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Menahem Mesha Menaham Messa And Others () v. Moses Bunin Menahem Messa And Others (S)

Bombay High Court
Mar 7, 1938
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Structured Summary of the Opinion (Rangnekar, J. and subsequent appellate remarks)

Factual and Procedural Background

Bunin Menahem Messa (hereafter “Bunin”) died domiciled at Aden on October 12, 1922, leaving significant immovable and movable property (some in Palestine, Alexandria/Egypt, Aden and elsewhere) and a half-share in a family partnership carried on as Menahem Messa. The plaintiff is Bunin's only son and sued seeking a declaration that Bunin's will dated July 10, 1919 (exhibit A/C) was not a valid last will and testament, that it was not validly executed according to the law applicable to the parties (Jewish law of domicile), that the appointment of executors and legatees under the will was invalid, and for consequential relief including letters of administration.

After Bunin's death the plaintiff sought administration in Egypt (Port Said; transferred to His Britannic Majesty's Supreme Court at Alexandria). The Alexandria court found for the plaintiff on June 30, 1925, declaring the will null and void and issuing letters of administration limited to estate within its jurisdiction. Proceedings in Aden were referred to the High Court, and suits (No. 91 of 1925 and No. 303 of 1926, ultimately transferred) were tried before Rangnekar, J. The judge considered: (1) the effect of the Alexandria judgment; (2) the validity of the will under the Jewish law applicable to parties domiciled in Aden; and (3) validity of some provisions of the will. Rangnekar, J. held the Alexandria judgment to be a judgment in rem under s.41 Indian Evidence Act and conclusive, and on the merits he found the will invalid under Jewish law. The decree in favour of the plaintiff was made, and costs/orders as recorded in the judgment followed. Defendants (various executors/legatees) appealed; the appeal was heard and dismissed (appeal dismissed; decree confirmed).

Legal Issues Presented

  1. What effect should an Indian court give to the judgment of the Supreme Court at Alexandria (whether it is a judgment in rem under s.41 of the Indian Evidence Act and therefore conclusive)?
  2. Was Bunin's will validly executed under the law applicable to the parties (Jewish law of domicile — requirements such as Kinyan, delivery, and subject-matter definiteness)?
  3. Were particular provisions of the will (bequests of partnership shares, appointment of Apothropos/executors, specified legacies and conditions) valid under that law?

Arguments of the Parties

Plaintiff's Arguments

  • The Alexandria judgment is a judgment in rem under s.41 of the Indian Evidence Act; it conclusively establishes the plaintiff's status as administrator and bars re-opening the validity of the will in this Court.
  • The Jewish law applicable (law of domicile — Aden) was correctly applied by the Alexandria court in finding the will invalid; the will was not validly executed according to those requirements.
  • The will purports to give partnership shares in an invalid manner (indefinite subject-matter; lack of proper Kinyan and necessary delivery), so the whole will should be treated as invalid and the plaintiff entitled as heir (intestacy) subject to maintenance obligations of widows.
  • If any conflict of authorities on Jewish law existed, the plaintiff as Muchzac (heir/possessor-in-law) can rely on the doctrine of Kimli (i.e., reliance on authorities favourable to him where conflict exists).

Defendants' Arguments

  • Section 41 Indian Evidence Act does not apply to a foreign (non-British-Indian domestic) court: the Alexandria judgment cannot be treated as conclusive in India beyond the territorial limits of the Court that pronounced it.
  • The Alexandria judgment in rem (if at all) has no extra-territorial effect except as to property situate within its jurisdiction; it cannot bind property or status outside those limits or the Court of domicile.
  • The Alexandria Court was not acting purely in probate jurisdiction and in any event the executors represented the legatees; the legatees were thus adequately represented and could be bound by that judgment (relying on De Mora v. Concha and related authority).
  • The will did create definite shares; the intention of the testator should control; the will language (use of words like “wenatati/natati”) and attestation should be sufficient; Kinyan or delivery either occurred or is presumed; doctrine of precept to fulfil the words of the deceased (moral/legal duty on the son) and other doctrines may support validity.
  • The executors/legatees could properly contest validity in another jurisdiction and their contest in this Court was justified; they should not be penalised with exceptional costs.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Chanmalapa Chenbasapa v. Abdul Vahab (observations of Chandavarkar, J.) Obiter that s.41 Evidence Act relates to judgments in rem and that "Court" may include foreign Courts; foreign probate judgments have ubiquitous authority. Rangnekar, J. referenced and respectfully agreed with the view that "Court" in s.41 may include foreign competent Courts and relied upon it in addressing s.41 applicability.
De Mora v. Concha Discusses scope of probate suits and whether executors represent legatees; executors may represent legatees for matters necessarily decided in suit. Rangnekar, J. relied on De Mora to support the proposition that executors ordinarily represent legatees for matters necessarily decided, and thus the Alexandria proceedings could bind legatees; defendants relied on it too (with distinctions).
Concha v. Concha (House of Lords) Holds limits on what probate suits can conclude; warns against decisions on matters unnecessary to probate judgment (e.g., domicile not necessary to decide). Cited by both sides; Rangnekar, J. used the principle to distinguish unnecessary findings by a probate court and to explain that even if a probate court goes beyond scope, the parts within scope remain binding.
Kalyanchand Lalchand v. Sitabai (Full Bench) Held narrow ground: mere dismissal of probate suit would not make a judgment in rem; s.41 wording ("expressly takes away") emphasised. Rangnekar, J. found the case distinguishable (it did not help defendants) because that case rested on narrow statutory wording and negative results, whereas here there was affirmative probate decision.
Dicey — Conflict of Laws (Rules 97, 101, 102, 118, 121 quoted) Rules concerning jurisdiction in actions in rem: (Rule 97) foreign Courts have jurisdiction over res locally situate; (101/102) jurisdiction to determine succession to movables/immovables within country; (118/121) valid foreign judgments in rem and succession judgments are binding to extent they determine title. Courts (trial and appellate) used Dicey's rules to analyse territorial limits of foreign judgments and to identify the correct test (whether judgment was founded on law of domicile and whether res or domicile were within forum). Rangnekar, J. relied on Dicey to support recognition of foreign probate judgments; appellate judges used Dicey to limit extra-territorial effect.
In re Trufort: Trafford v. Blanc (Stirling, J.) Rule: if title has been adjudicated by the Courts of domicile, other Courts must follow it; a foreign court administering estate must follow law of domicile and, where domicile court adjudicated, other courts should be bound. Rangnekar, J. cited and reproduced the passage; used it to reason that judgments on domicile law by domicile court are binding and that a court following law of domicile should give similar effect.
Enochin v. Wylie (Enohin v. Wylie) Where a revocable gift/will is concerned, delivery/publication to the donee or agent is necessary; absence of delivery invalidates certain wills. Rangnekar, J. cited this authority (via PC5 judgment) to support the proposition that delivery/publication is essential in revocable gifts; appellate judges also relied on similar texts to hold delivery lacking and will invalid.
Simpson v. Fogo Describes principle underlying judgments in rem: that a person who acquires a valid title by law of a country shall be deemed owner everywhere; judgments in rem bind. Quoted by Rangnekar, J. (via Dicey commentary) to discuss the conceptual basis for recognition of judgments in rem and their worldwide effect where appropriate.
Doglioni v. Crispin; Castrique v. Imrie; Trafford v. Blanc; Boyse v. Colclough; Boyse v. Rossborough Authorities referenced in Halsbury and Dicey on foreign judgments in rem and limits of their extra-territorial operation. Appellate reasoning invoked these authorities (via Halsbury/Dicey citations) to underline that a probate judgment of a foreign Court has effect primarily in respect of property within its territorial jurisdiction and that domicile matters are best decided by Court of domicile.
Preston v. Viscount Melville; Enohin v. Wylie; Ewing v. Orr Ewing; Pemberton v. Hughes; Young v. Holloway Various authorities on recognition of foreign probate/matrimonial/succession judgments, competence, territorial limits, and when foreign judgment is conclusive inter partes. Appellate judges cited these to evaluate the limits of Alexandria judgment's effect and to conclude that it could not be given absolute extraterritorial effect as a judgment in rem over property/domicile outside its jurisdiction; but they accepted it bound property within Egypt.
Salvesen / von Lorang v. Administrator of Austrian Property Illustrates that Court of domicile may or may not have exclusive jurisdiction in succession/probate matters. Cited by Rangnekar, J. to show that domicile court's exclusivity is not absolute and thus support recognition of foreign probate judgments under comity when courts act in rem over local res.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

Overview — two-tier reasoning in the record: The trial judge (Rangnekar, J.) and the appellate bench (Beaumont C.J. and Wadia, J.) both engaged two central lines of analysis: (A) the legal effect of the Alexandria probate judgment; and (B) the merits under Jewish law of the execution and form of Bunin's will. They reached convergent factual conclusions on the will's invalidity but differed in parts of their analysis about territorial effect of the foreign judgment.

1. Effect of Alexandria judgment — statutory and private international law analysis

  • The trial judge began with s.41 of the Indian Evidence Act (quoted in full). He considered whether a "final judgment, order or decree of a competent Court... in the exercise of probate... which confers upon or takes away any legal character" (i.e., judgments in rem) is conclusive. He accepted obiter observations in Chanmalapa Chenbasapa and commentary in Woodroffe & Ameer Ali that foreign probate judgments are often recognised by comity. He therefore read "Court" in s.41 to include any "Court which is competent either by international law or by a statute" and held the Alexandria Supreme Court was competent (Foreign Jurisdiction Act order, and the Supreme Court for Egypt had probate jurisdiction under that Order and s.107 expressly gave probate effect to property within Ottoman dominions).
  • He examined the Alexandria plaint, proceedings and formal decree (exhibits B–B7) and concluded the Alexandria Court acted in probate jurisdiction and declared Bunin's will null and void and issued letters of administration for property within its jurisdiction — thus functioning in rem in respect of property within its territory. He held such a determination amounts to a judgment in rem under s.41 and is conclusive on the executors/legatees on the validity of the will.
  • Rangnekar, J. also dealt with defendants' objections: (a) that the foreign judgment had no extra-territorial effect; (b) that the Alexandria decision went beyond necessary probate issues; (c) that legatees were not before the Court and natural justice objections. He relied on Dicey and authorities indicating foreign courts can determine title to immoveables/moveables within their jurisdiction and that judgment in rem may be respected by other Courts by comity; he also concluded executors represented legatees for necessary issues.
  • The appellate judges accepted Dicey and related authorities but emphasized limits: Beaumont C.J. and Wadia, J. held that a judgment in rem has no effect "absolutely" beyond the State unless the person was domiciled there or the res was there; they explained that a judgment of a foreign probate court is conclusive as to property within that court's jurisdiction but not conclusive "absolutely" elsewhere. They thus held the Alexandria judgment bound as to property situate in Egypt but did not make the Alexandria Court's order an absolute extra-territorial declaration binding on all Courts about status generally.
  • On whether the Alexandria decree bound the particular defendants in the present proceedings (inter partes effect), the appellate reasoning held that the judgment bound parties who had been parties to that suit (i.e., executors who were named), but it did not necessarily bind legatees who were not parties; the trial judge had earlier held executors adequately represented legatees for necessary matters.

2. Merits — application of Jewish law (substantive analysis by Rangnekar, J.)

The trial judge undertook a detailed examination of Jewish law through the plaintiff's expert (Dr. Eliash) and the texts produced by both sides. The court identified the applicable legal framework and applied it to the will's language and facts. Key elements of that reasoning:

  • Classification of testamentary modes under Jewish law: (1) conditional bond/charge-will (widest/formal method for indefinite/future property), (2) gift inter vivos to operate after death (revocable or irrevocable), (3) donatio mortis causa (dying declarations). The will in question was of the second type (revocable gift inter vivos operating after death).
  • Essential formalities under Jewish law for gifts of the second kind: (a) subject-matter must be definite, in existence and in possession at time of gift; (b) execution requires an appropriate Kinyan (formal symbolic act of acquisition) — Kinyan Sudar, Kinyan Agav, Kinyan Shtar with specific rules as to what each passes; (c) delivery / publication to the donee or his agent is needed for revocable gifts; (d) where multiple categories requiring differing Kinyanim are covered by a single Kinyan, the rule “bad in part, bad in whole” (subject to divergence in authorities) may invalidate the transaction; (e) a documented "admission" (words like "wenatati/natati") may dispense with proof of Kinyan in some authorities, but whether that applies depends on context and whether admission refers to a past effective transfer.
  • Application to facts: the will purported to divide Bunin's half-share in partnership into twelve shares and to bequeath specific numbers of those shares. The court examined whether a partner's share in a going concern is a definite object in possession and concluded (on texts and Dr. Eliash's evidence) that a share in partnership (a going concern) is an indefinite subject-matter and cannot be properly disposed of by the revocable gift form used; the appropriate form for such indefinite/future property is a conditional bond/charge-will. The will's language (general term "all my property" followed by particulars and the use of "Metaltelin") was construed in light of authorities; the judge held particulars qualify the general words and large items like merchandise and debts were not effectively disposed of by the instrument.
  • On Kinyan: the will's drafting combined indications of Kinyan Agav and Kinyan Sudar in a manner that, per Dr. Eliash and supporting texts, was not a proper or effective performance for the various categories (immovables, movables, coins, promissory notes). The possibility that the required Kinyan was performed in fact was not proved by competent evidence: declarations in the will or attestation clauses did not suffice to establish the strict proof required by Jewish law.
  • On delivery: the evidence conflicted (Howard — sealed envelope kept in Bunin's safe; Tob — kept in an almirah). The judge accepted Howard's evidence and found there was no effective delivery to donees or their agents in the sense required; delivery to an Apothropos (executor) does not generally operate as delivery to donees if there is a major heir, because the Apothropos is the donor's agent in lifetime and cannot validly accept on behalf of a major heir.
  • On doctrines such as "precept to fulfil the words of the deceased" and "Kimli": the court analysed both. It found the precept is limited (applies where specific property was deposited with a third party with instruction) and does not cure the formal defects of a revocable gift; Kimli allows a Muchzac (one in legal possession) to rely on authorities favourable to him when conflicts exist — the judge accepted that Kimli could be invoked by the heir but found it unnecessary to save the will on the facts given the weight of authorities against validity.
  • Conclusion on merits: the will was invalid under the Jewish law applicable to the parties because (a) the subject-matter (share in going partnership) was indefinite and not properly transferrable by the instrument used; (b) Kinyan and delivery requisites were not proven in the required strictness; and (c) applicable textual authorities supported invalidity (the judge accepted the plaintiff's expert and his chosen texts as decisive).

3. Appellate panel's final reasoning

  • The appellate court examined the territorial/legal effect of the Alexandria judgment and concluded that while the Alexandria Court's probate decision bound property within its jurisdiction (Egypt), it did not have the absolute extra-territorial effect of creating a universal "status" binding everywhere (i.e., the Alexandria judgment could not be treated as the exclusive judgment in rem about Bunin's worldwide estate when Bunin was domiciled in Aden).
  • On the core question whether Bunin's will complied with the system of law binding him (Jewish law of domicile), the appellate judges agreed with the trial judge’s detailed textual and expert-based reasoning and concluded the will was not made in accordance with those rules; they therefore dismissed the appeal and affirmed the trial court's decree declaring the will invalid and the plaintiff entitled as heir/administrator (subject to limitations and costs as ordered).

Holding and Implications

Holding (core rulings):

  • WILL DECLARED INVALID — The trial court (and the appellate bench on review) held that Bunin's will dated 10 July 1919 was invalid under the Jewish law applicable to the parties (law of domicile at Aden) for reasons set out (indefinite subject-matter, defective/insufficient Kinyan and lack of required delivery/publication).
  • APPEAL DISMISSED — The defendants' appeal was dismissed and the decree for the plaintiff was upheld by the appellate court.

Implications / Direct consequences:

  • The plaintiff is entitled to letters of administration to Bunin's estate (subject to territorial limits where other grants were made) and, on the facts as found, to succeed as heir to the assets not validly disposed of by the will; legacies and attempted dispositions under the invalid will do not bind the heir for the reasons given in the judgment.
  • The Alexandria Supreme Court's decree remains effective as to real and personal property of the deceased within the territorial jurisdiction of that Court (Egypt), but appellate reasoning limits that decree's absolute extra-territorial effect: a foreign probate judgment does not automatically extinguish relitigation regarding property or status outside the pronouncing court's territorial competence unless the proper tests (domicile/res or conformity with law of domicile) are satisfied. In short: the Alexandria judgment binds as to Egyptian-situate assets but does not operate as an absolute worldwide judgment in rem.
  • Costs: the judgment records detailed cost orders (costs to come out of the estate and other specified allocations); the appellate court ordered appellants (some defendants) to pay costs of the appeal as recorded.
  • No novel statutory reinterpretation beyond the case: the courts applied s.41 Indian Evidence Act and established principles from Dicey and authorities on comity and probate; the opinion explains limits and application but does not purport to create a new broad rule beyond those applications. (The appellate judges expressly limited the extra-territorial ambit of foreign probate decrees.)

Additional Notes and Observations from the Opinion

- The trial judge extensively assessed expert evidence on Jewish law and found Dr. Eliash a reliable, lucid and credible witness whose exposition of Kinyan forms and textual authorities was central to the merits ruling.
- The trial judge urged the parties to consider settlement because of family ties and the long duration and expense likely to result from continued litigation; he observed the moral/pious suggestion of the precept to fulfil the words of the deceased although he declined to apply it legally to the facts.

Disposition

The trial court's decree for the plaintiff (declaring the will invalid, issuing letters of administration, and declaring plaintiff sole heir to estate within jurisdiction) was ultimately sustained on appeal. The appeal was dismissed. Costs and procedural directions are recorded in the judgment.

This summary is limited to and derived exclusively from the text of the provided opinion. No facts, rulings, or inferences beyond what the opinion itself contains have been added.

Show all summary ...

Rangnekar, J.:—

The plaintiff is the only son of one Bunin Menahem Messa, a wealthy Jew domiciled in Aden, and has brought this suit for a declaration that the will made by his father, exhibit A to the plaint, is not the valid last will and testament of his father, that it was not validly executed in accordance with the law applicable to the parties and is null and void, as also the purported appointment of executors and legatees contained therein, for administration of Bunin's estate, and for other incidental reliefs.

Bunin died at Aden, on October 12, 1922, possessed of considerable immoveable and moveable property situate at Palestine, Alexandria, Aden and elsewhere. In addition to his private property, Bunin had, according to the plaintiff, a half share in a partnership firm carried on in the name and style of Menahem Messa (see para. 4 of the plaint). The firm was started and established by one Menahem Messa who died in 1863, and it is common ground that on his death he was succeeded by his five sons, Messa, Bunin, Mansoor, Judah and Selim, as partners in equal shares.

Mansoor died in 1876, and his widow married Bunin, and it is the plaintiff's case that thereby the share of Mansoor came to Bunin under Jewish law; so that Bunin became entitled after 1876 to a two-fifths share in the partnership. The defendants admit this, but say that Bunin became entitled to the share of Mansoor in the assets of the partnership business as it stood on the date of his death, and the profits of the business after Mansoor's death belonged to the surviving brothers in equal shares. Till 1891 there was no partnership deed in existence, and it was on March 6, 1891, that the then partners executed a partnership deed (exhibit A in the suit). Under the deed the partnership was for a period of twenty-five years, which period expired in 1916, but the partners continued the business thereafter in the same way and in the same shares. It may be stated that the partnership deed supports the plaintiff's case that the share of Bunin was two-fifths in the partnership. Apart from the stock-in-trade, goods and other assets, the firm owned immoveable properties also.

Selim retired in 1893, and took away his one-fifth share, and so thereafter the shares in all were four; two of Bunin, one of Messa and one of Judah. Messa Menahem died in 1879 and was succeeded by his sons Menahem (defendant No. 1), Selim (defendant No. 4) and Tob (defendant No. 2). The firm, however, was continued and business was carried on as before.

Bunin made his will on July 10, 1919, and died, as stated above, on October 12, 1922. Defendants Nos. 1, 2, 3 and Judah were appointed executors under the will. By his will Bunin divided his half share in the partnership into twelve parts, two of which he gave to the plaintiff; two to defendant No. 5, who is the plaintiff's son; one to Messa, one of the sons of defendant No. 1; two to defendant No. 6, who is one of the sons of Judah; one to defendant No. 7, who is the surviving son of defendant No. 1; and one to defendant No. 8, who is one of the sons of defendant No. 2. Messa, the son of defendant No. 1, died in 1920, and the legacy given to him therefore lapsed. Judah died in 1926, and defendants Nos. 3 and 6 are his sons. Defendant No. 4, one of the sons of Messa Menahem, and defendant No. 2, his brother, are the executors of Judah's will. Defendants Nos. 9, 10 and 11 are the widows of Bunin. Defendant No. 5 died in 1928, and the plaintiff is his heir; so the shares given to him come to the plaintiff. This accounts for the nine shares out of twelve, and three are admittedly undisposed of and fall into the residue which is given to the plaintiff. It will be seen that out of twelve shares, in the events that have happened, eight shares come to the plaintiff, and if Bunin had a half share in the partnership, the actual dispute in the suit is confined really to four shares out of the twelve, that is as to one-sixth share in the partnership. If the will is invalid, the whole of Bunin's interest in the partnership as well as his private property would go to the plaintiff subject to his obligation to provide for the maintenance of defendants Nos. 9 to 11, the widows of Bunin. It may be mentioned that Bunin also left him surviving two married daughters, but they take no interest in his property. These facts are substantially admitted.

After the death of Bunin, the plaintiff, who was then at Alexandria, came to Aden, on November 8, 1922, where the partnership firm was being carried on. According to the plaintiff, Judah had taken possession of the properties at Aden. The plaintiff requested Judah to give him inspection of the books and documents and information as to the properties belonging to his father and to allow him to take inspection of the books of account of the firm, which request, according to him, was not complied with. Correspondence ensued in 1923, and on August 16, 1923, the plaintiff instituted proceedings at first at Port Said. These were removed to His Britannic Majesty's Supreme Court at Alexandria. The proceedings consisted of a petition by the plaintiff for letters of administration to Bunin's property situate in Egypt. The executors under Bunin's will filed a caveat. On May 30, 1924, summonses were issued to all the executors and they duly filed their appearance. On an interim application for appointment of an administrator pendente lite, on February 16, 1925, the plaintiff and an agent of the executors were appointed administrators pendente lite. In the same year the plaintiff brought this suit in the Court of the Resident at Aden for administration and also for dissolution of the partnership firm of Menahem Messa, being suit No. 91 of 1925. On June 30, 1925, the Supreme Court at Alexandira upheld the plaintiff's contention and held that the will was not a valid will and was not properly executed in accordance with the law of domicile of Bunin, and that the plaintiff was entitled to letters of administration as on intestacy, and a decree to that effect was made on June 30, 1925, and letters of administration to the estate of the deceased within the jurisdiction of the Court were accordingly issued to the plaintiff on July 9, 1925.

In December, 1925, the Resident at Aden made a reference to this Court recommending that having regard to the nature of the suit and the questions arising therein, it should be transferred to this Court for trial. The reference came before Marten C.J and Kemp, J., who allowed it to stand over as they found that all the parties were not properly represented before them. They also expressed a doubt as to whether the two causes of action in the plaint in suit No. 91 of 1925 could properly be combined in one suit. To get over this difficulty the plaintiff filed another suit, being suit No. 303 of 1926, in the Aden Court, and applied to this Court for the transfer of that suit also to this Court. This application along with the original reference by the Resident at Aden was heard by this Court, and on December 6, 1926 both the suits were transferred to this Court for trial. It is under these circumstances that suit No. 303 came on for hearing before me in the early part of this year.

The plaintiff contends that the will is not valid and was not validly executed in accordance with the provisions of the law applicable to the parties. It is common ground that Bunin was domiciled in Aden. The defendants say that the law applicable is the Jewish law obtaining in Aden. The plaintiff says that law is the same as is applicable to Jews anywhere else and there is no difference between the Jewish law obtaining in Aden or anywhere else. The plaintiff further contends that the judgment of the Alexandria Court is a judgment in rem and is conclusive proof of his status and character as an administrator, and is a bar to the trial of the question as to the validity of the will.

There are two main questions arising in this case. The first is as regards the effect of the judgment of the Alexandria Court; the second, as regards the validity of the will. The third question is as to the validity of some of the provisions of the will.

The plaintiff alleges that the judgment of the Alexandria Court is a judgment in rem and is binding on the defendants, and is conclusive in this country and ought to be enforced by this Court. I have now to determine what effect ought to be given by an Indian Court to this judgment.

Section 41 of the Indian Evidence Act is in the terms following:—

“41. A final judgment, order or decree of a competent Court, in the exercise of probate, matrimonial, admiralty or insolvency jurisdiction, which confers upon or takes away from any person any legal character, or which declares any person to be entitled to any such character, or to be entitled to any specific thing, not as against any specified person but absolutely, is relevant when the existence of any such legal character, or the title of any such person to any such thing, is relevant.

Such judgment, order or decree is conclusive proof—

that any legal character which it confers accrued at the time when such judgment, order or decree came into operation;

that any legal character, to which it declares any such person to be entitled, accrued to that person at the time when such judgment, order or decree declares it to have accrued to that person;

that any legal character which it takes away from any such person ceased at the time from which such judgment, order or decree declared that it had ceased or should cease;

and that anything to which it declares any person to be so entitled was the property of that person at the time from which such judgment, order or decree declares that it had been or should be his property.”

If the judgment in question comes under s. 41, there can be no doubt that the validity of the will cannot be allowed to be re-opened. It establishes the character and status of the plaintiff as an administrator as on intestacy and takes away the character of defendants Nos. 1 to 3 as executors of the will on the ground that the will was not executed in accordance with the law applicable to the parties and is invalid.

The defendants' contentions are: (1) Section 41 of the Indian Evidence Act does not apply as the judgment is not of a domestic Court but of a foreign Court; (2) that the foreign judgment in rem has no effect beyond the limits of the State under the sovereign authority of which the Court pronouncing it is established; (3) it is not a judgment in rem as the Court was not acting in the exercise of its probate jurisdiction and as the action instituted was for the administration of the property; (4) it was not necessary to decide the validity of the will as also the question as to the validity of the bequests, or to construe the will, and any opinion expressed on any of these questions went beyond the scope of a judgment in a probate action; (5) the property at Alexandria being unaffected by the will, the question as to the validity of the will was unnecessary; (6) though a judgment in rem of a Court of domicile would be universally conclusive, a judgment of a Court within the limits of which the deceased was not domiciled can have no operation beyond its territorial limits of jurisdiction and cannot affect property outside the same; and (7) it is opposed to natural justice as the legatees were not before the Court, and in any case cannot affect some of the defendants who are legatees.

The first question is whether s. 41 of the Indian Evidence Act is applicable in this case. The plaintiff relies on the observations of Chandavarkar, J. in Chanmalapa Chenbasapa v. Abdul Vahab, which of course are obiter dicta. The learned Judge says (p. 145):—

“Section 41 of the Indian Evidence Act, on which Mr. Jayakar relies in support of his argument, relates to judgments in rem, which are judgments of all competent Courts, including foreign, in the exercise of probate, matrimonial, admiralty, or insolvency jurisdiction. The word ‘competent Court’ in that section includes a foreign Court, because of the well-known rule of law that such judgments are of ‘ubiquitous authority and universally conclusive.’ (Story on the Conflict of Laws Ch. XV; and Hukum Chand on Res Judicata, pp. 603 to 606). This section in the evidence act supports the conclusion that the word ‘Court,’ occurring in a statute excludes a foreign Court, unless by express language or by necessary implication the statute includes it, or some well-known rule of law warrants the wider sense.”

Mr. Jinnah for the defendants relies on the commentary to s. 41 of the Indian Evidence Act in Woodroffe and Ameer Ali's Law of Evidence, 9th Edn., at page 417. The learned commentators there observe as follows:—

“Foreign judgments in rem stand on a footing somewhat different from that of domestic judgment in rem as well as from that of foreign judgments in personam. Their recognition and enforcement is still void of express legislative sanction, as while they are beyond the rule of res judicata enunciated in the Civil Procedure Code, there is nothing in this Act to directly indicate that its provisions relating to judgments in rem are to be construed so as to include foreign judgments.”

But the learned authors proceed further to observe as follows:—

“But it is apprehended that in analogy with the practice of the English Courts, such judgments given in the exercise of probate, matrimonial, admiralty, or insolvency jurisdiction will receive in India the same recognition as is accorded to domestic judgments of the same character.”

The indian evidence act makes no distinction between a foreign Court and a British Indian Court as the Civil Procedure Code does, and I am unable to see any principle upon which such distinction should be made for the purpose of giving effect to s. 41 of the Act. The word “Court” is not defined in the Act, but s. 3 says that, unless a contrary intention appears from the context, the word “Court” is used in the Act as including all Judges and Magistrates, and all persons, except arbitrators, legally authorised to take evidence. This of course is not a definition, and it is clear that the word “Court” is not in terms limited to a domestic Court. Having regard to the principles on which such judgments are recognised, I see no reason to restrict s. 41 to judgments of domestic tribunals, and respectfully agree with the view of Chandavarkar, J. in the case referred to above. I think the word “Court” in s. 41 means any Court which is competent either by international law or by a statute. Assuming, however, this is not correct, the position practically remains the same, because by comity of nations such judgments are given the same recognition, as Woodroffe and Ameer Ali point out, as domestic judgments.

As far as I can see, it is not disputed that the Court at Alexandria was competent to hear the action and make the grant. The Supreme Court at Alexandria was constituted by an Order in Council under the Foreign Jurisdiction Act, 1890, and a notification to that effect appeared in the London Gazette and was republished for general information by the Government of India in December, 1910, in the Gazette of India, and in the Bombay Government Gazette, dated January 19, 1911. Section 2 of the Order says:—

“2. The limits of this order are the dominions of Sublime Ottoman Ports, but, as respects Egypt, do not extend to any place south of the 22nd parallel of north latitude; and the expressions ‘Ottoman Dominions’ and ‘Egypt’ shall, for the purposes of this Order, be construed accordingly.”

Section 3, which is the defining section, defines “administration”, as meaning “letters of administration, including the same with will annexed or granted for special or limited purposes or limited in duration.” The expression “British Subject” includes a British protected person. The word “Court” is defined as follows:—

“‘The Court,’ except when the reference is to a particular Court, means any Court established under this Order, subject, however, to the provisions of this Order with respect to powers and local jurisdiction.”

Section 5 shows what the jurisdiction of the Court is and in clause (ii) says:—

“(ii) The property and all personal proprietary rights and liabilities within the said limits of British subjects, whether such subjects are within the said limits or not.” Part IV deals with “Probate and Administration,” and sub-ss. (1) and (3) of s. 107 run as follows:—

“107. (1) The Supreme Court shall, as far as circumstances admit, have, for and within the Ottoman Dominions, with respect to the wills and property in the Ottoman dominions of deceased British subjects, all such jurisdiction as for the time being belongs to the High Court in England.”

“107. (3) Probate or Administration granted by a Court under this Order shall have effect over all the property of the deceased within the Ottoman dominions, and shall effectually discharge persons dealing with an executor or administrator thereunder, notwithstanding that any defect afterwards appears in the grant.”

Finally, sub-s. (1) of s. III is as follows:—

“111. (1) Where a British subject dies in the Ottoman dominions or elsewhere intestate, then, until administration is granted, his personal property in the Ottoman dominions shall be vested in the Judge of the Supreme Court.”

Exhibit B is the statement of claim, and shows that the petition was presented under the probate jurisdiction of His Britannic Majesty's Supreme Court for Egypt. Writs of summonses were issued on May 31, 1924, in which the plaintiff was styled as plaintiff and defendants Nos. 1, 2 and 3 and Judah as defendants. Paragraph 2 stated that Bunin left personal and real estate in Egypt within the jurisdiction of that Court. Paragraph 3 stated that Bunin died intestate leaving him surviving the plaintiff as his only lawful and natural son, two daughters and three widows. Paragraph 4 stated that the law governing in Egypt is the Hebrew law. In paragraph 5 it is stated in the alternative that Bunin was domiciled and died in Aden and the law applicable for his succession is the law of his domicile, namely, the law of Aden, and paragraph 5 stated that the law of Aden applicable to the succession of a member of the Jewish community in Aden is the Hebrew law. Paragraphs 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15 and 16 are as follows:—

“6. By the Hebrew Law the estate real and personal of an intestate goes to his male children to the exclusion of all other next-of-kin and the plaintiff as the only natural and lawful son of the said deceased is consequently entitled to the whole of the estate of the deceased.

7. The plaintiff says that he applied for administration to the estate of his deceased father in the jurisdiction of this Court but that the defendants have opposed the grant and have filed caveats alleging that they are executors under a pretended will dated July 10, 1919.

8. The said defendants have not obtained or applied for probate of the said pretended will, but nevertheless have without any authority from the Court administered the estate real and personal of the deceased within the jurisdiction.

9. By order of this Court dated June 12, 1924, the plaintiff and Rahim David were appointed administrators pendente lite of the estate of the deceased.

10. The plaintiff says that the document referred to by the defendants in their caveats is not a will.

11. The plaintiff says in the alternative that the said alleged will was not properly executed.

12. The plaintiff further says that the said alleged will is not a valid will by the law of the domicile of the said deceased.

13. The plaintiff says that the said alleged will does not contain the appointment of the defendants as executors and that the appointment of the defendants as ‘Apotropos’ contained in the said alleged will over an heir who is not a minor, is null and void by the law of the domicile of the said deceased.

14. The plaintiff further says in the alternative to paragraphs 10, 11, and 12, that the gifts made under the alleged will to (1) David Moses Bunin Menahem Messa, (2) Moses Bunin Menahem Messa, (3) Zion Judah Menahem Messa, (4) Mesha Menahem Mesha Menahem Messa, (5) Jacob Menahem Mesha Menahem Messa, (6) Meshamoor Tob Mesha Menahem Messa are null and void and that, in consequence, the said gifts revert to him under an intestacy or alternatively revert to him as residue under the alleged will.

15. The plaintiff says that the real and personal estate of the deceased situate within the jurisdiction of this Court is undisposed of in the said alleged will, and that the plaintiff is entitled thereto under an intestacy.

16. Alternatively the plaintiff says that if disposed of by the alleged will, the said estate is part of the residue and he is entitled to the same as residuary legatee.”

The prayers are:—

“1. That the Court pronounce against the validity of the said will.

2. A grant to him of letters of administration to the estate of the said deceased.

3. A declaration that the plaintiff is entitled to the real and personal estate of the said deceased within the jurisdiction of this Court.”

The plaint is dated May 31, 1924. Exhibit B1 is the appearance of the defendants dated June 4, 1924. Exhibit B2 is the statement of defence. Paragraph 1 admits paragraphs 1, 2, 3, 7 and 9 of the plaint. Paragraphs 2, 3, 4, 6, 9, 10 and 11 of the statement of defence are as follows:—

“2. The defendants are the executors duly appointed of the will of Bunin Menahem Messa, deceased, who died domiciled at Aden in Arabia.

3. The said will of the said deceased was made at Aden on July 10, 1919, and duly executed and attested in accordance with law.

4. The defendants say that the said will is a good and valid will under Hebrew law, as well as under the law of England.

6. The defendants say that the property of the deceased situate in Egypt forms only a small part of the entire estate of the deceased affected by the said will, and that an action is now pending in the High Court in India for the purpose of determining the validity of the said will.

9. The defendants deny the allegations contained in paragraphs 10, 11, 12 and 13 of the statement of claim, and say that the will referred to is a good and valid will by the law of the domicile of the deceased and the appointment made therein of the defendants as executors is a valid and legal appointment.

10. With regard to paragraph 14 of the statement of claim the defendants deny that the gifts referred to are null and void.

11. The defendants deny that the estate of the said deceased situate within the jurisdiction of this Court is undisposed of by the said will.”

Exhibit B3 is the notice of the date of hearing, and so also exhibit B4. Exhibit B5 is the judgment and decree. The judgment declared the will of Bunin to be null and void and to be of no effect and that the plaintiff was solely entitled to all the real and personal estate of the said deceased within the jurisdiction of that Court. The decree stated:—

“That according to Jewish law which is applicable to the administration of property in this country the alleged will dated July 10, 1919, is declared invalid.

2. That the plaintiff is sole heir of the deceased according to Jewish law and entitled to the estate real and personal of the deceased under British law.

3. Costs against executors personally.

4. The plaintiff be appointed administrator of estate on usual terms and the order of February 16th/25th be rescinded.”

The formal decree is exhibit B6, and runs as follows:—

“1. That the will of Bunin Menahem Messa, late of Aden, deceased, dated July 10, 1919, (12th Tamiz 5679) a certified copy whereof was produced to and filed in this Court by the defendants subsequent to the order of the Provincial Court at Port-Said dated February 16, 1924, be and the same is hereby declared null and void and of no effect.

2. That the order of February 16, 1925, be and the same is hereby discharged and that letters of administration to the estate of the said deceased within the jurisdiction of this Court be issued to the plaintiff on the usual terms and Conditions.

And this Court further declares that the plaintiff is solely entitled to all the real and personal estate of the said deceased within the jurisdiction of this Court.

And it is further ordered:

That the defendants do pay to the plaintiff the costs of this action upon taxation as between party and party.”

Exhibit B7 are letters of administration issued to the plaintiff.

It is clear from the documents to which I have referred that the Court in the exercise of its probate jurisdiction declared the will of Bunin to be null and void and to be of no effect, and issued letters of administration to the plaintiff on the footing of Bunin having died intestate. It is therefore difficult to see that the Court was not acting in the exercise of its probate jurisdiction.

Chapter XIV of part II in Book 2 in Dicey's Conflict of Laws deals with “Jurisdiction in actions in rem” and Rule 97(b) is in these terms:—

“Rule 97(b).—In an action or proceeding in rem the Courts of a foreign country have jurisdiction to determine the title to any immoveable or moveable within such country.”

In the commentary Dicey observes as follows (p. 419):—

“Our Rule, it should be noted, is of wide application. It applies not only to proceedings which are in strictness in the eyes of English law actions in rem, but also to proceedings of any and every kind, such as the administration of a deceased persons's property which, though not strictly in the technical language of English law and in the view of English Courts actions in rem, determine the title to property.”

I have, therefore, no difficulty in holding that even if the action was for administration, the principles which apply to judgments in rem in a probate action would apply here. I may also refer to the instances of judgments in rem given in Halsbury's Laws of England, Vol. XIII, page 328. Among these the judgment of a Court of probate establishing a will or creating the status of an administrator is mentioned as heing a judgment in rem, and the authorities in support of it are mentioned in foot-note (r).

The next contention is that the judgment is opposed to natural justice, as the legatees were not before the Court. It may be stated that at one time this contention was put forward by the defendants on the ground that the judgment of the Alexandria Court was ex parte, their case being that when their application for adjournment was refused, their lawyer withdrew from the Court. But this ground was not pressed and was given up, and the objection now is that the judgment is opposed to natural justice as the legatees were not before the Court.

It is clear that generally speaking executors do represent legatees for many purposes. In this connection I may refer to De Mora v. Concha, where Bowen L.J made the following observations (p. 303):—

“It was in reality a finding between Adelinda and the executors of the will, and this leads us to consider the question how far the executors in a case like the present represented, with respect to such finding, a residuary legatee. It is manifest that for many purposes the executors do represent such a legatee. But Adelinda and her husband are not seeking to impeach the title of the executors, the validity of the will, or the interest of the legatee under the will.”

It is true that in that case it was held that the executors did not represent the residuary legatee; but as the judgment shows, that finding was based on the facts in that case. In this case the plaintiff was challenging the will which the defendants had set up and seeking to set it aside. That being so, it is difficult to see how the executors did not represent the legatees. The case just referred to went up to the House of Lords, and in their judgment the learned Lords approved of the view that the executors represented the legatees for certain purposes, and particularly as regards all matters necessarily decided in the suit to which the executors were parties. Order XXXI, r. 1, of the Civil Procedure Code, lays down the same principle. Having regard to the pleadings and the nature of questions raised, in my opinion, the executors were the only necessary parties to the action, and the legatees would be bound by the judgment.

It is next argued that the Court went beyond the scope of a probate action. It is further argued, relying on Rule 106 in Dicey, that the Court had no jurisdiction as it did not comply with that rule inasmuch as it did not recognise the rule which our law recognises, namely, that the probate Court has no jurisdiction to decide anything except the question of execution of the will. The scope of a probate action is described by Bowen L.J in De Mora v. Concha as follows (p. 304):—

“The scope of the probate suit is to establish that the will was executed in conformity with the law of the country of domicile, wherever that country was. But if it is not necessary for the purpose of such a suit to establish an English domicile more than a Chilian, the executors could not, either by litigating an incidental question, or by admissions they might choose to make about it, conclude the residuary legatee as to the extent to which the testator's will when proved will operate on property alleged by an adverse claimant to be outside his power of testamentary disposition. And as the residuary legatee could not be bound under such circumstances by a decision against the executors as to domicile, he cannot, since estoppels are mutual, treat as binding a decision in their favour.”

This passage was quoted with approval by Lord Ashbourne on appeal in Concha v. Concha.(2) Here the plaintiff sought to obtain a declaration that the will was invalid. The executors wanted to establish that it was valid and executed according to the law of domicile, which of course would include the question of genuineness as well as the validity. It was held that for want of Kinyan, want of delivery and want of reading the will to the legatees the will was bad. It is fairly conceded by Mr. Desai for the plaintiff that in so far as the judgment purported to decide the validity of the bequests on a true construction of the will, it went beyond the scope of a probate action. Even so, and if it was held that the will was invalid on any one single ground, it would be a proper decision of a Court of Probate, want of Kinyan alone would be enough, and would be a good ground for rejecting the will. Paragraph 5 of the judgment shows the ground on which the Court proceeds. It is in these terms (exhibit B5):—

“The whole of the will is null and void, because of the rules of transfer which have been violated, and because of the incapacity of the subject matter of gifts to be transferred.”

Mr. Jinnah relies on De Mora v. Concha, but there the judgment shows that the question decided, viz., the domicile of the deceased, was unnecessary to be decided, and it was held to be unnecessary. This appears from the observations of the House of Lords in appeal in Concha v. Concha, This is what Lord Herschell L.C stated (p. 550):—

“But in addition to the language which I have read, the order contains these words—after pronouncing for the force and validity of the will—‘and that the said deceased was at the time of the date of the said will and also at the time of his death a domiciled Englishman.’ Now I do not think it can be disputed that finding was not essential to the judgment in the cause.”

If then the Alexandria Court acting as a Court of Probate decides a question which properly falls within its scope, and then decides something which it was not necessary, or goes beyond its scope to decide it, the judgment will still remain a judgment in rem and binding on every one, so far as the decision goes on what properly falls within its scope. In my opinion the will being held invalid for want of compliance of proper formalities would be a good judgment in rem.

Mr. Jinnah relies on a full bench decision of this Court in Kalyanchand Lalchand v. Sitabai.(3) I do not think that case helps him, considering the careful language in which the judgment is expressed. All that was held in that case was that mere dismissal of a probate suit would not make the judgment a judgment in rem. The judgment emphasises the wording of s. 41 of the Indian Evidence Act, namely, “expressly takes away,” and proceeds on this narrow ground, and therefore cannot apply to an affirmative judgment such as we have in this case. Here the heir claimed to succeed to the property of his father. The claim would obviously have been rejected, if the Court had held that Bunin had made a valid will and executed it properly and in conformity with the law. The Court decided what property fell within its jurisdiction. It decided (1) that there was no valid will, and (2) that the heir was entitled to succeed. It seems to me to be extremely doubtful whether the plaintiff would have been granted letters of administration even as regards property not touched by the will, if Bunin's will had been held valid.

I have so far dealt with the various objections to the judgment being a judgment in rem, and this brings me now perhaps to a more important point taken as to the effect of the judgment. Mr. Jinnah contends that a foreign judgment in rem has no effect beyond the limits of the State under which the Court is constituted, or beyond the limits of the Court pronouncing it, unless the property affected was situate or the deceased person was domiciled at his death within such limits, and will not estop the defendants from raising the same question in the Court of domicile. He relies on a passage in Halsbury, Vol. XIII, para. 472, page 338, which, as far as it goes, undoubtedly supports the proposition advanced. But it may be pointed out that the decisions in support of it in foot-note (f) include the following cases: Doglioni v. Crispin and In re Trufort: Trafford v. Blanc. These decisions will be presently referred to. One short answer, however, is that if I am right in holding that s. 41 applies, then under it the judgment is conclusive against the defendants on the question of status and character of the plaintiff and of the executors. What then is the position on this question on the authorities?

Both parties have quoted liberally from Dicey, the standard book on the subject. I do not propose to refer to all the rules cited at the bar, as some of them seem to me to be irrelevant, but I shall content myself by referring to those only which in my opinion bear on the question. Mr. Jinnah refers to Rule 97 of Dicey, which I have already quoted above. What is stated in that rule is no doubt true, as the learned author points out (p. 418):—

“The foundation of jurisdiction in an ‘action in rem’—using these words in their very widest sense—is the power to deal with or dispose of the property, the title to which, or the possession whereof, is in question. If the sovereign of a country has in fact the power to transfer the ownership or possession of property, the judgment of his Courts in regard to such property is decisive in regard to the right to such property.”

Dealing with this question Dicey at p. 418 quotes section 591 from Story, which is as follows:—

“… If the matter in controversy is land, or other immoveable property, the judgment pronounced in the forum rei sitae is held to be of universal obligation, as to all the matters of right and title which it professes to decide in relation thereto. This results from the very nature of the case; for no other Court can have a competent jurisdiction to inquire into or settle such right or title. By the general consent of nations therefore in cases of immoveables, the judgment of the forum rei sitae is held absolutely conclusive.”

On the same page Dicey quotes section 592 of Story, which is in the following terms:—

“The same principle is applied to all … cases of proceedings in rem against moveable property within the jurisdiction of the court pronouncing the judgment. Whatever the court settles as to the right or title, or whatever disposition it makes of the property by sale, revendication, transfer, or other act, will be held valid in every other country, where the same question comes directly or indirectly in judgment before any other foreign tribunal. This is very familiarly known in the cases of proceedings in rem in foreign courts of admiralty, whether they are causes of prize, or of bottomry, or of salvage, or of forfeiture, (or of damage by collision), or of any of the like nature, over which such Courts have a rightful jurisdiction, founded on the actual or constructive possession of the subject-matter (res).”

The next rule referred to is Rule 101 at page 440, which is in the following terms:—

“Rule 101.—The Courts of a foreign country have jurisdiction to administer, and to determine the succession to, all immoveables and moveables of a deceased person locally situate in such country.

This jurisdiction is unaffected by the domicile of the deceased.”

Rule 102 at page 441 is as follows:—

“Rule 102.—The Courts of a foreign country have jurisdiction to determine the succession to all moveables wherever locally situate of a testator or intestate dying domiciled in such country.”

As far as this rule goes, the propositions there advanced are correct. But I think the true rule which can be extracted from the authorities is stated in In re Trufort: Trafford v. Blanc by Stirling, J. and I cannot do better than to reproduce it here (p. 611):—

“The rule to be extracted from these cases appears to be this, that although the parties claiming to be entitled to the estate of a deceased person may not be bound to resort to the tribunals of the country in which the deceased was domiciled, and although the Courts of this country may be called upon to administer the estate of a deceased person domiciled abroad, and in such case may be bound to ascertain as best they can who, according to the law of the domicile, are entitled to that estate, yet where the title has been adjudicated upon by the Courts of the domicile, such adjudication is binding upon, and must be followed by, the Courts of this country.”

It may be pointed out that this rule has been cited with approval by Dicey in his comment on Rule 102 mentioned above. I may perhaps cite in full the opinion of Lord Cranworth in Enohin v. Wylie at (p. 19):—

“Where there is such a will, and probate of it has been obtained here, the duty of the court in administering the propert supposing a suit to be instituted for its administration, is to ascertain who, by the law of the domicile, are entitled under the will, and, that being ascertained, to distribute the property accordingly. The duty of administration is to be discharged by the courts of this country, though in the performance of that duty they will be guided by the law of the domicile. This was the mode in which the law was laid down by Lord Cottenham in this House in the case of Preston v. Viscount Melville.

In the same case Lord Chelmsford was of the same opinion, and his Lordship observes (p. 23):—

“But the fund is within the jurisdiction of the court; the rights of the parties, according to the law of the domicile (assuming an intestacy), have been ascertained; the next-of-kin are, for the most part, in this country; and why, under these circumstances, the property should be remitted to the forum of the domicile, in order that it should be sent back again to be distributed, and why the Court should be incompetent to act effectively and finally in the suit which has been instituted, by decreeing a distribution amongst the several persons entitled, and transmitting to Russia the shares of the next-of-kin resident there, I am unable to comprehend.”

The decision of Salvesen or von Lorang v. Administrator of Austrian Property shows that the Court of domicile may or may not have exclusive jurisdiction to pronounce judgments in such cases.

The principles then deduced from these authorities are: (1) That the Court of domicile may or may not have exclusive jurisdiction to pronounce a judgment on the question of succession or probate actions as in other cases of status. (2) When the Court of domicile has pronounced an opinion as to the law of domicile, it is of universal application and binding everywhere and effect would be given to it by Courts of other nationality. (3) But if the Court in which the question comes up is not a Court of domicile but otherwise has jurisdiction on the ground of residence or situation of property, then, it will have jurisdiction to pronounce an opinion, and it will have the same effect as a judgment in rem, provided that the Court follows the law of the domicile. The real test is whether the judgment was founded upon the law of domicile, and not whether the Court is the Court of domicile. And (4) it is not the locality of the Court, but the law which is applied by the Court that is important. This is the principle underlying Rule 118 in Dicey, at p. 484, which is in these terms:—

“Rule 118.—A valid foreign judgment in rem in respect of the title to a moveable gives a valid title to the moveable in England to the extent to which such title is given by or under the judgment in the country where the judgment is pronounced.”

Commenting on it the learned author observes at p. 485 as follows:—

“The real principle of a judgment in rem is, ‘that a person who acquires a valid title by the law of any country either to a chattel or to realty shall be deemed all over the world to be owner of such chattel or realty. If, therefore, the Court has absolutely the disposal of the res, and it is in its power, as it is in the case of a judgment in rem in the Admiralty Court, it does not matter who is owner; all the Courts assume that the thing has been fairly litigated, that the man brought before the Court is owner, and had such an interest as entitled him to raise the contest, and that the judgment in rem bound the whole’ (Simpson v. Fogo).”

To the same effect is Rule 121, which runs as follows (p. 489):—

“Rule 121.—A valid foreign judgment in matters of succession is binding upon, and is to be followed by, the Court.”

Mr. Jinnah argues that an English grant has no operation outside India and relies on Rules 84 and 85 in Dicey, and says that it would have no operation in this country and our Court will have to make a fresh grant. That is true, but the question here is not that the grant made by the Alexandria Court as such has operation in this country, but whether the parties are concluded by the judgment of that Court on which the grant is based. The grant differs from the decision and judgment and follows the judgment, and of course is not operative beyond the local limits of the jurisdiction of the Court making it. The real question is whether if an application is made here under the Indian Succession Act for a grant, the grant will be made to a person other than the person to whom a Court of domicile or a Court following the law of domicile has made it. The rules on which Mr. Jinnah relies, it may be pointed out, are included in a chapter which has nothing to do with the effect of a foreign judgment, and that subject is dealt with by Dicey in Rules 91 and 121.

The question raised is not an easy one, but upon the whole I have reached the conclusion that the judgment in question is a judgment in rem, and under s. 41 of the Indian Evidence Act is conclusive of the question decided, namely, that the will was not validly executed by Bunin and is bad or invalid, and that the defendants are concluded by that judgment and cannot re-open the same question.

This brings me now to the other main question as to whether the will is invalid under the Hebrew law.

If the question of law I have just dealt with is difficult, the question on the merits is to me more difficult, as I find myself on an unknown and unfamiliar ground. The parties are Jews domiciled in Aden governed by the Hebrew law, and the question arising has to be decided by that law, which is not known here and on which no standard works are available to the practitioners or to the Court. The law seems to be ancient contained in various text books, and it has been difficult even to obtain translations of the texts satisfactory to both the parties. On behalf of the plaintiff one Dr. Eliash has been examined as an expert in Jewish law. He is an advocate practising before the Courts of Palestine since 1921, Bachelor of Literature of the Oxford University, and holds a Continental degree in Law of the Lyceum of Yaroslavl in Central Russia. He is also a Lay Councillor to the Chief Rabbinate of Palestine. He has been a lecturer and examiner in Jewish law at the Government Law School of Palestine and is also a member of the Council of Legal Studies of that place, and says that there is a statutory provision that at least one member of the Council must be learned in Jewish law and he sits there as such member. He knows the Hebrew language well, having studied it as well as Rabbinics from his childhood, and is conversant with the original sources of Jewish law. The Courts before whom he practised are established by the Mandatory Government of Palestine; the mandatories are the British Government.

Defendants have called no expert before me, but they have examined some witnesses on commission at Aden as expert witnesses. It is suggested that Dr. Eliash has no experience of Aden and the law there. Dr. Eliash himself has frankly admitted that. It seems, however, that his assistance was sought in one or two cases by the Sheria at Aden. But the point is unimportant, as there is nothing to show that the law of Aden differs from that of Palestine.

There does not seem to be any dispute as regards the sources of Jewish law. They are all fully set out in Dr. Eliash's evidence, and have not been challenged. Among these the books of Maimonedes are particularly respected and are of high authority in Aden, Egypt and the eastern countries. According to Dr. Eliash there is only one law for every part of the world and that Jewish law is of universal application and binding on all Jews wherever living. This is also admitted by the defendants' witnesses examined on commission. No doubt in course of time, as Dr. Eliash says, particular local institutions have arisen in different countries, for example, monogamy in so far as the Jews in the countries in which they live are bound by a statute law; but the main principles of law remain to be the same. I see no reason to reject Dr. Eliash's opinion that the law in Palestine is the same as in Aden. There is no evidence before me that different schools in the sense, for instance, as Mitakhshara or Dayabhaga in the case of Hindu law, arose or were in existence. It is true that Dr. Eliash stated that different schools sprang up with regard to the Jewish law, but he added that all the Courts would follow the general rules of Jewish law in deciding between conflicting opinions.

There is undoubtedly difference of opinion on various points between several writers, and the parties on some points have cited texts which are not perhaps easy to reconcile. But, as far as I can see, the difference is not on vital points arising in the case, and where there is such a difference, the plaintiff relies on a doctrine, known as the doctrine of Kimli, which, according to the plaintiff, briefly means this, that the heir is entitled to cite one or two authorities in case of such a conflict which are favourable to him in order to succeed in establishing his rights.

What then are the requirements of law for making a valid will or transferring property? The main forms in which a will can be made under Jewish law are three. A direct will in the sense of the Roman testmenti factio is not possible under the Jewish law. The three forms are: (1) by way of a conditional bond or charge, sometimes called charge-will, “whereby the devisor undertakes towards the recipient an obligation in a sum of money which may be discharged by delivery to the recipient of either a certain chattel or a certain share in the estate. In that way he leaves the heirs an option either to discharge the obligation in the terms stated or by delivering the object intended or the share in the estate. He would obviously increase the obligation to such an extent as to leave the heirs no option but to give the part of the estate or object intended”. (2) The second way is “by way of gift inter vivos which is to operate after his death. This again falls into two main divisions, namely, irrevocable and revocable”. (3) The third way, which can only be made use of by a person on death-bed, is donatio mortis causa. According to Dr. Eliash, the widest formula for disposing of any property is by way of a conditional bond or a charge-will. The defendants do not admit it.

According to Dr. Eliash, the object which may be given away is limited to the following:—

“It must be definitely known, and definable. It must be in the possession of the donor and it must exist at the time when the gift is created. If the thing donated ceases to exist between the time the gift is created and the death of the donor, the result would vary according to as the gift is revocable or irrevocable. If it is irrevocable, then the donee has a claim against the estate for its equivalent. If it is revocable, then he has no claim and the very fact that the object has ceased to exist is the best evidence of revocation.”

In the case of the second form, there is one more essential condition to constitute a valid testamentary disposition by gift inter vivos, and it is that as regards the execution of the deed there must be a Kinyan. Kinyan means a formal act of acquisition. Dr. Eliash translates it as follows:—

“Kinyan is a bilateral transaction. The assignor passes to the assignee either property or rights and the assignee or any one on his behalf passes a kerchief as symbolic consideration to conclude the acquisition either of the property or the right.”

He explained it further as follows:—

“The assignee or somebody on his behalf would pass a kerchief and say ‘acquire this kerchief and I shall acquire the obligation which you have created in my favour’.

By passing the kerchief the transaction becomes a valid undertaking; otherwise it would not be valid.” (See Ruth D1.)

There are three main forms of Kinyan. The first is Kinyan Sudar. Dr. Eliash explains it as follows:—

“Sudar means a kerchief. Kinyan Sudar is a form of acquisition by means of a kerchief. The ceremony as such sym bolises an exchange. For a gift some nominal consideration is necessary. That nominal consideration is given in this form.”

According to Dr. Eliash, Kinyan Sudar can pass any moveable or immoveable property except (1) coins of the realm, (2) promissory notes and bills, and (3) outstandings or debts. As to promissory notes and bills, they can pass only by way of endorsement and delivery. As to this it may be pointed out that in his cross-examination Dr. Eliash admitted that there was a conflict of authority on this point. As to outstandings the position is that debts not reduced to writing can pass only by a novatio or a havala transfer. As to the performance of Kinyan Dr. Eliash states that it can be performed by the donee himself or his agent. An agent for this purpose can be created ad hoc. No special appointment of agent for this purpose is necessary. But the agent must know on whose behalf he is acting and that he is acquiring on behalf of such and such a person. Another important principle is that if Kinyan Sudar is contained in a will, the will must be read to or contents explained to the agent, and generally an attesting witness can act as agent for the donee for performing this ceremony. The attesting witness who would pass the kerchief would say to the donor, “Acquire this kerchief on behalf of A.B whereby he will acquire the gift which you have made hereby”. Even an executor can act as agent for the donee. Any person can act as agent.

The second form of Kinyan is Kinyan Agav. This is explained by Dr. Eliash as follows:—

“Agav means ‘by way of’ or ‘along with’ or ‘through’. Kinyan Agav is a form of acquiring moveables along with immoveables. The essential conditions of this Kinyan are that some immoveables should be properly passed first and then a formula should be pronounced to the effect. ‘Acquire this immoveable and along with it acquire such-and-such moveables’.”

This form cannot pass moveables nor outstandings nor promissory notes, but can pass coins. As regards promissory notes and bills there is a conflict of authorities. But the essential condition is that there must be a proper passing of immoveable property either by Sudar or by a Shtar, and that the formula should be used. The formula is stated by Dr. Eliash as follows: “Kne karka ze ukne agavo metaltelin” which means “Acquire this land acquire along with it the chattels”. The witness Dr. Eliash then states:—

“The donor must first perform Kinyan Sudar or Kinyan Shtar in respect of the land to pass the land and after he has done that he uses the above formula. The acquisition of land is a moving power which draws along with it the remaining chattels.”

The third form of Kinyan is Kinyan Shtar.

It is explained by Dr. Eliash as follows:—

“Kinyan Shtar is a method of acquiring immoveable property by means of a document or deed containing the acknowledgment of the passing and being handed over to the assignee; delivery of the deed is necessary.”

There are certain other principles which are important in this case in view of the facts and contentions between the parties. They are, according to the plaintiff, as follows: (a) When the will is revocable, delivery of the will to the donee or his agent is necessary. If it is in favour of several persons, then it must be delivered to any one of them or to a stranger as the agent with the proper formula and that person must accept it on their behalf. Otherwise the will is invalid. The formula to be used is “Become now the agent of so-and-so for the purpose of receiving delivery of this deed”. (b) Delivery of the will to Apothropos (executor) is not enough, as an Apothropos is an agent for the donor. (c) No Apothropos can be validly appointed if there is a major heir. (d) There must be strict proof of Kinyan, and a person is entitled to enquire whether a Kinyan has been properly performed.

I have summarised the principles as to the essential conditions for a valid testamentary disposition by gift inter-vivos. It is common ground that the will in this case can only come under this particular form of the will. The plaintiff says that the essential conditions do not exist and the will is, therefore, bad. He further says that the property in the case being the share of Bunin in the partnership firm, the will is bad as such a share can only be transferred according to the first form, that is, by a bond or a charge-will.

The defendants dispute all this, and say that a definite share was given by the will and could be given in this way; that the conditions are not essential, but if they are, they were fulfilled. They further say that what is important under the Jewish law is the intention of the testator, and if the Court can gather it on a reading of the will as a whole, effect must be given to it. Then they say that even if there are any defects, they are cured by the doctrine of “precept to fulfil the words of the deceased”, and there is a legal duty cast on the plaintiff as the son of his father to carry out his father's intention and to give effect to his will. Their further contention is that the authorities relied upon by the plaintiff do not bear out the propositions stated by Dr. Eliash and in any case there is a conflict of authority and therefore they should be disregarded, and the testator's intention should be given effect to. As to this last contention the plaintiff's case is that the precept does not apply to the facts of this case, and, secondly, on points where there is a conflict, the plaintiff as the Muchzac is entitled to rely on the doctrine of Kimli. The defendants rejoin and say that even this doctrine is not of universal application and it can be availed of not only by the heir, as the plaintiff contends, but by the person in possession.

To sum up, the will is challenged on the grounds, (1) the property which is the subject-matter of the will being indefinite and partnership property, the same could not be transferred by this form of the will, but only by a bond or a charge-will; (2) proper Kinyan is wanting, and that no Kinyan of any kind was in fact performed; (3) there was no delivery of the will to the donees or to any agent on their behalf, and the will according to the Jewish law is, therefore, bad and must be treated as revoked; (4) that the will was not read over or the contents explained either to the donees or to any agent on their behalf; and (5) the appointment of the executors is not valid.

I shall first deal with the question whether, having regard to the sabject-matter of the will, the will is bad. The material portion of the will is as follows:—

“Now I have divided all my property, lands and houses and chattels (Metaltelin) and coins and promissory notes which I have got in partnership with my brother Judah Menahem Messa and with the sons of my brother Mesha, viz. Menahem Mesha, Selim Mesha and Tob Mesha into 12 shares except the dwelling houses …”

The will is in Hebrew, and was translated by Dr. Eliash and the translation was officialized according to our rules. But as there seemed to be some disagreement as regards some of the words, I asked the defendants to state in writing what their objections were. There is no Hebrew translator available in this place, and no Hebrew translators in our Court. The solicitor of some of the defendants knows Hebrew and is a member of the same community, as also one of the counsel of some of the defendants. I directed that their objections should be shown to Dr. Eliash and that he should state his comment or opinion as to the same. Accordingly a statement has been prepared showing in the first column the words in the official translation, in the second alterations in the translation suggested by Mr. Judah the solicitor, and in the third Dr. Eliash's remarks, and this has been annexed to the translation of the will, exhibit C. I may say at once that the translation made by Dr. Eliash is substantially accepted by the defendants, and the changes suggested do not affect the translation as a whole.

It will be seen from the clause in the will which I have set out above that what Bunin attempted or purported to dispose of was the property which he held in partnership with others and his share therein and which for the purpose of disposition he divided into twelve shares excepting the dwelling houses. Now it is true that he purports to transfer “all my property”, but this general expression is qualified by mentioning certain definite objects or items of property. The exact meaning of this expression and its legal significance I shall consider later on. It will be noted that there is no mention of any goods or merchandise which admittedly formed a large part of the partnership assets and the business, and it is obvious on the facts that what he purports to dispose of is his share in partnership and its property.

The plaintiff says that a share in partnership property or business cannot be disposed of in this way under the Jewish law and that the only way to do so under that law is by way of a conditional bond, or what is otherwise called, according to that law, charge-will. An illustration of such a will is given in exhibit D11 in these words:—

“… to my sister Leah I undertake an obligation of a perfect debt to pay her so and so much one hour before my death etc. or my said heirs can give to my said sister 1/7th of my entire estate etc. in which case, the said share shall extinguish the said Bond.”

This is also supported by the text in exhibit D12. The obligation assumed must obviously be of a greater value than that of the property given or disposed of, or else there would be no incentive to the heir to give the property rather than discharge the obligation.

The question then is, what is the nature of a share in a going concern or partnership property according to the authorities, and whether it can only be given by a bond or a charge-will? Is what Bunin gives indefinite property, or, as the defendants contend, what was given was a definite share which Bunin had in partnership property?

Before referring to the texts it may be stated that exhibit D is a compilation containing the texts which have been put in on behalf of the plaintiff, and exhibit 3 is the compilation of the texts on which the defendants rely. All these texts are in Hebrew, and it is agreed between counsel on both sides that the translations which have been put in should be accepted as correct, except that the plaintiff does not accept the translations in exhibit 3 of many texts as correct, and so when they were put in cross-examination of Dr. Eliash, he made certain alterations mostly in pencil in places where he did not accept the translations to be correct, and these alterations appear in the respective texts. As far as I can see, the defendants do not challenge the correctness of the translations of texts put in by the plaintiff except in a very few instances, but even in such cases they have made no attempt to state what the correct translation would be, nor suggested alterations. In addition to these two compilations very few texts have been put in, not numbering more than three or four on behalf of both the parties.

In support of his statement that the widest form for disposing of all kinds of property, whether definite or indefinite, or a share in the partnership property, which is the case here, is a conditional bond or a charge-will, Dr. Eliash relies on exhibits D9, D10, D11, D12, D16, and D16A. Mr. Jinnah says that these authorities do not support the proposition. I am unable to accept the contention in view of the clear language of these texts. Thus exhibit D9 states:—

“… Therefore, a healthy person who desires to distribute his property after his death so that his heirs after him should not quarrel, and he wishes to set the order of the will whilst he is still well, then he must perform a Kinyan. But even Kinyan is of no effect if he wants to give them that which he does not possess at the time, because no person can assign a thing which is not in his possession, and the only effective method is by way of admission, in which he admits that he owes to each one of them as much as he wishes.”

Five points are established by these texts: (a) if the language used in the will is “From to-day if I do not change my mind until after death”, then the will is revocable, and it is exactly like a gift of a sick person, and he can revoke the gift so long as he lives. It may be stated that the will in this case is worded in this way. (b) Even in the case of a healthy person if he uses the same language, the will is revocable. (c) Kinyan is necessary for a revocable gift. (d) There can be no valid, gift of any future property or any indefinite property. And (e) such property can only be transferred by way of an admission of a debt, that is by a bond or a charge-will. D10 runs as follows:—

“… And at any rate if he has got a going concern or merchandise or chattels (metaltelin), which cannot be defined and he wants to divide them among them and to give more to the one and less to the other, I know no way for him in which he can make them acquire by way of a gift of a healthy person from today to operate after death, lest what he has today will not be his at the time of his death. Therefore, he cannot achieve it in any way but by way of obligation, that is to say, that he will bind himself and his property from to-day and after death to each one of them for as much as he likes whether more or less.”

This is a quotation from Rashba whose authority, according to Rabbi Joseph Caro and Rashdam (two great authorities, held in high esteem) is recognised even against all codifiers. See foot-note in D10 by Dr. Eliash.

D12 shows that it is only by this way of obligation and charge that money not in existence can be transferred.

Dr. Eliash in his evidence states as follows:—

“An indefinite property can only be given by way of a bond or charge-will A business or a share in partnership cannot be given except by a bond or charge-will.”

His grounds are as follows:—

“My grounds for saying so are as follows:—

No gift can operate on property which is not in existence at the time of the gift and as the only other way of disposing the property after death is by way of gift, if a man were to make a gift of a going concern, whether in part or wholly, he would invalidate his own disposition by the fact that at the time of his death which may occur sometime after, this property which exists at the time of gift might not exist at the time of death. The only way is by charging such property as might exist at the time of death at the time the will is written.”

He further stated:—

“Under the Jewish law each partner has an indefinite share in the partnership property. What I mean is that the whole of the partnership belongs to the partners in accordance to their proportionate shares, but no partner can take away any part of the property of the partnership except as regards the money of the realm, e.g, if there are Rs. 1,000 between two partners, each partner would be entitled to take away Rs. 500 as representing his share, but he cannot do so in respect of so many bags of sugar or any chattel or property, or as to immoveable properties. The partners are considered to be agents of each other for certain purposes. The partners cannot claim possession as against one another.”

For the first proposition that a partner's share is indefinite, Dr. Eliash relies on exhibit D13, and for the second, on D14. The first seems to me by implication to support the proposition, and the second is borne out by D14. Finally he winds up as follows:—

“Pitche Tshuva, Ch. 257, S. 6, is a further authority for the proposition that the only possible way for devising indefinite property such as business or partnership property is by a conditional bond or a charge-will.”

He relies on D15, which, however, does not seem to support him; but exhibit D16 undoubtedly supports him, and is to be read with exhibits D9, D10, D5 and D62. Even so, the meaning is obscure; but the witness has explained it lucidly, and having read the texts carefully, I have no hesitation in accepting his explanation. The explanation is as follows:—

“The meaning of the text is that a person by way of Kinyan can certainly make a gift of merchandise or goods which he possesses at the time of making the gift. The Rashba however advises that such a gift is of no practical value, as the goods are in a going concern and the heirs at the time of the death would be able to plead that the goods gifted were sold or consumed, and that there is not even a duty to pay the proceeds of the sale to the donee, as the gift was a revocable one and the sale itself was the best sign of revocation. Nor can one make a gift of such goods as would exist in the concern at the time of the death in view of the established principle that no one can donate a thing which he has not in his possession at the time the gift is made. The only conclusion therefore is that the sole effective method is that of a charge-will or bond.”

The witness then explained the second part of the text as follows:—

“The second part of text 16 says that in a certain case where merchandise was bequeathed in the form of revocable gift, the heirs first of all pleaded that the merchandise which existed at the time of the gift was already sold and the merchandise at the time of the death was different, to one gifted. They succeeded on this point. They also pleaded that the entire gift was bad on the ruling that a Kinyan in respect of several categories of goods which is bad in part is bad in whole. The heirs pleaded Kimli with that opinion for setting aside the whole gift. The doctrine of Kimli is that a person who is in legal possession cannot be dispossessed if at least two authorities support the view that he is in the right. They failed on this plea because it was pointed out that the original Kinyan was not bad as regards the present goods. True that it failed in future, but at the time of making it was a good Kinyan and therefore it cannot be stated that it was a Kinyan which was bad in part. Had it been a Kinyan which was bad in part, they might have pleaded Kimli with the result that it would be bad in whole.”

In cross-examination the witness completed the text as follows:—

“If a person has got a business or a going concern of his own and makes a valid gift of it to operate after death then such articles as exist both at the time of making the will and at the time of death would pass to the donee. But he cannot protect the donee in respect of articles sold or their proceeds except by way of bond or charge-will.”

He also relies on exhibits D17 and D18. D17 shows that a gift of a share is generally bad, and that the gift of a share in a partnership is the gift of a share of a share, and, as Dr. Eliash says, is bad for double indefiniteness.

The text D18, which is not easily intelligible, is explained by Dr. Eliash in this way:—

“The explanation of this text is that the Rabbi who stated the case to the author of Penei Moshe proposed that the gift should be valid on the analogy of the ruling of Maimonides that a definite share in a definite field is a good gift and is merely defective in so far as it results in a gift of the worst part of the field. To this Dvar Moshe replied that even Maimonides would admit that if it is a partnership property then the gift is indefinite as the partner himself knows not at the time of the gift which part of the field will belong to him after partition, therefore it cannot even be stated that there was a consensus ad idem of both the parties at the time of the gift that the worst part should be acquired and the gift is therefore bad in toto.”

The following texts, viz. exhibits D25, D4, D5, D9, D16, D19, D20 and D10, support Dr. Eliash's proposition that the property given must be in possession of the donor at the time of the gift. Exhibit D4 is explained by the witness in the following words:—

“The explanation of this authority in which a reference is made to a creditor, debtor and a purchaser of the debtor, is as follows:—The Jewish law is that a creditor has a hen on the immoveable property of the debtor which existed at the time of the loan; he can follow it up even in the hands of a bona fide purchaser because a purchaser is bound to inquire before the purchase as to whether his vendor is in debt or not. A creditor coming to claim such a property from the purchaser must prove, however, that the vendor had the property at the time of the loan. For if he obtained it after the loan, the creditor's lien would not exist. The ruling in the authority quoted is that the position of the donee is analogous to the position of the creditor and the donee too must prove that the property which he claims was possessed by the donor at the time of the gift or otherwise the gift is invalid.”

Exhibit D19 shows that the property which is the subject-matter of the gift must be in existence. If it ceases to exist, then if the gift is irrevocable, it is good. If it is revocable, the legatee or the donee has no claim. This is supported by exhibits D15 and D16.

In cross-examination it was put to Dr. Eliash that this was not the only method of disposing of the partnership property; but the witness adhered to his opinion. Mr. Jinnah says that Bunin had set apart his share and it is defined, and therefore there was no need of admission of an imaginary debt as in the case of indefinite property. Apart from the texts and other points as to “Admission” made, to which I shall refer presently, there is no authority in favour of this contention. The authorities are all the other way.

The defendants rely on exhibits 3Q, 3L, 3O and 3P, which were put to Dr. Eliash in cross-examination. Exhibit 3Q is the same as Exhibit D9. The last line of the text is translated on behalf of the defendants differently from the translation of Dr. Eliash. It was shown to Dr. Eliash in his cross-examination, and, subject to certain alteration which he made therein, he admitted its correctness. Apart from this the other texts clearly show the nature of the admission referred to in 3Q or D9, and I think the plaintiff's translation is correct. Exhibit 3L, which is part of D9, seems to me to have nothing to do with this question. It deals with the effect of an admission, a point which will be referred to in its proper place. Exhibit 3O is the same as exhibit D73, and this supports Dr. Eliash. The defendants' translation is slightly different and is not accepted by Dr. Eliash, and I prefer to accept his translation as in exhibit D73. Exhibit 3P is admitted by Mr. Jinnah to have nothing to do with this question.

These were the texts referred, to by Mr. Jinnah in his argument. In Dr. Eliash's cross-examination, however, exhibit 3HH was put to him, which does show that there is to some extent a conflict of authority as to the will or gift of undefined property. Another text which was put in was exhibit 3M, and that is part of exhibit No. 2 and the same as exhibit D72. Dr. Eliash gave the correct translation of it as follows:—

“But there are others who are in conflict with this view and say that be it a sale or be it a gift a man can make another acquire a thing which is not defined.”

He stated that he did not agree with this view and that Maimonides holds the contrary view. Exhibit 3M does show that according to some authorities an undefined thing can be the subject-matter of a valid gift. Text 3EE was put to Dr. Eliash. This, in my opinion, does not help the defendants, and is explained by the witness as follows:—

“The translation is not quite correct. (Witness corrects the translation). A first born is entitled to two shares one as a son and the other as a first born. It is the latter share which he can sell before partition, but he cannot sell the other share. That appears from the commentary of Beth Joseph on this. It is the privilege of the first born as regards his share of the first born to sell it before partition. But as regards the ordinary share he has no right to sell before partition. The words in the original ‘Chelek Bekhorato’ mean the first born's share. The first born gets one extra share.”

Exhibit 3EF which was put in cross-examination shows particularly in the latter part that a partner can sell his share. It is admitted by Dr. Eliash that except for the view of Rashban the first born can sell his ordinary share.

The next text put in is exhibit 3GG. As to this the witness says as follows:—

“This is the source referred to in the passage of Beth Joseph referred to above. This is not the text itself. This is a commentary on the text of Rashbam. The translation is substantially correct. The dispute here is not whether the sale is good or bad but that whether the language which was used by the parties resulted in a sale of a quarter or a half share in the field, and it was held that according to the language used half was sold. That was a case in which A and B held a field in partnership and A passed a deed of sale in favour of the purchaser. The dispute was whether according to the language of the deed half share or half field was acquired. It was open to the vendor to contest the sale on the ground of indefiniteness but he did not do so. The same commentator says a different story at p. 126. Of course this is according to Rashbam's view. The other authorities hold that the sale is good. According to the other authorities the sale or gift of a share of a share in a field would be good.”

It is clear from this that the question in this case was one of construction. Finally the witness admitted, that the sale of a share in a field would be good; but this admission merely means this that there is a conflict as to whether a share of a share in some definite property can be given or sold, and the indefiniteness allowed for does not cover the case of indefiniteness which exists in the case of a share of a share in partnership. The share in a partnership has two aspects. First, the right to receive profits from time to time, and when the business is wound up, to receive a share in the assets; and, secondly, the assets change from time to time. Therefore, a share in a partnership is intangible, and cannot be transferred according to the texts, and secondly, a transfer of such a share amounts to a transfer of something which is future property, as the assets are liable to change. Thus there are two objections, (1) indefiniteness, and (2) the gift or sale may comprise future things. Therefore, the texts show that in either case or for either reason the gift is bad and therefore a share in a going concern cannot be gifted. I need not notice exhibit 3HH, as it is a part of exhibit D72.

There are some other texts which deal with the subject as to whether indefinite property can form the subject-matter of a valid gift. According to Dr. Eliash it cannot, and I have already referred to his opinion. The further texts are: D13, D14, D16 to D20, and D45. Mr. Jinnah relies on 3M, 3EE, 3FF, and 3HH. It is argued that when Dr. Eliash states that a gift of an indefinite thing cannot be made, he refers to a gift of a share in one item of property held jointly and not a gift of a whole share in partnership property. In view of Dr. Eliash's clear evidence I am unable to accept this contention. This is what he says: “A gift of a share in the partnership property is not a gift of a definite thing and is invalid for double indefiniteness”.

Then, exhibit D13 is not very clear. If at all, it is an authority for the proposition that a partner's share is joint or that partners are joint owners of the partnership property. Exhibit D14 shows that no partner can claim possession against another, that their possession is joint. These two authorities, in my opinion, have no clear bearing on the subject of indefiniteness. D16 to which I have already referred supports Dr. Eliash. D17, it is contended by Mr. Jinnah, is in his favour, and that it shows that if a definite share in the partnership is given, the gift is good. It seems to me, however, that all these texts show that a gift of a definite or specific share in a field is good to the extent that the donee gets that share out of the worst part of the field. At the most it may mean that the gift of a definite share in a definite property may be good and to that extent the contention is sound, but it is a far cry from saying that a gift of a definite share in a going concern or partnership business is good, and that is what we are concerned with here. D18, to which also I have referred, in my opinion, supports the plaintiff, and I cannot accept Mr. Jinnah's argument that it supports him.

Another point is made that the case in exhibit D18 is one of a gift of a part of a share, but this seems to me to be clearly wrong. As to exhibit D19, the contention is that it does not apply. The text, however, shows that a thing in existence but not in possession cannot be the subject-matter of a valid gift: see sub-s. (5) of D19. D20 does not apply, but it shows that the property, subject-matter of the gift, must be in possession of the donor. The same remark may be made with regard to D4. D5 also is an authority that the property must be in possession of the donor, and further shows that there is a conflict of opinion on this point.

I have already considered the defendants' texts. Exhibit 3EE shows that a first born son can give his first born son's share only. Exhibit 3FF supports Mr. Jinnah, but Rashbam is of a contrary opinion. And so the doctrine of Kimli if it is good would apply. As to exhibit 3GG, the position is that it is the source referred to by Beth Joseph in 3FF. This text seems to support the plaintiff. Exhibit 3GG is not the text itself but commentary on the texts of Rashbam, and I have already referred to Dr. Eliash's explanation on this text.

I now come to the doctrine of Kinyan. It is clear on the authorities that Kinyan is necessary to complete the transaction and is even necessary in the case of a bond or a charge-will: see exhibit D71. I have already explained what Kinyan means and what particular kind of property a particular Kinyan would pass. In support of his opinion in regard to Kinyan Sudar Dr. Eliash relies on the following texts: D21, D22, D23, D24 and D26. D26 supports Dr. Eliash, but it shows that the formula need not be repeated. D21 shows that Kinyan Sudar cannot pass coins, and D22 shows that it cannot pass promissory notes. But the latter text also shows that there is a conflict of view on this point. D23 supports Dr. Eliash and shows that debts in writing can be passed by Hawala. D24 also supports it. According to Dr. Eliash the only way in which promissory notes or bills can pass is by endorsement or delivery. He relies on D23 which, however, is a case of a Hawala of an unwritten debt. In cross-examination it is admitted by Dr. Eliash that where there is an admission of a past act, some authorities are of the opinion that it may be assumed that everything that was necessary had been done, and in such a case the document does not require anything more.

I now come to the texts dealing with Kinyan Agav. These are D29, D63, D27, D22, D28, D24, D25, D23 and D21. D29 supports Dr. Eliash's opinion, but also shows that there is a difference of opinion. D63 shows that land is to be passed first by a proper Kinyan and Agav (through or along with it) chattels. D27 shows that land must be passed and Agav (through or along with it) moveable property, but the formula must be used. It also shows that some authorities think that the formula need not be used when the moveables are situated on immoveables. The difference of opinion thus is only as regards the use of the formula when the moveable is on the immoveable property, and when it is not, D28 shows that the words “Kne” and “Agav” must be used. D24 only shows that for the transfer of a debt novatio is required. D25 supports Dr. Eliash, and further shows that even when property is transferred by this Kinyan, the money or chattels, the subject-matter of the gift, must be in the possession of the donor. It shows further that a deed of admission may dispense with the requirement of possession, when there is a deed of admission as to a past act. But the case is different where it is known that property is given by Kinyan Agav, and chattels cannot be acquired by Kinyan Agav unless they are in possession of the donor at the time. I have already referred to D23.

The texts dealing with Kinyan Shtar are D30, D21, and D22. D30 shows that the deed must be delivered to the donee and that Kinyan must be performed. That is the opinion of Dr. Eliash. In his cross-examination he stated as follows:—

“In the case of Kinyan Shtar passing of kerchief is not necessary. But if moveables are given by a document Kinyan is necessary. This is because moveables cannot be given by a document. If there is no Kinyan, merely by execution of a document moveables cannot pass. Ch. 190 to 200 deal with acquisition of property of which Ch. 196 deals with passing of moveables but that chapter does not mention that moveable property can pass by a deed. That is my reason for saying that moveable property cannot pass by Kinyan Shtar and therefore Kinyan would be necessary in case of moveables. If moveables and immoveable property are given by one deed, even then Kinyan would be necessary for the moveables. My authority for this is the same as above.”

Exhibit D21 shows that this Kinyan can pass coins. It is also an authority in connection with a novatio. D22 supports Dr. Eliash as to a writing being necessary and the necessity of its delivery. It further shows that promissory notes cannot pass by Agav, but, as admitted by him, the text also shows that there is a conflict of opinion on this point.

Mr. Jinnah argues that these texts apply to a definite property which is separately given, but cannot apply in the case of a partnership share. He says that in this case what is given is a share which is definite and what follows is mere surplusage. D29, which is another text referred to in this connection, supports Dr. Eliash. Mr. Jinnah says it also supports him. In my opinion, it does not. Of course it shows that there is a difference of opinion. Mr. Jinnah further says that Kinyan Agav may be used anywhere and in any way, and that no particular order for making the gift is necessary; but I am unable to accept this. The annotation of Rama shows the contrary, and according to him it is the essential view. That is to say it is only Agav the land or immoveable property that moveable can be validly passed when this Kinyan is made use of. As to Kinyan Shtar Mr. Jinnah argues that no authority is cited by Dr. Eliash in support of his opinion. It is clear to me that exhibit D30 is the authority for that.

This brings me to the doctrine that if one Kinyan is performed for several categories of objects and it is bad as to some, the whole is bad. With reference to the Kinyan mentioned in the will Dr. Eliash states as follows:—

“He further mentions the Kinyan Sudar and I do not know whether he made Kinyan Sudar of all the properties together. If so, the gift would be bad because when Kinyan is made for several categories of objects, if it is invalid in part it becomes invalid in whole and if the gift includes coins and promissory notes which cannot be passed by Kinyan Sudar, the entire Kinyan would fail, assuming that the Kinyan was for the entire property. See Mishpatim Yesharim Part I res. 19, which was a case where the Kinyan for the gift was made in respect of coins and chattels and lands. It is clearly decided that seeing that the Kinyan was bad in part it was bad in whole for this reason alone. This operates of course with the application of the doctrine of Kimli because this is not an universal opinion but there are sufficient authorities in favour of the heirs who are Muchzac to apply this ruling. In the will referred to in this responsa a reliance was also placed on the word “wena-tati” on the ground that it was an acknowledgment of an act done in the past, but that contention was disallowed.”

The witness relies on the texts D58, D58A, D59 D60 and D56, D58 D58A, D60 and D56 support Dr. Eliash. D59 shows that there is a conflict of opinion. It is fairly admitted by the witness that this is not a universal opinion, but with the application of Kimli the Kinyan would be bad.

As to D58 Mr. Jinnah admits that it supports Dr. Eliash, but his answer is that it shows that the gift in that case failed as it was not possible to gather the intention of the donor. But the text read with the note shows that what was given was lands, chattels and debts, and the donor performed one Kinyan. As to D58 Mr. Jinnah stated that it is vague and further that it shows a difference of opinion. The latter contention is correct, and this is admitted by Dr. Eliash. As to D60 Mr. Jinnah says that it supports Dr. Eliash, but says (1) that in that case there was no one single Kinyan as here for all the categories, (2) the intention could not be gathered having regard to all the properties given, and (3) there is a difference of opinion. As to D60A Mr. Jinnah's answer is the same as D60. D60A clearly supports Dr. Eliash's opinion, which I have set out, that an heir can plead Kimli with reference to such a Kinyan. Some reliance is placed on exhibit 3P. I do not see the relevancy of it and Mr. Jinnah did not refer to it in his final argument.

A somewhat alike topic is that where there is a clear admission of a gift by a donor in the document itself, and in particular when such admission is made by means of a well-known technical expression. “Wenatati” or “Natati,” it is not necessary to perform Kinyan, or Kinyan is dispensed with. In the will after, stating that he has divided all his property into twelve shares, the testator said “I have given (Wenatati) two shares…. etc.,” and further on he also uses for the expression “I have also given” the word “Natati.” The question is, what is the meaning of this expression, and whether it dispenses with the performance of or proof of the performance of Kinyan.

Dr. Eliash stated that “Wenatati” means “and I have given,” and that in spite of this expression the performance of Kinyan is necessary for the validity of the will. He relies on D55B, D56, and D42, and the defendants rely on 3A and 3B. In cross-examination Dr. Eliash stated as follows:—

“It would be correct to translate ‘Wenatati’ as ‘I have given’ or ‘I gave.’ It is not necessarily a word of admission. It may be a word of admission but it is very frequently used for an act done at the time of writing. It would depend upon the contest as to what meaning should be attached to it. If it appears from the context that it is used as an admission of an act done in the past then Kinyan must be presumed to have been performed in accordance with one opinion. The past means any time prior to the time of writing.”

Later on when 3B was put to him, he stated that the meaning of this is that in the opinion of many when the word “Natati” is used, then no Kinyan is necessary to be mentioned in the document itself. This presumes that the man did effectively what he admits to have been done. He further stated:—

“Kinyan is necessary if there is a bond or charge. In the case of an admission of past act there is an opinion that it may be assumed that everything that was necessary had been done. In such a case the document executed does not require anything more in accordance with that opinion.”

The text D55B supports Dr. Eliash and shows that though the expression may refer to a past act, whether it does or does not would depend on the context, the language and the actual facts, and even if a person says “I gave “, if the property is not then given, or was not given in the past, but the gift is to take place in future and refers to a future act and at the time is in the possession of the donor, the use of the expression would not make the gift valid if otherwise invalid, and would not dispense with the performance of Kinyan. It is true that the word is a technical expression, but the expression has two meanings, and the question is which one applies. D56 also supports Dr. Eliash. D42 merely shows that the words “I have given” or the use of this expression is part of the language of gifts. Exhibit 3A merely shows that the expression means an admission. It may be that where such an expression is used, the burden would be on the opponent to show that when a donor says “I gave” he did not actually give but that the gift was to take effect in future and that the property remained with the donor when he wrote out the words. The texts show that according to some authorities the use of the expression would pass the property. It may be noted that exhibit 3B is part of exhibit D71 and the same as exhibit F, on which the plaintiff also relies. It seems to me that the word is a technical word of admission, but it is frequently used at the time of writing for an act which is to take effect in future, as for an act which has already taken place before the writing. It would depend on the context and circumstances as to what meaning should be attached in a particular case. Exhibit 3A undoubtedly shows that according to some authorities the use of the expression would pass the property to the donee. Exhibit 3B is not complete, and the witness gave the first part of the text which shows that in the opinion of some authorities the expression means an admission, and if the word “Natati” is used, no Kinyan is necessary to be mentioned in the document itself.

There are a few more texts bearing on this subject which are not referred to by Mr. Jinnah in his argument, and they may now be noted. They are D25, D76 and D71. The second part of D25 runs as follows:—

“It seems to be plain, that even those who hold a different view there, do so because there one deals with a Deed of Admission produced before the Beth-Din in which it is staged ‘I gave to so-and-so’, where we say that he gave it to him in the past in an effective manner, viz., that he caused him to acquire the thing through another, as the Tur there stated, and it is not our duty to investigate how and by what means he gave it to him. The case is different here, where it is known that he caused him to acquire it by a Kinyan Agav, and chattels cannot be acquired by a Kinyan Agav unless they were in his possession at the time.”

Exhibit D25 shows, firstly, that the deed which would dispense with the performance of Kinyan must be a deed of admission from which it can reasonably be stated that it contains an admission of a past event; and, secondly, if from the language used what is stated to have occurred in a particular manner occurred in a manner which is bad, then the deed is useless. Exhibit D76 shows that notwithstanding the use of the word “Natati”, the necessity for the performance of Kinyan was still recognised. Exhibit D71 certainly shows that there is a difference of opinion on this point, and this is admitted by Mr. Desai. But D71 also shows that proof of Kinyan is necessary even if the expression “Natati” is used. D71 occurs in Ch. 60, s. 6, of Hoshen Mishpat, and shows that there must be a deed of admission.

The defendants rely on texts 3Q, 3L, 3O, 3P, 3X and 3G. I have already dealt with 3Q, and it seems to me to support the plaintiff as regards the point that the property must be in the possession of the donor. The correct translation of the above texts shows that the only way to give a thing which is not in one's hand is by a bond or charge-will. I have also referred to 3L, which shows that if one says that “such and such a property of such and such a person”, that is an admission and that is all, and that too in the case of a dying person. There seems to me to be no point in these texts, and I do not see how they can help the defendants. It is true, as Mr. Jinnah says, that there is an admission in the will. But that does not mean that Kinyan need not be performed. Then exhibit 3O, Mr. Jinnah says, supports him. I do not agree; in my opinion it supports Dr. Eliash. As to 3P Mr. Jinnah admits that it does not apply. Exhibit 3X merely shows that a person can bind himself by his oral admission, and that is all. But it does not touch the point which arises here. But this text also applies to a dying person, which is not the case here. Exhibit 3G also applies to a sick and dying person, and shows, as Dr. Eliash says, that only a sick person can make a will orally.

I shall now consider the law as to the necessity of delivery of a will or a document to the donee or his agent and how far it is essential for the validity of the deed or will. According to Dr. Eliash, as already stated, where the will is revocable, the delivery of the will is necessary, and if it is not delivered, the gift is invalid. If it is in favour of several persons, then it must be delivered to any one of them or to a stranger as the agent with the proper formula. In his cross-examination he stated that the document passing the property must be given to the donee or to an agent of the donee. He relies on exhibits D31, D32, D33, and D34. The defendants rely on 3CC, 3DD and 3II. D31 supports Dr. Eliash, and shows that where the will is revocable, as in this case, delivery of the will to the donee or his agents is necessary even though Kinyan is performed. Exhibit D32 applies to irrevocable wills and shows that in the case of a revocable will delivery is necessary of course by implication. It is perhaps not as clear as D31 on this point. The first part of the text supports the proposition that if there is no delivery the gift is invalid. Exhibit D33 seems to support Dr. Eliash, but also shows that there is a difference of opinion. Exhibit D34 shows that delivery is necessary even though Kinyan is performed. The texts on which the defendants rely apply to cases of irrevocable gifts only. Exhibit 3II shows that the gift was held to be bad if the donee called for the deed after the donor's death. The text seems to support Dr. Eliash apart from the fact that the gift in this case was of a sick person. Finally there is not a single text which says that delivery can be dispensed with.

The defendants argue that an executor is an agent of the donee and delivery to him is the delivery to the donee. The technical term is “Apothropos”, which also is used by Bunin in his will. The plaintiff rejoins that a delivery to an Apothropos is no delivery to the donee. Further no Apothropos can be validly appointed where there is a major son, as in this case, and the latter can object to his appointment. It is conceded that even if the appointment is invalid, it does not affect the question of the validity or otherwise of the will. The question is important in connection with, the subject of delivery. I shall, therefore, examine the evidence and the law on the subject of appointment of Apothropos, and whether delivery of the will to him is delivery to the donee, or whether he is the agent of the donee to accept the will.

According to Dr. Eliash, there is a general proposition in the Jewish law that the delivery of the document by the maker of it to a third party is not considered delivery in favour of the person named in the document, but a delivery to the agent of the maker. Dr. Eliash relied upon exhibit D37 in support of this proposition. He further stated:—

“Delivery of a revocable will to an Apothropos (executor) would not make a will valid. Apothropos is mainly a guardian of the minor. That is the primary sense. He is appointed either by the testator or by the Court. Apothropos is regarded as the agent of the donor and therefore delivery to the Apothropos is not delivery to the donee.”

He further stated: “No Apothropos can be validly appointed if there is a major heir. The major heir can object to the appointment of the Apothropos.” Then he states as follows:—

“In that case if the will is a good will in law the estate would be administered by the major heirs … In such a case the appointment is bad but the will is good if it is good in law. The effect of this is that if a person leaves one major son or two major sons the appointment of Apothropos is bad and the sons would be entitled to take possession of the estate, but if there is a minor son the appointment is good as regards the minor son and the major son or sons would be entitled to take away their shares. If there is one major son to whom certain bequests are given and there are other legatees who are minors, the appointment of Apothropos is valid so far as the minor legatees are concerned, but so far as the major legatees are concerned, they can disregard the appointment of the Apothropos.”

In cross-examination he stated as follows:—

“An executor represents the estate only after the death. Until the death of the testator he does not assume that character. Prior to the death of the testator he is the agent of the testator. My authority is cited at pp. 35-36 of Ex. D.”

Dr. Eliash relied upon exhibits D35, D36, D37, D38, D39. The defendants rely on 3Z, 3U, 3T and D50. Exhibit D35 supports Dr: Eliash. Mr. Jinnah says that the real point is whether the will was revoked, and on the evidence the Court should hold that the will was delivered to Judah, and it does not matter whether he was the agent of the legatees or not. He further says that if the document is given to an outsider, it would be irrevocable. There is no authority to support it. Now D35 shows that delivery to the Apothropos is of no effect. Mr. Jinnah says that the text deals with a case where delivery of the document was necessary to complete the gift, as there was no Kinyan in that case; if Kinyan is performed, no delivery is necessary, and he refers to 3CC, 3DD and 3II. Now 3CC and 3DD are cases of irrevocable gifts and do not apply. Exhibit 3II supports the plaintiff. This is conceded by Mr. Jinnah, but he says that in the case of 3II there was no Kinyan. Mr. Jinnah says that if 3II is against him and if delivery was necessary, then on the evidence he asks me to hold that there was delivery to Judah and that he was guardian of some of the minor legatees and therefore delivery to him complies with the law. I shall deal with the evidence on this point later on. D36 supports Dr. Eliash. The first part of D37 supports Dr. Eliash, but the commentary shows that it is so only when there is no Kinyan, and if no Kinyan was performed in this case, then undoubtedly this text will support the plaintiff. Exhibit D38, s. 1, shows that Apothropos can be appointed for minors only. Section 26 supports Dr. Eliash's opinion, and Rama's comment shows that a major son can object to the appointment of an Apothropos. Exhibit D39 also supports Dr. Eliash. It no doubt shows that the appointment in such a case is good if the doctrine of “precept to fulfil the words of the deceased” applies. But it is clear that if the doctrine does not apply, then the appointment of Apothropos where there is a major son is, as Dr. Eliash states, bad.

In his cross-examination Dr. Eliash admitted that where a testator has made a conditional gift to the effect that the donee should not be paid the amount of the gift for a certain period, then whether the gift is made either to a minor or a major person, the testator can appoint an executor to hold the gift on behalf of the legatee. In his further cross-examination he stated as follows:—

“A person can be appointed a guardian of the minor children and the executor in respect of their shares. He cannot appoint a guardian of the major persons. If such an appointment is made he cannot function. According to my opinion if there is a major son then the testator cannot appoint an executor who can function. If a person has got a major son and three minor sons, he cannot appoint an executor of his entire estate. If such an executor is appointed, the appointment would be partly bad. It is bad as regards the major son. In such a case the executor can present the will to the Court and ask for its confirmation to prove that it is the last will and testament of the deceased. In such a case he is always regarded as acting in the interests of the minors only. If the will is confirmed or proved, he would be entitled to act in accordance with the directions of the will as regards the minors' shares. As far as regards the directions given in the will with regard to the share of the major son it would be a nullity with one exception only: If there is a conditional gift directing that the gift should be paid for a number of years then such directions would be carried out, and the person appointed in such a case would also act qua executor of the gift. If the testator appoints an executor to wind up or administer the estate, the directions would be void when there are major sons. If the testator directs that the executor should realise the estate and distribute the same in equal shares among his one major and three minor sons, the direction as to his administering the share of the major son would be a nullity and he cannot sell the share of the major son though he can sell the shares of the minor sons. In that case the position would be exactly the same as if the major son was a stranger and the testator had got a three-fourths share in the estate which would go to the minors. The executor cannot do anything for the purpose of administering the whole estate without the consent of the major son. The result of the joint holding would be that any group of interests can ask for partition or can agree with the other for joint administration.”

Further his cross-examination is to the following effect:—

“Q. Supposing a man makes a testamentary writing and he has got only two minor sons and he appoints an executor. In that case will not the executor be the guardian of the minor sons?

A. Yes. In that case he would be representing the minors and the estate.

To that extent he would be an agent of the minors and if a document is handed over to him, he would be regarded as taking the document on behalf of the minors. But that would all be after the death of the testator. If the document is handed over to him before death, then in that case he would not be the agent of the minors. Up to the death of the testator he would have no status and does not represent any one but he would be regarded as the agent of the testator. The moment his name is mentioned as the executor he becomes the agent of the testator, but he does not become the guardian of the minors until after the death of the testator.

Q. I put it to you that he is nobody's agent and he has no status of any kind whatsoever until after the death of the testator.

I do not agree with that. Of course this (i.e, his acting as testator's agent) is relation to his dealings with the testator.”

As to D50 Mr. Jinnah argues that it shows that an Apothropos does not represent any one in particular when there is a major or minor son. But this refers to a different subject. There the property was in possession of the Apothropos who was appointed by the testator, and all that the text says is that he does not hold it for the minor any more than for the major. I do not see how this would help Mr. Jinnah.

Reading the whole of Dr. Eliash's evidence carefully, I am unable to accept the argument that he has gone back on his opinion that an Apothropos cannot be appointed where there is a major son, and that delivery to him is no delivery to the donee. At the most as there is a conditional gift here, the appointment of the executors may be good qua minors, but that does not mean that delivery to the executor is delivery to the minor.

I now come to the defendants' texts. Exhibit 3Z is not applicable. It merely shows that an executor can be appointed who can look after the property, which nobody disputes. Exhibit 3T supports Dr. Eliash. It shows that Apothropos can be appointed in the case of a major, but only by reason of virtue to fulfil the words of the deceased. 3U seems to me to be irrelevant.

One of the principal contentions on behalf of the defendants is that even if there is defective execution of the will, if the intention is clear, it must be given effect to. It is rather difficult to appreciate this, but, what is said is, that notwithstanding a defect in the performance of Kinyan, or that the wrong Kinyan being performed, or non-delivery of the will, if the Court can gather a clear intention on the part of the testator to give a legacy to a person, then the Court should give effect to it. I shall deal with this question at this stage: Dr. Eliash's evidence on this point is to this effect:—

“A defective execution cannot be cured by the proof of intention of the testator. If the language of the document is not sufficient, the intention cannot be given effect to. If a person intends to make a gift but does not perform the proper Kinyan, the gift fails whatever his intention may be.”

He relies on exhibits D51 and D52; the defendants on 3JJ and 3KK. D51 and D52 support Dr. Eliash. Exhibit 3JJ merely shows that a gift which is otherwise good would be invalid if the events show the mind of the donor, and that if the true facts were known, the gift would not have been made. I do not see how this helps the defendants. In the case of 3JJ the gift depended on outside events. Exhibit 3KK involves a question of construction of the language used, and means that if the language used shows an intention to give absolutely and if that intention is not made clear, still the Court would give effect to it.

Another defence is the doctrine of “precept to fulfil the words of the deceased”, to which I have referred. Dr. Eliash stated as follows:—

“The precept ‘to fulfil the words of the deceased’ is applicable where the testator deposits specific property in the hands of third persons with specific instructions. (See Hoshen Mishpat, Ch. 252, S. 2.) This doctrine does not apply to the case of a revocable will because one cannot put a definite obligation on the heir when the testator may have at the last moment revoked the gift.”

In cross-examination Dr. Eliash stated:—

“There are many precepts which a son is obliged to observe. A son must observe the precept to fulfil the words of the deceased, where such precept applies. This precept is not binding on the son if there is a deed of gift. A deed of gift is judged by its own merit. The law of precepts applies only when there are oral instructions or desire by the testator. If the testator deposits a chattel with a third party and expresses a wish about its disposal in a certain way, in that case the precept would apply and the son would be bound by the wish of the father although such a transaction would not be valid according to law and nevertheless it would be legally binding on the son by virtue of the precept to fulfil the words of the deceased. In such a case the Court would not order the bailee to part with the chattel at the instance of the son.”

There is some cross-examination directed to challenge Dr. Eliash's translation of the words “Lifnin Mishurat hadin”. Dr. Eliash finally translated the same as follows:—

“He is bound to fulfil it at any rate as an act of saintliness (lifhin mishurat hadin, i.e, which is outside the line of law) and in such a matter one exercises a persuasion of words as stated above. The Hebrew equivalent of ‘act of saintliness' is ‘lifnin mishurat hadin’.”

The defendants say that this expression means “inside the line of law”. After giving my best consideration to the point, I am inclined to accept Dr. Eliash's translation as correct, particularly having regard to the words “and in such a matter one exercises persuasion of words”. It is difficult to see why persuasion is required or necessary if the act is within the line of the law. The plaintiff's case is that the precept means that it is merely a pious duty of the son that he should carry out the words of his father. The defendants' case is that it is the son's legal duty. But if it is a legal duty, no persuasion is necessary, and I am unable to accept the argument that the son is bound to carry out “leniently the act enjoined, and that he is to be persuaded by telling him, it is within the law”.

The texts relied on behalf of the plaintiff are D39, D40, D41 and D42. All of them support the opinion of Dr. Eliash. Exhibit D41 shows that the doctrine does not apply in the case of revocable wills, and will only apply when the will is in the form of instructions, desire or command, but not when it is in the form of conveyance. These texts show that this doctrine applies only when specific property is deposited with a third person with specific instructions and the language used is in terms of instructions, desire or command. Mr. Jinnah relies on 3A. This is part of exhibit E and shows what the doctrine is, and in my opinion supports Dr. Eliash.

I now come to the doctrine of Kimli. I have already explained Dr. Eliash's evidence as to the meaning of it. It is more fully explained in these words:—

“Kimli applies to a possessor who is a defendant and also a legal heir because of his status as Muchzac or possessor by virtue of his inheritance. It mean's that in case of conflict of authorities the status quo ante is retained as regards the possession of the property and the possessor is allowed to plead Kimli, i.e the doctrine that the right view is the one held by the authorities which favour him. Numerous authorities are cited at p. 1 of Pachad Izhac by Issac Lampronti who died in Venice in 1756. This is the most useful authority for this proposition. Also Hoshen Mishpat, Ch. 25, s. 2, annotation of Rama. A person cannot be Muchzac if he is in wrongful possession of the property. (See Pitche Tshuva, Rules of unlawful seizure following s. 25 at p. 66). Kerem Shlomo by Rabbi Shlomo Amaralya of Salonica at p. 203.-1 is another authority. According to Bene Samuel by Rabbi Hayoun, s. 10 at p. 38, Muchzac can plead Kimli if he has got two minor authorities. There are similar references in Knesseth Hagedola, p. 29, Rules 45, 24, 18, 13, etc. The established theory is that a Muchzac can plead Kimli with two authorities who are competent to decide and which may be relied upon even against the whole body of authorities on the other side. Rashdam, Hoshen Mishpat, s. 225, p. 11, also refers to Kimli. So also Rashdam Eben Haezer, s. 144. Kimli cannot be pleaded by an Apothropos against an heir because he holds the property on behalf of the heir and he is in no better position than the legatee. (See Mishpate Schemeul by Rabbi Samuel Kali of the 16th century, Res. 96 at p. 99).”

The parties are at issue as to this. According to the defendants the doctrine itself is not of universal application, and, secondly, it can be pleaded by the real defendant in a suit who is in possession against a trespasser. The plaintiff says that in law the heir is Muchzac and is deemed to be in possession even if in fact he is not, and his possession is that of the defendant in possession. That is denied by the defendants. They say that Muchzac means a person in possession, except when such possession is the result of a wrongful seizure. They then say that when the heir is not in possession, he cannot be the defendant, and against him the person in possession can plead Kimli. According to the defendants, it really is a question of onus, and the person on whom the onus lies cannot plead Kimli. They admit that the surviving partners are in possession and say that therefore they can set up Kimli if necessary but not the plaintiff: That is their case.

The first question is, what is the true position of a Muchzac? Dr. Eliash explains it in the following words:—

“As soon as the owner dies the legal heir is seized of the estate. He is legally presumed to be in possession of the estate the moment after the death of the owner. The technical term for this is Muchzac which means legal possessor irrespective of physical possession. As such he is considered to be the defendant in any proceeding with reference to the estate in the sense that he has got all the legal remedies and reliefs which are accorded to a defendant in any proceedings.”

He relies on D2 to D7, D43 and D46. Of these D6, D7 and D3 are clear authorities in support of Dr. Eliash's opinion. Exhibits D2 and D5 (commentary of Baer Heteb) also support him. Similarly D43 is a clear authority to show that the scriptural heir is Muchzac and the property is in his possession wherever it actually is and whatever doubt arises, and that the heir therefore can plead Kimli seeing that he is Muchzac of the property. Similarly D46 is clear authority to show that an heir must be given the relief of the defendant.

The defendants rely on 3V and 3W. 3V which is a part of D44 merely shows that Muchzac cannot be dispossessed, but is not helpful on this point. D44 shows that on the text Muchzac was in possession. 3W seems to me to be irrelevant.

The result of the evidence of the texts is that the propositions put forward by Dr. Eliash are supported by the texts. Finally the whole of the defendants' case on this point is given away by their own witness Solomon Aaron, who was examined as an expert on commission at Aden. This is what he says:—

“I agree that if a will is disputed and is doubtful, the heir is Muchzac and the legatees must prove their right to the legacy. If there is a difference of opinion between the authorities, the heir can say Kimli.”

Turning back, then, to the doctrine of Kimli, I have already set out what Dr. Eliash stated in his examination-in-chief. In his cross-examination he stated as follows:—

“Different schools have sprung up with regard to Jewish law but all the Courts would follow the general rules of Jewish law in deciding between conflicting opinions. If Rashdam says one thing and Beth Joseph says another, the Court before which the question comes will allow the defendant, whoever he may be, whether an heir or not, to plead Kimli; in case of an ordinary defendant he would require two authorities and in the case of heir only one. The authorities are of different ranks. Some have greater weight than others. Some are more respected in the East others in the west. The authority of Maimonides would prevail in Aden. But it would be open to the defendant who is a Muchzac to plead Kimli with two authorities of sufficient standing. Kimli can only be pleaded by an ordinary defendant who is in the actual possession of the property or by an heir who becomes the defendant as in the eye of the law he is in possession. The authorities pleaded must be considered by the Court to be fit ones. A list of such authorities is contained in Pitche Tshuva.”

In his further cross-examination he stated as follows:—

“One finds the principle of the doctrine of Kimli for the first time in Tur, the author of which is Rabbi Jacob Asheri, son of Rabbi Rosh. After Tur there came Hushen Mishpat of which s. 25 deals with this doctrine. It is not true according to my opinion that even according to Hoshen Mishpat the doctrine of Kimli is not of universal application.

Referred to Hoshen Mishpat Ch. 60.2 The doctrine of Kimli is not mentioned in Moran who is the same as Caro the author of Hoshen Mishpat, although the Tur mentions the principle of it and also Maimonides mentions it.

Q. Would it not be right therefore to conclude that the author of Hoshen Mishpat (Caro) did not favour the principle of the doctrine of Kimli?

A. No.

I have looked up several authorities and found the doctrine of Kimli mentioned therein. I made no attempt to find out if there were other authorities wherein that doctrine was not mentioned. I have given several authorities which mention the doctrine of Kimli and I can produce many more which mention this doctrine.

To the Court:— I may mention that Caro himself in his commentary on the Tur which is known as Beth Joseph mentions the principle of the doctrine of Kimli.”

Dr. Eliash relies on D43 to D49. Of these D43 and D46 are already referred to and support Dr. Eliash. D44 shows that when there is a doubt in the law, money is not to be taken out of the hand of the Muchzac. If I am right in holding that the Muchzac is an heir, who is deemed to be in possession though he is not, then these texts also support Dr. Eliash. According to Mr. Jinnah, the texts only show that the Court has to decide right. That no doubt is one of the points in the texts, but not the sole point. D45 supports the plaintiff and further shows that the Judge has to plead Kimli on behalf of the Muchzac. It is argued that D46 shows that Kimli is not always made applicable, and that in the texts there was nothing to show that the heir was not in possession. I am unable to accept this, as I think the text shows that the heir was not in fact the defendant. As to D47 Mr. Jinnah says that it is irrelevant. D47 shows that two authorities are necessary for the application of the doctrine of Kimli, and is in favour of the plaintiff. D48 says that the Court has to satisfy itself that the authority is fit. It is argued that Rule 45 in that text applies to the holder of the deed, not to the person in possession. This seems to be wrong. D49 shows that two authorities are enough even though they proceed on different grounds. The defendants rely on 3LL. This shows at most that the heir cannot plead Kimli with one authority, and that on this point there is a conflict of opinion. It was suggested in cross-examination of Dr. Eliash that the doctrine of Kimli is not of universal application according to Hoshen Mishpat. Dr. Eliash denied this and further denied that Caro, the author of Hoshen Mishpat, did not favour the doctrine of Kimli. He stated that he has seen many authorities in favour of the doctrine of Kimli. It is true he admitted that he made no attempts to find other authorities in which the doctrine was not mentioned. But no such authorities are forthcoming. In addition to the authorities relied upon by him, Dr. Eliash stated that he was prepared to produce many more authorities. He was not asked to produce any. Finally Dr. Eliash stated that Caro had mentioned this doctrine in his commentary known as Beth Joseph, and therefore the mere fact that he did not mention it in Moran—which is Caro again—is not important.

This brings me now to the expression “all my property” and to the question as to when a general expression of this character is used and is followed by a particular expression, what is the property which passes? It is said for the defendants that the will disposes of all Bunin's property, and what follows this expression is only for the purpose of specifying what that property is. The plaintiff's case is that where a general expression like this is used and is followed by a particular expression, what pass are the particular things so specified. In other words the rival contentions are: the plaintiff says the words “all my property” in the will should be omitted from consideration and what the testator gave are the specific things which he mentions immediately after these words; the defendants say that what he mentions after these words is surplusage and should be omitted, and what he really gave was “all my property”.

The relevancy of this question is not only as regards what passes under the will, but also as regards the performance of Kinyan. I have already stated that according to Dr. Eliash when there are several categories given requiring different Kinyans or methods of transfer, one single Kinyan makes the gift invalid on the doctrine of “part being bad, the whole is bad”. What then is the position with regard to this subject under the Jewish law? Dr. Eliash stated as follows:—

“A defective execution cannot be cured by the proof of intention of the testator. If the language of the document is not sufficient the intention cannot be given effect to. If a person intends to make a gift but does not perform the proper Kinyan, the gift fails whatever his intention may be … In a document such as a will the generality of the expression is qualified by the particulars followed. (Tur Beth Joseph c. 66, s. 43). This is also an authority as to the meaning of the word ‘Metaltelin’ which does not include many things, inter alia promissory notes and deeds.”

The texts relied upon are D53, D54, D33B and D33C. All these authorities support Dr. Eliash. The defendants rely on 3I, 3J, 3K, 3R, 3S and 3E. Exhibit 3I shows that when a person says I sell “all the properties”, it means even the houses, slaves and all the moveables which are known to be his even the phylacteries on his head. In other words it shows that “all the properties” includes everything. But this cannot affect the position in this case, as the words here are not merely “all my property” and nothing more, but are followed by particular description of property, and so the doctrine relied upon by the plaintiff would apply. Exhibit 3J agrees with 3I and the same explanation would apply to it. Exhibit 3K runs as follows:—

“A person who gives to his friend all his properties, moveables Agav immoveables, and has not left for his heirs except 5 gold coins (Zehubim) and (the donor) has got in his house Bonds of debts (Shitre Hoboth). If it was a gift of a sick person (the donee) has acquired because the bonds are included in property (Nekhasim). But if it was a gift of a person in health he (the donee) has not acquired since he (the donor) did not write thus: ‘Acquire them and all the rights emanating therefrom’ and therefore the heirs do acquire.”

The suggestion was that if the formula “Acquire this and all the rights emanating therefrom” was used—as it is the will in this case—bonds of debts would pass as the text says. Dr. Eliash said “No”. His explanation is that all that the text shows is that as the formula was not used, the gift was bad. As to whether it would be good or not one has to go to Ch. 66, s. 10, which shows that there is a conflict of authority. Chapter 66, s. 10, is D22. The witness was then asked whether he knows as to which opinion is followed in Aden, and he stated that he did not definitely know it. Exhibit 3R seems to me to be irrelevant, and apart from that the text relates to the case of a dying person, and as Dr. Eliash says there is a difference between the gift of a dying sick person and a healthy person. 3S refers to quite a different case. It no doubt appears to support the defendants' contention, but in the case in that text everything is definitely given and much stronger words than the mere word “Metaltelin” are used.

It will be seen that the expression “Metaltelin” occurs in some of these texts and also in the will. According to Dr. Eliash the meaning of this expression is as follows:—

“Metaltelin etymologically means moveables but in the course of time it assumed the meaning of household chattels. It does not include merchandise. The term as used in legal deeds and documents means household goods.

Question: What is your authority for this meaning?

Answer: Hoshen Mishpat, Ch. 248, s. 10; Ha Mabit part I Res. No. 288.

Metaltelin can be given a wider meaning by saying Kol metaltelin, i.e all the metaltelin. If it is preceded by a general term for ‘property’, then the general expression would be limited by particularization and the meaning would be as I have stated above.”

The texts to which Dr. Eliash refers are D54, D55, D55A, D33B and, D33C. D54 supports Dr. Eliash, and shows that the expression means moveable property and does not include bills. D55, D33B and D33C also support him. The defendants' texts are 3E and 3S. 3E, which is part of D54, shows “my property” includes bills, and the expression “moveables” could not include bills. I have already dealt with 3S. There are two more texts in connection with this on which the defendants rely. They are 3BB and 3J. 3J shows that Metaltelin means moveables and prima facie would not include bills. Exhibit 3BB is irrelevant, the words used there are “all moveables”. The argument on behalf of the defendants ignores the actual words. If it is “all property”, prima facie it would include everything. But that is not the point. The point is, when the testator says “all my property” and then specifies only some items, what passes? Or when he uses the expression “Metaltelin” what passes? As to this I am clear that Dr. Eliash is right, and there is nothing in the texts cited or to which my attention has been drawn to affect my conclusion. The defendants' texts seem to me to be irrelevant. They merely mean that the expression “all my property” would include everything, a proposition which standing by itself cannot be disputed.

It will be convenient at this stage to refer briefly to the evidence on commission. The defendants have examined two witnesses as experts. Both of them refer to several texts, most of which are exhibited before me, either in the evidence in chief or the cross-examination of Dr. Eliash, and which do not support the case of these two witnesses, but in some cases show the contrary. Then there are some other texts which are not separately exhibited before me nor on commission, but are translated by the witnesses, the translations being set out in their evidence. I shall deal with these presently. There are some more texts referred to by these witnesses which are not even translated, which, I think, I would, be justified in ignoring, as neither the texts nor the translations are available in this Court. Nor any attempt has been made in the argument of counsel to refer to these, and as far as I can see, even Mr. Jinnah does not rely on them. One thing is clear, the evidence of these witnesses shows that the sources of the Jewish law are the same, and are contained in the books, to which Dr. Eliash has referred in his evidence and which he produced as the evidence proceeded. Even as to the texts translated in the evidence of these witnesses, most of them were not referred to, as I have stated above, nor put in cross-examination of Dr. Eliash. Indeed, as far as I can see, Mr. Jinnah has confined his argument to exhibit D and exhibit No. 3, and has only referred to some passages in the evidence of the witnesses on commission, to which I shall come immediately. Another thing which is clear is that the commission witnesses admit, as Dr. Eliash stated, that the Jewish law is universal.

One of the issues raised in the case is issue No. 10, viz., “Whether the opinion of the Jewish Sheriah at Aden is not conclusive and binding upon the parties in the case, and whether it should be acted upon by the Court.” Sheriah is a body of persons who, according to one of the witnesses on commission, decide civil matters, inheritance, divorce and marriage questions. The witness himself is a member of the Sheriah, and he says that the Sheriah has the power to decide all questions of Jewish law, and they decide according to the laws laid down in Shelan Aruch. The Sheriah holds meetings in the Jewish synagogue in a specially reserved portion of it. They keep no record of the evidence or pleadings, but merely take down a summary of the matter and decide it. After the decision the summary is destroyed. They keep a record of the certificates sent to Court about the heirs and also opinion sent to Courts. It is stated by these witnesses that if there is a dispute about Jewish law between persons, they go to the Sheriah for decision. It is admitted by them that if they agree to the decision of the Sheriah, well and good; otherwise they go to the Court. On any question relating to marriage and divorce, the Courts often ask the opinion of the Sheriah, as also in matters of inheritance. One of the witnesses says that he cannot say if on any other point the opinion of the Sheriah is asked. It is clear on the evidence of these witnesses that the Court is not bound by the opinion of the Sheriah. The opinion given by the Sheriah in this case is DC7, and according to that opinion the will is “strong and valid without any doubt”, and the Sheriah confirmed the will and declared it valid, and further found that it was made in accordance with the regulations of sages, and confirmed it and declared it to be valid. It is admitted that the opinion given by the Sheriah is ex parte and that the plaintiff did not appear before the Sheriah at the time.

On a reading of the commission evidence as a whole, I am of opinion that it does not help in the determination of the question which I have to decide. As I have pointed out, the sources in the texts are common and have been freely referred to before me, and I am unable to accept any opinion of these witnesses, which are contrary to the texts and some of which are not even supported by any texts. Indeed, in many cases it will be seen that beyond a categorical statement of opinion nothing is referred to back it up by way of authority or otherwise.

It is argued on behalf of the plaintiff that these two witnesses are not experts. Section 45 of the Indian Evidence Act explains what an expert is. An expert is a person who is specially skilled in foreign law, science, art, etc. on which he is asked to depose. The first witness is Salim Yakub. He is, as I have stated, a member of the Sheriah and was appointed in 1923. He draws his salary from the firm of Menahem Messa out of the community fund. Before he was appointed as a member of the Sheriah, he was working as a salesman in the shop of one Menahem Yahuda for many years. For ten years before that he was a Cantor and performer of marriage ceremonies. Before he entered the service of Menahem Yahuda he had a grocer's shop for ten years. Before that he was working in the shop of one Mansoor Shemia. Before he gave his evidence, he was approached by one Mr. Manilal on behalf of the defendants, and he asked him to consider the question relating to the will and Jewish law on the subject. He showed him the word Kimli and other expressions in the will, and asked him to look up the Jewish law on this point. Manilal saw him about eight or ten times. Even whilst he was giving evidence, he was looking into the books to find out the meaning of the term “wenatati”. When he was asked as to whether a son is an heir or not, as to the difference of opinion on this point, he stated that he could not answer off-hand as to what opinion should be held good and that he would have to study the books before he could give reply. When he was asked about the word “weagalon” and what happens when that word is not used, he stated that he will have to look up the question in the books. I have briefly referred to the qualifications and the position of this man, and from this and from his other evidence I am unable to hold that he is an expert.

I am also unable to hold the second witness Ayahya Abraham as an expert. He has been in the service of Menahem Messa for twenty-six years and began as a petty clerk and draws his salary from that firm. He has begun to act as a member of the Sheriah just a few days before he gave evidence, but admitted that he could not decide any legal question himself. When he was asked whether he could show any authority in Hoshen Mishpat as to what happens when there is a difference of opinion between the members of the Sheriah, he stated that he had come prepared to answer questions which were connected with the case and that he had taken notes of the chapters relating to the will and it was only by referring to them that he could answer the questions. He further stated that the whole of the law was not in his brain and it would take time to find out authorities for matters not concerned with the subject of wills. Even now he is acting as the godown keeper of Menahem Messa. He admitted that it was the first time that he appeared in Court as an expert in Jewish law, and he has no certificate of merit. The very books which he brought to the Court were new and borrowed from one Shilay, who is a clerk at Menahem Messa. He stated that he had the same books but they had become old. According to him an expert is one who can read and understand books. He admitted that he had discussed the question of Jewish law including this will with a Jewish expert brought by the defendants from Port Said. On many points he is unable to give any opinion. In one respect he contradicted the first witness by saying that a member of the Sheriah who is a witness to a document cannot give judgment on that document. One of the members of the Sheriah who gave judgment on the will is Yakub Nersha, who also is a witness to the will. The witness admitted that he did not know under what law the Sheriah dealt with the will and held it to be valid.

I have already stated that Mr. Jinnah in his final argument only referred to some of the pages of the compilation containing the evidence on commission. These are pages 74, 75, 76, 84, 85, 99, 100 and 101. I propose now to deal with these passages. The second witness stated as follows:—

“In the will of Bunin everything known to him is gifted away including merchandise, coins, bills, etc., as well as Government securities, shares in companies and debts so long as he had documents to rely upon. Even if he had no documents, the debts, shares in companies and Government securities would also pass to the legatees because he used the word “all”. If after the date of the will the property mentioned in the will underwent a change the will would not be affected because the goods in business change daily. The right reserved by Bunin to change his mind does not invalidate the will.”

No authority is cited for this, and I am unable to accept this in view of Dr. Eliash's clear opinion supported as it is by authority. The position here is that the testator gave not merely “all property”, but that expression is followed by certain kinds or particular items of property. The witness further stated that the appointment of Apothropos was valid, and referred to Hoshen Mishpat, s. 290, para. 26, is support of his opinion. This text, however, is not translated nor produced, and I am unable to attach any importance to his opinion especially as he mentions no ground in support of his opinions. Then at page 74 of the compilation the witness stated as follows:—

“Under the terms of the will the testator having declared that the property is divided and given to a third person for the minors and others, therefore the legatees are considered to be the possessors. The heirs are ‘Mohzac’ generally and the man who takes actual possession of the property is also ‘Mohzak’.

“The person to whom the will is handed over is ‘Mohafiz’ and not a Mohzak. Mohafiz is called ‘Apothropos’ or executor. The plaintiff under this will is entitled to two shares out of twelve. All the legatees in this will are ‘Waddais’ (certain). Uncertain cannot deprive one who is certain.

“‘Kimli’ is the right of a person to accept the decision of one authority when there are differences of opinion among Rabbis.

“Kimli in my opinion does not apply to the will in question because when a testator says, ‘I have given and I have deposited with a third person’ the property is gone from his possession and ‘Kimli’ therefore does not come in.”

No authority is cited for this proposition. At page 76 the witness stated:—

“There is a difference in the will of a person in health and a person who is sick. A sick person can make a valid will without Kinyan by a declaration in the presence of two persons; whereas Kinyan is necessary in the case of a healthy person. Kinyan was necessary for the will in question although some of the Rabbis say that if the will was written and signed by the testator Kinyan is not necessary.”

This is clearly against Mr. Jinnah, as the witness admits that Kinyan is necessary in the case of a healthy person. Therefore Kinyan was necessary in this case. Mr. Jinnah in his argument stated that when there is a document, no Kinyan is necessary, and that Dr. Eliash admitted this. But this is not correct. All that Dr. Eliash admitted is that some say that when there is an admission, the presumption is that everything necessary was done and that in such a case the document executed does not require anything more.

The witness (on commission) stated that he agreed with Tor Hoshen Mishpat, p. 198, Beth Joseph, Ch. 250, para. 50, but stated that there should be an undertaking and the document written by a person himself amounts to an undertaking, and that the undertaking should state that the man is indebted or that he has given. According to him the wording in the text is not “he is indebted” but that “he is bound”. This seems to me to be quibbling. The witness then proceeded to say that in the will in question the writing and the witnesses amount to “Hayyub”, and that the authority for this was s. 255. Hoshen Mishpat, para. 2. This seems to me to be absurd and not supported by authority. The authority to which he refers is D79. Now D79 is the case of a dying and sick person. This is admitted by the witness, but he says that the authority would apply even if the person is in health. It seems to me to be equally absurd. He refers to another authority, Hoshen Mishpat, Ch. 40, para. 2. This is 3P. As to this Mr. Jinnah admitted that this does not apply, and nothing more need be said.

Then on the question of Hayyub, whether it means “bound” and not that “he owed”, I prefer to accept Dr. Eliash's explanation to that of the witness. It may be noted that the text which was put to him and with which he agreed is D10, on which Dr. Eliash relies. At page 85 the witness stated that he agreed that Kinyan was necessary to complete a valid gift, but if the gift is in the handwriting of the person making it, Kinyan is not necessary but it only strengthens the gift. “If the will is in the handwriting of a testator and is attested by two witnesses, Kinyan is not necessary. This applies to sick and healthy both”. There is no authority in support of this opinion.

At pages 99-100 the witness stated:—

“In my opinion the legatees become partners of the firm of Menahem Messa from the date of the will.

The buyer of the interest of a partner in a firm does not become a partner without the consent of other partners. If the purchaser of the share does not want and the other partners want him, the partnership is dissolved. The purchaser becomes separated from the date of the purchase but the remaining members of the firm remain partners. If the purchaser and other partners do not object and the business is carried on, they are partners. If a partner dies, the heir can say ‘I want my share’ if he has a right.”

The proposition is that the legatees become partners of the firm of Menahem Messa from the date of the will. This seems to me to be absurd, and there is no authority for it. But if this contention is correct, namely, that legatees become partners of the firm of Menahem Messa from the date of the will, what he says at page 100 seems to be inconsistent.

I shall now refer only to one document put in on behalf of the plaintiff, and that is PC5, at page 198. It is a judgment in one Enoch Levi's case. This judgment establishes the following points: (1) That where the will is revocable, delivery of it to the donees or some agent on their behalf is necessary and Kinyan is not complete otherwise. (2) It is doubtful if the delivery of the will to the Apothropos is sufficient. (3) That the gift must be open and manifest. (4) Where the language used is the language of future, but Kinyan is performed, some say the will is good, others say it is bad, and the heir can plead Kimli with those who say that it is no use to write the formula, and this even if some of the legatees are themselves heirs. (5) That the Sheriah apply the universal law. (6) That the intention does not matter, what matters is the language used.

The words in that particular case were “by open and manifest gift”. Mr. Jinnah as to this says that this judgment shows that when a testator puts his will in the hands of the executor, he is a third party, and such delivery amounts to an assignment to the legatee and the will is good. This seems to me to be correct and would help the defendants if on facts it be held that this was done, that the will was delivered to the executors.

Mr. Jinnah's further objections are: (1) that the judgment is irrelevant; and (2) that the language in the judgment is different, it is the language of futurity, and the judgment shows that the doctrine of Kimli is unimportant. As to the first, it may be pointed out that both sides have referred to the will. As to the second, it is true that the language is different and is what is called language of futurity. But, I think it rather supports the plaintiff's case than that of the defendants. As to the third, it clearly supports the plaintiff on the doctrine of Kimli.

I now come to the texts on commission, and here I am referring only to those texts which the witnesses have translated in their evidence and which have not been put in evidence either at Aden or here. I am much indebted to the defendants' solicitors for handing in a compilation at the end of the case, containing an index showing the texts cited on commission and giving cross references to the defendants' compilation and the plaintiff's compilation. The compilation handed in is admitted by Mr. Desai to be substantially correct except as to some mistakes as to exhibit numbers. Column 1 gives the pages of the compilation of the commission evidence; column 2, the texts; column 3, whether translated in evidence or not; and column 4, exhibit numbers.

Pages 6 and 7: The proposition here referred to is that the shares of some of the legatees were directed to be held for a period of fifteen years in the will, and therefore although the heir in fact was a major, the appointment of Apothropos was good. The authority cited is Hoshen Mishpat Caro, Ch. 219, s. 26. The authority does not support this proposition. All it shows is that in such a case it is competent to the Court to appoint executors. Page 15 seems to me to be irrelevant. Page 26: The witness admits the plaintiff's proposition as to Apothropos to be correct, but says that this is true only in the case of an unconditional will. This is admitted by Dr. Eliash. Page 26: Hoshen Mishpat, Ch. 258, s. 2. The witness admits that in the case of “from now and after death” the legatees can only take after death. This clearly contradicts the opinion of the second witness at page 99 of the compilation, on which Mr. Jinnah relies. Page 40: This merely shows that the evidence should not be taken in the absence of the opponent, and if taken, it should not be acted upon. It seems to me to be unimportant and not relevant. The authority there mentioned is Hoshen Mishpat, Ch. s. 28. Then the texts referred to on pages 40 to 43, which are translated but not exhibited, seem to me to be irrelevant and not important. Page 46: Hoshen Mishpat, Ch. 257, s. 6, Pitche Tshuva. This seems to support the plaintiff as to revocable wills. Page 53: Hoshen Mishpat, Ch. 176, s. 19 and comment. This shows that if a partner dies, the partnership is dissolved. Page 55: Hoshen Mishpat, Ch. 18, s. 1. This is irrelevant. Page 58: Tur Hoshen Mishpat, Ch. 250, s. 35. Also irrelevant. But the witness clearly admitted from this text that a document is only a proof.

My conclusions are as follows:—

1. There are three kinds of wills, and the widest form of will for disposing of any kind of property is by way of a bond or a charge-will.

2. According to the Jewish law Kinyan of the appropriate kind is necessary and essential to the validity of all transfers either by way of gift inter vivos or by a will.

3. Kinyan is of three kinds: Kinyan Sudar, Kinyan Agav and Kinyan Shtar. Only particular kinds of property can be passed or transferred by each of these Kinyans. Bills and promissory notes to pass under appropriate Kinyan require endorsement and delivery. Unwritten debts require Hawala. Kinyan Shtar applies to immoveable property. Kinyan Sudar covers moveable and immoveable property, except bills, outstandings and coins. For Kinyan Agav, there must first be a transfer by an appropriate Kinyan of immoveable property.

4. The subject-matter of a gift or a legacy must be definite, existing and in possession. No uncertain or future property can validly form the subject of a gift or a will.

5. A share of a share in partnership property is indefinite.

6. According to some authorities, a defined thing in a definite and existing object can be given, but that does not mean that a share in an indefinite thing can be given. A gift may be indefinite by reason of the subject-matter being indefinite or may be bad for not being in possession or not being in existence. A gift of a going concern or a share therein in case the gift is “from to-day and till after death” suffers from both infirmity. The text D60A (Fourthly) shows that a mere arithmetical portion is indefinite. 3GG is the text which allows the utmost indulgence, and under it a share in an existing thing may be definite. But a share in a partnership is quite different, as it may include future things. D18 shows that Maimonides is of the definite opinion that the sale of a share in one property is bad. This is supported by D60A and D63. In the case of a revocable gift, as in this case, that is where the gift is “from to-day and after death if I do not change my mind”, the gift in the case of a going concern is bad even if Kinyan is performed.

7. (a) The gift of merchandise which the donor possesses at the time of the gift accompanied by proper Kinyan is good; but according to Rashbam it has no value if it is of a going concern, and the heirs can plead that it is revoked or that the goods are sold. (b) The gift of goods, merchandise, etc., as would exist at the death of the testator has no value unless it is made by a bond or a charge-will, (c) The gift of a share in a partnership is good if irrevocable and is accompanied by proper Kinyan; it is bad, if revocable. (d) If the property given is defined and there is proper Kinyan, then the gift is good, whether it was revoked or not revoked.

8. Kinyan is necessary in the case of an admission of an obligation or a bond.

9. Only Kinyan Sudar and Kinyan Agav are relevant in this case. Latter has no valid and independent existence as a means of transfer of property except when preceded by Kinyan Sudar or adjunct to it. Kinyan Agav can be used along with Kinyan Sudar for passing all kinds of moveable property, except coins, bills and outstandings. In no case can Kinyan Agav pass immoveable property.

10. These propositions apply to gifts of healthy persons and a gift not complying with these requirements is invalid.

11. Delivery of the document, be it a gift inter vivos or in the form of a will, to a person on behalf of the donee or the legatee is essential in order to complete the transaction. A will must be read or the contents thereof explained to the donee or the legatee or to some agent of his.

12. If any of the essential requirements is not complied with or observed, the defect cannot, be cured by insisting upon the doctrine of precept to fulfil the words of the deceased. The heir is bound by the precept where specific property has been deposited irrevocably with a third party with oral instructions regarding its disposition.

13. Kinyan is dispensed with only when the fact or the transaction alleged to have occurred is admitted or proved to have occurred as recorded in a subsequent instrument.

14. Muchzac means an heir, whether the property is in his possession or not.

15. Where there is a conflict of authority, the doctrine of Kimli applies, and that means that the heir can rely upon two authorities which are in his favour.

16. Intention is not the same thing as desire as appearing from the documents; it is the expressed words of Menahem the document that matter. Defective execution cannot be cured by saying that the donor intended to make a gift or will.

17. No Apothropos can be appointed when there is a major heir, and the major heir can object to such an appointment.

18. An Apothropos is not the agent of the donee to accept the delivery of the will except when there is a conditional gift.

This brings me to the will. I shall first deal with the opinion of Dr. Eliash. He stated that the will is made by way of gift inter vivos, revocable, and to operate after the testator's death. I do not think there is any dispute about this, and that is clear from the language used, which is similar to the language in D9. Then he stated that the word “wenatati” is used, which means “I have given”, and that in spite of that Kinyan is necessary. He relied on D55B, D42, and D56. D55B supports Dr. Eliash, and further proves that the facts can be scrutinized, as also the language of the deed in order to see whether the expression “I gave” or “I have given” refers to a past transaction or a future transaction. There is nothing in it, however, to show that Kinyan is necessary. D42 and D56 seem to me to support Dr. Eliash. Dr. Eliash in his evidence stated that the form adopted in the will cannot be used to devise something which is indefinite such as partnership property, and that there is double indefiniteness. He further stated that assuming that the property was definite, the will was bad as there was no sufficient and good Kinyan, because the deviser had used in the course of the gift two expressions, one referring to Kinyan Agav and the other referring to Kinyan Sudar. He then proceeded to state as follows:—

“When he speaks of Kinyan Agav he says ‘land and houses and Agavan (along with them) Metaltelin (chattels, etc.) and coins, promissory notes, etc.’ and then adds by Kinyan Sudar from to-day if I do not change my mind until after my life. This from is reversed, because he has attempted to pass immoveables by Kinyan Agav which is not correct and apparently then the moveables by Kinyan Sudar. When he speaks of Kinyan Agav there should have been first a statement that he passed immoveable property by Kinyan Sudar (or Kinyan Shtar) and then Agavan (along with them), i.e, Agav the immoveable properties passed moveable properties, chattels and other things mentioned there. I have already cited the authorities and formula in this connection.”

The next objection in Dr. Eliash's opinion is that the testator had mentioned Kinyan Sudar, and if he made Kinyan Sudar of all the properties together, the gift would be bad, because when Kinyan is made for several categories or objects, if it is invalid in part it becomes invalid in whole, and if the gift includes the coins and promissory notes, which cannot pass by Kinyan Sudar, the entire Kinyan would fail, assuming that Kinyan was for the entire property. He then refers to several authorities which support him on this point, some of which also show that there is a conflict of opinion on the point.

Another objection is as regards the delivery of the will to the donees, and if there was no delivery of the will, the will was invalid. According to him a document devising a revocable gift inter vivos to operate after death must be delivered to the donee of the gift to be effective. Dr. Eliash further stated that the precept to fulfil the words of the deceased would not apply to this will for three reasons, viz., (1) that there was no specific deposit of the property for a specific purpose with a third party; (2) the will was revocable; and (3) the will was in the form of a gift and not by way of instructions or order.

Then another objection of his is that assuming that the son is a major, he could object to the appointment of Apothropos in the will.

The last objection is that anyone accepting Kinyan must know the contents of the will. If that is not so, there is no valid Kinyan, and the will is bad, and the donees do not acquire any benefit.

In his cross-examination the witness admitted that there was a difference of opinion as to (1) Wenatati, and (2) the doctrine “bad in part the whole is bad”. The witness further admitted that if the word “acquire”, i.e, the word “kne” is used in the word Agav in some form or other, then the actual words of the formula need not be used. He further admitted that the words “all the rights contained therein” constitute a good formula. In his opinion the will is invalid and not in accordance with the Jewish law.

The will is challenged on the following grounds: (1) No Kinyan was in fact performed and there is no evidence of it. Kinyan expressed being bad in part is bad as to whole. (2) The will does not fall within any principle dispensing with Kinyan. (3) There was no delivery to the donees or any one else on their behalf; and at any rate the contents of the will were not read to any one on behalf of anybody. (4) Subject-matter of the will is such that it cannot be the subject of a valid gift in the form in which the will was made. (5) There was no valid appointment of executors.

The defences are, as to (1) and (2), when there is a document no Kinyan is necessary. If it was necessary, then in fact it was performed and the Courts should presume it. It is argued that the attesting witnesses say that Kinyan was performed, and that Kinyan was performed in fact. As to the objection based on the doctrine “bad in part the whole is bad”, that there is a difference of opinion which is admitted. As to, (3), when there is Kinyan, no delivery is necessary. But there is evidence to shew that there was delivery. Apart from delivery the will was not revoked, and this fact can be proved by other evidence than delivery. As to (4), the property is not indefinite; it is a definite share of partnership business and it can validly be the subject-matter of a gift or a will, and at any rate there is a difference of opinion. As to (5), the appointment of Apothropos is valid, particularly as there is a conditional gift, and it is admitted that in such a case the appointment is valid.

Now there is no evidence before me that Kinyan was performed in fact. All that is argued is that there is an admission of the testator and of the attesting witnesses that it was performed. This in law is hardly sufficient to show that proper formalities were observed. Statements in the will of a deceased person that due formalities were observed, or of attesting witnesses who are dead, cannot amount to a proof of due performance of necessary formalities required under the law. Nor do they amount to an admission of such performance within the meaning of the indian evidence act and dispense with the proof of such performance when the law requires it. The Jewish law requires strict proof of performance of Kinyan and the heir is entitled to inquire whether proper Kinyan has been performed. Then it is argued that Bunin and his attesting witnesses would not have stated that Kinyan was performed unless in fact it was. The argument does not appeal to me, particularly in view of Howard's evidence as to what actually took place when the will came to be made and signed, and to which I shall refer in detail presently.

The next point is that when there is a document containing an admission as to the gift, as there is in this will, Kinyan is not necessary. The defendants rely on the use of the technical expression “wenatati” and say that the use of this word or the word “natati” which comes from the same root dispenses with the necessity of performin Kinyan, and that throughout the will the testator has used the present perfect tense. There is no dispute about this, but on a true reading of the will it means the present tense particularly in view of the circumstances of the deposed to by Howard. There is nothing in the will to indicate that the gift had taken place or had been made in the past or at some time prior to the execution of the will. The language used, therefore, cannot relate back to a past act of which the will can be said to be a record. There is no evidence that the gift had been made in the past, and in my opinion when the testator stated “I have given” or “I gave”, what he meant was that he was going to give and the gift was to operate after death. There is nothing to show that in fact it had taken place in the past of which the will can be said to be a record. On the other hand the evidence of Howard, which I accept, shows what the true facts were, so that even if there was a presumption in favour of the defendants, based on the language used, that presumption is rebutted. Even Tob, the only witness for the defendants before me, has not deposed to any such past transaction, and the very words which he says the testator has used go to show that the provision was to take effect in future. According to him the testator told him after the will was executed, “Thank God, I have provided for the children of the family”.

Exhibit D25 shows that a deed dispensing with Kinyan must be a deed of admission from which it can reasonably be said that it is an admission of a past event. Every act in the will has a reference to the date of the will. D76 shows that notwithstanding “Natati” necessity for proof of Kinyan was still recognised. Undoubtedly there is a difference of opinion on this point. But the text shows that it should be a deed of admission, and this is strengthened by the fact that text occurs in Ch. 60, s. 6, of Hoshen Mishpat, which deals with admission, and I think for this purpose the plaintiff will be entitled to rely on the doctrine of Kimli.

But even supposing that there is an admission of Kinyan, or a completed gift, if it appears from the very deed in which the admission is contained, that Kinyan performed is bad, then the admission cannot avail the party relying on it. This is clear from D25, and, on the authorities, apart from Dr. Eliash's opinion, I have no hesitation in holding that Kinyan was not performed and that the will is bad.

The next question is, if Kinyan was performed, is it good? It is argued that by the will Bunin gives all his property and his definite share in the partnership property, and that as the things and objects mentioned after “all my property” are by way of surplusage, they should be disregarded. According to the texts, to which I have referred, there being a general expression followed by a particular expression as to certain items of property, what passes would be the latter or the things particularized. On a true reading of the will it seems to me that Bunin divides certain items of property which he held in partnership, and all that is transferred under the Jewish law, or can pass under that law, would be the items particularly described there, and the words “all my property” mean nothing. This is supported by the fact that there is no mention of merchandise or goods which admittedly were a large, if not the largest, part of the partnership property.

Then there is no Kinyan of lands and houses mentioned, and therefore Kinyan Agav is useless and ineffective. Then Kinyan Sudar comes after Kinyan Agav, and that is bad under the law. If, then, Kinyan mentioned is bad in part as regards some of the categories, then under the Jewish law the whole is bad. It is bad in part as it shows that coins and promissory notes cannot pass by Kinyan Sudar. It is true that there is a difference of opinion as to whether Kinyan Agav passes bills or not, or whether they require only endorsement and delivery, as also on the doctrine of “partly bad, wholly bad”. But there are enough authorities in favour of the plaintiff who is the Muchzac, and he can successfully contend, relying on the doctrine of Kimli, that Kinyan being bad in part, the whole is bad. Nor can I accept the defendants' contention that the intention of the testator would cure the defective execution. I can only gather the intention from the language used, and this shows clearly that if Kinyan was performed, the Kinyan performed or the order and manner of its performance shows that it was bad, at any rate as to several categories of property disposed of. It seems to me that both the testator and the attesting witnesses had some idea that Kinyan was necessary, though they did not know which Kinyan, and the manner in which it was to be performed, and the language in the will seems to have been taken from some common formula. This is supported by Howard's evidence.

This brings me to the question of delivery. Assuming that Kinyan was performed and it was good Kinyan, the question is whether the will was delivered to the donees or to an agent on their behalf or whether it was read over to or the contents known by them. The Jewish law requires a deed or a will to be delivered to the donee or legatee or to an agent on his behalf for its validity, and the question is whether this requirement was complied with in this case. This of course is a question of fact and both sides have examined a witness each. I shall first refer to the plaintiff's witness Howard.

Howard was a confidential clerk of Bunin in the employ of the firm for thirty-six years. For two years he was an Honorary Magistrate at Aden, and thereafter the post was abolished. Then, when he was in their service, he had his private business to which he attended after he resigned from the firm in 1922. His salary from the firm was Rs. 250 per month. He resigned from the firm as he was smarting under the firm's refusal to give him a house for Rs. 6,000 in cash and take a mortgage for the balance. All this was in Bunin's lifetime. In December 1922, he was employed by the plaintiff on Rs. 300 per month to help him in a general way in regard to his case and the will. In 1924 an agreement was arrived at between him and the plaintiff by which he was engaged to conduct his case in Aden on a remuneration of Rs. 18,000 in addition to his salary of Rs. 300 per month. At that time there was no bar in Aden Courts.

He describes how the will came to be made. According to him, Bunin told him that he wanted to make a will, and handed him a paper containing instructions in writing as regards the last disposition of his property. He also handed to him another paper which he said was given to him by Yakub Mesha, one of the attesting witnesses. That contained a form of the will. Bunin then asked him to draw up the will on the basis of those two papers. The witness prepared a draft and handed it to Bunin. He kept that with him for a day or two and then he called the witness and made some correction in the draft. He then gave it back to the witness for making a fair copy. That was done and the fair copy was handed over to Bunin, and the latter put it in a desk in the presence of the witness. A day or two later he called the witness and asked him to assist him in writing the will. On the first day he wrote about half the will, and on the following day he completed it. The will was written by Bunin when he was quite alone and in fact he had stationed a servant at the outer door with instructions not to admit any one from outside. The room in which the writing was done was used by Bunin, Judah and the witness, but on these two occasions Judah was not present and remained on the second floor. On the second day after completing the writing Bunin signed the will in the presence of the witness. Then he sent a servant to call Yakub Mesha and David Izhac. They came one after another within five minutes. Bunin then took out the will from his drawer and gave it to Yakub Mesha, told him that it was his will and he had signed it. Then he asked both of them to attest it. The witness was present throughout, and nobody else. Then Yakub Mesha signed the will and was followed by David Izhac. They signed after writing the attestation clause. The attestation clause was dictated by the witness to Yakub Mesha out of his note-book which he had handed over to the witness. Nobody read the document, neither was it read out. The two attesting witnesses then salaamed (bowed to) Bunin and went away, and nothing more happened at that time. After they had gone Bunin took an envelope from the witness and sealing wax. He then folded the will, put it in an envelope, closed it and sealed it, and wrote on the back of the envelope “This is my will”. The envelope is produced in Court and bears the writing of Bunin. Bunin then took the closed envelope to an inner room, opened his private iron safe, and put it in and then closed it. On the day that Bunin died, the witness went to his house, then Judah sent a servant to fetch the keys from one of the Bunin's widows. The keys were brought and the witness was asked to find out the burial permit from Bunin's private safe. It is common ground that such permit is required for the purpose of being buried in the old cemetery, and Bunin had obtained such permit in his lifetime for himself and for his family. The witness went to the safe and looked for the permit, but could not find it. When he was searching for the permit, he saw a bundle of papers tied in a kerchief, and when he untied the kerchief he found the will in the same condition. As he could not find the permit he tied the bundle again leaving the will in the bundle. When he saw it, the envelope had not been opened.

The witness examined on behalf of the defendants is Tob, one of the executors and a party to the suit. His evidence, so far as material, is to the following effect:—

“In 1919 he made up his mind to make a will. I came to know about the existence of No. 4 on the same day it was written. He had informed me that before he left for Aden he intended to make his will. That was probably in June or July 1919. He personally told me so. On that day I was discussing business with him, and after the discussion he told me that he wanted to make his will, before he left Aden. At that time there was nothing more said. I used to see him about four or five times a day. My office is on the ground floor and Bunin's office is on the first floor. Our residence is on the second floor. The whole of the ground floor is used for office and godown. The first floor is used partly for office purposes and partly as residential quarters. On this occasion he had called me to his room. When Bunin required anything he called me up and if I required to talk to him I went up myself. After discussing the business he told me that he wanted to make a will. In the room in which Bunin had his seat Judah and Howard were also sitting. There was an inner room in that room. There is a safe in that inner room. In the outer room there is an almirah which contains important business papers, books recording withdrawals by the partners, receipts of debts due by others, etc. The key of the almirah used to remain with Bunin as the senior member. The key of the safe was kept in a tin box in the almirah. The safe contains the will of my father and grandfather, certain agreements and releases between the partners, and also other papers pertaining to the business of the firm.

The next thing which I heard about the will was that Bunin told me that he had made a will. That was told to me by Bunin on the very day he made the will. Nothing was told to me in between. When he talked to me about his intention to make the will Howard was not present. He was also not present when Bunin told me that he had made a will. Bunin told me about 4 p.m In the noon-time of that day I had seen Yacub Mesha, David Izhac and Howard with Bunin in Bunin's room, when I had put my head in the room. I did not go inside the room. I saw it from the door. I then went away to my room. When I passed by Bunin's room the doors were not closed, they were open in the manner as these doors (he points out the doors of the Court room) are open. They always used to remain open. At about 4 p.m Bunin told me ‘Thank God, I have already made my will and I have written legacies to the children of the house and that the will is kept with Judah’. He told me that Judah was going to inform me what was in the will. On that occasion he did not say anything else. I also said nothing.

“The next day I saw Judah in the office and he gave me certain information.”

Howard's evidence is attacked as being the evidence of an interested witness. The same objection applies to the evidence of Tob, if anything, with more force. The question is which is a natural story.

One thing is clear that although Judah and Tob were on the premises and available, they were not taken into confidence by Bunin. Then if Tob's evidence is true, there is no reason why Judah should have been told what the will was and about the will, and not Tob.

Another point on which the parties are at conflict is at to where the will was kept. The evidence is conflicting as to this. The defendants' version is that the will was kept in an almirah in the room in which Bunin, Judah and Howard used to sit. The plaintiff's version is that it used to be kept in the private safe of Bunin which was in the inner room. Having regard to the fact that the wills of the ancestors of the parties were kept in that safe, the story of the plaintiff is more probable. Then the permit which was an important document was also kept in the safe. Tob knows nothing about it and has not ventured to contradict Howard's evidence on this point. If the permit was in the safe, as I hold it was, it would strengthen the probability of the will also having been kept in the safe.

Another point on which there is a conflict of testimony is as regards the possession of the keys of the almirah and of the safe. Admittedly they remained with Bunin until he was in Aden. When he left, he must have given the keys of the almirah in which the business papers were kept to Judah, and when Judah went out of Aden he must have passed them on to Tob. But the question is, did Bunin give the key of the safe either to Judah or Tob? Tob admits that the wills of his father and grandfather were kept in the safe, as also certain agreements and releases between the partners. These would be important documents. It is true that he also kept his business papers there. But if there was an almirah in the office room itself, it is not likely that Bunin would keep any business papers in the safe. Then Tob admits that the will was sealed and it was in a bundle. This supports Howard's evidence. The envelope produced before me shows that it was sealed and apparently not opened till some time after the death of Bunin.

But accepting the whole of Tob's evidence, there is nothing to show (1) that Judah knew of the contents of the will, or that he told Tob what they were; or (2) that the will was delivered to Judah. Tob's case is that he saw the will, that is to say, the sealed envelope in the almirah, and this would not amount to a delivery under the law. Tob has not stated that the will was delivered to Judah, nor does he say that it was delivered to Judah on behalf of the legatees. All he says is that Bunin told him that he handed the will to Judah. This is a futile statement and this is not enough under the law. When there is delivery of the will by the donor or the testator, the authorities show that it must be on behalf of the donees and the agent must accept it as such on their behalf. There is nothing in Tob's evidence about this. All that Tob says briefly is, (1) the will was given to judah, (2) he himself saw the will long afterwards in a sealed envelope in an almirah, and (3) that the key of the almirah was available to and remained with Judah and him. This seems to me to be of no effect. If Bunin gave the will to Judah, why should Judah have kept it in the almirah to which everybody had access. Judah in that case would keep it in his own safe.

Howard, on the other hand, seems to be a confidential servant, the only person connected with the firm who was allowed to be present, as admitted by Tob, at the time of making and attestation of the will. Judah used to sit in the same room, and admittedly he was not present. Then it is said that Howard was interested in this case. Up to 1928 he was the plaintiff's agent to conduct his case as a pleader or advocate at Aden, as there was no bar at Aden up to that year. He knew English and Hebrew, was an Honorary Magistrate and a business man, and it is not surprising that the plaintiff should have engaged him. Nor is there anything improbable in Howard's story that he saw the will long after. That seems to be Tob's case also. Howard's evidence as to instructions given to him by Bunin and the form of the will and how the will was copied and from what, is not challenged in cross-examination.

The position then, is that there is no evidence that Kinyan was performed. If such an important ceremony was gone through, it would be natural for Tob to know of it and probably it would be performed in his presence, and yet there is not one word in his evidence about it. On a careful consideration I see no reason to distrust the evidence of Howard, considering the way in which he gave it, and the probabilities are in favour of him, and I must, therefore, reject the evidence of Tob.

It is argued that Judah was the guardian of the minor David and therefore delivery to him was delivery to the minor. In my opinion, there has been no delivery as required by the Jewish law. But assuming there was any delivery, there is no evidence to show that the will was read over to Judah or that he knew the contents of it.

The next point is about the nature of the property given. The clause dealing with this is somewhat curious. I am clear about one thing. If a general expression is followed by a particular, the latter alone would pass. In that case only certain items of property which Bunin held in partnership were disposed of. This is supported by the fact that there is no reference to merchandise, which admittedly formed no inconsiderable part of the partnership assets, and the gift in that case can only be given effect to by a division of the partnership assets. Assuming, however, that a definite share in the partnership businesses is given—which is the defendants' case—still under the authorities it is bad for double indefiniteness. Mr. Jinnah argues that Dr. Eliash finally admitted that a share in a going concern can be the subject-matter of the will or gift. I have already pointed out that all that he admitted was that a definite share in a definite existing item of property can, according to some authorites, be given, and that both he and Maimonides took a contrary view. But a going concern is another proposition. There is no authority in favour of Mr. Jinnah's contention as to this. Assuming, however, there is a difference of opinion, the heir will be entitled to rely on the doctrine of Kimli, and I need not pursue the point further. My conclusion is that the property attempted to be given can only be disposed of by a bond or a charge-will.

The last question is as to the validity of the appointment of executors. It is not very material except as to the question of delivery. The material points on which there is a difference of opinion are: (1) definiteness of property. The plaintiff relies on D17, D18 and D60A, which are in his favour. (2) That the doctrine, partly bad wholly bad, applies in this case. The plaintiff relies on D16, D56, D58, D58A, D59, D59A, and D60. I consider these good and sound and prefer to accept them in preference to the other authorities on the doctrine of Kimli. There is a difference of opinion on some other points also as to which the authorities on which the plaintiff relies seem to me to be sound, and I hold that the plaintiff is entitled to rely on them under the doctrine of Kimli.

I shall now deal briefly with some of the issues. I have held that the will is not valid, and the question of the construction of the will and the validity of the bequests does not arise. But as the case is likely to go further, I should like to record briefly my opinion on this question.

I have already stated that Bunin divided his half share in the partnership business into twelve shares. Two were given to the plaintiff. Two were given to the plaintiff's son David. As to this the provision in the will is as follows:—

“I have given (wenatati) two shares of what is mentioned above to David son of my son Mesha lands and houses and over them (Agav’ an) chattels (metaltelin) and coins and promissory notes the latter with all the rights contained therein as an absolute manifest and open gift by a Kinyan on a kerchief (Suddar) from this date if I do not change my mind until after my life and I have conveyed (wezikkiti) to him the aforesaid two shares through my brother Judah Menahem Messa and I have deposited them now in his hands that he shall give to him till the duration of thirteen years from the undermentioned date.”

Then two shares are given to Zion, son of Judah, defendant No. 6; and one to Mesha, son of defendant No. 1. Now Mesha died in 1920. Then one share was given to Jacob, defendant No. 7; and one to Meshoomar, defendant No. 8. Three shares were undisposed of. Then the testator stated as follows:—

“I declare my intention and desire that I have given the abovementioned gifts on condition that all the gifts shall remain in the partnership business of the firm Menahem Messa until the duration of fifteen years from this day.”

Then the testator gave a legacy of Rs. 50,000 to the plaintiff in these words:—

“My son Mesha there shall be given to him out of my property Rs. 50,000 for trading on his own account and there shall also be given to my said son Mesha out of my property Rs. 500 every month for his expenses.”

He then gave a legacy to Mesha, son of Judah, in these words:—

“Mesha son of my brother Judah there shall be given to him out of my property Rs. 50,000, after fifteen years from this day.”

Then he made a provision for his widows for their life, and left the residue to himself for life and thereafter to the plaintiff. The question now is, which of these bequests are valid, and what is their effect?

As regards the share given to Mesha, son of defendant No. 1, there is no dispute that as he predeceased the testator, the legacy lapses and would fall into the residue, and pass to the plaintiff. The residue and the three shares undisposed of which Bunin reserves for himself, would of course be taken by the plaintiff, as also the two shares given to him. The dispute is with regard to the legacy to the plaintiff's son and the legacies to defendants Nos. 6, 7 and 8. David died since the suit, and the plaintiff is his heir, so that the benefit of that legacy also now comes to the plaintiff. The plaintiff says that all these bequests are invalid, and defendants say that all of them are valid.

The first question is what is the property which Bunin disposed of and which passes to the legatees. Is it his share in the partnership, or is it only some particular kinds of property which he held in partnership with his brothers and nephews?

According to the plaintiff the text 3A would come in here. The text deals with the subject of “general followed by particular”. If this doctrine applies, as I have held it does, then what was given was only certain specified items of property held by Bunin in partnership at the time. For one thing there is no reference to a going concern, no reference to merchandise, all oral debts, shares, securities, shares which admittedly formed part of the partnership assets, and these would therefore be excluded and would fall into the residue. As to coins the bequest would be bad. The dwelling houses held in partnership are admittedly excluded and would fall into the residue and go, or rather Bunin's share in them would go, to the plaintiff. As to lands and houses, there being no Kinyan, Kinyan Agav is ineffective. Then as Kinyan Sudar comes after Kinyan Agav, the Kinyan is bad. It is also bad on the doctrine “part bad, the whole bad”, and nothing passes to the legatees. Assuming, however, that the will was executed in conformity with the Jewish law and proper Kinyan was performed, then the position is that the will being revocable, the clause giving the bequest can only operate on properties as were in existence at the date of the will and at the date of the death of Bunin. The defendants' witnesses examined on commission admit that the bequest would not include merchandise, and practically admit what Dr. Eliash stated and what I have stated above. On the authorities the pecuniary gifts of Rs. 50,000 to the plaintiff and to the son of Judah are bad, apart from the fact that they are given in what is called the language of futurity, as there is no Kinyan performed with regard to them. They will therefore fall into the residue. Then whatever falls into the residue passes to the plaintiff and the executors are accountable to him with regard to the same and cannot as against him continue in possession of the residue.

The real question is as to the two shares of David and of the seven shares, two of the plaintiff, two of Zion, one of Mesha, one of Yacub and one of Meshoomar. Of these I have dealt with the share given to Mesha and the two shares of David. As to gift to David which Judah was asked to hold for thirteen years, the position in law would be that the executors would be bound to reduce the share and hold it in possession for thirteen years. The condition of course is good. In that case the executors ought to have realised it and invested the proceeds in authorized securities. As regards the gifts to the other legatees, which were to be continued in their hands for fifteen years, the condition may be good, but then the question is what is the effect?

Two questions arise: Would the legatees share the profits and losses of the business after the date of the gift, and, in any case, after the death of Bunin? Or, would the legacies, or rather their value when realized, merely be deposits to the credit of the legatees in the business? It is clear on the authorities that an executor cannot carry on business at the expense of the estate unless there is a clear authority or direction by the testator to that effect. It is argued that there is such a direction in this case. But I am unable to accept the argument. The words are:—

“… and I declared my intention and desire that I have given the above-mentioned gifts on condition that all the gifts shall remain in the partnership business of the firm Menahem Messa until the duration of 15 years from this day.”

The period fixed by the deed of partnership had expired. The partnership then was one at will and became dissolved on Bunin's death. Assuming this was the partnership referred to, it became dissolved on Judah's death. Then it is clear that if the plaintiff objects, the executors can at most continue the business with four shares only. But as to the three shares which fell into the residue and one of Mesha, there is no condition. How can the business then go on? In my opinion on the facts and having regard to the language used, the proper legal position would be, assuming that the gifts are good, the executors will have to estimate and realize the value of the shares as on the death of Bunin and the amount will remain credited in the firm to the respective legatees, and I think an account will have to be taken on this footing. It is difficult to see how the surviving partners or executors can use the amounts of the legacies in the business and carry on the business so as to make the legatees partners in a going concern.

Upon the whole I have reached the conclusion that the will is bad and invalid, and was not in accordance with the Jewish law.

This is a difficult case, and if I may say so, of an unusual nature, as it involves questions of law with which I am not familiar and about which standard works are not available in this country. The books are in Hebrew, and they were produced by Dr. Eliash when he gave evidence. There is no Hebrew interpreter in this Court; and I have already pointed out the difficulty of getting the texts translated. The arguments of counsel lasted for more than three weeks. My task would have been considerably onerous had it not been for the assistance which was freely given to me by counsel, which I should like most sincerely to acknowledge here. But they were also labouring under the same disadvantage. Thanks, however, to Dr. Eliash, my task has been considerably lightened in this respect. In all my experience both at the bar and on the bench I have not come across an expert witness more lucid and clear, intelligent and transparently honest, than Dr. Eliash. He has a remarkable grip over this abstruse and ancient law, and above all a gift of clear expression. He has been attacked by counsel for the defendants as an interested witness. After making due allowance for the fact that he has been engaged by the plaintiff, I have no hesitation in saying that he has given his evidence in a perfectly straightforward manner, as a person who only speaks of what he knows and expresses opinions based not only on authorities to which he refers, but from an inner consciousness and honest Conviction as to their correctness.

I would not like to conclude the judgment without giving a piece of advice to the parties, and in particular to the plaintiff. The parties are all related and the family firm has been in existence and been carried on by the family since before 1867. It will be some years before this litigation would finally come to an end and the rights and liabilities of the parties finally determined, and still some more, before they will be worked out and given effect to. As far as I can see, enormous costs have been incurred by the parties and Still more will have to be incurred. At one time the disputes were almost settled, but some little hitch occurred. Even in the course of the hearing the parties took a week's adjournment to settle the suit, but the negotiations came to nothing. I would urge upon the parties these considerations and ask them to pause and seriously consider whether it would not be far wiser for them to meet each other in a spirit of mutual tolerance and give and take, continue the family traditions, ties and affection, which, as far as I can see, have bound the family and its members for many many years. To the plaintiff I would say that there is an excellent principle which the law and the faith, of which I have no doubt he is a devout follower, inculcates. The Jewish law enjoins upon the son, as does the Hindu law, to follow the wishes of his father and says that it is the son's pious duty to carry out the wishes of his dead father. Although I have held as a Judge that the “precept to fulfil the words of the deceased” does not apply to the facts of this case, the spirit of it, I think, does; and as a devout son it is his moral duty to obey the spirit, if not the law, of this excellent maxim. I hope that these last words of mine would not go in vain, but inspire the parties with a genuine desire to come closer to each other and settle their disputes in a spirit of love and goodwill, remembering that Bunin at any rate wished that the estate should be managed in the way he has indicated.

In the result, there will be a decree for the plaintiff in terms of prayers (a), (b) and (c) of the plaint. Relief in prayer (g) is reserved in order to enable the parties to come to some arrangement. Otherwise there will be a reference to the Commissioner.

There remains only the question of costs. The defendants are executors and legatees. There is no suggestion that any of them procured the will or in any manner influenced Bunin in making the will and appointing the first three defendants as executors. It is not suggested that the will was brought about by undue influence, fraud, etc., on their part. It was Bunin who has put them in the position in which they now find themselves. The will was confirmed by the Sheriah, a body which admittedly has some sort of jurisdiction over the Jews in Aden and, at least some members of which know something about the Hebrew law. The questions involved were new and, complicated, and as far as I have been able to ascertain, have never come up for decision in any British Court on the Eastern side of Port Said. It is doubtful whether an average Jew knows the law involved in this case. As I have held, some of the members of the Sheriah do not seem to possess any sufficient knowledge of it. Under these circumtances, it is difficult to see what position other than the one which the defendants have taken could possibly have been taken by them. After stating their position the defendants have by their written statement submitted to the orders of the Court. It is said that the defendants should not have contested this suit at any rate after the Alexandria judgment and therefore they are not entitled to any costs. If I had felt that they had in fact contested the Alexandria suit, there might have been some force in this argument. Though the Alexandria judgment is in law not an ex parte judgment, in fact it is. What happened was that on the day fixed for the hearing the defendants' lawyer asked for an adjournment which, according to him, had already been agreed to by the plaintiffs lawyer. This arrangement was denied by the plaintiff's representative, and the application was rejected by the Court. The defendants' lawyer thereupon withdrew his appearance from the suit. If the law and practice at Alexandria is the same as here or as in England, the defendants might have applied for having the ex parte judgment set aside. They did not take that course. But it must be remembered that during the pendency of the action and even before the judgment of the Alexandria Court was delivered, an action raising the same question was already pending in this Court. See defendants' written statement, para. 6. It is difficult, therefore, to see why the defendants should not have preferred to pursue the matter in a Court in this presidency to applying in the Alexandria Court for having the judgment set aside. They wanted a thorough investigation into the question and they preferred to put their case before the Court within the jurisdiction of which they were domiciled and property situate. That being the position, I am unable to see on what principle they should be deprived of the benefit of the ordinary rule which applies in such cases. Under these circumstances, the order that I make is that the costs of all parties to come out of the estate, those of defendants Nos. 1, 2, 3 and 4 as between attorney and client.

The partnership suit should be on my board after I return from the Sessions, subject to a part heard, but not to be called on before November 26, 1934.

[August 31, 1934]. This matter is set down before me for argument on the question of costs, inasmuch as when I delivered my judgment, I had not the advantage of hearing senior counsel in the case on this point. I may say at once that counsel in the case have put their each respective cases fairly and concisely. Mr. Desai on behalf of the plaintiff says that in any case defendant No. 4 ought not to get separate costs, and that at most he may be entitled to get costs incurred by him up to his written statement. As to defendants Nos. 1, 2 and 3, he submits that they were bound by the judgment in the Aden Court, and, secondly, by the opinion of the Rabbinical Court in Palestine which was obtained by the plaintiff and a copy of which was sent to the defendants, so that before they came to the Court they had ample notice that the will was bad according to the Jewish law and according to the judgment of the Alexandria Court. First as to the costs of defendants Nos. 1, 2 and 3, I have already given my reason for making the order of costs when I delivered my judgment, and I do not wish to say anything more about it. I have pointed out there that the judgment though it was final and though in law it could not be said to be ex parte, still at that time the defendants were prosecuting a suit in Aden on the same question in a British Court. As regards the opinion of the Rabbinical Court, that is not exhibited before me and was never produced before me, and as far as my recollection goes, there is no evidence that any copy of it was furnished to the defendants. But assuming that it was and the opinion was there, in view of the very difficult questions which arose in the case, and the fact that even in the texts there was a great divergence of view on many of the vital points in the case, and that until now at any rate the Sheriah was looked upon as competent to pronounce opinion on questions similar to these and they had pronounced in favour of the validity of the will, I think the defendants were justified in contesting the will. But then it is said that apart from the will they set up a separate case, namely, an arrangement as a result of which they claim that the provision of the will in effect should be carried out. Now as far as I can see from the record, it seems to me that they never set up any separate agreement as such, but they relied on the contents of the will in support of their plea that there was an arrangement between the parties by which the rights of parties were declared by Bunin in the will, and the mere fact that they asked for a separate issue does not alter the position. Then I do not wish to add anything to what I have already said on the question of costs, except perhaps to state that Mr. Setalvad relies on Vol. I of Williams on Executors, 11th edn., pp. 284-285, as supporting the order I have made.

As regards defendant No. 4, Mr. Desai says that he had no right to sever from the other defendants. But it may be pointed out that very serious allegations were made against these people, including defendant No. 4, and although defendant No. 4 by his written statement stated that he had no interest, I do not think there is anything in law which would prevent him from defending the suit. I think he was bound to show that the allegations were not justified. I think he has done so at minimum costs. He took no part in the case, and I do not see why I should deprive him of his costs.

Upon the whole, in my opinion, there is no reason to change the order of costs which I have made. Costs of this hearing will be costs in the cause.

Defendants Nos. 1, 2, 3, 6, 7 and 8 appealed. At the hearing appellants Nos. 4 and 5 (defendants Nos. 6 and 7) were at their request transferred as respondents.

M.C Setalvad, Advocate General, with V.F Taraporewala, for appellants Nos. 2, 3 and 6.

F.J Coltman, with G.C O'Gorman and Sir Jamshedji Kanga, for respondents Nos. 1, 4 and 5.

D.B Desai, for appellants Nos. 4 and 5 who were transposed as respondents.

Setalvad. The trial Court has treated the judgment of the Alexandria Court as a judgment in rem and has applied s. 41 of the Indian Evidence Act. The term “competent Court” as used in the section refers to a British Indian Court and s. 41 has no application to the case. Assuming that the section is applicable the “Court” there referred to is a Court of the domicile. The Alexandria Court was not the Court of the domicile of the deceased and its decision is not binding outside the jurisdiction on property situate outside the jurisdiction, although a decision of a Court of the domicile would be binding as a judgment in rem.

Halsbury's Laws of England, 2nd Edn., Vol. 13., p. 420, para. 473. Castrique v. Imrie Doglioni v. Crispin, In re Trufort: Trafford v. Blanc, Enohin v. Wylie,(4) and Boyse v. Colclough: Boyse v. Rossborough, relied on. According to Dicey (Rule 97, Conflict of Laws) in an action or proceeding in rem the Courts of a foreign country have jurisdiction to determine title to any movable or immovable property within such country. These is no case which lays down that probate granted by a Court other than the Court of the domicile is binding everywhere, even on the Court of the domicile.

The finding is that the executors were not properly appointed. They cannot represent the estate or the legatees. The legatees who were really interested in the suit were not parties to the Alexandria suit. There is therefore no adjudication between proper parties to be a judgment inter partes binding under s. 13 of the Civil Procedure Code, 1908. Further, a judgment in rem would not be given effect to if it is unnecessary to the point in issue: De Mora v. Concha and Concha v. Concha. Here the properties in Alexandria being undisposed of by the will it was unnecessary for the Court to adjudicate on the validity of the will.

The proceedings in Alexandria were against natural justice inasmuch as the legatees were not cited. Also the judgment went beyond the scope of a probate action in that it decided the validity of the bequests and the construction of the will.

Coltman: The indian evidence act is a comprehensive Code for British India. It goes further than the law of other countries. There is nothing in s. 41, to justify the conclusion that the Court should be the Court of domicile. In a probate suit the appointment of an administrator creates status. Therefore the judgment of Alexandria Court which confers the status of administrator on the plaintiff is good against the whole world. There would be no need for s. 41 if the judgment is effective only in the place where it is given.

The judgment of a Probate Court which is a Court of the domicile is not the only one which is binding on other Courts: Ewing v. Orr Ewing.

The judgment of Alexandria Court is a judgment in rem. The application of s. 41 does not depend on the ultimate result of the judgment. It says “confers or takes away any legal character” and not “legal character in reference to goods or property within the jurisdiction of the ‘Court’”.

Even if s. 41 does not apply the judgment is a bar to the present action under s. 13 of the Civil Procedure Code, 1908. The executors were parties to the Alexandria suit. They are two of the appellants here. Both executors and legatees are litigating under the same title. All the beneficiaries were represented by the executors. Both are bound by the result: De Mora v. Concha. The decision was on merits and not in default of pleadings and is binding on all the parties to the suit.

The arguments of counsel on the Jewish law are stated in the judgment.

Beaumont, C.J:—This is an appeal from a decision of Mr. Justice Rangnekar. The suit was originally transferred from Aden, where the deceased testator was domiciled. So that the suit is heard by this Court as the Court which at the date of the suit had jurisdiction in the Protectorate of Aden.

The plaintiff is the only son and heir of one Bunim Menahem Mesha, who died on October 12, 1922, domiciled in Aden. The deceased left a will dated July 10, 1919, which, is exhibit C, and the plaintiff sues in this suit for a declaration that will is not the last will of Bunim, that the plaintiff is entitled to the whole estate as heir, that he is also entitled to a grant of letters of administration, and he further asks for administration. The Judge held that exhibit C was not the last will of Bunim, and, decreed the Plaintiff's suit, and from that decree this appeal is brought.

Appellant No. 1 has died, and his name has been ordered to be struck out; appellants Nos. 4 and 5 have at their own request been transposed and made respondents, and they support the other respondents; so that the only effective appellants are those originally numbered 2, 3 and 6, of whom Nos. 2 and 3 were executors under the alleged will, and No. 6 was a legatee.

At the date of the death of the deceased he was a partner with his brother, original appellant No. 1, and other relatives, in the firm of Menahem Mesha, which carried on business at Aden, and owned a considerable amount of property. In addition to property at Aden the deceased left property in Egypt. Whether that property was his own or partnership property is not clear. At any rate he had property in his name in Egypt, and in 1923 the plaintiff started a suit in the Court of Port Said, which was subsequently transferred to the Supreme Court at Alexandria, and in that suit the plaintiff challenged the will, and asked for the grant of letters of administration to himself. The defendants to the suit were the executors named in the will. On June 30, 1925, the Supreme Court at Alexandria gave judgment, holding that the will of the deceased was null and void, and they granted letters of administration to the plaintiff limited to the personal estate situate within the jurisdiction of the Court.

Mr. Justice Rangnekar in the Court below held that judgment of the Alexandria Court, being a judgment which affected status by taking away from the defendants the status of executors and conferring on the plaintiff the status of an administrator, was a judgment in rem, and binding, so far as related to the status which it established or took away, on the whole world. I am unable to agree with that view. In my judgment no Court can pronounce a judgment in rem binding outside the State in which the Court exercises jurisdiction unless such judgment affects either a thing situate, or a person domiciled, within such State, see Halsbury's Laws of England, 2nd Edn., Vol. XIII, p. 420. We have been referred to a considerable number of cases on the subject including Doglioni v. Crispin, Shaw v. Gould, Castrique v. Imrie, In re Trufort: Trafford v. Blanc, Ewing v. Orr Ewing(5) and Concha v. Concha.(6) In my opinion those cases establish the following propositions which are relevant for the purposes of this case, though they also establish a good many other propositions.

1. That where the Court of a State gives a judgment affecting the status of a person domiciled within its territory, such judgment is treated by the comity of nations as analogous to a judgment in rem, and as binding all the world over.

2. That the succession to the estate of a deceased person is governed by the law of his domicile.

3. That where a person domiciled in one country dies leaving assets situate in another country, the Courts of the latter country have jurisdiction to appoint a representative of the deceased in that country and to distribute the assets in that country according to the law of succession of the country of domicile, such law being ascertained in accordance with the ordinary laws of evidence, which usually involve calling expert witnesses on the subject. I know, however, of no case which establishes that by the comity of nations the Courts of one country are bound to accept as conclusive, on a question as to its own law and in a matter upon which it is called upon to adjudicate, the judgment of a foreign Court, and I am not prepared to accede to the proposition. Mr. Coltman for the respondents has not seriously argued that there is any rule of international law which requires this Court to accept the judgment of the Alexandria Court as to the law of the deceased's domicile, which is our own domestic law, as binding outside the limits of that Court's jurisdiction, but he argues that in British India s. 41 of the Indian Evidence Act goes further than the rule of International Law applicable elsewhere. In my opinion that is not so. Section 41 provides that “a final judgment, order or decree of a competent Court, in the exercise of probate, matrimonial, admiralty or insolvency jurisdiction, which confers upon or takes away from any person any legal character, or which declares any person to be entitled to any such character, or to be entitled to any specific thing, not as against any specified person but absolutely, is relevant when the existence of any such legal character, or the title of any such person to any such thing, is relevant”, and then the section enacts the effects of any such judgment. It is argued by the learned Advocate General for the appellant that a “Court” in that section means a Court of British India, but that, in my opinion, is plainly not so. Although the expression, is not used, the section is clearly dealing with what are known as judgments in rem, and, in my opinion, “competent-Court” means the Court of any country which is competent to pass such judgment as is referred to in the section, that is to say, putting it shortly, a judgment in rem. As, in my opinion, the Alexandria Court in this case was not competent to pass a judgment in rem in relation to a deceased person who had died domiciled in Aden, s. 41 of the Indian Evidence Act does not help the respondents. It is not disputed by the appellants that the judgment of the Alexandrian Court is binding upon them, whether or not they were parties to the decision, in respect of the assets situate in Egypt. So that it is not necessary for us to consider whether in respect of those assets the judgment of the Court binds any one but the parties before it. In my opinion, however, the argument of the appellants is right that in respect of assets outside Egypt the judgment of the Alexandrian Court has no effect as a judgment in rem.

The next question is whether it has effect as a judgment inter partes, and is binding on the parties to the suit under s. 13 of the Code of Civil Procedure, which provides that a foreign judgment shall be conclusive as to any matter thereby directly adjudicated upon between the same parties or between parties under whom they or any of them claim litigating under the same title, with certain exceptions, which in my opinion do not apply to this case. I think therefore that the judgment is binding on the persons who were parties to the suit, that is to say, the original appellants Nos. 2 and 3, but the original appellant No. 6 was not a party. It is suggested that he is bound because he was a legatee claiming under the will, and the executors appointed by the will were parties to the litigation in Egypt. One may assume, I think, that by the rules of procedure of the Alexandrian Court the executors sufficiently represented the legatees under the will for the purposes of the suit, but it is going rather further to say that legatees claim through the executors, seeing that the title of a legatee may clearly be good, although the title of the executor is bad. In the present case it is to be noticed that in his plaint in the Alexandrian suit the plaintiff challenged the appointment of the executors, apart altogether from the alleged invalidity of the will, his contention being that as the deceased left a major heir, it was not competent for him by Jewish law to appoint an executor. The Court upheld that contention. It seems to me, therefore, impossible to say that in that particular suit the executors, whose title as such was successfully challenged, can be held to have properly represented the legatees so as to bind them. In my opinion, therefore, the judgment of the Alexandrian Court is not binding upon appellant No. 6, who was not a party to it.

It is therefore necessary to consider whether the will of the deceased is binding according to the law in force in Aden. The parties are Jews, and expert evidence was given as to the law affecting Jews domiciled in Aden, and the learned Judge went at great length through the texts which had been cited, and the expert evidence, and arrived at the conclusion that the will was invalid according to the law of the testator's domicile. As I agree with the conclusion of the learned Judge on that point it is not necessary for me to go at any great length through the texts and the expert evidence. The defendants had examined on commission some people called Sharias, people who had been appointed Sharias in Aden, and they seem to be persons having some knowledge of Jewish law in Aden. The learned Judge came to the conclusion that they were not experts, and in any case they were plainly not impartial, because they had been appointed Sharias by the firm in which the defendants and the deceased had been partners, and I agree with the learned Judge that their evidence is not of any value. The only real expert who was called was Dr. Eliash, on whose evidence and demeanour in the box the learned Judge commented very favourably. Dr. Eliash in his evidence states the classes of wills which can be made under Jewish law, and his evidence in the main is that Jewish law is the same all the world over. He says:—

“The main forms in which a will can be made under the Jewish law are three. A direct will in the sense of the Roman testamenti-factio is not possible under the Jewish law. The widest formula for disposing of any property is by way of a conditional bond or charge, whereby the devisor undertakes towards the recipient an obligation in a sum of money which may be discharged by delivery to the recipient of either a certain chattel or a certain share in the estate. In that way he leaves the heirs an option either to discharge the obligation in the terms stated or by delivering the object intended or the share in the estate. He would obviously increase the obligation to such an extent as to leave the heirs no option but to give the part of the estate or the object intended. The second way is by way of gift inter vivos which is to operate after his death. This again falls into two main divisions, namely irrevocable and revocable. The third way which can only be made use of by a person on sick bed is donatio mortis causa.”

There is no doubt that the will in the present case is made in the second form, and as to that the witness goes on to give the following evidence:—

“The second way is always a gift in form but in essence it is testamentary disposition. The object which may be given away is limited to the following: It must be definitely known, and definable. It must be in the possession of the donor and it must exist at the time when the gift is created. If the thing donated ceases to exist between the time the gift is created and the death of the donor the result would vary according as the gift is revocable or irrevocable. If it is irrevocable, then the donee has a claim against the estate for its equivalent. If it is revocable then he has no claim and the very fact that the object has ceased to exist is the best evidence of revocation.”

Then he was asked as to the conditions affecting a gift of the second class, and he says:—

“As regards the execution of the deed there must be a Kinyan. Kinyan is like symbolical transfer of property.”

The witness then referred to many texts, and I would only mention exhibits D9, 10, 16 and 18 as corroborating the evidence of the witness. D18 gives an illustration, which is, I think, apposite. The author of the text points out that a gift of a half share of a field would be good, because the Court would assume that the donor meant the worst half share of the field, and that the donee accepted the gift on that basis, a rule which might not appeal to the sentiments of all nationalities. But then the learned author goes on to say that a gift of a share in land which the donor had in partnership with others would be bad as being too indefinite, because it could not be assumed that the donor as a partner was entitled either to the best or the worst half of the land. Now the present will is, as I have said, clearly in form a will of the second class described by Dr. Eliash, and purports to have been effected by Kinyan, that is, symbolical delivery of possession. The testator was, I think, aware of the difficulty of giving a share in a partnership which might exist at his death, because that would not be a share of definite property in his possession. For some reason or other he did not adopt the form of making his will by means of a conditional bond. As I read his will, what he does do is this. He gives all his property, lands and houses, and chattels and coins and promissory notes which he had got in partnership with his brother and with the other relatives he mentions, and he gives that property in different shares amongst the legatees. In all the testator endeavoured to dispose specifically of nine-twelfths of his total share, leaving the other three-twelfths undisposed of. What exactly would be included in the word “property”, whether that would embrace things like merchandise, or other property not specifically mentioned, may be doubtful, but, at any rate, what the testator has purported to do, as I read his will, is to give specific property which he then holds in partnership with others, and to give that specific property in certain shares. It seems to me quite impossible to say that is a gift of specific definite property which is in the possession of the donor. The interest which the testator had in this property was in his capacity as a partner in a subsisting partnership. It seems to have been a partnership at will on the terms of a deed which had come to an end in 1916, but, at any rate, it was a subsisting partnership, and continued to subsist until the death of the testator. The testator could not say that any particular asset belonging to the partnership belonged to him. His only right was to share in the profits of the partnership and to share in the assets on a winding up. But it was plainly quite impossible for him to take possession of any particular asset of the partnership and still more impossible for him, after taking possession of such asset, to hand over shares of that asset to his legatees. The will, in my opinion, was clearly one which a Jew domiciled in Aden was incompetent to make, and that really disposes of the case.

A good many other objections were taken to the will, and those objections have been argued, and the respondents do not desire to abandon them. I can however dispose of them shortly. It is said that it is not proved that effective Kinyan was ever performed. As to that my impression is that as the testator alleges in, his will that Kinyan was performed, Kinyan being a purely symbolical act of delivery, we should have to accept the testator's admission as conclusive.

A much more serious difficulty in the way of the appellants is that according to the evidence of Dr. Eliash and the texts on which he relies, a will of this character to be effective, must be delivered to the intended donees or to some one on their behalf. Two witnesses gave evidence as to the custody of the deceased's will after it was made, namely Mr. Howard, and Tob, a nephew of the deceased, and the learned Judge accepted the evidence of Howard. His evidence is that directly the will was executed it was placed by the testator in a sealed envelope, and locked up in his safe. The evidence of Tob is that it was not in the safe, but was in an almirah or cupboard, which was in the partnership office and of which the deceased as senior partner generally had the key, but that when he went away he left the key with his brother Judah, and sometimes told the witness to keep the key. But even if one accepted the evidence that the will was in a sealed envelope in the almirah, although I should think it much more probable that it was in the safe, in my opinion it is impossible to say that the mere fact that partners were given possession of the key of the cupboard would amount to delivery of this will, which was in a sealed envelope. Clearly they would have been guilty of a gross breach of confidence if they had taken the will out of the envelope or made any use of it. I am disposed to think, therefore, that the will is not proved to have been delivered to the legatees or any one on their behalf, and under Jewish law that alone would invalidate it.

The appellants also sought to rely on the doctrine of precept, by which a son may be bound to carry out the wishes of his deceased, father, but the text relied on, exhibit E, says:

“There is a precept to fulfil the words of the deceased, even in case of a healthy person who made testamentary provisions and died, but only provided if he at the same time delivered the property to a third person for that purpose.”

As in my opinion the property was incapable of delivery in this case, the doctrine of ‘precept’ can have no application.

Reference has also been made to the doctrine of Kimli, which is discussed in the judgment of the learned Judge. That seems to be a rule under which a party in possession of property, if he can cite two texts in his favour, is entitled to call Kimli, and thereupon his title, as I understand it, is indefeasible. Mr. Coltman's client is in possession, but though Mr. Coltman cited more than two texts in his favour, he did not call “Kimli”, and, if he had, we could not in my opinion, have paid any attention. The doctrine seems to be in the nature of a rule of procedure and to be inconsistent with the indian evidence act. We have to make up our minds as best we can from the texts and the expert evidence as to what the Jewish law is. We cannot, in my judgment, accept a rule which compels us to stop the inquiry at a certain point and to shut out evidence admissible under the indian evidence act. I mention the doctrine, because the appellants, although they did not say Kimli in this Court, nevertheless desire to reserve the right to rely on the doctrine in the event of an appeal.

In my opinion the appeal fails because the will of the testator was not made in accordance with the system of law by which he was bound, and must be dismissed. Appellants Nos. 2, 3 and 6 to pay the plaintiff's costs of the appeal. No order as to costs of Mr. Desai's clients, who are newly added as respondents. Cross-objections dismissed with costs. Administration order stayed.

B.J Wadia, J. There are several questions of law and fact arising on this appeal. The first important question relates to the effect which this Court would give to the judgment and order of the Supreme Court of Alexandria, dated June 30, 1925. As the learned Judge in the Court below has observed, the question is not an easy one. The principles, however, on which it can be decided have been considered in the several cases that were cited and discussed before us. The Alexandria Court declared the will of Bunin dated July 10, 1919, to be null and void and of no effect, and ordered letters of administration to issue to the plaintiff, the 1st respondent in this appeal, who is the only son and heir of the deceased, to the estate of the deceased lying within the jurisdiction of that Court on the footing of the deceased having died intestate. It was urged that even if it was not necessary for the Judge in that Court to decide against the validity of the will for the purpose of the proceedings before it, yet that in fact he had decided it, and his decision was recorded in the order of the Court, and that therefore his decision on the point was conclusive against the world. Section 41 of the Indian Evidence Act deals with what are known as judgments in rem. The term judgment in rem is not used in the indian evidence act, but it is clear that the section incorporates the law on the subject. It is not easy to give any satisfactory and comprehensive definition of a judgment in rem, but it is defined in the Duchess of Kingston's Case, Smith's Leading Cases, 13th edn., Vol. II, p. 666, as “an adjudication pronounced (as indeed its name denotes) upon the status of some particular subject-matter, by a tribunal having competent authority for that purpose,” and Cozens Hardy M.R cited this definition with approval in Hill v. Clifford: Clifford v. Timms: Clifford v. Phillips. It is further stated that such an adjudication, “being a most solemn declaration from the proper and accredited quarter that the status of the thing adjudicated upon is as declared, concludes all persons from saying that the status of the thing adjudicated upon was not such as declared by the adjudication.” It is thus conclusive for or against all persons, whether parties, privies, or strangers, to the matter actually decided.

The judgment of the Court at Alexandria was pronounced in its probate Jurisdiction. It purported to take away the status of the executors mentioned in the will, and to confer upon the plaintiff the status of an administrator, the Court confining its grant of letters of administration to the estate of the deceased within its jurisdiction. It further declared that the plaintiff was solely entitled to all the real and personal estate of the deceased within that jurisdiction. A judgment of a Court of Probate which creates the status of an administrator is on the face of it a judgment in rem, and the question is whether the judgment of the Alexandria Court is of a character which bars the defendants from setting up the will in this suit with regard to properties other than those which were the subject of the proceedings in that Court. In other words, the question is whether that judgment has created for the plaintiff the status of an administrator ‘absolutely’, to use the word mentioned in section 41. If so, was the Alexandria Court competent to create it? I do not think that the word ‘Court’ in section 41 is restricted to a Court in British India, and I agree with the observation of Chandavarkar, J. in Chanmalapa Chenbasapa v. Abdul Vahab, though it was only obiter, that it is not so restricted. I do not see any reason why the judgment of a foreign Court should be excluded from the operation of s. 41, provided it is competent to pronounce a judgment such as is contemplated by the section. If the Court is competent to pronounce a judgment in rem, its effect would be to bind not only the persons who were parties to the suit, but all persons and all Courts, until it was set aside. It would be a judgment conclusive against the world as to the status or title which it established. It is not in dispute that the deceased Bunin was domiciled in and was a resident of Aden up to the time of his death. It is also not in dispute that the Alexandria Court was not the Court of domicile. As stated in Halsbury's Laws of England, 2nd edn., Vol. XIII, p. 420, para. 473, a judgment in rem can have no effect as such beyond the limits of the State within which the Court delivering the judgment exercises jurisdiction, unless the thing affected is situate, or the person affected is domiciled, within those limits. The two cases relating to the exercise of the Court's jurisdiction when a person is domiciled within its limits, which are cited in the foot-note, are matrimonial cases. But a decree for divorce which alters the status of parties to a marriage and which might, as it often does, affect the legitimacy of after-born children, is certainly much more like a judgment in rem than a judgment in personam, and the principle underlying such a judgment is the same as the judgment of a competent Court in the Probate Division. That is clear from s. 41 itself. The person affected by the judgment of the Alexandria Court, namely Bunin, was not domiciled within the limits of its jurisdiction, and as to the thing affected, only a small portion of his estate was actually lying within those limits. It is a well-known rule that the moveable property of a deceased, in whatever country it is locally situate, is regarded as to succession, whether testate or intestate, by the law of the country to which he belongs, that is by the law of the domicile. The material point, however, is to determine the effect of a grant of letters of administration in a country other than that of the domicile. The grant no doubt follows upon the judgment. The judgment of the Alexandria Court has purported, to create a status of administrator in the plaintiff by declaring against the will. A question of status, however, is a question which has to be determined according to the law of the domicile. Can a foreign Court decide a question of status which is to be absolute as against the world? It is argued that it is open to the foreign Court to ascertain as best as it can the law of the domicile by taking expert evidence on the subject when necessary, and it can then pronounce judgment upon the question of status. The argument seems to be based an certain dicta in cases where it is said that a judgment in rem in order to have a binding effect upon all the world in respect of moveable property need not be a judgment of a Court of exclusive jurisdiction, and that such judgment need not necessarily be a judgment of the Court of domicile, provided the Court which pronounced it follows the law of the domicile. But so far as I am able to gather from the cases which have been cited and discussed, such expert evidence is taken in a foreign Court whenever it is necessary for that Court to ascertain the law of the domicile for the purpose of determining the succession to moveables within its jurisdiction in order to enable that Court to make its grant, just as in this case the Alexandria Court has made a grant limited to the moveables belonging to the estate of the deceased within its jurisdiction. Such a grant operates merely for the purpose of getting in or collecting the property within the juridiction of the foreign Court. In Dicey's Conflict of Laws, 5th edn., p. 484, Rule 118 is stated in this way:—

“A valid foreign judgment in rem in respect of the title to a moveable gives a valid title to the moveable in England to the extent to which such title is given by or under the judgment in the country where the judgment is pronounced.”

In his commentary Dicey observes that a valid foreign judgment or judicial proceeding in rem which either directly or indirectly determines the title to a moveable is conclusive against all the world; and he adds that “this applies to all proceedings in rem against moveable property within the jurisdiction of the Court pronouncing the judgment.” In my opinion, therefore, the judgment of the Alexandria Court has not the absolute effect of creating the status contemplated by s. 41, but has effect only qua the property situate within the jurisdiction of that Court. A judgment in rem as to status ‘absolutely’ must be decided by the law of the domicile and in the Court of domicile which, is the best judge of that law. Otherwise there might be an anomalous position, if there were two judgments in rem, one of a Court of competent jurisdiction having decided in rem, and another of a foreign Court which may also proceed in rem and pronounce a contrary decree with regard to the same res or subject-matter. There cannot be two judgments in rem on the question of status having effect absolutely, that is, against all the world. The only judgment in rem as to status absolutely is the judgment pronounced not only according to the law of the domicile, but by the Court of domicile. The judgment of any other Court as to such status would have no extra-territorial force or validity. The very foundation of the jurisdiction in all cases of proceedings in rem against moveable property is the power to deal with it or to dispose of it, if it is within the jurisdiction of the Court pronouncing the judgment in rem. See Dicey's Conflict of Laws, 5th edn., pages 418-419. Over such property the foreign Court would have a rightful jurisdiction, “founded on the actual or constructive possession of the subject matter (res).”

There is also a further limitation to the effect of a judgment in rem. It is not conclusive if it relates to a matter which, need not have been controverted or which was not material or which only came collaterally into question or which was only incidentally cognizable. It was not necessary for the Alexandria Court to decide on the validity of the will and the bequests contained in it for the purpose of the grant of letters of administration to the plaintiff limited to the estate of the deceased within its jurisdiction. No question can be said to be conclusively determined if the Court has expressed an opinion upon it which was not necessary for its decision. Even if therefore the Alexandria Court had not pronounced against the validity of the will one way or the other, the grant would still have been limited as it was, and the decree would have been the same, and the plaintiff would have been declared entitled to the real and personal estate of the deceased within its jurisdiction. The principle is that in order to be a judgment in rem binding on the world there must be a finding on status which is not only the foundation of the judgment but is necessary for it. Under all these circumstances I am of opinion that the judgment of the Alexandria Court is not a judgment in rem declaring the status of the administrator absolutely.

The next question is whether that judgment is valid inter partes under the provisions of s. 13 of the Civil Procedure Code. Under that section also the judgment must be of a Court of competent jurisdiction. But the jurisdiction which alone is important in such matter is the competence of the Court in an international sense, that is its territorial competence relating to the subject-matter and the defendant. As pointed out by Lindley M.R in Pemberton v. Hughes, if a judgment is pronounced by a foreign Court over persons within its jurisdiction and in a matter with which it is competent to deal, English Courts never investigate the propriety of the proceedings in the foreign Court, unless they offend against English views of substantial justice. Such a judgment cannot be impeached on its merits. Further, the previous judgment which is to operate as res judicata must be a judgment between the same parties or parties claiming under them, litigating under the same title. Two of the defendants in the suit in the Alexandria Court are also defendants in this suit. In paragraph 13 of the statement of claim the plaintiff in that suit said that the alleged will did not contain the appointment of the defendants as executors, and that the appointment of the defendants as “Apothropos” or executors in the will over an heir who is not a minor was null and void by the law of the domicile of the said deceased. That allegation is denied by the executors. In my opinion there is considerable force in the contention that the plaintiff cannot say that the will does not appoint executors or that their appointment is not valid, and at the same time say that such executors represent the legatees in a probate action. Ordinarily, the executors would represent the legatees including the residuary legatee regarding all matters which have necessarily to be decided in a suit to which the executors are parties. That is pointed out by the House of Lords in Concha v. Concha. It cannot, however, be said here that the executors where title was challenged represented the legatees, nor that under the circumstances the legatees claimed through those executors. There is also nothing to show that all the legatees were cognizant of the proceedings in the Alexandria Court at the time and could have intervened if they chose to do so: see Young v. Holloway. If they were not represented and were unaware of the proceedings, it would be contrary to natural justice to hold that they could be injured by any determination which they had not the opportunity to controvert. In my opinion, the proceedings in the Alexandria Court do not constitute a bar to this suit as far as any one who was not a party to that suit is concerned.

The next important question is whether the will of Bunin and the bequests and provisions contained in it are valid according to the Jewish law. The will is in the Hebrew language, and was written by the testator himself. It is in one of the archaic forms known to the ancient Jewish law, namely, by way of a gift inter vivos which is to operate after the death of the testator and is revocable by him during his lifetime. It has been attested by two witnesses according to the requirements of the law. The will has been translated into English by an expert in Jewish law, Dr. Eliash, and the translation has been accepted by all parties as substantially correct. He also gave evidence as an expert in Jewish law in the Court below. The defendants had two experts examined on commission, but none was examined before the learned Judge. Various texts from the old Hebrew writers and commentators; not always easy to explain or to reconcile, have been also translated and put in, and have been relied on by both sides in support of their contentions. The learned Judge has discussed and considered these texts exhaustively, and taking them in connection with the evidence recorded I agree with his conclusion that the will is invalid and not in accordance with the Jewish law. It has not been seriously suggested that the opinion of the ‘Sheriah’ at Aden, a body of persons who deal with matters of marriage, inheritance and divorce, and which pronounced in favour of the will, is binding upon this Court. It goes without saying that it could not be binding if it was pronounced in the absence of the plaintiff, that is, without hearing him.

It is not in dispute that Bunin had a half share in a partnership business which he carried on with his deceased brother Judah and his three nephews, being the sons of another brother Mesha. He divided his half share in the partnership assets, excluding the dwelling houses, into twelve parts, and by his will devised 2 in favour of his son the plaintiff, 2 in favour of his grandson since deceased, 2 to his nephew Zion son of Judah, and one to each of three grandnephews. This makes a total of 9, leaving 3 out of the 12 shares undisposed of. It is one of the requirements of the old Hebrew law, as appears from the texts, that the object of a revokable gift inter vivos must be a thing which is definitely known; that it must exist at the date of the gift, and must be in the possession of the donor. A gift of future property is not valid according to that law, nor can a man assign something which is not in his possession either by sale or by way of gift. A share in a partnership which is a going concern or rather a share out of a share, the 12 shares being carved out of Bunin's half share, is in my opinion something which is not definite. It does not exist and is not in possession, and therefore could not pass by a gift inter vivos. It can only be given, as Dr. Eliash stated, by that form of will called “a conditional bond” or a “charge-will,” and it is not disputed that is not the form used by Bunin. A present share in a going partnership is something indefinite according to English law, and it cannot be said to be definite merely because it is capable of being in some way rendered definite. No partner under the English as well as under the Indian law can point to any specific item of either moveable or immoveable property belonging to the partnership as his own and appropriate it to his own share. In order to ascertain that share the assets would have to be realised for payment of debts and liabilities. As pointed out by the learned commentators in Pollock & Mulla's Law of Contract, 6th edn., p. 704, the only conclusive measure of a partner's share is what he is entitled to claim on the determination of the partnership or could at any given time claim, if the partnership had at that time to be wound up and its assets realised and distributed. It is nobody's case that there was a dissolution at the time or that any dissolution was even contemplated at the time. In fact, the shares bequeathed were to remain in the partnership, either for thirteen or for fifteen years from the date of the will, though the original partnership period had long expired, and the partnership at the time was only one at will. The appellants, however, rely on certain texts of the Hebrew law on the subject. One of them is from the Tur Hoshen Mishpat, chapter 278, paragraphs 12 and 13. That was a code of the civil law which was prepared somewhere about the 14th century. It provides that a first born son can effectively sell his share as first born before division because he has got a right therein before division. It was argued on behalf of the appellants by way of analogy that a partner can also sell his undivided share or make a gift of the same before dissolution, a gift and a sale being put by the Hebrew texts on the same footing. In my opinion, however, the analogy does not help the appellants at all. The share of the first born becomes defined on the death of the father, even though its value may not be immediately ascertained, whereas the share of a partner does not become defined until on the termination of the partnership or on dissolution. As I have said before, the partnership was still continuing, though at will, and no dissolution was contemplated at the time. The other text which the appellants rely on is from Tur Beth Joseph, chapter 278. That is also a commentary on the Jewish law. It provides that a partner is at liberty to sell his share as stated in chapter Hammokher et Habbait (62). That refers, however, only to a field held by two persons in partnership. A field is a specific thing with a specific area, and is not a thing which is indefinite as a share in a going concern. I do not therefore think that these two texts help the appellants at all. On the other hand there are texts from the Hoshen Mishpat, chapters 176-179, which say that with regard to a thing which belongs to a partnership there is no exercise of possession by one of the partners against the other; if he wants to take his share, he must effect a partition, which is something corresponding to the dissolution of a partnership business. In other texts it is also pointed out that in the case of a share of a house or land owned in partnership there is what is called “the indefiniteness of the object.” The only way to dispose of such a share is to do so “by way of undertaking,” that is to say, by way of a ‘charge-will,’ which we have not got here. That is pointed out clearly in an extract from the Tur Beth Joseph, chapter 250, section 15, which says that if a man has got a “going concern” or merchandise or chattels which cannot be defined, and he wants to divide the same and to give more to one and less to another, there is “no way for him in which he can make them acquire by way of a gift of a healthy person from to-day to operate after death, lest what he has to-day will not be his at the time of his death.” Therefore he cannot achieve it in any way “but by way of obligation, that is to say, that he will bind himself and his property from, to-day and after death to each one of them for as much as he likes whether more or less.” That is a clear statement as to how a share in a going concern can be left by a testator to a legatee, and the shares left by Bunin out of his half share have not been left in the manner indicated by the Hebrew texts. Both therefore on a construction of the gift according to the Hebrew texts and according to the principles of English law the gift is not valid and not binding upon the plaintiff who is the only heir of the testator.

There are also various objections to the valid execution of the will. The two principal objections are, (i) the want of performance of the proper ‘Kinyan’, that is the omission of the formal act of acquiring the thing gifted by or on behalf of the donee, and (ii) the absence of delivery of the will to the donee or his agent. The Jewish law requires strict proof of ‘Kinyan’ as part of the execution of a Jewish will. There are three forms of ‘Kinyan.’ Two of them are referred to in the will, namely, ‘Kinyan Sudar’ and ‘Kinyan Agav’. ‘Kinyan Agav’ is the form used for acquiring moveables along or in co-herence with immoveable property, but it is essential that the immoveable property must pass first, and then the moveables pass after it. The donee must acquire firstly the immoveables, and through them the moveables. The question is whether these methods of transfer have been observed in the proper order in the will. The order is not clear. The whole will has not been very happily or clearly worded. The learned Judge in the Court below is of opinion that as ‘Kinyan Sudar’ comes after ‘Kinyan Agav’, the gifts have not been made in the proper manner and with the necessary formalities, and I agree with his conclusion. It was further pointed out that several categories of objects were comprised in the gifts, e.g coins, promissory notes, and even outstandings would be covered, if the words “all my property” have a wider meaning, and that the proper ‘Kinyan’ had not been performed in respect of these objects. Under the circumstances another doctrine of the Hebrew law would apply, namely, that the ‘Kinyan’ being bad in part must be considered bad as a whole, though it may be pointed out that according to the texts there is a conflict of opinion on the subject. It has been urged before us that any defect that there may be is cured by reason of the acknowledgment of the performance of ‘Kinyan’ in the note at the end of the will. But that strictly speaking is not an acknowledgment by the testator himself; it is a statement of the attesting witnesses, made very probably in the testator's presence, so that it may be binding upon him. It was further urged that it was not necessary to perform ‘Kinyan’ by reason of the technical words used in the will, namely “Wenatati” and “Natati”, meaning either “I gave” or “I have given”. It is said that these are words of admission on the part of Bunin that he had done something in the past, which may have been even just before the will was written out, and that he was only confirming or admitting what he had already effectively done. There is a conflict as to what exactly the meaning of those words is. If they are capable of two meanings, namely, “I gave” which refers to the past, or “I have given” which refers to what he was giving by the will itself, the more natural and proper construction would be that the testator was making his gifts by the will, and not merely admitting what he had done in the past. In fact, one of the respondents' own witnesses, Tob, has stated that it was after the will had been completed and attested that Bunin expressed his satisfaction that he had made the will for the benefit of those whom he intended to benefit. That would ordinarily refer to what was done by the will itself. The Jewish expert Dr. Eliash, whose evidence and interpretation of the texts the learned Judge has accepted, was of opinion that the proper ‘Kinyan’ should have been performed in spite of the use of the words. The learned Judge agreed with that opinion, and I see no reason to differ from it myself.

It is another essential requirement for the validity of a will under the old Hebrew law that it should have been delivered to the donee or his agent, that is to say, the will should have been published in the lifetime of the testator himself to the different donees or their agents. There is no text which says that delivery can be dispensed with when there is a gift inter vivos which is revocable. Some texts have been relied on by counsel for the appellants, but they refer to an irrevocable gift. In an extract quoted from Tur Hoshen Mishpat it is said that a deed of gift found in the safe of the deceased is worthless in case it was either the gift of a sick person the effect of which only began after his death, or the gift of a healthy person who wrote therein “if I do not change my mind, till after death,” meaning that he did not change his mind in his lifetime. Such a gift is invalid for want of delivery of the deed or writing. Another text from the Tur Hoshen Mishput also lays down that the donee acquires no right to a gift so long as the will has not been handed over to him in the donor's lifetime. There is some conflict of evidence as to whether the will was in fact delivered by the testator to Judah, one of the executors, as stated by the witness Tob, or whether the testator put it in a sealed envelope in his safe and kept it there as stated by the witness Menahem Howard. They were both examined in Court, and the learned Judge has accepted the evidence of Howard in preference to that of Tob. Even if there was a delivery to Judah, it would be delivery to an executor, and according to the old Hebrew law delivery to the executor is not delivery to an agent of the donee, because until the death of the donor or the testator the executor or “Apothropos” is only the agent of the donor. Further, there cannot be a valid appointment of an “Apothropos” when the only heir of the deceased, as in this case, is a major. The will was kept in safe custody by the deceased himself, and was produced on his death from his safe, the keys of which were with one of his widows. This essential requirement for the validity of a will under the Hebrew law therefore has not been complied with. It was argued on behalf of the appellants that the defect, if any, was cured by recourse to the maxim namely “the precept to fulfil the words of the testator.” But on a consideration of the texts I find that the precept is not enjoined on the son as a legal duty; it is a matter of persuasion. A legal duty would be a binding obligation, but one text distinctly says that the son must apply the precept ‘leniently’, which obviously he could not do, if in law he was bound to apply it strictly. Lastly, there is the doctrine that the heir is what is called ‘Muchzak’, that is the man who is entitled to legal possession, and the plaintiff as the only son and heir was entitled to legal possession of the estate of his father. The respondents' own witness Solomon Aron, who was examined as an expert on commission at Aden, said as follows:—

“I agree that if a will is disputed and is doubtful, the heir is the ‘Muchzak’ and the legatees must prove their right to the legacy. If there is a difference of opinion between the authorities, the heir can say ‘Kimli’.”

I do not think it is necessary to go into the doctrine of ‘Kimli’ at length. It means that where there is a conflict of authorities, the person in legal possession of the property can plead ‘Kimli’ by showing that two reliable authorities are in his favour, even though other authorities are not. In my opinion the will was not delivered or published to the donees in the lifetime of the testator, and that defect is fatal to its validity.

I may mention here that counsel for the plaintiff, namely, the 1st respondent, said at the close of his address that he was not prepared to give up a single point taken by him in the Court below, even though he did not deal with all of them at length before us. All the points arising in connection with the will have been dealt with by the learned Judge. He has pronounced definitely and distinctly against the will, and I agree with his conclusions regarding the same.

Under these circumstances I agree that the appeal must be dismissed with costs.

Attorneys for appellants Nos. 2, 3 and 6: Messrs Crawford, Bayley & Co.

Attorneys for respondents Nos. 1, 4 and 5: Messrs Little & Co.

Attorneys for appellants Nos. 4 and 5 transposed as respondents: Messrs Vakil, Dadabhoy & Bharucha.

Appeal dismissed.
N.K.A