Haridas Roy & Ors. v. State Of West Bengal

A.M Bhattacharjee, J.:— The suit that has wended to this Court in this second appeal was for declaration that the revisional record of rights in respect of the suit land was erroneous and that the determination of rent by the Revenue Officer in respect thereof was illegal, for correction of the records and for assessment by the Court of fair rent for the suit lands. The trial Court in decreeing the suit granted the declarations and also assessed the fair rent as prayed for. On appeal by the State, the first Appellate Court allowed the appeal in part and while maintaining that the impugned assessment of rent was illegal and not binding on the plaintiffs, set aside the assessment of rent made by the trial court. The plaintiffs have appealed to this Court and have urged that the first appellate court was wrong in setting aside the assessment of rent and ought to have maintained the assessment of rent made by the trial court. We are, however, of the view that after the commencement of the Estates Acquisition Act of 1953, a suit for assessment of rent in respect of lands covered by that Act has become impliedly baned under the provisions of the said Act.

2. Relying on the decisions in Dhananjoy v. Upendra (22 CWN 685), in Priva Nath v. Official Trustee (AIR 1928 Calcutta 43) and Ram Gobinda v. Shashi Sekhar (AIR 1925 Patna 517). Mr. Ranjit Banerjee, the learned Advocate appearing for the appellants, has strongly urged that the suit for assessment of rent is a suit of a civil nature and therefore the suit, even so far it related to assessment of rent, was patently conizable by the Civil Court and therefore the trial court was right in assessing fair rent in respect of the suit land and the first appellate court was wrong in setting aside the same. We are, however, inclined to think that in the context of the various provisions of the Estate Acquisition Act of 1953, it would not be possible for us to accept the contention of Mr. Banerjee for the reasons as hereunder.

3. Vesting of all estates and rights of intermediaries in such estates, the right of an intermediary to retain a portion of the lands vested in the State, the liability of an intermediary to pay rent for such lands retained by him and the right of the State to assess such rents, are all creatures of the Estates Acquisition Act and are no longer general law rights and liabilities. Powers and jurisdictions have been given to the Revenue Officers and other authorities to determine such rents and detailed provisions therefor have been made in Ss. 40, 41, 42, 43, 44 and other provisions of Chapter V of the Act. It is settled law that where the rights and the liabilities in question are created by the Statute and the Statute also provides remedies for the enforcement of such rights and liabilities by and through authorities created and constituted by and under the Statute, then the jurisdiction of such authorities is exclusive and the general law jurisdiction of the Civil Court is impliedly barred. It is too well settled to require any citation that where a special authority or body is created by a Statute for the determination of rights and liabilities which are the creation of the Statute, then the jurisdiction of that authority or body, unless provided otherwise, is exclusive and civil courts cannot take cognizance of such matters. It is true that it is also equally well-settled that even when the jurisdiction of a Civil Court is so barred, the Civil Court, unless otherwise provided, would still have jurisdiction to examine as to whether such special authorities have acted according to the provisions of law or the fundamental principles of judicial procedure and to strike down all acts done in violation of such law or procedure, but the Civil Court cannot substitute its decision for that of the special authority. The Civil Court can undo what the authority has illegally done, but cannot, for itself, do what the authority was to and was alone to do. In this case, therefore, the trial court was right in setting aside the assessment of rent arrived at by the Revenue Authority in violation of the provisions of S. 54A of the Estates Acquisition Act without notice to the appellants as required under that Section and the first appellate court was also equally right in affirming the decision of the trial court to that extent. But the trial court had and could have no jurisdiction to make any determination of the rent and ought to have left the same to the special authorities created by the Estates Acquisition Act. The first appellate court has, therefore, been perfectly justified in setting aside the assessment of rent made by the trial court and we would accordingly affirm the order of the first appellate court. As the first appellate court has rightly held, it would now be for the Revenue Officer to proceed to determine rent for the lands in question in accordance with the provisions of the Estates Acquisition Act and the Rules made thereunder.

4. A question cropped up during the course of argument as to whether the expression “Civil Court” in S. 57B of the Estates Acquisition Act would also include the “High Court” and whether the Division Bench case of Jnanendra Nath v. Sushil Kumar (80 CWN 250), holding that the expression does not, was correctly decided in view of the earlier Full Bench decision in Narsing Das v. Chogemull (AIR 1939 Calcutta 435) and very learned and elaborate argument was advanced by Mr. Banerjee on that score. But in the view we take in this appeal it is no longer necessary for us to go into that question.

5. For the reasons stated, we would dismiss this second appeal and affirm the decision of the first appellate court; but in the circumstances, we would make no order as to costs.

6. Sankari Prasad Das Ghosh, J.:— I agree.

Appeal dismissed.