both the proceedings have been marked as contentious cause and are now appearing in my List for final disposal.

5. This litigation gave promise to be one of the celebrated Will case of this Court. The application for the appointment of administrator pendente lite was a grand show. Not only all leading counsel of this Court were briefed, but Mr. P.R Das was brought down from Patna. On the executors giving certain undertakings to court in respect to the realisation of assets, keeping accounts and giving inspection to Gopi Devi Memani no administrator pendente lite was appointed. Subsequently, a number of applications were made in the above goods, inter alia, for keeping the testamentary instrument in the safe custody of the Registrar for taking photographs and for chemical examination of the instrument by an eminent scientist. Each one of several applications made on behalf of Gopi Devi Memani was strenuously resisted. By my order the testamentary document was kept in the custody of the Court. I passed another order giving permission to Gopi Devi Memani to take photographs and I indicated that I would allow chemical examination later, if I found it necessary.

6. The case was opened with great ability by Mr. Manadev Hazra and the learned Standing Counsel for two days. On the third day, the learned Standing Counsel intimated to me that his clients do not propose to proceed further with the application and would not tender evidence in proof of the Will. The reason for not further proceeding with the testamentary instrument, as stated by the learned Standing Counsel, is that having regard to the value of the estate, it would be sheer lunacy to proceed further with this testamentary suit. The learned Standing Counsel stated that his client had already spent more than Rs. 50,000/- in this litigation and if the case is fought to the bitter end, further costs to be incurred will far exceed the value of the estate. The propounders, therefore, have decided not to proceed with this suit any further, and having regard to the fact that there is a bequest in favour of the charity, thought fit to renounce executorship so that the interest of the other legatees may not be jeopardised. The document purporting to be a deed of renunciation reads as follows:

“Whereas Meghraj Kothari of 168-B, Cotton Street, Calcutta, deceased, died on the 18th April 1953 at Calcutta leaving his last Will and Testament dated the 6th October 1952 thereby appointing us the undersigned, Chunilal Kothari, Hiralal Kothari and Kanhaiyalal Kothari, sole executors:

Now we the said Chunilal Kothari, Hiralal Kothari and Kanhaiyalal Kothari do hereby renounce the executorship of the said Will.

Chunilal Kothari Hiralal Kothari Kanhaiyalal Kothari 17-8-61.”

7. The learned Standing Counsel has submitted that under Secs. 229 and 230 of the Indian Succession Act the executors are entitled to renounce at any time prior to the grant of probate. He is entitled to renounce, even if the executor has taken the oath of office, but before grant. He is entitled to renounce even if he has intermeddled with the estate. If in English Law an executor who has intermeddled is not allowed to renounce, that is not the law in India. Sections 229 and 230 of the Succession Act are the only sections dealing with renunciation. They do not indicate any restriction to the executor's renouncing his office. Reference, to English procedure and practice is worse than useless as stated by the Judicial Committee in two cases cited by the learned Standing Counsel. A number of decisions have been cited. The decisions cited are:

8. Brojolal Banerjee v. Sharajubala Debi, ILR 51 Cal 745: (AIR 1924 Cal 864); Mohamidu Mohideen Hadjiar v. Pitchey, 1894 AC 437; Jagadish Chandra v. Upendra Chandra, 48 Cal WN 294; Mordaunt v. Clarke, (1868) 1 P and D 592, Jnanendra Nath v. Jitendra Nath, 32 Cal WN 108: (AIR 1928 Cal 274); 48 Cal WN 436 (sic); Gaziram Bania…Accused v. Emperor, AIR 1947 Cal 40 In the Goods of Narendra Narayan Roy, 50 Cal WN 126, Commr. of Income-tax, Bombay v. Western India Turf Club Ltd., AIR 1928 PG 1; Mirza Kusratulani v. Peara Saheb, 32 Ind App 244 (PC). Counsel appearing for the caveatrix, however, submitted that in India as) in England an executor who has intermeddled is not entitled to renounce executorship and that the executor may be compelled to prove the Will if he has intermeddled with the estate. The observations relied on by the learned Standing Counsel have been made by the Judicial Committee in cases wherein applications were made not in the High Court in its testamentary jurisdiction. In exercise of the testamentary jurisdiction, when the Court entertains a testamentary matter, the Rules of this Court expressly provide that the Rules of the Supreme Court of England are to be applied, provided they are not inconsistent with the Indian Succession Act and the Rules of this Court. The decisions therefore do not touch the instant case. In the instant case the courts must follow the English practice. In England an executor who has intermeddled is not allowed to renounce executorship. The same is the law in India. Mr. Roy submitted that in the facts of this case I should compel the executors, who are also attesting witnesses, to come to the witness box to prove the Will and record my decision as to the validity of the testamentary instrument propounded. This is a dishonest attempt to prevent an adjudication by the court which the executors know will be against the Will. For nine years the executors have acted as executors, intermeddled with the estate, prevented the heir-at-law from getting possession, and kept the only daughter at bay. The executors have compelled the daughter to spend an enormous sum of money to disprove the Will. It would be contrary to justice to allow the executors to renounce at this stage even if renunciation is permissible in law, having regard to the acts and conduct of the propounders throughout the proceedings.

9. In my judgment, it is not necessary for me to decide this question at this stage. All that I am concerned with at present is whether probate should be granted to the executors in terms of the petition for grant. The propounders now think fit not to proceed any further and not to tender evidence in proof of the Will. The only order that can be passed in such event is to dismiss the application. It is not for me to enter into the motives of the applicants in taking up the present attitude. Whether the motive is as stated by the learned Standing Counsel or as stated by Mr. S. Roy is irrelevant, Again what would be the effect of this order of dismissal is a question that need not be considered now. Nor do I think it necessary to record my view as to the factum and validity of the document placed before me purporting to be a renunciation in writing of executorship. There is no evidence that the signatures in the instrument are the signatures of the three executors nor have the executors appeared before me and orally renounced executorship. The question of law raised by the learned Standing Counsel, though very interesting and argued with great ability, cannot and need not be answered.

10. An executor may have a right to renounce office at any stage before grant under Secs. 229 and 230 of the Indian Succession Act. There are authorities of this and other High Courts to that effect. The decision of the Judicial Committee reported in 1894 AC 437 seems to suggest that he can renounce even after he had intermeddled with the estate. It was a case from Ceylon. Some Indian decisions have cited that case with approval in testamentary proceedings in India. Reterence can be made to in cases reported in 48 Cal WN 294 and ILR 51 Cal 745: (AIR 1924 Cal 864), and in Khairati Kam, In the matter of AIR 1931 Lah 476. In none of the above cases except the case reported in ILR 51 Cal 749; (AIR 1924 Cal 864) the executor was proved to have intermeddled. The peculiarity of the Calcutta case will be noticed later. But the question before me in the instant case is not whether an executor who has intermeddled can or cannot renounce. The question before me is whether an executor who has actually made an application for grant and proceeded upto hearing, thereby compelling the caveatrix to incur enormous costs, can be allowed to renounce, so as to make his own application incompetent in law. It is entirely a different question. The case reported in ILR 51 Cal 745: (AIR 1924 Cal 864) is the only case cited where the applicant for probate was allowed to renounce. But such renunciation was allowed by the Court, because all the parties interested, including the party who was opposing the grant, entered into a compromise, a term of which was that the executor should renounce. No case has been cited wherein in spite of the opposition of the caveator the executor has been allowed to renounce and make his own application for grant infructuous and ineffective. If it is necessary in, the instant case, to record my decision whether I should allow the renunciation, I record my view that renunciation, in the facts of the instant ease, is not permissible. I have, however, indicated before that it is not necessary for me to go into the question now. There is no oral renunciation by the executors before me. The document placed before me alleged to be renunciation in writing is not proved to have been signed by the executors. Apart from law, therefore, the fact of renunciation has not been proved according to law. At the request of the learned Standing Counsel I am directing the document to be kept with the records. For reasons stated above, I am not called upon to make any adjudication on the document, nor do I make any such adjudication.

11. For reasons given above, the application fails and must be dismissed and I make an order accordingly refusing the grant. The parties have incurred enormous costs and it is contended on behalf of the caveatrix that she should be properly compensated. Costs of the parties appearing to oppose the grant must be paid by the propounders, including all reserved costs, if any, as also the costs of taking photographs, which include the fees paid for taking photographs, and making report. Certified for three Counsel.

KE/M/K.S.B

12. Application dismissed.