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Waman Vishwanath Bap... v. Yeshwant Alias Balu ...

Bombay High Court
Dec 12, 1947
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Factual and Procedural Background

This appeal arises from execution proceedings relating to a decree passed on an award dated January 11, 1937, in Civil Suit No. 1636 of 1936. The decree directed defendants Nos. 1 to 5 to pay the plaintiff Rs. 7,303-7-0 in total, payable in instalments. The decree provided that if the defendants defaulted on payment of any two instalments, the plaintiff could realize the decretal amount by sale of the mortgaged property or by taking possession under certain conditions.

After the decree, the defendants made payments irregularly. In June 1941, the plaintiff filed an application (darkhast No. 805 of 1941) to recover the full balance due, alleging defaults by the defendants. Notice was issued, and the defendants appeared initially but later absented themselves. An order for sale of the mortgaged property was passed, but before sale, the plaintiff accepted some payments and withdrew the darkhast, which was struck off in October 1941.

Further payments were made by the defendants, but in October 1943, the plaintiff filed another darkhast to recover the full decretal amount. The mortgaged property was again ordered to be sold. The defendant appeared but later failed to file a written statement, leading to an order for sale in June 1944. Before the sale, the defendant applied to the Court contending that payments made should excuse defaults and sought to pay the balance by instalments. The defendant deposited Rs. 1,828-6-6 in Court, which the plaintiff withdrew.

The learned Civil Judge held that the defendant's contention that the plaintiff waived his rights was unfounded and that although defaults were committed, the defendant should be relieved and allowed to pay by instalments as per the decree. The darkhast was struck off. The plaintiff has appealed against this order.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the plaintiff judgment-creditor is entitled to recover the full amount due under the decree upon the judgment-debtor's default in payment of instalments.
  2. Whether the acceptance of payments by the decree-holder after defaults amounts to a waiver of the right to recover the full decretal amount as per the decree.

Arguments of the Parties

Appellant's Arguments

  • The learned Judge had no jurisdiction to excuse the defaults made by the judgment-debtor.
  • Under the award decree, the plaintiff was entitled to recover the whole balance due at the time of filing the darkhast.
  • The plaintiff’s election to recover the whole amount converted the decree into an ordinary money decree, precluding subsequent claims for instalments.
  • Earlier rulings that allowed relief against forfeiture or excused defaults (such as Narayan v. Rajimal and Narsinha Gopal v. Balvant Madhav) are no longer good law.
  • The condition for payment of instalments is a concession, not a penal clause, and must be strictly enforced without relief.
  • The acceptance of payments after default does not amount to waiver of the right to recover the full amount.

Respondents' Arguments

  • The decree is an award decree where failure to pay instalments makes the whole amount payable with higher interest, a provision in the nature of a penalty.
  • The Court has jurisdiction to relieve against such penalties and hardships.
  • The judgment-debtor had been paying Rs. 25 per month, and the decree-holder accepted these payments, indicating waiver and hardship.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Sheth Burjorji Shaptjrji v. Dr. Madhavlal Jesingbhai Payment conditions in decrees as concessions, not penal clauses; courts cannot grant relief against breach of such conditions. Adopted to hold that the concession of instalment payments must be strictly enforced and relief against default is not permissible.
Pari Chimanlal Dholidas v. Shah Chimanlal Bhudardas Courts should not interfere with agreements merely because they seem unfair; importance of certainty in law. Supported the principle that decrees with instalment provisions must be executed as per terms without equitable relief.
Narayan v. Rajimal Relief against forfeiture and excusing defaults in consent decrees on equitable grounds. Rejected by the Court as wrongly decided and overruled in the present case.
Narsinha Gopal v. Balvant Madhav Similar to Narayan v. Rajimal; relief against default in instalment decrees on equitable grounds. Rejected and overruled as not good law for the purposes of this case.
Hanmant Bhimrao v. Gururao Swamirao Election by decree-holder to recover whole amount after default bars subsequent recovery by instalments. Applied to hold that the decree-holder’s election to recover lump sum precludes later instalment claims.
Walchand Sakharam v. Nathu Onkar Acceptance of payments after default may amount to waiver of rights under the decree. Not fully consistent with Hanmant Bhimrao; noted as a conflicting authority.
Lachiram v. Jana Yesu Consent decrees cannot be varied except by consent; no relief against default. Rejected as too restrictive; the Court emphasized equitable jurisdiction to relieve against penalties.
Shirekuli Timapa Hegda v. Mahablya Doctrine of penalties not applicable to stipulations in decrees; strict enforcement of decree terms. Not necessary to decide fully but noted as an extreme view.
Dalsook Ratanchand v. Chagan Narrun Decree must be executed as it is; no relief even on equitable grounds. Represents one pole of conflicting opinions on relief against default.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Court examined conflicting judicial opinions regarding the enforcement of instalment decrees and relief against defaults. It identified two principal views: one, that decrees must be strictly executed as per their terms without equitable relief; the other, that courts have broad equitable powers to relieve against penalties or forfeitures arising from defaults.

The Court analyzed the nature of the decree's provisions, concluding that the instalment payment schedule was a concession to the judgment-debtor rather than a penal clause. Therefore, the debtor must strictly comply with the instalment terms or face the consequence of paying the entire balance immediately.

The Court rejected earlier decisions (Narayan v. Rajimal and Narsinha Gopal v. Balvant Madhav) that allowed relief on equitable grounds, overruling them as not good law. It favored the reasoning in Sheth Burjorji Shaptjrji and Pari Chimanlal Dholidas, which emphasized the sanctity of the contractual terms embodied in decrees and the importance of certainty in law.

Regarding waiver, the Court accepted the lower Court's factual finding that acceptance of payments after default did not amount to a waiver of the plaintiff’s rights to recover the full amount. It distinguished between accepting payments and waiving the right to enforce the decree strictly.

Ultimately, the Court held that upon default, the decree-holder’s election to recover the whole amount converts the instalment decree into a lump sum decree, barring subsequent recovery by instalments.

Holding and Implications

The appeal is allowed.

The order of the lower Court excusing the judgment-debtor's defaults and striking off the darkhast is set aside. The matter is remanded to the executing Court to proceed in accordance with law, enforcing the decree strictly as per its terms.

The respondents (judgment-debtors) are ordered to pay the costs of the appellant.

No new precedent beyond this decision is established; however, the Court explicitly overruled previous conflicting authorities that allowed equitable relief against default in instalment decrees, thereby clarifying the legal position on enforcement of such decrees in execution proceedings.

Show all summary ...

Gajendragadkar, J.:—

This appeal arises in execution proceedings, the decree sought to be executed having been passed on an award on January 11, 1937, in Civil Suit No. 1636 of 1936. The said decree directed that the defendants Nos. 1 to 5 should pay to the plaintiff Rs, 5,803-7-0 and Rs. 1,500 for further interest making in all Rs. 7,303-7-0. The said amount was made payable by certain stated instalments and it was provided that if the defendants failed to pay any two instalments to the plaintiff regularly, the plaintiff should realise the monies due to him by getting the mortgaged property in suit sold through Court, and not wait for subsequent instalments. In case the amount realised by sale was found to be insufficient to meet the decretal claim, the plaintiff was at liberty to recover the balance from the person and the other property belonging to the defendants. In case of two defaults the decree had given the plaintiff an alternative remedy of taking actual possession of the mortgaged property on certain conditions. After this decree was passed the judgment-debtors made certain payments, though not in the manner mentioned in the decree. In June 1941 the plaintiff filed darkhast No. 805 of 1941 seeking to recover the whole of the balance due under the decree on the ground that two defaults had been committed by the judgment-debtor. In the said darkhast application notice was issued to the judgment-debtors under O. XXI, r. 22, and on receipt of it the defendant appeared and took time to file his written statement. Thereafter he remained absent and an order was passed directing the sale of the mortgaged property and the issue of notice under O. XXI, r. 66. Subsequently the plaintiff was paid some amount and he informed the Court that he did not wish to proceed with the darkhast. Accordingly the darkhast was struck off on October 13, 1941. After the darkhast was thus struck off the defendant made some farther payments to the plaintiff. On October 11, 1943, the present darkhast was filed by the plaintiff seeking to recover the whole of the decretal amount. In this darkhast the mortgaged property was ordered to be sold and notice directed to be issued under O. XXI, r. 66. This notice was served on the defendant and he appeared and took time to file his written statement. On March 15, 1944, the defendant was absent and his pleader told the Court that he had no instructions. The Court, therefore, made an order that lot No. 1 out of the properties mortgaged should be sold. It was directed that the sale should be held on the premises of the Court on June 12, 1944, and June 14, 1944. Before these dates of sale, however, arrived, the defendant made an application to the Court on June 9, 1944, in which he contended that the plaintiff was not entitled to claim the whole decretal amount since he had received from the defendant Rs. 25 per month. It had also been contended by the defendant that on his paying Rs. 1,210 in Court the default committed by him should be excused and he should be permitted to pay the balance of the decretal amount by instalments as mentioned in the decree. Thereafter the defendant paid in all Rs. 1,828-6-6 in Court for the amount that had become due in terms of the decree up to the end of May 1944, as well as the costs of the Darkhast as claimed in the Darkhast. This amount the plaintiff had withdrawn from the Court. The learned Civil Judge, Senior Division, Poona, held that the defendant's contention that the plaintiff ever intended to waive his rights under the decree was not well-founded since in his opinion “From mere acceptance of amounts on account of the decree but which are not paid in terms of the decree, it cannot be inferred that the plaintiff intended to waive his right to recover the amount of the decree in terms of the decree.” He found that the defendant had committed default in the payment of the instalments, but in his opinion this was a case in which the default should be excused and the plaintiff should be directed to recover the decretal amount as under the instalments mentioned in the decree and not the whole of the balance then due. He, therefore, held that the amount already paid by the defendant should be credited to the Darkhast and the Darkhast should be struck off. It is against this order that the present appeal has been filed by the decree-holder.

Mr. Bakhle for the appellant has contended that the learned Judge had no jurisdiction to excuse the defaults made by the judgment-debtor and that under the award decree he was entitled to recover the whole of the balance of the decretal amount due at the time when the Darkhast was filed. In support of his contention Mr. Bakhle has relied upon the decision of this Court in Sheth Burjorji Shaptjrji…(Original Plaintiff—Decree-Holder), v. Dr. Madhavlal Jesingbhai…(Original Defendant—Judgment-Debtor), .* and Pari Chimanlal Dholidas v. Shah Chimanlal Bhudardas. In Pari Chimanlal's case this Court was dealing with an award decree the terms of which were somewhat similar to the terms of the decree with which we are concerned in this appeal. Beaumont, C.J, who delivered the judgment of the Court, referred to his own judgment in Burjorji's case and said that the view expressed by him there lays down the correct rule. In the said earlier case he had observed (p. 617):—

“If there is an agreement to pay a sum of money by a particular date with a condition that if the money is not paid on that date a larger sum shall be paid, that condition is in the nature of a penalty against which a Court of equity can grant relief and award to the party seeking payment only such damage as he has suffered by the non-performance of the contract. But if, on the other hand, there is an agreement to pay a particular ??? followed by a condition allowing to the debtor a concession, for example, the payment of a lesser sum, or payment by instalments, by a particular date or dates, then the party seeking to take advantage of that concession must carry out strictly the conditions on which it was granted, and there is no power in the Court to relieve him from the obligation of so doing.

In Pari Chimanlal's case several earlier decisions of this Court were cited in which a contrary view had been upheld. Beaumont, C.J, expressed his dissent from all those cases somewhat emphatically and observed that—

“……… having regard to the importance of certainty in the law, I am quite sure that much more harm than good would be done by allowing Courts to interfere with agreements made between parties merely because the Court may think a particular agreement unfair.”

Some of the earlier decisions of this Court which took a contrary view are: Narayan v. Rajimal, Supdu Dhodu v. Madhavraw Jivram and Narsinha Gopal v. Balvant Madhav(3). It may be mentioned that in Narayan v. Rajimal, the Court was dealing with a consent decree which provided for the payment of a sum in certain fixed instalments. The decree had also provided that on failure to pay two instalments the plaintiff was entitled to take possession of certain lands. A delay of a few days having occurred in the payment of two instalments the plaintiff applied to get possession of the lands. It was held by this Court that in view of the fact that the plaintiff had accepted the amount which was paid somewhat late, the default made by the judgment-debtor should be excused and the defendants relieved against forfeiture. In this case it was urged before the Court on the authority of Lachiram v. Jana Yesu(4) that a consent decree can only be varied by consent and that if a default occurs in the payment of instalments as provided in the consent decree, the plaintiff would be entitled to take possession of the property under the said decree. Sir Norman Macleod, who delivered the judgment of the Court, refused to follow that decision because he observed that he had always thought that the said decision did not enunciate a correct principle, and that he had always been opposed to the suggestion that one Court can be bind all Courts in future by deciding that no consent decree can possibly be departed from even when justice and equity demand it. “It is the privilege of this Court”, observed Macleod, C.J, “to administer equity, and, in following the principles of equity, to relieve against forfeiture, if it considers the nature of the case requires it.” In Pari Chimanlal's case Beaumont, C.J, did not approve of the view thus expressed by Macleod, C.J, and he remarked that “Sir Norman Macleod entertained a rather exalted view of the powers possessed by this Court when exercising equitable jurisdiction.” Thus upon this point of law which arises for decision in this case conflicting views have been expressed by this Court. The point is of considerable importance and we think the best way to settle this conflict is to refer the case to a Full Bench.

On behalf of the respondents it has been urged before us that the learned Civil Judge was wrong in holding that the plaintiff had not waived his right under the decree to recover the whole of the decretal amount. In support of this contention reliance is placed upon the plaintiff's acceptance of several amounts paid by the defendants from time to time. This question also may raise a point of law which, in our opinion, is not free from difficulty. In Hanmant Bhimrao v. Gururao Swamirao, it has been held that where a decree payable by instalments provides that in default of payment of any one instalment the whole of the amount then due can be recovered at once, and on such default the decree-holder elects to recover the whole amount due, he is bound thereafter to execute the decree to recover the whole amount in one sum, and it is not open to him to apply subsequently to recover the amount in instalments. In the present case the decree-holder had filed a Darkhast in 1941 to recover the whole of the decretal amount, and in that sense, be deemed to have made his election. On that view the fact that the judgment-debtor paid some amounts and the decree-holder accepted them may not enable the judgment-debtor to plead waiver. In Walchand Sakharam v. Nathu Onkar decided on April 9, 1937, Beaumont, C.J, was dealing with somewhat similar facts and he took the view that waiver could be pleaded in such a case. Prima facie there appears to be some inconsistency between the views expressed by Beaumont, C.J, in Hanmant Bhimrao v. Gururao Swamirao and those expressed by him in Walchand's Case. If it is held that the subsequent acceptance of the amounts by the decree-holder in this case may enable the judgment-debtors to raise a plea of waiver, it would be necessary to consider whether in law such a plea could be permitted to be raised having regard to the fact that owing to the election of the decree-holder the instalment decree has ceased to be an instalment decree and must be treated as a decree for the payment of the lump sum which represents the balance due at the time of the election. This question again is of some importance and we think it Would be better if it is decided by a Full Bench.

We, therefore, direct that the papers in this case including our judgment should be laid before the learned Chief Justice in order that he may direct that this appeal may be fixed for hearing before a Full Bench.

The reference was heard by a Full Bench consisting of Chagla, A.C.J, Bavdekar and Gajendragadkar, JJ. on December 12, 1947.

S.Y Abhyankar, for the appellant.

The two points involved in this appeal are whether the plaintiff judgment-creditor is entitled to recover the full amount due under the decree, in view of default on the part of the judgment-debtor-defendant to pay instalments, and whether the acceptance of the amounts on account of decree, after the default, amounts to a waiver of the right to recover the decretal amount in terms of the decree.

Regarding the first point, I submit that on default on the part of the judgment-debtor two inconsistent remedies are open to the judgment-creditor-plaintiff, either to demand the whole amount or to claim the amount due under the instalments. If he chooses to exercise his option by resorting to one of these alternatives, he cannot again fall back on the other one. By his application to execute the decree for the whole amount he had converted the decree into an ordinary money decree, and he would not be entitled to claim instalments again. Vide Hanmant Bhimrao v. Gururao Swamirao Laxman v. Parvatibai. The lower Court seems to have followed Narayan v. Rajimal and an earlier ruling in Narsinha Gopal v. Balvant Madhav.

I submit those rulings are no longer good law.

There are two divergent opinions expressed on this point by our High Court. First view is taken in Dalsook Ratanchand v. Chagan Narrun(5) which says that the decree must be executed as it is and no relief should be granted even on suitable grounds. The other extreme view taken is that the Court has inherent and very large powers to grant relief on equitable grounds even in execution of decrees. That view has been taken in Narsinha Gopal v. Balvant Madhav and in Narayan v. Rajimal. In these cases the ruling in Lachiram v. Jana Yesu—namely consent decree can only be varied by consent—was followed. This view is not accepted in Sheth Burjorji Shaptjrji…(Original Plaintiff—Decree-Holder), v. Dr. Madhavlal Jesingbhai…(Original Defendant—Judgment-Debtor), .* and in an unreported judgment in Pari Chimanlal Dholidas v. Chimanlal Bhudardas Shah.

In Sheth Burjorji Shaptjrji…(Original Plaintiff—Decree-Holder), v. Dr. Madhavlal Jesingbhai…(Original Defendant—Judgment-Debtor), .* it is said that s. 74 of the Contract Act should be applied in principle and relief should be granted on the basis whether the condition amounts to a penal clause. In the present case it is a concession given to the judgment-debtor and is not a penal clause. Therefore, the lower Court was wrong in excusing the default and granting relief to the judgment-debtor.

Regarding the second point, the lower Court has given a finding that the acceptance of the amount, after the default, towards the payment under the decree generally would not amount to waiver of the right to recover the amount of the decree. This view is the correct view and should be accepted.

S.G Patwardhan, for the respondents. This is an award decree. If the judgment-debtor, fails to pay instalments on due dates, the whole amount becomes payable at once and in that case interest works out at a higher rate. The provision is in the nature of penalty and the Court has jurisdiction to relieve against it. The decree-holder will get costs for his trouble. The judgment-debtor has gone on paying at the rate of Rs. 25 per month and the decree-holder has accepted the payments. This is a case of great hardship and the Court can relieve against hardship.

Chagla, A.C.J:—The facts leading up to this appeal are that on August 20, 1936, the appellant obtained a mortgage decree for Rs. 7,303-7-0. That decree was made payable by certain instalments. The first instalment was to be made payable on May 1, 1937. The instalment fixed was Rs. 300, the next instalment of Rs. 200 on or before May 1, 1938, the third instalment of Rs. 300 on or before May 1, 1939, the fourth instalment of Rs. 500 on or before May 1, 1940, and the subsequent instalments of Rs. 500 each payable on or before the 1st May of every subsequent year.

The judgment-debtor committed default in payment of the first instalment on its due date and the first payment was made by him in 1938 of Rs. 130. On June 2, 1941, the decree-holder filed a Darkhast applying for the execution of the decree. A notice was issued under O. XXI, r. 22. The judgment-debtor did not appear in answer to that notice and on August 2, 1941, the mortgaged property was ordered to be sold and notice was issued under O. XXI, r. 66. Thereafter the decree-holder obtained a sum of Rs. 100 from the judgment-debtor and he decided not to proceed with his Darkhast and the Darkhast was dismissed. Thereafter certain amounts were paid by the judgment-debtor to the decree-holder. On October 11, 1943, the present Darkhast was filed by the decree-holder and again the mortgaged property was ordered to be sold and a notice was issued under O. XXI, r. 66. The date for the sale of the property was fixed on June 12, 1944. Before that on June 9, 1944, the judgment-debtor presented an application submitting among other grounds that he was bringing into Court the sum of Rs. 1,210, the amount then due under the various instalments, that amount should be accepted and he should be relieved against the breach he had committed in payment of the instalments on their respective due dates.

The learned Civil Judge, Senior Division, took the view that this was a case where the judgment-debtor should be relieved against the penalty provided under the decree and ordered the Darkhast to be struck off on the amount paid by the judgment-debtor being credited to the decree-holder. The appeal came before my brother Grajendragadkar J. and Mr. Justice Macklin and as there are conflicting decisions of this Court the matter was referred to this Full Bench.

Mr. Abhyankar for the appellant has contended that this is a case where effect should be given to the provisions and terms of the decree and that the judgment-debtor having made default, the rights which accrued to the decree-holder should be strictly enforced. On the other hand, the Government Pleader has contended that the judgment-debtor should be relieved from the consequences of the breach committed by him in not making payments on their respective due dates.

There are two conflicting views which have been taken by this Court on this question and the two protagonists of these two views are Sir John Beaumont and Sir Norman Macleod two learned Chief justices of this Court. Sir John Beaumont in Sheth Burjorji Shaptjrji…(Original Plaintiff—Decree-Holder), v. Dr. Madhavlal Jesingbhai…(Original Defendant—Judgment-Debtor), .* was considering a case where a certain amount was made payable under the decree and it was provided that if a certain amount was paid on the dates specified, then satisfaction was to be entered up. In default of payment on the due date the full amount under the decree became payable. The judgment-debtor failed to pay the smaller amount on the due date and the decree-holder applied for execution and the question arose whether the delay in payment on the due date should be condoned and Sir John Beaumont took the view that what the decree-holder had done was to have made a concession to the judgment-debtor, the concession being that if he paid the smaller amount by a particular date, full satisfaction would be entered up, but in default of payment on the due date the amount actually due under the decree would become payable, and the learned Chief Justice took the view that the provision for the payment of the full amount in default of payment of the smaller amount on the due date was not in the nature of a penalty and the Court could not relieve against the breach committed in the failure to pay the amount on the due date. At page 617 the learned Chief Justice sets out the law which he says is not open to any serious question and what he says is this:

“If there is an agreement to pay a sum of money by a particular date with a condition that if the money is not paid on that date a larger sum shall be paid, that condition is in the nature of a penalty against which a Court of equity can grant relief and award to the party seeking payment only such damage as he has suffered by the non-performance of the contract. But if, on the other hand, there is an agreement to pay a particular sum followed by a condition allowing to the debtor a concession, for example, the payment of a lesser sum, or payment by instalments, by a particular date or dates, then the party seeking to take advantage of that concession must carry out strictly the conditions on which it was granted, and there is no power in the Court to relieve him from the obligation of so doing”.

In this case also the decree provides for the payment of a particular sum. It proceeds to confer a concession upon the debtor, viz. if he pays the decretal amount by certain instalments, then he need not pay the full decretal amount at once. But if he fails to pay those instalments on their respective due dates, then the concession disappears and he is under an obligation to pay the full amount and what we are now asked by the Government Pleader to do is to relieve the judgment-debtor from his obligation to pay the instalments on their respective due dates, he paving obtained the concession as a result of undertaking that obligation.

Sir John Beaumont also considered the same question in an unreported judgment, Pari Chimanlal Dholidas v. Chimanlal Bhudardas Shah. There he points out that there is no general power in Courts of equity to disregard agreements which it thinks unjust and he also points out that at the present time the rules of equity are almost as well settled as rules of the common law and he sounds a note of warning that more harm than good would be done by allowing Courts to interfere with agreements made between the parties merely because the Court may think a particular agreement unfair. The principle enunciated by him applies not only to consent decrees but also to decrees passed by the Court in invitum. Whereas in the case of a consent decree it is the question of the sanctity of contract, in the case of a decree it is the question of a solemn adjudication by the Court of the rights of parties.

The other view found favour with Sir Norman Macleod and he gave expression to that view in Narayan v. Rajimal. In that case a consent decree provided for the payment of a sum in certain fixed instalments. It also provided that on failure to pay two instalments the plaintiff was entitled to take possession of certain lands. There was a delay of a few days in the payment of two instalments. The plaintiff accepted the instalments and then he next applied to get possession of the lands and Sir Norman Macleod and Mr. Justice Coyajee held that the default should be excused and the defendants relieved against forfeiture and Sir Norman Macleod expressed himself rather emphatically at page 1455 that he was always opposed to the suggestion that one Court can bind all Courts in future by deciding that no consent decree can possibly be departed from even when justice and equity demanded it. According to him, it was the privilege of this Court to administer equity, and, in following the principles of equity, to relieve against forfeiture, if it considers the nature of the case requires it. With great respect, what the learned Chief Justice overlooked was whether there was any penalty provided in the consent decree. It is not disputed and it cannot be disputed that a Court of equity can relieve against penalties or against forfeiture. But the question that has got to be determined is whether a certain obligation undertaken by a judgment-debtor is in the nature of a penalty or whether it is the result of a concession conferred upon him by the decree-holder.

The same view of the law was taken by Sir Norman Macleod in a previous case reported in Narsinha Gopal v. Balvant Madhav. There again there was an instalment decree. There was failure to pay instalment on the due date and Sir Norman Macleod and Mr. Justice Shah took the view that the delay should be excused and the judgment-debtor should be relieved from the consequences of the default.

The more extreme view is to be found in two earlier decisions, one is Shirekuli Timapa Hegda v. Mahablya, where Mr. Justice Birdwood and Mr. Justice Jardine went to the length of suggesting that the doctrine of penalties was not applicable to stipulations contained in decrees, and that the plaintiff was entitled to recover, and in Lachiram v. Jana Yesu Sir Basil Scott and Mr. Justice Beaman refused to excuse delay and save the judgment-debtor from the consequences of default on the ground that a consent decree could only be varied by consent. It is unnecessary to consider in this appeal whether these two decisions have not gone too far in restricting the jurisdiction of the Court to give relief against penalties. It is sufficient to hold that Narayan v. Rajimal, and Narsinha Gopal v. Balvant Madhav, were wrongly decided and must be overruled.

A point has also been urged as to whether the decree-holder waived the breach by accepting payments. The facts show that from 1938 till October 11, 1943, the decree-holder accepted payments from time to time from the judgment-debtor. On the default having taken place on May 1, 1937, admittedly the whole decretal amount became due and payable and there is nothing to show on the record that the decree-holder accepted these payments not towards what was due to him under the decree but in waiver of the breach committed by the judgment-debtor. As a matter of fact the learned Judge below has found as a fact that these payments were not accepted as a waiver of the decree-holder's rights and we see no reason to differ from that finding of fact.

The result is that the appeal must be allowed, the order of the lower Court set aside and the Darkhast sent back to the executing Court to be disposed of according to law. Respondents must pay the cost of the appellant.

Appeal allowed.
M.W.P