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Rango Ramacharya Kat... v. Gopal Narayan Kulkar...
Judgment Summary — Broomfield, J.
Factual and Procedural Background
This is a second appeal arising from execution proceedings. In 1912 two panchas of a temple sued two persons who claimed to be vahiwatdars, seeking recovery of moneys alleged to have been wrongfully appropriated. A decree for Rs. 3,593 and interest was entered against the two defendants, directing that the amount be recovered first from defendant No. 1 and, if any balance remained, from defendant No. 2. The decree was substantially confirmed on appeal and by the High Court, but the High Court (12 March 1918) ordered that execution be stayed until a receiver was appointed in a suit under section 92 of the Civil Procedure Code concerning the same temple (that suit had been filed in 1917).
The charity suit under section 92 was decided in April 1922 and a committee of management was appointed sometime after 29 June 1922. Steps to recover the sum from defendant No. 1 were unsuccessful. On 8 June 1934 a darkhast (application for execution) was filed by the chairman of the managing committee against the two brothers of defendant No. 2 (defendant No. 2 had died).
The darkhast was opposed on several grounds; the trial Court dismissed the darkhast on the ground that it ought to have been presented by the secretary. On appeal the Assistant Judge ordered that the darkhast proceed against the deceased second defendant's one-third share. This second appeal considers the lawfulness of the darkhast and related questions.
Legal Issues Presented
- Whether the darkhast filed on 8 June 1934 was barred by section 48 of the Civil Procedure Code (i.e., whether the twelve-year period ran from the date of the High Court decree of 12 March 1918 or from some later date when the decree became executable).
- Whether the chairman of the managing committee was competent to present the darkhast (given the committee's rules providing that the secretary was to file suits with the chairman's sanction).
- Whether, because the property claimed had not been attached in defendant No. 2's lifetime and the family was joint, the property passed by survivorship to defendant No. 2's brothers (i.e., the effect of alleged survivorship versus a 1923 sale-deed by defendant No. 2 in favour of his two brothers).
Arguments of the Parties
Objectors' Arguments
- The darkhast was barred by time under section 48 of the Civil Procedure Code because more than twelve years had elapsed since the High Court decree of 12 March 1918.
- The chairman of the managing committee lacked competence to present the darkhast; the committee's rules provided that the secretary should file suits (with the chairman's sanction), and therefore the darkhast ought to have been presented by the secretary.
- The property claimed in the darkhast had passed by survivorship to the brothers of defendant No. 2 because it was not attached during defendant No. 2's lifetime; defendant No. 2 and his brothers were joint coparceners.
Decree-Holder / Proponent's Contentions
- The decree was not capable of execution immediately on the date of the High Court decree because execution had been stayed until the appointment of a receiver in the section 92 suit; accordingly, the twelve-year period under section 48 (if it applies) should run only from the date the decree became executable (i.e., the appointment of a receiver or another person with authority to execute).
- Implicit in the record is that earlier attempts to enforce the decree were made (papers show darkhasts filed in 1919 and 1920), and the managing committee (and its chairman) acted to pursue the decree after formation of the committee and the decision in the charity suit.
Table of Precedents Cited
| Precedent | Rule or Principle Cited For | Application by the Court |
|---|---|---|
| Narhar Raghunath v. Krishnaji Govind | Held that the twelve years under s.48 run from the date when the decree becomes in all its parts ripe for execution (i.e., time runs from when the decree is executable in respect of the relief sought). | The lower Courts relied on this case, but the present Court concluded it "can no longer be regarded as good law." |
| Khulna Loan Company v. Jnanendra Nath Bose | Held that, in combined mortgage decrees, time runs for all reliefs from the date of the decree. | The Privy Council affirmed the Calcutta High Court's decision; the present Court treated this and related authorities as persuasive to depart from Narhar Raghunath. |
| Nawab Shuja-ul-mulk Bahadur v. Umir-ul-umra Bahadur | Mentality of decisions treating time as running from date of decree for combined mortgage decrees (Madras High Court authority consistent with Khulna Loan Company). | Used as supporting authority for the view that Narhar Raghunath is no longer good law. |
| Swaminatha Odayar v. Thiagarajaswami Odayar | Madras High Court decision in line with the view that limitation runs from date of decree. | Relied upon to show the development of authority away from Narhar Raghunath. |
| Aiyasamier v. Venkatachela Mudali | Full bench case which took the same view as Narhar Raghunath (i.e., time runs from when decree becomes executable). | The Madras decisions treated this case as impliedly overruled; the present Court cites that development. |
| Banku Behari Chatterji v. Naraindas Dutt | Applied the principle that the twelve years for enforcing a mortgage decree against the mortgagor personally runs from the date of the final decree (art.183 of the Limitation Act). | Cited as an instance where the Privy Council applied the rule that the limitation period for personal relief runs from the date of the decree. |
| Subbarayan v. Natarajan | Addressed whether s.15 of the Limitation Act controls s.48 of the Civil Procedure Code; judges differed in reasoning. | The present Court refers to the differing views and expresses reservations about some of the reasoning, noting the point but not deciding it finally in this case. |
| Jurawan Pasi v. Mahabir Dhar Dube | Observed that the word "prescribed" in s.48 appears to refer to periods prescribed by the Limitation Act and described s.48 as an enactment forbidding execution on a decree more than twelve years old. | Quoted to show judicial treatment of the interplay between s.48 and the Limitation Act; used to consider whether Limitation Act provisions qualify s.48. |
| Rameshvar Singh v. Homeshvar Singh | Held that when a decree is not executable except on the happening of a contingency, time will not begin to run until that contingency occurs (under art.182 of the Limitation Act). | The Court applied the same principle to s.48: a decree not capable of execution at date of decree does not trigger s.48 until it becomes executable. |
| Maharaja Jagadindra Nath Roy Bahadur v. Rani Hemanta Kumari Debi | Recognized that the right to bring suit or legal proceedings on behalf of an idol is vested in the shebait or manager. | Relied upon to justify permitting the chairman of a committee of management to bring a suit or file a darkhast on behalf of the committee/idol. |
Court's Reasoning and Analysis
The Court proceeded in several distinct analytical steps:
- Assessment of precedent: The Court reviewed conflicting authorities on when the twelve-year period of s.48 (CPC) begins to run. It observed that earlier authorities (e.g., Narhar Raghunath) held that time runs from when a decree becomes ripe for execution, while other authorities (Khulna Loan Company and subsequent decisions affirmed by the Privy Council and applied in later cases) held that the period runs from the date of the decree. Having considered these authorities, the Court concluded that Narhar Raghunath "can no longer be regarded as good law." The Court treated the line of authority affirming that limitation runs from the date of the decree as persuasive.
- Interaction with the Limitation Act: The Court considered the question whether provisions of the Indian Limitation Act (notably s.15 and s.4) affect the operation of s.48 of the Civil Procedure Code. It reviewed Subbarayan v. Natarajan and Jurawan Pasi, noting divergent reasoning in Subbarayan and an observation in Jurawan Pasi that "prescribed" in s.48 may refer to periods in the Limitation Act. While the Court expressed that on general principles s.15 appears capable of extending the period prescribed by s.48 and that it was "not satisfied... that it does not apply," the Court did not consider it necessary to decide that point for the present case.
- Principal legal proposition adopted for the case: Independently of the s.15 question, the Court adopted the principle that s.48 deals with decrees and their execution and therefore must relate to a decree which is capable of execution. Accordingly, s.48 cannot be said to apply until the decree becomes executable (for example, upon appointment of a receiver or another person with authority to execute). This approach is consistent with the Privy Council decision in Rameshvar Singh v. Homeshvar Singh, holding that where execution is contingent on a future event, time does not run until that contingency occurs.
- Application to the facts: The Assistant Judge had found that the decree became capable of execution only after 29 June 1922; if that were true, the darkhast filed in 1934 might have been in time. The Court examined the record and found no adequate basis for the Assistant Judge's factual finding. The High Court's stay had been until the appointment of a receiver, not until appointment of a managing committee; moreover, the record indicated that there were earlier darkhasts filed in 1919 and 1920. The Court held that it was the decree-holder's burden to produce clear evidence that no receiver had been appointed (or that no person capable of executing the decree existed) before the managing committee's appointment; that evidence was not produced. Given the existence of darkhasts in 1919 and 1920, the contention that the decree did not become executable until after 29 June 1922 was unsustainable.
- Competence to present darkhast: The Court accepted the authority that the right to bring suit for an idol vests in the shebait or manager, but observed that, in the presence of a committee of management, the Court may permit the chairman of the committee to bring actions on behalf of the committee. Consequently, the objection that only the secretary could present the darkhast was without substance.
- Ownership / survivorship question: The Court analysed the defendants' contention that the property passed by survivorship to the brothers of defendant No. 2. It observed a 1923 sale-deed (exhibit 29) by defendant No. 2 in favour of his two brothers, noting an inconsistency between the defendants' claim of joint family survivorship and the alleged sale. The Court found no reason to overturn the lower Courts' interpretations regarding the sale-deed, but also noted that the point became immaterial given the conclusion that the darkhast was barred by time.
Holding and Implications
Core Ruling: The appeal is allowed; the darkhast is barred by limitation and the order of the trial Court (dismissing the darkhast) is restored.
Consequences and orders:
- The order of the trial Court will be restored.
- Costs: The appellant will recover costs in the Court of first appeal, but must pay his own costs and those of the respondent in this Court in accordance with the order passed on 4 February 1937.
Broader implications noted by the Court:
- The Court declared that the decision in Narhar Raghunath v. Krishnaji Govind "can no longer be regarded as good law," aligning with a line of authority indicating that, in many cases concerning combined decrees, limitation runs from the date of the decree. However, the Court did not finally decide the broader question whether s.15 of the Limitation Act governs or extends the period prescribed by s.48 of the Civil Procedure Code; it observed that s.15 might apply but left the point undecided for present purposes.
- The Court affirmed the principle (derived from Rameshvar Singh v. Homeshvar Singh) that where a decree is not executable until a contingency occurs, time for limitation does not begin to run until that contingency occurs; it applied that principle to s.48 in this case when examining whether execution was stayed until the appointment of a receiver.
Appeal allowed.
This summary is confined strictly to the content of the provided opinion and does not add facts or inferences not explicitly stated therein.
Broomfield, J.:—
This is a second appeal in execution proceedings. The material facts are as follows. In 1912 there was a suit brought by two panchas of a certain temple against two persons claiming to be vahiwatdars of the temple to recover moneys alleged to have been wrongfully appropriated. A decree of the sum of Rs. 3,593 and interest was passed against the two defendants. It directed that the amount should be recovered first from defendant No. 1 by taking all legal steps against him, and the balance if any was to be recovered from defendant No. 2. This decree was substantially confirmed in appeal by the District Court and the High Court. But the High Court directed that execution should be stayed until a receiver was appointed in a suit under s. 92 of the Civil Procedure Code relating to the same temple which had been filed in 1917 and was then pending. The date of the High Court decree was March 12, 1918. The charity suit was decided in April, 1922 and a committee of management was appointed sometime after June 29, 1922. Steps to recover the money from defendant No. 1 having failed, the darkhast which has given rise to this appeal was filed by the chairman of the managing committee on June 8, 1934, against the two brothers of defendant No. 2 (who had died in the meantime).
The objections taken to the darkhast were (1) that it was barred under s. 48 of the Civil Procedure Code, being more than twelve years from the date of the High Court decree, (2) that the chairman of the managing committee was not competent to present the darkhast, the rules framed under the scheme providing that the secretary was to file suits with the sanction of the chairman. (3) that defendant No. 2 was joint with his brothers, and as the property claimed in the darkhast had not been attached in his lifetime, it had passed by survivorship to the present defendants.
Both the lower Courts have held against the objectors on the first and third points, although they differed as to the extent of the property liable to be proceeded against. The trial Court dismissed the darkhast on the ground that it ought to have been presented by the secretary. In appeal the Assistant Judge differed and ordered that the darkhast should proceed against the deceased second defendant's one-third share in the property.
On the question of limitation the lower Courts have relied on Narhar Raghunath v. Krishnaji Govind where it was held that the execution and application contemplated by s. 48 relate to a decree which is executable at that date in respect of the application made and execution sought, that the twelve years' period prescribed by the section runs only from the date when the decree becomes in all its parts ripe for execution, and that consequently when a decree directs the recovery of a mortgage debt by sale of the mortgage property and in case of deficit from other properties and from the defendants personally, time runs in respect of the latter relief from the date of sale and not from the date of the decree.
The Calcutta High Court took a different view in Khulna Loan Company v. Jnanendra Nath Bose and held that in the case of such combined mortgage decrees time runs in respect of all the reliefs from the date of the decree. The Privy Council on appeal affirmed the decree of the Calcutta High Court. Since then the Madras High Court in two cases, Nawab Shuja-ul-mulk Bahadur v. Umir-ul-umra Bahadur(2) and Swaminatha Odayar v. Thiagarajaswami Odayar(3) has laid down the law in this sense and treated Aiyasamier v. Venkatachela Mudali(4) a full bench case which took the same view as Narhar Raghunath v. Krishnaji Govind,(5) as impliedly overruled. In the Khulna Loan Company's case their Lordships did not give reasons and apparently the case is not reported in the authorised reports. But they affirmed the judgment of the Calcutta High Court and therefore presumably approved of the reasoning, and they have applied the same principle in Banku Behari Chatterji v. Naraindas Dutt.(6) It was held there that the twelve years within which a mortgage decree can be enforced against the mortgagor personally runs from the date of the final decree, not from the time when the deficiency is ascertained by the sale of the mortgaged properties. Lord Phillimore said (p. 505):—
“… it is suggested on his [appellant's] behalf, that he could not have a personal decree till all the mortgaged properties had been exhausted by sale. This is true, but it does not mean that he could first wait till just short of twelve years before selling and then take another period just short of twelve years for a personal decree.”
This was a case under art. 183 of the Indian Limitation Act and not under s. 48 of the Civil Procedure Code, but I do not see that makes any difference to the principle. In view of the authorities to which I have referred, we are of opinion that Narhar Raghunath v. Krishnaji Govind can no longer be regarded as good law.
In one respect the present case is distinguishable from all those which have been cited, viz. by reason of the fact that the High Court in confirming the decree in second appeal stayed execution until the appointment of a receiver in the suit under s. 92. It has been held that s. 15 of the Indian Limitation Act does not in any way control the operation of s. 48 of the Civil Procedure Code. This view was taken in Subbarayan v. Natarajan. The learned Judges who decided that case differed as to the grounds of their decision. Mr. Justice Spencer went on the ground that “prescribed” in s. 15 means prescribed by the Indian Limitation Act itself. Mr. Justice Ramesam did not accept that view. He held that the period prescribed by s. 48 is not strictly a period of limitation at all. But the learned Judge, as he admitted, felt considerable difficulty over the point and I must say with all deference that his reasoning does not appear to be very convincing. The point has been referred to also in Jurawan Pasi v. Mahabir Dhar Dube, where the Court said (p. 203):—
“… it seems pretty clear that the word ‘prescribed’ in this section refers to periods prescribed by the Limitation Act. Section 48 of the Code of Civil Procedure does not in a strict sense provide a ‘period’ of limitation. It is an enactment which forbids an order for execution upon a decree which is more than twelve years old.”
I must confess that I cannot see that there is much difference between an enactment which forbids execution upon a decree more than twelve years old and one prescribing a maximum period of limitation of twelve years.
In both these cases it has been stated that s. 48 contains an unqualified prohibition and it seems to be implied that in that way it differs from the provisions of the Indian Limitation Act. But why s. 48 should be regarded as more unqualified in its operation than, for instance, s. 15 of the Indian Limitation Act is not very clear. Mr. Justice Ramesam in Subbarayan v. Natarajan held that the provisions of the Indian Limitation Act do in some respects control the operation of the Civil Procedure Code, and it was admitted in the argument before us that s. 48 is at any rate qualified by the operation of s. 4 of the Indian Limitation Act. On general principles there would seem to be no reason why s. 15 should not apply so as to extend the period prescribed by s. 48 of the Code and we are not satisfied as at present advised that it does not apply.
It is not really necessary however to decide that point in this case because apart from the question whether s. 15 of the Indian Limitation Act applies, s. 48 of the Code deals with decrees and the execution thereof and obviously therefore must relate to a decree which is capable of execution. The decree as passed by the High Court in second appeal was not capable of execution at all on its date and s. 48 therefore could not be said to apply until it became a decree capable of execution, that is to say, until the appointment of a receiver or some other person who had authority to execute. This view seems to me to be in accordance with the rule laid down by the Privy Council in Rameshvar Singh v. Homeshvar Singh, a case which is referred to in Nawab Shuja-ul-mulk Bahadur v. Umir-ul-umra Bahadur. It was there held that in the case of a decree not executable, except on the happening of a particular contingency, time will not begin to run until that contingency occurs. It was a decision under art. 182 of the Indian Limitation Act, but in my opinion the same principle would apply to cases under s. 48.
The learned Assistant Judge has held that the decree in this case did not become capable of execution until after June 29, 1922. If that was so in fact we think the darkhast would have been in time, but unfortunately for the decree-holder there seems to be no justification for this finding. It is true that the decree in suit No. 10 of 1917, which was the suit under s. 92, called for applications from persons desirous to be members of the managing committee to be made on or before June 29, 1922, and there is no doubt that the managing committee appointed under the scheme cannot have been appointed until after that date. But the High Court did not say that the decree was only to be executed by the managing committee; execution was only stayed until the appointment of a receiver. The Assistant Judge appears to have thought that no receiver was appointed. It is, however, by no means clear that was the case. The plaint in the suit under s. 92 mentioned the fact that the temple property was in the hands of a receiver appointed by the Athni Court, i.e the Court which tried the original suit by the panchas against the Vahiwatdars. It may well be, however, that the Court trying the suit under s. 92 appointed a receiver of its own or confirmed the appointment made by the Athni Court. In any case it was for the decree-holder to produce evidence sufficient to establish clearly that no receiver was appointed and that there was no other person capable of executing the decree before the time when the managing committee was appointed. This has not been done. The point was not taken at all in the trial Court. It was only raised in the course of arguments before the Assistant Judge and even then it appears to have been referred to only as a side argument, as the learned Assistant Judge says.
It has been brought to our notice that the papers on the record show that one darkhast was actually filed in the year 1919 and a second darkhast in the year 1920. That being so, the contention that the decree did not become executable until after June 29, 1922, is manifestly unsustainable. We must hold that the execution of this darkhast is barred by time.
We agree with the learned Assistant Judge in holding that there is no substance in the objection to the darkhast on the ground that it was not presented by the secretary of the committee. The real decree-holder is the idol. The right to bring a suit or to take other legal proceedings on behalf of an idol is by law vested in the shebait or manager: Maharaja Jagadindra Nath Roy Bahadur v. Rani Hemanta Kumari Debi. In this case we have a committee of management. But there is no reason why the Court should not permit the chairman of the committee to bring a suit or file a darkhast on behalf of the committee.
The question what property would be affected by the darkhast is one of some little difficulty. It depends mainly on the importance to be attached to exhibit 29 which is a sale-deed by defendant No. 2 in favour of his two brothers in 1923. The defendants' case was that the family was joint and that they got the property claimed in the darkhast by survivorship, That case, however, is inconsistent with a sale of the interest of one of the coparceners to the others. Therefore, we think it would not be open to the defendants to claim the ownership of the property sold on the strength of this sale-deed which in fact they did not rely upon and which it is not shown to have been acted upon. Whether the lower Courts are right in interpreting this sale-deed as convincing evidence of a separation of interest between the three brothers is a point of more difficulty. On the whole we see no sufficient reason to differ from the view taken by the lower Courts. The point is no longer of any importance since we hold that the darkhast must be dismissed.
We therefore allow the appeal. The order of the trial Court will be restored. The appellant will get his costs in the Court of first appeal but he must pay his own costs and those of the respondent in this Court in accordance with the order passed on February 4, 1937.
Appeal allowed.
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