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Nana Namdeo Patil v. Dalpat Supadu Patil

Bombay High Court
Jun 29, 1939
Smart Summary (Beta)

Concise Analytical Summary of the Opinion

Factual and Procedural Background

The dispute arises from a series of promissory notes: in 1919 the plaintiff's father Supadu passed two promissory notes in favour of defendant 1 (Rs. 500 and Rs. 200). Supadu died in 1920. His brother Shenfadu, in 1922, passed a promissory note for Rs. 800 in favour of defendant 1 in satisfaction of Supadu's notes. In renewal of that note, the plaintiff's mother Zumkabai passed two promissory notes of Rs. 400 each in 1924.

In 1928 Zumkabai (acting as guardian of her minor son, the plaintiff) and defendant 1 referred the dispute to arbitration. The arbitrator awarded on 17 October 1928. Defendant 1 presented the award in Court to have it filed the next day; this application was registered as Suit No. 846 of 1928. Zumkabai appeared in Court the same day and gave her consent to the award being filed, and a decree was passed in terms of the award.

The present suit was filed by the plaintiff's maternal uncle as next friend, seeking a declaration that the decree in Suit No. 846 of 1928 was not binding on the minor on grounds including (a) no legal necessity for the original debt, (b) no prior court sanction obtained by Zumkabai before giving consent to filing the award, and (c) the minor's interests were not properly safeguarded due to gross negligence by Zumkabai. Defendant 1 challenged maintainability, contending the uncle was not the proper guardian and that no prior sanction was required from the Court.

The trial Court upheld defendant 1's contentions and dismissed the suit. On appeal the District Judge relied on (1896) PJ 609, held that Zumkabai was bound to take the sanction of the Court under O. 32, R. 7 CPC before giving consent, allowed the appeal, declared the decree in Suit No. 846 of 1928 not binding on the plaintiff, and issued an injunction restraining defendant 1 from executing the decree against the plaintiff. The present opinion is from a higher court reviewing that appellate decision.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the consent given by the minor's guardian (Zumkabai) to the filing of an out-of-court arbitral award required the prior leave/sanction of the Court under Order 32, Rule 7 of the Civil Procedure Code (corresponding to Sec. 462 in earlier law), such that the award-decree could be set aside for want of that sanction.
  2. Whether gross negligence by the next friend or guardian, without fraud or collusion, suffices to set aside a decree obtained against a minor.
  3. Whether the suit as framed by the plaintiff's maternal uncle (acting as next friend) was maintainable and whether he was the proper guardian to file the suit (this was contended by defendant 1 and addressed at earlier stages of the litigation).

Arguments of the Parties

Plaintiff's (next friend's) Arguments

  • The decree in Suit No. 846 of 1928 was not binding on the minor because there was no legal necessity for the original debt.
  • The minor's mother Zumkabai did not obtain the prior sanction of the Court before giving her consent to the filing of the award; therefore the award-decree is void as to the minor.
  • Zumkabai acted with gross negligence in safeguarding the minor's interests, rendering the decree vulnerable to being set aside.

Defendant 1's Arguments

  • The suit was not maintainable in its present form; the plaintiff's maternal uncle was not the proper guardian to institute the suit on behalf of the minor.
  • No previous sanction of the Court was required to be taken by the minor's mother Zumkabai before giving her consent to the filing of the award.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
(1896) PJ 609 Illustrates that where a guardian, during the pendency of a suit, enters into an agreement that an award should be allowed to be filed (i.e., gives consent while suit is pending), the minors may not have been properly represented and court sanction under the statutory provision (Sec. 462 / O. 32, R. 7 CPC) is essential. The court examined and distinguished this authority on the facts: in (1896) PJ 609 there was an agreement entered into during the pendency of the suit. In the present case the court found no evidence of any such agreement made during pendency, so the precedent did not compel requiring prior sanction here.
41 Bom LR 592 (Full Bench) Establishes that mere gross negligence by a next friend or guardian, absent fraud or collusion, does not provide a basis for setting aside a decree obtained against a minor. The court relied on this Full Bench ruling to hold that the allegation of gross negligence by the minor's mother, without an allegation or proof of fraud or collusion, was insufficient to set aside the award-decree.
43 Bom 2583 Distinguishes (1896) PJ 609; holds that where the minor's guardian is the party who presented the award in Court (i.e., the guardian is the plaintiff in the suit to file the award) no sanction under O. 32, R. 7 is necessary because the guardian did nothing after the filing that would require leave. The court cited this decision to support the proposition that if no agreement is made during the pendency of a suit, the need for court sanction does not arise; it used the distinction to show the differing factual matrices between that case and (1896) PJ 609.
26 Bom 2984 Followed the same principle: where the application for filing an award is made by the minor's guardian, no sanction of the Court was necessary. The court cited this authority as additional support for the view that O. 32, R. 7 does not apply where there is no agreement entered into during the pendency of proceedings and where the guardian did not act in a way requiring prior leave.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The court's analysis proceeds in two main strands: (A) the statutory requirement under O. 32, R. 7 CPC (and its counterpart Sec. 462 in earlier law) regarding agreements or compromises on behalf of a minor during a pending suit, and (B) the sufficiency of gross negligence (without fraud or collusion) to set aside a decree obtained against a minor.

A. Interpretation and application of O. 32, R. 7 CPC:

  • The court emphasised the wording of O. 32, R. 7: it prohibits a next friend or guardian "for the suit" from, without leave of the Court, entering into any agreement or compromise on behalf of a minor in the suit. The phrase "for the suit" points to agreements entered into during the pendency of a suit or proceeding.
  • The court distinguished between (i) a reference to arbitration made out of Court before any proceedings were pending and (ii) an agreement entered into during the pendency of a suit. It held that a reference made out of Court does not, by itself, require prior court sanction because there was no "next friend or guardian for the suit" at that time.
  • In the present case, Zumkabai's appearance in Court and her consent to the filing of the award followed the presentation of the award by defendant 1; however, there was no evidence that she and defendant 1 had entered into any agreement during the pendency of the filing application that she would not oppose the award. The court emphasised the absence of proof: defendant 1 gave evidence but was not cross-examined on any such agreement and no witness suggested any meeting or communication between them after the filing.
  • The court observed that it is not unusual for a party to consent to filing an award without having entered into any prior agreement; the absence of opposition does not automatically imply an agreement made during pendency requiring leave.
  • Therefore, unless an agreement during the pendency of proceedings is shown, the protective sanction contemplated by O. 32, R. 7 is not triggered.

B. Gross negligence versus fraud/collusion:

  • The court relied on the Full Bench ruling in 41 Bom LR 592 to conclude that mere gross negligence by a next friend or guardian, without fraud or collusion, does not justify setting aside a decree obtained against a minor.
  • Applying that principle, since the plaint only alleged gross negligence (and did not allege fraud or collusion by the minor's mother), the court held this allegation insufficient to set aside the award-decree.

C. Application of precedents and factual findings:

  • The court considered (1896) PJ 609 at length and found its ratio confined to cases where a guardian had entered into an agreement during the pendency of proceedings (which would require court sanction). That case was distinguishable because here no such agreement was proved or suggested.
  • The court cited decisions (43 Bom 2583 and 26 Bom 2984) applying the converse principle where the guardian presented the award or the filing application and hence no sanction was required; these authorities supported the court's conclusion that no leave was necessary in the present circumstances.
  • Given the lack of evidence of any in-suit agreement and the insufficiency of gross negligence alone to set aside the decree, the court concluded that no prior court sanction was required and that the decree could not be invalidated on the pleaded grounds.

Holding and Implications

HOLDING: The court allowed the appeal before it, set aside the decree of the lower Appellate Court (which had allowed the plaintiff's appeal), and restored the decree of the trial Court which had dismissed the plaintiff's suit. The court ordered that the plaintiff shall pay the costs of defendant 1 throughout.

Implications:

  • Direct effect: The decree arising from the filing of the arbitral award in Suit No. 846 of 1928 remains effective and is not set aside as against the minor on the grounds advanced in the plaint. The plaintiff's suit seeking to declare that decree not binding has failed in this court and costs are awarded against the plaintiff.
  • Limitation on setting aside decrees for minors: The decision reaffirms the principle (following 41 Bom LR 592) that allegations of gross negligence by a guardian, without proof of fraud or collusion, do not suffice to set aside a decree obtained against a minor.
  • Scope of O. 32, R. 7 CPC: The opinion clarifies (on the facts) that the requirement of leave under O. 32, R. 7 to enter into agreements or compromises on behalf of a minor is engaged only where an agreement is made during the pendency of a suit or proceeding (i.e., where there is a "next friend or guardian for the suit"); an out-of-court reference to arbitration, or a guardian's later voluntary consent to filing an award absent any in-suit agreement, does not automatically require prior court sanction.
  • No new broad precedent was formulated beyond the application of existing authorities: the court primarily distinguished earlier rulings on their facts and applied established principles to the facts before it.

Outcome summary: Appeal allowed; decree of lower Appellate Court set aside; trial Court's dismissal of the plaintiff's suit restored; plaintiff to pay defendant 1's costs.

Show all summary ...

1. The plaintiff's father Supadu had passed two promissory notes in favour of defendant 1 in 1919, one for Rs. 500 and the other for Rs. 200. After Supadu's death in 1920, his brother Shenfadu passed a promissory note for Rs. 800 in favou of defendant 1 in 1922 in satisfaction Supadu's promissory notes. In renewal of that promissory note the plaintiff's mother Zumkabai passed two promissory notes of Rs. 400 each in favour of defendant. 1 in 1924. In 1928 Zumkabai, acting as the guardian of her minor son, the plaintiff, and defendant 1 referred the dispute regarding the promissory notes to arbitration, and the arbitrator gave his award on 17th October, 1928. On the next day, defendant 1 presented the award in Court to have it filed. His application to have the award filed was registered as Suit No. 846 of 1928. On the same day the plaintiff's mother Zumkabai appeared in Court and gave her consent to the award being filed. A decree was accordingly passed in terms of the award. The present suit was filed by the plaintiff's maternal uncle, acting as his next friend, for a declaration that the decree in Suit No. 846 of 1928 was not binding on the minor plaintiff on the grounds that there was no legal necessity for the original debt, that no previous sanction of the Court was obtained by the plaintiff's mother Zumkabai before giving her consent to the filing of the award and that the minor's interests were not properly safeguarded owing to gross negligence on the part of the minor's mother. Defendant 1 contended that the suit was not maintainable in its present form, that the minor's maternal uncle was not his proper guardian to file the suit and that no previous sanction of the Court was required to be taken by the minor's mother Zumkabai before giving her consent to the filing of the award. The trial Court upheld these contentions and dismissed the suit. In appeal the learned District Judge, relying upon the ruling in (1896) PJ 6091, held that the plaintiff's mother was bound to take the sanction of the Court under O. 32, R. 7 of the CPC, before giving her consent to the filing of the award, and allowed the appeal. He declared that the decree in Suit No. 846 of 1928 was not binding on the plaintiff and issued an injunction restraining defendant 1 from executing the decree against the plaintiff.

2. The only grounds on which the decree against the minor plaintiff in Suit No. 846 of 1928 is sought to be set aside in this suit are the want of sanction of the Court to the consent given by the minor's mother to the filing of the award and her alleged gross negligence in protecting the minor's interests. It is not alleged in the plaint that the minor's mother acted fraudulently either in referring the dispute to the arbitrator or in giving her consent to the award. It is now well established by the ruling of the Full Bench in 41 Bom LR 592 that mere gross negligence, apart from fraud or collusion on the part of the next friend or guardian ad litem of a minor litigant, does not afford the basis of a suit to set aside a decree against him. All that is alleged against the minor's mother in the plaint is that, she was grossly negligent. In the absence of any allegation of her fraud or her collusion with defendant 1, the award decree cannot be set aside even if it be assumed that she was grossly negligent and did not guard the minor's interests properly. As regards the other ground, there is no allegation in the plaint that after the award was presented in Court by defendant 1 for being filed, there was any agreement between him and the minor's mother that she should not oppose the filing of the award, and that in pursuance of such an agreement she gave her consent to its being filed. O. 32, R. 7 of the CPC, provides:

No next friend or guardian for the suit shall, without the leave of the Court, expressly recorded in the proceedings, enter into any agreement or compromise on behalf of a minor with reference to the suit in which he acts as next friend or guardian.

3. The very use of the words “next friend or guardian for the suit” shows that the leave of the Court is necessary if an agreement is to be entered into or a compromise is to be effected on behalf of a minor in a pending suit or proceeding. If no suit or proceeding is pending, there cannot be any next friend or guardian for the suit for the minor. In this case all that the minor's mother did after defendant 1 presented his application in Court to have the award filed was that she voluntarily appeared in Court and gave her consent to the award. It does not necessarily follow that this consent was given as a result of any agreement entered into by her with defendant 1 after the application was presented by him in Court. It cannot be contended that the reference to arbitration required the sanction of any Court, because the reference was made out of Court and at that time no proceedings were pending in any Court. It is suggested that the agreement to refer to arbitration must have been accompanied by an agreement that neither of the parties to the reference should oppose the filing of the award in Court. There is no reason to assume that in every case of a reference to arbitration there is a simultaneous agreement that the filing of the award should not be opposed by any party to it. On the other hand, it is common experience that the party against whom the award is given, often opposes it on some ground or other and it is not likely that before knowing what the award is going to be, a party will undertake not to oppose it. Even assuming that there was such an understanding between the plaintiff's mother and defendant 1, such an agreement would be before the award was presented in Court, and it cannot be contended that it should have been entered into with the sanction of any Court. It is only when an agreement is entered into after the award is presented in Court that there would be a Court to sanction or not to sanction it. Till then there would be no Court whose sanction could be sought. On behalf of the plaintiff reliance is placed mainly on the ruling in (1896) PJ 609. In that case there was a reference to arbitration out of Court, and after the award was presented in Court for being filed, the minor defendants' guardian gave his consent to the filing of the award. It was held that the minors were not properly represented in the suit on the award, and the award decree could have been set aside on that ground alone. But Parsons and Ranade, JJ. proceeded to consider also whether the award decree was had for want of sanction of the Court. They observed (page 610):

It is admitted that the sanction of the Court was not obtained either to the original agreement of reference to arbitration made by Vinayak Balkrishna Kelkar on behalf of his sons or to the agreement of the same person that the award should be filed or to the decree. It is, in our opinion, essential under Sec. 462 of the Code that the leave of the Court should have been obtained to the agreement before a decree was passed on it.

4. From this it appears that there was an agreement entered into by the minors' guardian that the award should not be opposed, but should be allowed to be filed. The full facts held proved in that case do not appear in the judgment or in the report. It is obvious that unless such an agreement during the pendency of the suit was presumed or held proved, no sanction of the Court was-necessary under S. 462, corresponding to the present O. 32, R. 7 of the CPC. This case was referred to in 43 Bom 2583, and was distinguished. In that case the minor through his guardian, was one of the parties to the reference to arbitration, and after the award was given by the arbitrator, it was the guardian who presented it in Court for being filed. The other party gave consent, and a decree was passed in terms of the award. It was held that as the minor's guardian himself was the plaintiff in the suit for the filing of the award, it could not be said that he had entered into any agreement after the suit was filed and that as he had done nothing after the filing of the suit, there was no occasion for any sanction of the Court; whereas in the case of (1896) PJ 609, the minors' guardian happened to be the defendant, and when he appeared and gave his consent, the suit was pending. Scott, C.J observed (page 271):

I infer from the judgment in the case in (1896) PJ 609 that the Court there was of opinion that the original agreement of reference before there had been any application numbered as a suit, would not require the leave of the Court.

5. That is really the gist of the case. Unless it is held that an agreement was entered into by the minor's guardian during the pendency of the suit, the question of the consent of the Court does not arise. In 26 Bom 2984 also, the same principle was followed. There too the application for the filing of the award was made by the minor's guardian, and it was held that no sanction of the Court was necessary. In fact this follows from the very wording of O. 32, R. 7 of the CPC, and it cannot be inferred from the mere fact that the minor's guardian gave her consent to the filing of the award that she must have done so in pursuance of an agreement entered into by her after the application for the filing of the award was presented. In this case, although defendant 1 entered the witness-box, not a single question was put to him in cross-examination as to whether there was any such agreement between him and the minor plaintiff's mother. There was no evidence even to suggest that the plaintiff's mother met defendant 1 after he presented the award in Court for being filed. Had there been the slightest evidence to prove that there was any talk between them during the pendency of the suit, it would not have been far-fetched to infer that he had entered into an agreement with her that she should give her consent to the filing of the award. But in the absence of any such evidence, it is not fair to infer that such an agreement existed, from the mere fact that the minor plaintiff's mother voluntarily gave her consent to the filing of the award after it was presented in Court.

6. It is not necessary that in every case in which an award is presented, its filing must be opposed in Court. If the arbitrator had acted fairly and was not guilty of any misconduct and if there was no ground on which the validity of the award could be challenged, the defendant would naturally not think it wise or proper to oppose it. From the failure to oppose the award it cannot be inferred that it must be due to any express or implied agreement between the parties. I therefore hold that in this case no sanction of the Court was required to be taken by the minor plaintiff's mother before putting in her written statement giving her consent to the filing of the award. No other ground for setting aside the award-decree is urged. I allow the appeal, set aside the decree of the lower Appellate Court and restore that of the trial Court. The plaintiff shall pay the costs of defendant 1 throughout.

D.S/R.K

7. Appeal allowed.