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Narayan Divakarappa Hubli v. Parameshvarappa Bhimappa Yarcad

Bombay High Court
Sep 8, 1941
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Factual and Procedural Background

The suit concerned a house originally belonging to defendant No. 1 which was mortgaged three times: (1) Rs. 300 to Shantappa (March 1931); (2) Rs. 400 to Kalappa (September 1931); (3) Rs. 650 to the plaintiff (October 1933). The plaintiff's mortgage recorded the prior mortgages and provided that Rs. 308 of the consideration would be spent to pay off the first mortgage. In January 1936 defendant No. 2, having obtained a money decree against defendant No. 1, purchased the property at execution sale for Rs. 800 subject to the second mortgage; he paid off the second mortgage and Rs. 670-3-0 was paid into Court. The plaintiff sued defendants Nos. 1 and 2 to enforce his (third) mortgage; he had received Rs. 670-3-0 and sought the balance. Defendant No. 2 claimed subrogation under s. 92 of the Transfer of Property Act and priority over the plaintiff. The lower appellate Court rejected defendant No. 2's claim citing s. 59A; this second appeal followed.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether defendant No. 2, as an auction purchaser under a money decree who paid off the second mortgage, is entitled to subrogation under s. 92 of the Transfer of Property Act and thereby has priority over the plaintiff's subsequent mortgage.
  2. Whether the plaintiff, a puisne mortgagee who paid off the first mortgage pursuant to his mortgage deed, is entitled to subrogation to the first mortgage.
  3. How s. 59A, s. 91 and s. 92 of the Transfer of Property Act interact in determining rights of subrogation for persons deriving title from the mortgagor and puisne mortgagees who discharge prior encumbrances.

Arguments of the Parties

Defendant No. 2's Arguments

  • He was a person having an interest in the mortgaged property other than the mortgagor and therefore prima facie entitled to subrogation under s. 92 of the Transfer of Property Act after paying off the second mortgage.
  • By paying off the second mortgage he should be subrogated to the rights of the second mortgagee and have priority over the plaintiff.

Plaintiff's Arguments

  • The plaintiff contended that because he paid off the first mortgage as arranged in his mortgage deed he was subrogated to the first mortgage and thus had priority; he relied on Full Bench authority in Tota Ram v. Ram Lal to support an ipso facto right of subrogation for a puisne mortgagee who discharges a prior mortgage pursuant to the mortgage contract.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Malireddi Ayyareddi v. Gopala Krishnayya Privy Council decision that an auction purchaser under a money decree who paid off a prior mortgage was entitled to subrogation. Used to support defendant No. 2's entitlement to subrogation when he paid off the second mortgage.
Tota Ram v. Ram Lal Full Bench (Allahabad) view that a puisne mortgagee who pays off a prior mortgage pursuant to his mortgage is entitled to subrogation by virtue of inclusion in s. 91/s. 92. Not accepted as authoritative by this Court; cited by the plaintiff but the Court preferred later contrary authority.
Hira Singh v. Jai Singh Bench of five (Allahabad) holding that a puisne mortgagee who pays off a prior mortgage as part of the consideration uses the mortgagor's money and acquires no right of subrogation. Adopted by this Court to deny the plaintiff any subrogation to the first mortgage.
Vithaldas Bhagwandas v. Tukaram Vithoba Authority which referred with approval to Hira Singh's reasoning. Referred to with approval to support the conclusion that the puisne mortgagee (plaintiff) is not entitled to subrogation.
Lakshmi Amma v. Shankara Narayana Menon Full Bench (Madras) holding that a puisne mortgagee in similar circumstances is excluded from subrogation under the first clause of s. 92 and can obtain subrogation only by registered agreement under clause 3. Relied on as additional authority supporting denial of subrogation to the plaintiff.
Mukaram Marwari v. Mahammad Hosain Held a puisne mortgagee was disentitled to subrogation where his mortgage contained a covenant to pay off the prior mortgage. Cited among authorities to conclude that the plaintiff's covenant to pay off the first mortgage precluded his obtaining subrogation.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Court began by recognizing defendant No. 2's prima facie entitlement to subrogation as a person with an interest other than the mortgagor under s. 92 (read with s. 91). The lower appellate Court's rejection based on s. 59A was considered and the Court observed that s. 59A contains the caveat "unless otherwise expressly provided." The Court read s. 91 (which distinguishes the mortgagor from persons deriving title) together with s. 92 (which grants subrogation to persons mentioned in s. 91 other than the mortgagor) and held that s. 92 operates as an express exception to the generality of s. 59A. The Court relied on pre-1929 law and the Privy Council decision in Malireddi Ayyareddi v. Gopala Krishnayya to support the proposition that an auction purchaser who redeems a prior mortgage is entitled to subrogation.

Turning to the plaintiff's claim to subrogation to the first mortgage, the Court considered Full Bench authority in Tota Ram v. Ram Lal but preferred the later five-judge decision in Hira Singh v. Jai Singh (and subsequent approvals and decisions, including Vithaldas Bhagwandas and Lakshmi Amma). Those authorities held that a puisne mortgagee who pays off a prior mortgage as part of the consideration is in effect using the mortgagor's money and therefore acquires no right of subrogation. Applying that principle, the Court concluded the plaintiff had used the mortgagor's money when he paid off the first mortgage and thus obtained no subrogation right.

On these grounds the appeal of defendant No. 2 succeeded: defendant No. 2 is subrogated to the second mortgage which he redeemed; the plaintiff is not subrogated to the first mortgage which he paid off as part of his mortgage transaction.

Holding and Implications

Decree modified: defendant No. 2 entitled to subrogation to the second mortgage; plaintiff not entitled to subrogation to the first mortgage.

Direct consequences:

  • The plaintiff will not be entitled to apply for a final decree for sale of the mortgaged property unless and until he pays defendant No. 2 Rs. 800 (the amount paid by defendant No. 2 in satisfaction of the second mortgage) together with interest at 6% per annum from 2 June 1936 to the date of payment.
  • The order of costs in the trial Court remains; defendant No. 2 is entitled to his costs in this Court and in the lower appellate Court from the plaintiff (respondent No. 1).

No broader new precedent was announced beyond applying existing authorities and statutory construction to the facts before the Court.

Show all summary ...

Macklin, J.:—

The question with which we are concerned in this second appeal is one of subrogation. The property concerned in the suit is a house which originally belonged to defendant No. 1. He mortgaged it three times in all. The first mortgage was for Rs. 300 in March, 1931, in favour of one Shantappa. The second was for Rs. 400 in favour of one Kalappa in September, 1931. The third was to the plaintiff in October, 1933, for Rs. 650. The plaintiff's mortgage mentioned the other two mortgages and provided that out of the consideration money Rs. 308 should be spent by the plaintiff in paying off the first mortgage. In January, 1936, defendant No. 2 took out execution of a money decree which he had obtained against defendant No. 1 and bought the property in suit for Rs. 800 subject to the second mortgage. He paid off the second mortgage, and Rs. 670-3-0 (i.e Rs. 800 less defendant No. 2's expenses) was paid into Court. The plaintiff has now sued defendants Nos. 1 and 2 to enforce his own mortgage, the third, of the series. He has been paid Rs. 670-3-0, and he now claims to be paid the balance. It is admitted that the plaintiff did in fact pay off the first of the mortgagees. Defendant No. 2's defence to the suit is that by reason of s. 92 of the Transfer of Property Act he is subrogated to the second mortgagee whose mortgage he has paid off, and on that ground he claims to have priority over the plaintiff's mortgage.

As being a person having an interest in the mortgaged property other than the mortgagor (see s. 92 read with s. 91) he is prima facie entitled to subrogation. But his claim has been rejected by the lower appellate Court by reason of s. 59A of the Transfer of Property Act. That section is as follows:

“Unless otherwise expressly provided, reference in this Chapter to mortgagors and mortgagees shall be deemed to include references to persons deriving title from them respectively.”

The learned Judge says that by s. 59A the term mortgagor includes a person deriving a title from him, that defendant No. 2 by purchasing the right title and interest of the mortgagor defendant No. 1 simply stepped into his shoes, and that he cannot therefore claim to be subrogated to the rights of the second mortgagee whose mortgage he redeemed. But in reasoning in this way the learned Judge appears to overlook the words “unless otherwise expressly provided” occurring in s. 59A. In providing that “Besides the mortgagor the following persons are entitled to redeem” and in including among those persons such persons as derive title from the mortgagor, s. 91 clearly distinguishes between the mortgagor and persons deriving title from the mortgagor. And in saying that any of the persons mentioned in s. 91 other than the mortgagor are entitled to subrogation, s. 92 obviously repeats the distinction and so provides an exception to the general rule laid down in s. 59A. To this extent s. 92 merely reaffirms the law as it stood in India before the enactment of 1929, and the Privy Council had already held that an auction purchaser under a money decree who paid off a prior mortgage was entitled to subrogation against a subsequent mortgagee; see Malireddi Ayyareddi v. Gopala Krishnayya. I may also refer to Sir Dinshah Mulla's “Transfer of Property Act”, Second Edition, where at page 523 the learned author says:—

“Although the word ‘mortgagor’ includes a purchaser of the equity of redemption (see s. 59A), yet the purchaser of an equity of redemption is not excluded from the right of subrogation. This is because (1) he is under no covenant or personal liability to the mortgagee whose mortgage he discharges, and (2) the principle that the mortgagor cannot derogate from his grant has no application to him.”

It follows that defendant No. 2 is protected against the third mortgagee by his having paid off the second of the mortgages.

But on behalf of the plaintiff respondent it is argued that he in his turn is subrogated to the first mortgagee, he having admittedly paid off the first mortgage as arranged for in his own mortgage. It is said that as puisne mortgagee he is ipso facto entitled to subrogation, and reference is made to a decision of the Full Bench of the Allahabad High Court in Tota Ram v. Ram Lal. The learned Judges who decided that case declined to accept the argument that a mortgagee Whose mortgage provides for paying off a prior mortgage as part of the consideration and pays it off accordingly does so as an agent of the mortgagor. They said that the whole question of subrogation had been simplified by the amendment of the Act of 1929, under which we have our present s. 92, and they took the view that a puisne mortgagee was entitled to subrogation merely by virtue of his being included in the list of persons entitled under s. 91 to redeem and on that account being included among the persons entitled under s. 92 to subrogation. But in a later case of the same High Court, Hira Singh v. Jai Singh, a Bench of five Judges disagreed with the reasoning in Tota Ram v. Ram Lal and held that a puisne mortgagee who pays off a prior mortgage as part of the consideration for the puisne mortgage is using the mortgagor's money and not his own, so that he obviously acquires no right for himself by his payment. That decision was referred to with approval by our own High Court in Vithaldas Bhagwandas v. Tukaram Vithoba. In Lakshmi Amma v. Shankara Narayana Menon a Full Bench of the Madras High Court reached the same result upon a different ground. It was held, upon a consideration of the first and the third clauses of s. 92 together, that a puisne mortgagee in circumstances such as these could not be intended to be included in the first clause, since that clause referred only to persons holding pre-existing interests in the property, and that he could get no right of subrogation unless he held a registered agreement to that effect as provided in cl. 3. In Mukaram Marwari v. Mahammad, Hosain a puisne mortgagee was held to be disentitled to subrogation from the very fact that his mortgage contained a covenant to pay off the prior mortgage; and this decision was arrived at after reference to numerous authorities. But for our purposes it is enough to say that the plaintiff must be held to have been using the mortgagor's money when he paid off the first mortgage, so that he gets no right of subrogation by his payment.

The appeal of defendant No. 2 therefore succeeds and the decree will have to be modified. The order of the Court below is for payment by the defendants to the plaintiff of Rs. 970, together with interest on Rs. 650 at 18 per cent, per annum from the date of the suit and costs, and that on their failure to pay the plaintiff should apply for a final decree for the sale of the mortgaged property. In view of our finding that defendant No. 2 is entitled to subrogation, the liberty given to the plaintiff to apply for sale must be made subject to the modification that he pay defendant No. 2 Rs. 800, (which is the amount paid by defendant No. 2 in satisfaction of the second mortgage) together with interest at 6 per cent, from 2 June, 1936, to the date of payment. That means the plaintiff will not be entitled to apply for a final decree for sale of the mortgaged property unless and until he pays this amount. The order of costs in the trial Court will stand. But defendant No. 2 is entitled to his costs in this Court and in the lower appellate Court from the plaintiff respondent No. 1.

Decree modified.
Y.V.D