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Fort Gloster Industries Ltd v. Tatanagar Transport Corpn
Judgment Summary — Ajit Kumar Sengupta, J.
Factual and Procedural Background
The suit was instituted on 10th November, 1977. The plaintiffs applied on 12th June, 1986 for leave to lodge a fresh writ of summons for service upon the defendants through the bailiff of the court and by registered post with acknowledgement due, and for an extension of the returnable date of the writ. An earlier application was mislaid and an identical application was filed on the date of the hearing and kept on record.
Until the June 1986 application, the writ of summons had not been served on the defendants. The plaintiffs stated in their petition (paras. 3–4 of the petition) that due to bona fide inadvertence they had not taken steps to lodge the writ of summons with the sheriff because the plaintiffs' advocate on record was seriously ill; the advocate on record is said to have discovered on 20th February, 1986 that the summons had not been lodged for service.
Order 9 Rule 5 of the Code of Civil Procedure was invoked. Because of the case's importance the court appointed Mr. Nirmal Mitra as amicus curiae, who assisted the court.
Legal Issues Presented
- Whether the plaintiffs have shown sufficient cause to permit lodging a fresh writ of summons and to extend the time for service under Order 9 Rule 5 of the Code of Civil Procedure.
- Whether the plaintiffs' unexplained failure to prosecute service of the writ for over eight years (from filing on 10th November, 1977 until the 1986 application) justifies extension of time, or requires dismissal of the suit.
- Whether the principles laid down in prior decisions interpreting Order 9 Rule 5 (specifically Laxmi Trading v. Shriram Govindnarain) apply to the facts of this case and require dismissal where no timely application for fresh summons or for extension was made.
Arguments of the Parties
Plaintiffs' Arguments
- The plaintiffs sought leave to lodge a fresh writ and an extension of time for service under Order 9 Rule 5 of the Code of Civil Procedure.
- The plaintiffs relied on an unreported judgment of this court in Tusnial Trading Co. v. Himangshu Kumar Roy & Ors. (Appeal No. 318 of 1982; Suit No. 818 of 1978) decided 20th March, 1985, as supportive authority.
- The plaintiffs explained non-service on the basis of bona fide inadvertence: the plaintiffs' advocate on record was seriously ill, and only discovered on 20th February, 1986 that the summons had not been lodged with the sheriff for service.
Table of Precedents Cited
| Precedent | Rule or Principle Cited For | Application by the Court |
|---|---|---|
| Tusnial Trading Co. v. Himangshu Kumar Roy & Ors. (Appeal No. 318 of 1982; Suit No. 818 of 1978) — unreported (judgment delivered 20th March, 1985) | Relied on by plaintiffs to support their application for relief (plaintiffs cited this decision). | The court considered the decision relied on by the plaintiffs but held it had no application to the present case on the facts. The court noted that the Tusnial decision concerned gross negligence and delay and proceeded on specific factual findings not present here. |
| Laxmi Trading v. Shriram Govindnarain, reported in 61 CWN 212 (opinion by Chief Justice Chakravartti) | Interpretation of Order 9 Rule 5: requirement that a plaintiff must apply within the prescribed period either for a fresh summons or for extension of time to apply for a fresh summons; if neither is done the court must dismiss the suit. | The court applied the principles in Laxmi Trading, holding that if a plaintiff does not make the required application within the prescribed period the court cannot entertain a later application for extension and the suit must be dismissed. The court concluded those principles applied to the present facts and supported dismissal. |
Court's Reasoning and Analysis
The court proceeded by reference to Order 9 Rule 5 of the Code of Civil Procedure and factual findings in the petition and affidavit.
Key analytical steps taken by the court:
- The court observed that the suit was filed on 10th November, 1977 and that, by the date of the plaintiffs' application in June 1986, the writ of summons had never been served on the defendants.
- The court examined the plaintiffs' stated grounds for non-service: a claim of "bona fide inadvertence" due to the advocate on record being seriously ill, and the advocate's alleged discovery on 20th February, 1986 that the summons had not been lodged with the sheriff.
- The court found the illness explanation "absolutely vague and devoid of particulars": there was no statement of when the advocate fell ill, how long the illness continued, nor supporting documentation; an averment in the affidavit was internally inconsistent with earlier statements.
- The court noted that the petition did not describe any steps actually taken or attempts made to serve the writ, and that the plaintiffs did not claim the defendants evaded service. Instead, it was a case where steps for service were not taken at all.
- The court applied the amended timeline under Order 9 Rule 5: after the 1976 amendment the time for a plaintiff to apply was reduced to one month (the court concluded the 1976 amendment applied to this suit). There was no assertion that any application for fresh summons or for extension had been made within the prescribed period.
- The court relied on the reasoning in Laxmi Trading (61 CWN 212) for the proposition that where no application for a fresh summons or for extension is made within the prescribed period, the court can no longer entertain a later application and must dismiss the suit; the court regarded those principles as equally applicable here.
- The court also observed an inordinate and unexplained delay: although the advocate allegedly discovered the non-lodgment on 20th February, 1986, the plaintiffs only took out summons in June 1986 (after several months), and they did not even seek condonation of delay in their petition.
- Having regard to the absence of explanation, lack of particulars, lack of attempts at service, and applicable precedent, the court found no reason to extend time for lodging a fresh writ of summons with the sheriff.
The court recorded appreciation for the assistance of the appointed amicus curiae, Mr. Nirmal Mitra, but the amicus's arguments are not detailed in the opinion.
Holding and Implications
Core Ruling: The application is dismissed. The suit is also dismissed.
Consequences and implications as stated by the court:
- The plaintiffs' application for leave to lodge a fresh writ of summons and for extension of time was dismissed for failure to show sufficient cause under Order 9 Rule 5.
- Because the application was dismissed, the suit itself was dismissed. Both dismissals were made without any order as to costs.
- The court applied existing precedent (notably Laxmi Trading) in reaching its decision; the opinion does not purport to create or announce any new legal principle or precedent beyond the application of settled law to the facts.
Application dismissed; suit dismissed; no order as to costs.
Ajit Kumar Sengupta, J.:-
(1) This application has been made by the plaintiffs on 12th june, 1986, inter alia, for leave to lodge fresh writ of summons for service upon the defendant through the baillif of this court and also under registered post with acknowledgement due and for extension of returnable date of the writ. Since the said application was mislaid another application on identified terms to be filed today. Let it be kept on record.
(2) The suit was instituted on 10th november, 1977 but the writ of summons has not been served upon the defendants till the date of this application made in june, 1986. The ground urged for non service of writ of summons upon the defendant has been stated by the plaintiffs in paragraph 3 and 4 of the petition. It is stated that due to bonafide inadvertence, no steps were taken for lodging the writ of summons with the sheriff for service upon the defendants as the petitioner's advocate on record was lying seriously ill. It is also stated that the learned advocate on record after making enquiries same to know on 20th february, 1986 that the summons had not boon lodged with the sheriff for service upon the defendants.
(3) Mr. S. K. Mullick, advocate appearing for the plaintiff has relied on older 9 rule 5 of the civil procedure code and also on an unreported judgment of this court in the case of tusnial trading co. V. Himangshu kumar roy and ors. In appeal no. 318 of 1982 (suit no. 818 of 1978). The judgment was delivered by the division bench presided over by r. N. Pyne, j. On 20th march, 1985.
(4) In view of the importance of this case, i appointed mr. Nirmal mitra, learned advocate as amicus curea and he has assisted the court and the court records its, appreciation for such asistance rendered by mr. Mitra.
(5) Order 9 rule 5 of the code of civil procedure provides as follows: -
"dismissal of suit where plaintiff, after summons returned unserved, fails for three months to apply for fresh summons (1) where, after a summons has been issued to the defendant, or to one of several defendants, and returned unserved, the plaintiff fails, for a period of one month (k) from the date of the return made to the court by the officer ordinarily certifying to the court returns made by the serving officers, to apply for the issue of a fresh summons the court shall make an order that the suit be dismissed as against such defendant, unless the plaintiff (s) has within the said period satisfied the court that (a) he has failed after using his best endeavours to discover the residence of the defendant who has not been served, or (b) such defendant is avoiding service of process, or (c) there is any other sufficient clause for extending the time, in which case the court may extend the time for making such application for such period as it thinks fit. (2) in such case the plaintiff may (subject to the law of limitation) bring a fresh suit. ''
(6) In the petition for extension of time for service of the writ of summons, it has been stated that the writ of summons could not at all be served upon the defendants. It has not been stated in the petition as to the steps taken or attempts made by the plaintiffs for service of writ of summons upon the defendants. It is also not the case of the plaintiffs that the defendants evaded service of process of this court. It is a case where the plaintiffs did not take steps for service of the writ of summons at all.
(7) Prior to the amendment of the code of civil procedure, a plaintiff in a suit was required to serve writ of summons upon the defendant within three months from the date of filing of the suit and in the event the summons was returned unserved from the date of the return made to the court by the officer ordinarily certifying to the court returns made by the serving officer, the plaintiff was to apply for issue of the fresh summons and in the event the plaintiff failed to apply to the court for issue of a fresh summons within the time limit the suit was liable to be dismissed. After the amendment the time has been reduced to one month and since this is a suit of 1977 the amendment of 1976 would be applicable. In this case it has not been stated by the plaintiffs as to whether any attempt was at all made by the plaintiffs for service of summons to the defendants from the date of filing of the suit, that is, 10th november, 1977 within the period of one month as provided under the provisions of order 9 rule 5 of the code of civil procedure.
(8) The ground that due to illness of the advocate on record for the plaintiffs the writ of summons could not be served for service upon the defendants is absolutely vague and devoid of particulars. It is not stated when the advocate on record fell sick after 10th november, 1977 and how long such illness continued. No supporting document with regard to such alleged illness of the plaintiffs' advocate on record has been annexed. The averment made in paragraph 4 of the affidavit is contrary to what has been stated earlier. It is alleged that on 20th february, 1986 the learned advocate on record for the plaintiffs upon enquiry came to know that the summons in respect of the above suit had not been lodged with the sheriff for service upon the defendants. It only means that after more than 8 years, the plaintiffs advocate on record, for the first time, ascertained that the writ of summons in respect of the above suit could not at all be served upon the defendants. As indicated above, no explanation has been given in the petition as to what steps were taken by the plaintiffs for conducting or prosecuting the suit since the date of the filing. If the advocate on record for the plaintiffs was ill, when the suit was filed on 10th november, 1977, immediately thereafter an application ought to have been made for extension of time for lodging the writ of summons but that was not done. A plea has been taken by the plaintiffs that the advocate on record for the plaintiffs came to know for the first time on 20th february 1986 that the writ of summons in respect of the suit had not been lodged with the sheriff.
(9) It is also significant that although, according to the plaintiffs, their advocate on record came to know on 20th february 1986 that the writ of summons had not been lodged with the sheriff for service upon the defendants but the summons was taken out by the plaintiffs in june 1986, that is, after a lapse of about months. No explanation has been given for such inordinate delay in making this application. Even a prayer has not been made in the petition for condonation of delay. Thus, the plaintiff has neither given any explanation why the writ of summons could not be served upon the defendants nor any reason has been given for making this application, at this stage, after 8 years. The judgment of this court in the case of tusnial trading co. (supra) relied on by the plaintiffs has no application to the facts and circumstances of this case. In that case c. K. Banerji, j. Allowed the application of respondent no. 1 for dismissal of suit. The learned judge was of the opinion that there was gross negligence and delay on the part of the plaintiff and its advocate on record and there was no explanation for non issuance or non service of the writ of summons in the suit which was filed on 16th november, 1978. There, a contention was raised that there was no default on the part of the plaintiff but such default was on the part of the advocate on record for the plaintiff. The court proceeded on that basis and held as follows:
"after a legal proceeding is instituted it is not in the absence of any special reasons, generally required of a party to enquire whether proper steps, particularly procedural in nature, are being taken in the matter. We are expressing our thorough disapproval and dissatisfaction the way the instant case has been conducted by the advocate on record of the appellant or the advocate of the said firm in charge of the matter or the clerk. In our view, in the absence of any special reason only because the appellant did not enquire from time to time from its advocates on record as to what was being done in the suit that would amount to sufficient negligence or default of a party who has filed a suit for recovery of a substantial amount it should be penalised."
(10) In that case, no question was raised as to whether the court has any power to extend the time for service of writ of summons in view of the provisions contained in order 9 rule 5. Mr. Mitra has relied on a judgment of this court in the case of laxmi trading v. Shriram govindnarain reported in 61 cwn 212. In that case no application was made for issue of a fresh summons that was returned unserved nor was any application made within the prescribed period for extension of time. The question was whether, under those circumstances, the master was right in holding that he could not possibly make any order on the application and whether the learned judge was right in upholding the master. Chief justice chakravartti, speaking for the court held at page 216 of the report as follows: -
"the scheme of the rule seems to me to be this. Where the writ of summons first issued is returned unserved, the plaintiff must make an application for the issue of a fresh summons within three months from the date on which the summons was so returned. If however he fails to make such application he is given the right to make another application also within the 'said period', that is to say, three months, but that is to be an application for extending the time for making the other application, namely, the application for the issue of a fresh summons. If within such time the plaintiff makes out to the satisfaction of the court, that is to say the master, that he failed to cause the summons to be served for a reason recognised by the rule or that there is some other sufficient reason for which time ought to be extended, the master may extend the time. But extend the time for what? the rule says extend the time for making such application, that is to say, for making an application for the issue of a fresh summons. I confess that the prescription of the same period for making an application for the issue of a fresh summons and for making out a sufficient reason for extending the time, might prima facie seem to create some difficulty, but a close examination will show that no difficulty really exists. The sufficient cause to be made out under the second part of the rule is not cause for failure to make an application for the issue of a fresh summons, but cause for failure to discover the residence of the defendant or some other reason for which service could not be effected. It is quite a workable construction of the rule to hold that the plaintiff will have to apply within three months from the date on which the summons was returned unserved either for the issue of fresh summons or for an extension of time to make the application for the issue of a fresh summons, if he needs an extension. It may be said that if he has to apply for an extension of time within the same three months, he might as well make an application at once for the issue of a fresh summons and it is not intelligible why, if some part of the three months is still left, as it must be if the application for the extension of time is to be made within three months, he should trouble to ask for an extension of time, instead of making the application for the issue of a fresh summons straight - way. The answer i conceive is that even when the period of three months is drawing to a close, the plaintiff may not be in possession of the necessary particulars about the defendant which will enable him to cause the summons to be served, and therefore, he may not yet be in a position to apply for the issue of a fresh summons. It is clear from the terms of the rule to which have just referred, that where the plaintiff has not made an application for the issue of a fresh summons within the three months, nor has made an application within that period for an extension of time, the master can no longer entertain an application for such extension, far less an application fort the issue of a fresh summons and that in the situation which arises, the court will be bound to make an order that the suit be dismissed, the learned master, therefore, was entirely right in the present case in refusing to make any order on the appellant's application and the learned judge's order appealed from is also right."
(11) In my view the principles laid down in the said decision will equally apply to the facts and circumstances of this case. A right has accrued in favour of the defendants. Even a copy of the master's summons was not served upon the defendants. Having regard to the facts of this case and having regard to the explanation given, i do not find any reason to extend the time for lodging a fresh writ of summons with the sheriff. For the reasons aforesaid, this application fails and is dismissed without any order as to costs. Since the application has been dismissed, the suit is also dismissed without any order as to costs. Application dismissed.
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