1. This writ application was moved by the petitioner company challenging an Order of Requisition no. 21682 dated 17th July 1985 which is annexure ‘B’ to the writ petition under the provision of sub-s (1) of s. ??? of the West Bengal Land (Requisition & Acquisition) Act 1948. The Additional District Magistrate, Howrah requisitioned the property in question which was already in the occupation of Messrs Remington Rand of India Ltd. the Respondent No. 5 herein, for the purpose of providing proper facilities for maintaining supplies and services essential to the life of the community and for cerating employment opportunities to the people. The facts relevant for the purpose of this case in short are as follows:

2. By a registered Deed of Lease dated 16th of September 1959, the petitioner company who was the owner of the Jute Mill in Shibpur, Howrah granted a lease of a portion of its Mill premises in favour of the respondent no. 5, Remington Rand of India Ltd. for a term of 20 years begining from 1st of September 1959 which expired with effect from 1st of September 1979 at a monthly rent of Rs. 17,250/-. Before the expiry of the said lease period of 20 years the petitioner company by the notice dated 7th of February 1979 required the respondent no. 5, Remington Rand of India Ltd. to deliver peaceful and vacant possession of the said premises to the petitioner company on the expiry of the period stipulated in the Deed of Lease dated 16th September, 1959. After the lease period expired with effect from 1st September 1979, the Respondent company did not deliver possession of the said premises. Thereafter, on 21st of April, 1980 the petitioner company filed a suit for eviction of the respondent company in Title Suit No. 46 of ??? in the Court of Subordinate Judge, Howrah. Upon the petitioner's application made before this High Court under Clause 13 of the Letters Patent for transfer of the said suit to this Hon'ble Court, the said suit was transferred before this Court for expeditions hearing on the basis of the allegation that the respondents were delaying the final heating of the said suit on some ??? or other. On 29th May, 1985, the said suit appeared for final hearing and on that date, the respondent Company moved an application for amendment of the written statement. The said amendment was allowed by His Lordship Hon'ble Mr. Justice B.C Basak of this Court and the matter was directed to be listed on 4th June, 1985. On that date in course of hearing of the said amendment application, His Lordship Hon'ble Mr. Justice B.C Basak of this Court enquired from the parties whether the suit could be settled by the parties agreeing upon the grant of fresh demise in favour of the respondent company at an enhanced rate of rent fixed having regard to the market rate. The matter was adjourned for effecting a settlement between the parties. Thereafter, the respondent company offered the terms of settlement to the petitioner company, but the petitioner company could not agree and according to the petitioner company, the respondents have no intention to pay the market rate of rent for the said premises and the respondent company wanted to continue in occupation of the said premises at the old rate of rent fixed in the year 1959. It is stated by the petitioner company that the respondent company is a flourishing concern and the available profit before ??? for the year ending 31st March 1984 was Rs. 24001 lakhs and the net profit was Rs. ??? lakhs. It is stated that the respondent company offered dividend during that period at the rate of 20%. When the suit was adjourned for effecting a compromise between the parties, this order of requisition was served upon the petitioner company for continuing in occupation of the premises in question of the respondent company. This order of requisition is under challenge.

3. The petitioner company challenged the validity of the order of requisition on the ground that an order of requisition could only be passed under the provision of the impugned Act if the purpose which was specifically mentioned by the legislature is fulfilled or in other words, it is only for the purpose of fulfilment of any of the purposes specified in the Act, the property could be requisitioned. It is stated that the order of requisition was passed on the basis of formation of an opinion that is was necessary for the purpose of providing proper facilities for maintaining supplies and services essential to the life of the community and for creating employment opportunities to the people. It is alleged and not in dispute that the respondent Company for whose benefit the order of requisition was issued, is engaged in the manufacturing of typewriter machine. It is contended that typewriter machine cannot be said to be a thing which is necessary for maintaining supplies and services essential to the life of the community. The words “supplies and services essential to the life of the community” have got its own meaning and the moaning of this expression could not be enlarged to bring within its fold all matters and things which are not strictly supplies and services essential to the life of the community. It is stated that under the provision of the said Act, requisition could not be made for a private company and in this connection, reference was made to the provision of Lard Acquisition Act particularly Part VII thereof which provides the mode of ??? of property under the provisions of Land Acquisition Act for the purpose of a company and one of the pre requisites for acquiring property for a company is that the Company must bona fide attempt to purchase the said property and secondly, such acquisition could only be made for a public purpose. It is stated that the order of requisition could only be passed under the impugned Act which is made for speedy requisition of the property to meet with the urgent situation connected with supplies and services essential to the life of the community or for increasing employment opportunities for the people by establishing commercial estates and industrial estates and/or for proper facilities for transport, communication, irrigation or drainage etc. It is next submitted on behalf of the petitioner company that the order of requisition was issued in colourable exercise of power under the law inasmuch as, it is stated that in the instant case, admittedly the lease period had expired and after the expiry of the lease period the respondent company failed and neglected to deliver possession and thereafter for recovery of possession, a suit was filed and that during the pendency of the said suit, when the attempt for effecting compromise failed, the summary power of requisition under the impugned Act was invoked solely for the purpose of protecting a company who was in occupation of premises in question as a lessee and after the lease expired it failed to deliver possession for which a suit was filed and also refused to pay the market rate of rent, on the contrary by invoking the summary power of requisition the property was requisitioned. It is submitted by the petitioner company that the State Government by the exercise of an emergency power under the statute intended the respondent company to continue in possession at the old rate at the cost of the petitioner company who is facing a great financial ??? and it is stated that the existence of the petitioner company is at stake. It is further submitted that there could not be any public interest and/or public purpose behind the order of requisition, particularly, in view of the fact that the suit was pending in the matter, which was adjourned for settlement and during this interregnum period this action was taken. Further by the impugned order of requisition, it is provided that the possession of the property in question would be taken over and delivered to the respondent company which is a private company. It is stated that within the scope of the said Act, the same is on the face of it without jurisdiction and without the authority of law. It is further stated that though in the said order of requisition that the land described in the schedule thereto would be delivered to the respondent company on 17th July, 1985 after taking possession at 1 p.m on 17th July, 1985 the order of requisition was delivered and served the upon petitioner Company long after 1 p.m on 17th of July, 1985. It is further submitted that the said order of requisition would not fulfil any of its purposes mentioned in the Act and as such it must be held that mala fide was the foundation of the said order of requisition and that the same is nothing but a malice in law. It was contended on behalf of the respondent company that the respondent company is engaged in the manufacture of Typewriter machine and that there are demands for typew ??? in this country. On the requisitioned land there exists a factory for the manufacture of typewriter machine. The said company pays huge amount of excise duty, customs duty. Income tax and sales tax and a number of person is already engaged in factory. The further case of the respondent company is that the said requisition would help providing employment to a large number of people as the said factory had a tremendous employment protentiallty. The case of the State Government is that the said order of requisition was made for providing and/or continuing the employment of a large number of people without any break, so that the industrial peace and harmony continues in a sensative industrial area. It is stated that the purpose of the requisition was for the social need and to create or continue employment potentialities in the State. It is stated that the purpose of the order was also to have an uninterrupted industrial production for the ultimate benefit of the State by way of revenue coming from the production.

4. It was further submitted that the order of requisition could be passed under the provision of the impugned Act in favour of the respondent company and in support thereof, reliance was placed to the Division Bench judgment of this Court in the case of Dr. Bez Boruah v. State of West Bengal reported in 86 CWN 1046, where the State Government acquired the land for the Calcutta Electric Supply Corporation Ltd. which was engaged in the production and distribution of electricity which is admittedly a supply essential to the life of the community. Reliance was also placed to a decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Girdharilal & Sons v. Balbir Nath reported in AIR 1986 SC 1499 in support of the contention that it was a duty of the Court to give a statute a purposeful or a functional interpretation. In that case it was held that measures aimed at social amelioration should receive liberal or benefient construction. It that case it was also held that to avoid patent injustice, anomaly or absurdity or to avoid invalidation to a law, the Court would be justified in departing from the so-called golden rule of construction so as to give effect to the object and purpose of the enactment by supplementing, the written word if necessary. In order to appreciate the rival contentions of the parties, it is necessary to set out the provisions of s. 3(1) of the said Act under which the order of requisition had been passed. The said s. 3(1) of the said Act is as follows:

“3 Power of requisition: (1) If the State Government is of the ??? that it is necessary so to do for maintaining supplies and services essential to the life of the community or for increasing employment opportunities for the people by establishing commercial estates and industrial estates in different areas or for providing proper facilities for transport, communication, irrigation or drainage, or for the creation of better living conditions in rural or urban areas, not being an industrial or other area excluded by State Government by a notification in this behalf, by the construction or reconstruction of dwelling places in such areas, or for purposes connected therewith or incidental thereto the State Government may, by order in writing, requisition any land and may make such further orders as appear to it to be necessary or expedient in connection with the requisitioning:

Provided that no land used for the purpose of religious worship or used by an educational, charitable or institution shall be requisitioned under this section.”

5. The preamble of this impugned Act is as follows:—

“Whereas it is expedient to provide for the requisition and speedy acquistion of land for the purpose of maintaining supplies and rervices essential to the life of the community increasing employment opportunities for the people by establishing commercial estates and industrial estates in different areas, providing proper facilities for transport, communication, irrigation or drainage and for the creation of better living conditions in urban or rural areas by the construction or re-construction of dwelling places in such areas or for purposes connected therewith or Incidental thereto.”

6. With regard to the submission of the petitioner that the order of requisition was passed in colourable exercise of the pretended power under the provision of the said Act, while the suit filed by the petitioner for recovery of possession was pending, in concerned affidavit-in-opposition on behalf of the respondent nos. 1, 2 and 3 it was stated that “I state that on or about 29th May, 1985 the Minister-in-Charge of Land & Land Reforms Department in consultation with the Chief Minister of West Bengal, had decided on behalf of the State of West Bengal to requisition and acquisition land measuring about 156884 sq. ft. as mentioned in the schedule of the notice dated 17th of July, 1985 for creating employment opportunities to the people of the State of West Bengal. The said decision has been conveyed to the Board. Board of Revenue, on the same date that is on 25.5.85, subsequently the member of Board of Revenue has considered the proposal and forwarded the same to Commerce and Industrial Department, West Bengal, Minister-in-Charge and the Secretary, Commerce and industries Department has considered the proposal of acquiring the said land and financial implication. It appears that after obtaining the financial provision for the compensation paid to the petitioner for the assets, it was decided by the appropriate department, and has consented for acquiring the land which would secure employment of at least 2,000 employees in the State of West Bengal at the factory situated over the land mentioned in the schedule of notice.” It may be mentioned that on 28th of May, 1985, the suit that was filed by petitioner against the respondent no. 5 appeared in the peremptory list and on that date, the respondent no. 5 moved an application for amendment of the written statement. The said amendment was allowed on the said date and the suit was directed to be listed on 4th June, 1985 and it appears that on the next date, namely, 29th of May, 1985, the decision was taken as disclosed in the affidavit in-opposition. It may be mentioned that on 28th of May, 1985 in course of the hearing of the amendment application His Lordship Hon'ble Mr. Justice B.C Basak of this Court enquired whether the suit could be settled by the parties agreeing upon the grant of a fresh demise in favour of the respondent company at an enhanced rate of rent to be fixed having regard to the market value. It further appears that Mr. Justice B.C Basak directed the respondent company to try for aggreing mutually upon the new rates of rent for a fresh lease and directed the petitioner company to appear on 4th of June, 1985. It appears that on the next date, on 29th May, 1985 the decision was taken. The date of decision is very significant and that it is made crystal clear that at the point of time when the matter was pending for settlement, the decision to requisition of the property was taken by the Government. The question is whether in the facts and circumstances of the case, was it made bona fide and done in public interest. It is now firmly established principle that every activity of the Government must have a public element in it and it must therefore be informed with reasons and guided by public interest. The Government cannot act arbitraily. In the instant case, in order to decide the question whether the State Government had acted bona fide and in public interest in the matter, we have to look into the facts and circumstances of the case under which the decision was taken by the Government. Admittedly, the respondent company was a lessee and the period of lease expired and after the expiry of the period of lease, the petitioner company filed a suit for recovery of possession and that this is not in dispute that the petitioner company was contesting the suit and it only when the question of compromising the suit by agreeing to renew the lease on an enhanced rent came up for consideration, at that point of time, the petitioner moved the State Government and thereupon the State Government decided to requisition the property which was already in their occupation and to make the suit infructuous and to continue the private respondent in occupation in the property. It was done to validate the possession by the impugned requisition order. In the instant case, admittedly the power under s. 3 of the said Act was exercised by the State Government at the instance of the respondent no. 5 at a point of time, when the suit was pending and it is a matter of record that the respondent no. 5 was standing in the way of earlier disposal of the suit and that was the precise reason for which the suit was transferred to this court for speedy disposal and on 28th of May, 1985, the application for amendment of the written statement filed by the respondent no. 5 was allowed and in course of the hearing the learned Judge enquired whether the matter could be compromised on revised terms. On the next date the decision was taken in this behalf by the State Government. It is crystal clear that the power under s. 3 was exercised admittedly to make the suit infructuous. It my view it was not proper on the part of the State respondent to invoke the provisions of s. 3 of the said Act when the suit was pending and the circumstances suggest that the action was taken in this behalf was not bona fide.

7. With regard to the next submission on the part of the petitioner that in the facts and circumstances of the case, the power under s. 3 of the said Act could not be invoked at all inasmuch a, the condition precedent for exercising of power under the Act was wholly absent. The respondent company had disclosed the reasons for exercising the power under s. 3 of the said Act and it was stated that the requisition was made for “creating employment opportunities to the people of the State of West Bengal.” In the order of requisition it was stated that the said requisition was made for “the purpose of providing proper facilities for maintaining supplies and services essential to the life of the community and for creating employment opportunities to the people.” Admittedly, the respondent no. 5 was in occupation of the property and was continuing in manufacturing of typewriter machine there. The first question which calls for consideration by this Count is whether the typewriter machine is required for “maintaining supplies and services essential to the life of the community.” The word “essential” means according to Black's Law Dictionary ‘indispensibly necessary: important in the highest degree: requisite, that which is required for the continued existence of a thing.” Typewriter machine is required for the purpose of typing and the use of the typewriter machine in this country is well known. The question is whether the typewriter machine could be said to be a thing which is necessary for maintaining supplies and services essential to the life of the community. I am afraid that I cannot give such a wide meaning to such an word which would be beyond the scope and object of the Act. The words ‘supplies and services essential to the life of the community’ cannot be given such a wide meaning. A word in statute has to be interpreted in manner which carry out the intention of the legislature in its perspective. Reading the preamble of the said Act, it is made abundantly clear that the power under s. 3 could only be invoked for the purposes specifically mentioned therein and that it is difficult to hold that manufacture of typewriter machine is a thing which is necessary for maintaining supplies and services essential to the life of the community, inasmuch as, community as a whole could not require typewriter machine as essential supplies and services to the community even if it is easily or freely available. Whether a particular thing is required for maintaining supplies and services essential to the life of the community has to be construed according to its need for proper enjoyment of life. Reference may be made to the provision of the Essential of Commodities Act 1955 where certain foods and articles which are treated to be essential for the community as such Foodstuff, fuels and other articles required for the community as a whole are essential commodities but certainly cosmetic cannot be said to be essential commodity. The word ‘essential services’ has its own meaning and the services which are essential for the people like water supply, electricity, supply of milk, hospital service etc. without which the people at large cannot normally go. All and sundry services cannot be said to be an essential services. In the instant case, the words ‘supplies and services’ are qualified by the word essential, so all supplies and services cannot said to be essential unless it can be shown that it is indispensibly necessary for the community. Accordingly, I hold that typewriter machine cannot be said to be a thing which is necessary for maintaining supplies and services essential to the life of the community as provided under s. 3 of the said Act. Further the question is whether the said requisition could be supported by any of the purposes mentioned in the s. 3 of the said Act. It was also stated in the said order of requisition, the same was issued also for the increasing employment opportunities for the people of the State. The requisition could be made for “increasing employment opportunities for the people by establishing commercial estates and industrial estates in different areas.” The order of requisition could only be made for increasing employment protentlality by establising commercial estates and industrial estates, but in the instant case there is no question of establishing commercial estates and industrial estates, inasmuch as, the industry is very much in existence and because of its continued existence, the power under s. 3 of the said Act had been exercised. In my view, in fact, none of the alternative clauses available to the State respondent for exercising the power of requisition under s. 3 of the said Act could be invoked in this case. From the purposes and scheme of the Act I am unable to give a meaning to s. 3 of the said Act, which would open a flood gate for the respondents for exercising power under s. 3 in each and every case. When powers are circumscribed under statute, the power has to be exercised for the purpose for which statute was passed. All powers have got its limit. When the legislature thought it fit that the power of requisition could only be exercised in some limited cases, the power has to be exercised to fulfil purpose for which it was enacted. The question of creating employment opportunities to the people of the State in this case did not and could not arise at all. The question may arise what would happen if the order of requisition was not passed. Admittedly, the respondent company is a very solvent company and was in occupation of the premises in question under a lease since 16th September 1959. The period of lease expired on 16th of September 1979. The respondent company knew that under the law of the land unless the lease is renewed, the respondent company had to deliver possession and that it is also an admitted fact that the respondent company was in occupation of premises even after the expiry of the period of lease and for the purpose of recovery of possession, the petitioner company filed a title suit and when the suit is pending and the talks for compromise were to begin, at that time the State Government passed the order of requisition in a summary manner to protect the respondent company who was the erring party and the statutory power was exercised to protect a company who was liable to be evicted under the general law of the land and against whom the suit was pending and in my view, in the facts and circumstances of the case, it was highly improper on the part of the State respondent to intervene and exercise emergency power of requisition in manner which was done. In my view, it was wholly unjust and contrary to public policy to protect an erring party who had no right to continue in possession and against whom the suit for recovery of possession was pending. In my view, within the scope and ambit of the provision of s. 3 of the said Act State can not protect an unauthorised occupant and to allow such unauthorised occupants to continue in possession by validating the same by exercise of the statutory power as it has been sought to be done in the instant case. Incidentally, it may be mentioned that under the ordinary law of acquisition namely Land Acquisition Act, the property could be acqulsiticned, but before acquisition is made for a company, certain statutory requirements were to be complied with and in my view, those statutory requirement cannot be by-passed by invoking the summary and emergency power under the impugned Act. The impugned Act could only be invoked for specified purposes. Under the provision of the impugned Act, the property could be requisitioned if the situation and/or the purpose is mentioned under the Act, is fulfilled and thereafter, if it is necessary to keep the property, in that event, the same may be acquired. The purpose of the Act is for speedy requisition in order to meet the situation. In the instant case, the facts and circumstances under which the power has been exercised in the manner was beyond the scope of s. 3 of the said Act. In this connection reference may be made to the decision of the Supreme Court of India in the case of H.D Vora v. State of Maharastra reported in AIR 1984 SC 866 wherein it was held that ‘if the Government wants to take over the property for and indefinite period of time, the Government must acquire the property but it cannot use the power of requisition for achieving at object. The power of requisition is exerciseable by the government only for public purpose which is of a transitory character. If the public purpose for which the premises are required is of a perennial or permanent character from the very inception no order can be passed requisitioning the premises and in such a case the order of requisition, if passed, would be a fraud upon the statute, for the Government would be requisitioning the premises when really speaking they want the premises for acquisition, the object of taking the premises being not transitory but permanent in character.” In the instant case it is an admitted position that the need of the respondent company was permanent in nature and in view of the principle laid down by the Supreme Court it is not open to the State Government to requisition the property when the need was admittedly permanent.

8. The Land Acquisition Act 1894 laid down elaborate procedure for acquisition of land for a company and it is permissible to acquire property for a private company, for a public purpose where the word ‘public purpose’ was not defined. When the provisions of the Land Acquisition Act laid down the conditions and/or the restrictions under which a land could be acquired for a company in my view the property could not be requisitioned for a company by passing the provisions laid down in the Land Acquisition Act. One of the important conditions for acquisition of land for a company under the Land Acquisition Act 1894 is provided in Rule 4 of the Land Acquisition (Companies) Rules 1963, which provides that whenever a company makes an application to the Government for acquisition of any land, the Government must be satisfied on the basis of a report from the Collector that the company has made its best endeavour to find out lands in the locality suitable for the purpose of the acquisition and that the company has made all reasonable efforts to get such lands by negotiation with the persons interested therein on payment of reasonable price and such efforts have failed. In my view, when the Land Acquisition Act and/or the rules framed thereunder had laid down elaborate and in-built procedure, the same cannot be by-passed and that this also throws light that the legislature never intended to requisition any land under the Requisition Act for which special procedure was laid down under the Land Acquisition Act. Accordingly, I hold that the impugned requisition for a private company under the West Bengal Land (Acquisition and Requisition) Act 1948 is void and illegal.

9. There is another aspect in the matter that under the scheme of the said Act, not only the order under s. 3 should be issued for valid reasons, the same should be served upon the owner and occupant and possession whereof should be taken on the date and time fixed. This is not a case where property is requisitioned by any notification and/or by issuing any prior notice. Under the scheme of the Act, the requisition would be completed when the possession is taken in terms of the notice. But in the instant case, this is not in dispute that the notice of requisition was served upon the petitioner company after the time mentioned in the order of requisition was over.

10. The other point raised by the petitioner is that whether the property could be requisitioned for a purpose which is already in the possession of the respondents. The word ‘requisition’ means taking or seizure of property by Government. When the property is under the occupation of the respondents, in my view, that property could tot be requisitioned by the respondents. It is made clear from the scheme of the Act and/or the provision of the Act. The impugned Act no where contemplates that the impugned Act could be invoked for the purpose of validating possession in respect of which the respondent was an unauthorised occupant.

11. It is not necessary to decide the question whether the pmpugned Act could not be invoked for the purpose and it is not necessary for the Court to refer to case law cited on behalf of the respondents in as much as in that case, the property was requisitioned for a purpose which was not specified in the Act But in the instant case as I have already held that in the facts and circumstances of the case, the power under s. 3 could not be invoked as the purpose for which it was invoked fails outside the scope and ambit of the provision of s. 3 of the said Act, I also hold on the basis of the materials placed before this court that there was no material in the possession of the State Government to form the requisite opinion as required under s. 3(1) of the said Act and as such it must be held that the said order of requisition was on the face illegald issue, without any jurisdiction and as a result thereof, the writ petition succeeds. The rule is made absolute. The order of requisition dated 17th of July, 1985 bearing no. 21682, which is Annexure ‘B’ to the petition, is quashed. The writ in the nature of certiorari do issue quashing the said order under s. 3 of the said Act dated 17th of July, 1985 and the writ in the nature of mandamus do issue commanding the respondents not to give any effect or further effect to the order of requisition dated 17th of July, 1985. The rule is made absolute. There will be no order as to costs.

Rule made absolute.