Login
  • Bookmark
  • PDF
  • Share
  • CaseIQ

Ritu Sachdev v. Anita Jindal And Others

Calcutta High Court
Feb 25, 1982
Important Paras
Please sign up to view Important Paras.
Smart Summary (Beta)

Structured Summary of the Opinion (as contained in the provided text)

Factual and Procedural Background

This appeal arises from an order dated 19 February 1980 concerning an application by respondent No. 1 (Smt. Anita Jindal) for revocation of leave granted under Clause 12 of the Letters Patent.

The appellant, Ritu Sachdev, instituted Suit No. 576 of 1979 for partition and administration of the estate of her deceased father, Baldev Raj Sachdev (died 17 August 1975). The deceased left, among others, the appellant and respondent Nos. 1 and 3 (three daughters) and respondent No. 2 (his wife) as heiresses and legal representatives. The plaint included a schedule of properties; it claimed partition of various properties, some situated outside the jurisdiction (e.g., at New Alipore) and some allegedly within the court's jurisdiction, including tenancy rights in respect of premises No. 14/2, Old China Bazar Street (shop-room where the deceased carried on business as Printers Emporium) and a godown at No. 22, Sukeas Lane, Calcutta.

Leave under Clause 12 was obtained by the appellant on the basis that some of the immovable properties were within the jurisdiction of the court.

The respondent No. 1 applied for revocation of that leave on the ground that, after the deceased's death, the business had been converted into a partnership (the respondents being partners and the appellant as a minor admitted to the benefit), and that by a dissolution deed dated 1 April 1978 the firm was dissolved and the firm's assets (including the tenancy rights at 14/2 Old China Bazar Street and the godown at 22 Sukeas Lane) were transferred to Satish Kant Jindal (husband of respondent No. 1). The respondent alleged that the tenancy in respect of the godown was surrendered and subsequently given to Satish Kant Jindal, so that the relevant tenancy rights belonged to him and hence no immovable property of the estate lay within the jurisdiction.

The trial judge, Mrs. Padma Khastgir, J., delivered an order dated 19 February 1980 which is the subject of this appeal. The text of the opinion contains both a statement at the outset that the appeal is directed against the judgment and order of 19 February 1980 "allowing the application made by the respondent No. 1 ... for revocation of leave under Cl. 12" and, later in the opinion, a statement that "Mrs. Padma Khastgir, J. by the judgment and order dated February 19, 1980 dismissed the said application." The appellate decision and reasoning that follow in this opinion indicate that the appellant challenged the trial judge's treatment of the question of jurisdiction and the revocation application.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the court has jurisdiction to entertain Suit No. 576 of 1979 on the basis of the allegations in the plaint (specifically whether some immovable property forming part of the estate is situated within the court's jurisdiction).
  2. Whether leave granted under Clause 12 of the Letters Patent can be revoked on affidavit evidence where the revocation raises complex questions of fact and law (for example, whether tenancy rights have been validly transferred away from the estate).
  3. Whether questions relating to the validity of the partnership/dissolution deed and the assignment of tenancy rights (including alleged voidability because the plaintiff was a minor and registration requirements) are matters to be decided in a summary revocation application or in the suit itself.

Arguments of the Parties

Appellant's Arguments (as summarised in the opinion)

  • For the purpose of an application for revocation of leave on the ground of lack of jurisdiction, the allegations in the plaint must be treated as admitted; paragraph 2 and schedule items indicate some immovable properties lie within the court's jurisdiction, so jurisdiction cannot be challenged on affidavit alone.
  • The court should not decide the jurisdictional question merely on the defendants' allegations that, by a deed of dissolution (1-4-1978), tenancy rights were assigned to Satish Kant Jindal and the godown tenancy was surrendered; the deed of partnership itself was challenged in the plaint and so these matters require adjudication in the suit.
  • The deed of dissolution was voidable because the plaintiff was a minor and the alleged transfer occurred without the court's permission and is therefore hit by Section 8(2) of the Hindu Minority and Guardianship Act, 1956 (as cited in the opinion).
  • The deed of dissolution (insofar as it related to assignment of tenancy) was not admissible in evidence for want of registration under Section 49 read with Section 17(1)(b) of the Indian Registration Act (as cited in the opinion).
  • The assignment of tenancy was invalid under Section 14(1)(b) of the West Bengal Premises Tenancy Act, 1956 (as cited in the opinion).
  • All of the above are substantive questions of fact and law that should be tried in the suit rather than determined in a summary application; the trial judge erred by proceeding on collateral facts and by resolving matters which the appellate court can review and set aside if unwarranted.

Respondent's Arguments (as summarised in the opinion)

  • The tenancy rights in respect of the two immovable properties (the shop-room at 14/2 Old China Bazar Street and the godown at 22 Sukeas Lane) do not form part of the deceased's estate because they belong to Satish Kant Jindal (husband of respondent No. 1).
  • Not all co-sharers are interested in those tenancy rights — only the appellant and Satish Kant Jindal are interested — and therefore no immovable property of the estate is situate within the jurisdiction and the court lacks jurisdiction.
  • In the dispute regarding tenancy rights only the appellant and Satish Kant Jindal are interested; consequently leave under Clause 12 should be revoked.
  • Counsel relied on Ranjit Kumar Palchowdhury v. Murari Mohan Pal Chowdhury (AIR 1958 Cal 710) and an unreported bench decision (Promod Kumar Jalan v. Shyam Lal Jalan) in support of the contention that revocation was appropriate; it was noted that the appellant's application to amend the plaint had been dismissed at trial, so the trial court could not decide the validity of the dissolution and assignment in that suit.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Dominion of India v. Jagadish Prosad Pannalal (AIR 1949 Cal 622) Supports the principle that the question of jurisdiction must be decided on the face of the pleadings and such jurisdictional questions should be decided before the trial proceeds. The court relied on this authority for the proposition that if the pleadings disclose jurisdiction the suit should not be removed merely because a defendant later contends otherwise; used to support the appellate conclusion that jurisdiction could not be negatived on affidavit evidence alone.
Himatsinghka Timber Ltd. v. Narendra Nath Banerjee ((1946) 50 Cal WN 624) Included among authorities for the approach that jurisdictional questions are to be determined from pleadings and that complex issues should not be decided on affidavit. Relied on to underscore that revocation applications which raise complicated questions ought not to be finally determined on affidavits and that such issues should be left for trial.
Secretary of State v. Golabari Poliram (AIR 1932 Cal 146) Listed as one of the authorities supporting the general principle on deciding jurisdiction from pleadings and avoiding summary determination of complex factual disputes. Used as one of the supporting authorities to justify declining to decide complex factual and legal questions in a revocation application.
United Commercial Bank… v. Sanatan Bastushilpa Pratisthan Pvt. Ltd. (AIR 1981 Cal 146) Cited in the list of authorities addressing jurisdictional questions and the proper handling of applications to revoke leave under Clause 12 where factual complexity exists. Relied upon as a precedent that supports the appellate court's view that jurisdiction should be determined from pleadings and that summary revocation is inappropriate for complex disputes.
Basanta Kumar Biswas v. Prosonna Kumar Guha (AIR 1932 Cal 47) Included among the cases referenced regarding jurisdictional principles and the treatment of leave under letters patent. Adverted to as part of the body of authority justifying the appellate approach that the suit should proceed when the pleadings disclose jurisdiction and complicated matters should be tried, not decided on affidavit.
Ranjit Kumar Palchowdhury v. Murari Mohan Pal Chowdhury (AIR 1958 Cal 710) Relied on by respondent's counsel to support the contention that revocation of leave was appropriate in the circumstances of the present case. Noted in the opinion as a case relied on by respondent's counsel; the appellate court considered it among authorities but proceeded to apply the principles favouring trial on the pleadings and refusal to decide the complex factual issues on affidavits.
Promod Kumar Jalan v. Shyam Lal Jalan (unreported bench decision) Relied on by respondent's counsel (unreported authority) in support of revocation. Mentioned as relied on by the respondent; the appellate court nonetheless applied the broader principles from the reported authorities to hold that the revocation application was not the proper vehicle to decide the disputed questions.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The court's analysis proceeded along the following lines, using only the reasoning as presented in the opinion:

  1. Foundational principle: the question of jurisdiction must be determined from the allegations in the pleadings. If the pleadings on their face disclose jurisdiction, subsequent contentions by defendants do not oust the court's jurisdiction. The opinion expressly cites decided cases for this principle.
  2. Noted that where leave has been granted under Clause 12 of the Letters Patent, an application by a defendant to revoke leave may sometimes raise questions "far too difficult to determine upon affidavit evidence." Where questions are difficult or important, they should not be finally decided on affidavits in a revocation application.
  3. Observed that the trial judge's revocation of leave (as recorded in the appealed order) rested on findings that the tenancy rights belonged to Satish Kant Jindal and that the appellant's application to amend the plaint and add parties had been dismissed. The trial court concluded that only the New Alipore property remained for partition and thus that no part of the cause of action arose within the jurisdiction.
  4. Applied the pleaded-facts rule to the present plaint: paragraph 2 read with schedule items indicated that some immovable properties were situated within jurisdiction. On that basis, and particularly because the appellate court (by its separate judgment in Appeal No. 154 of 1980) had allowed the appellant's amendment and party additions, it could not be said at this stage, on the face of the plaint, that this court lacked jurisdiction.
  5. Emphasised that the questions whether the tenancy rights belong to the estate (i.e., whether all co-sharers are interested) or whether they were validly transferred are complicated questions of fact and law. Those issues should be decided in the suit after evidence, not on affidavits in an application for revocation of leave.
  6. Concluded that, in view of the pleadings and the appellate court's allowance of amendment (Appeal No. 154 of 1980), it was inappropriate to hold at the revocation stage that this Court had no jurisdiction. Hence the revocation decision could not be sustained.

Holding and Implications

Holding: The appellate court held that the appeal succeeds and accordingly the appeal is allowed (as stated in the opinion).

Implications (direct consequences as stated in the opinion):

  • The appellate court concluded that it could not say, on the face of the plaint and in view of its allowance of the appellant's amendment (Appeal No. 154 of 1980), that the trial court had no jurisdiction to try the suit.
  • The appellate court determined that disputed questions concerning whether tenancy rights belong to the estate and whether those rights were validly assigned are complicated questions of fact and law that must be tried in the suit and not resolved by affidavit in a revocation application.
  • The appeal was allowed; costs of the appeal "will abide by the result of the suit" (i.e., costs reserved to be determined by the outcome of the substantive proceedings).
  • No distinct broader precedent-creating consequence is stated in the opinion; the court applied existing authorities to the procedural question and directed that the substantive issues be tried in the suit.

Note: This summary is prepared exclusively from the text of the provided opinion. No facts or conclusions beyond those appearing in the opinion have been inferred or added. Where the opinion itself contains statements that appear in tension (for example, an opening description that the appeal was directed against a judgment "allowing" the revocation application and a later passage saying the trial judge "dismissed the said application"), both textual statements have been recorded above without attempting to reconcile them beyond citing how the appellate court treated the issue.

Show all summary ...

R.N Pyne, J.:— This appeal is directed against the judgment and order dated 19th February, 1980 of Mrs. Padma Khastgir, J. allowing the application made by the respondent No. 1, Smt. Anita Jindal, inter alia, for revocation of leave under Cl. 12 of the Letters Patent and for other reliefs as will appear from the petition of the said application.

2. The appellant, Ritu Sachdev, filed Suit No. 576 of 1979 for partition and administration of the estate left by her deceased father, one Baldev Raj Sachdev. Baldev Raj Sachdev, since deceased, (hereinafter referred to as the said deceased) died on 17th August 1975 leaving the respondent No. 2 (his wife) and the appellant and the respondent Nos. 1 & 3 (his three daughters) as his heiresses and legal representatives and various properties as will appear from the schedule to the plaint. In the suit the plaintiff claimed partition of various properties including immovable properties situated at New Alipore outside the jurisdiction and tenancy rights in respect of shop-room at premises No. 14/2, old China Bazar Street where the said deceased used to carry on business under the name and style of printers emporium and of the godown at No. 22, Sukeas Lane, Calcutta. The premises No. 14/2, old China Bazar Street. and 22, Sukeas Lane, Calcutta are situate within the jurisdiction of this court and on that basis leave under clause 12 was obtained by the appellant.

3. The respondent No. 1, Anita Jindal, made the said application for revocation of the leave under clause 12 of the Letters Patent on the ground that after the death of the said deceased the business of Printers Emporium was converted into a partnership whereof the respondents were partners and the appellant, then being a minor, was admitted to the benefit of partnership and thereafter by a, deed of dissolution dated 1st April, 1978 the said firm was dissolved and the entire assets of the said firm including the tenancy right in respect of the shop-room in premises No. 14/2, Old China Zazar Street were transferred to one Satish Kant Jindal, the husband of the respondent No. 1. The tenancy in respect of the godown at No. 22, Sukeas Lane, Calcutta was surrendered and thereafter it was given to Satish Kant Jindal. The said Satish Kant Jindal became and is the tenant in respect of the said shoproom and the godown. As, according to the respondent No. 1, no immovable property belonging to the estate were situate within the jurisdiction of this court, she made the said application for revocation of the leave under Cl. 12 of the Letters Patent.

4. Mrs. Padma Khastgir, J. by the judgment and order dated February 19, 1980 dismissed the said application. According to her Lordship, inasmuch as no part of the immovable property was situate within the jurisdiction and further the application for amendment of the plaint and addition of the parties made by the appellant was dismissed it could not be said that any part of the cause of action arose within the jurisdiction of this Court.

5. Counsel for the appellant has submitted that for the purpose of an application for revocation of leave on the ground of lack of jurisdiction the allegation in the plaint must be deemed to be admitted. So far as the present case is concerned it is clear from paragraph 2 read with schedule item Nos. 3 & 4 that some of the immovable properties are situate within the jurisdiction of this court. Therefore, on the basis of the allegations made in the plaint it is not open to any party to challenge the said allegation or to urge that this court has no jurisdiction. It was further submitted that if the court wanted to decide the question of jurisdiction it should not have been done so merely on the allegation by one of the defendants to the effect that under the deed of dissolution dated 1-4-1978 the tenancy rights in respect of the shoproom at 14/2, Old China Bazar Street was assigned in favour of the husband of the defendant No. 1, Satish Kant Jindal or on the allegation of the surrender of the tenancy in respect of 22, Sukeas Lans and its subsequent mutation in the name of Satish Kant Jindal, the husband of the defendant No. 1, in view of the fact that the deed of partnership itself was challenged in the plaint According to counsel, it should have been acsertained whether the properties continue to form part of the joint estate and as such liable to partition. Further, and in any event, the deed of dissolution was voidable because the plaintiff was a minor and the alleged transfer was done without court's permission and was hit by S. 8(2) of the Hindu Minority and Guardianship Act, 1956. It was also the submission of the counsel that the deed of dissolution was not admissible in evidence for want of registration under Section 49 read with Section 17(1)(b) of the Indian Registration Act in so far as it related to the assignment of tenancy. The assignment of tenancy is also invalid in view of Section 14(1)(b) of the West Bengal Premises Tenancy Act, 1956. Counsel has, therefore, submitted that all these are questions which should be decided in the suit and not in a summary manner in an application. It has also been submitted that the judgment is erroneous because it proceeds on the basis of fact collateral to the matter in issue and the appeal court is entitled to examine the reasons and if the appeal court finds these reasons are unwarranted it should set aside the order.

6. In support of his above submissions, counsel has referred to the cases, Dominion of India v. Jagadish Prosad Pannalal, (1949) 84 Cal LJ 175 : (AIR 1949 Cal 622); United Commercial Bank… v. Sanatan Bastushilpa Pratisthan Pvt. Ltd.…., AIR 1981 Cal 146; Himatsinghka Timber Ltd. v. Narendranath Banerji.*, (1946) 50 Cal WN 624 at p. 626 and Basanta Kumar Biswas v. Prosonna Kumar Guha, AIR 1932 Cal 47.

7. Counsel for the respondent has submitted that in the instant case as the two immovable properties namely, the tenancy rights in respect of two premises No. 14/2, Old China Bazar Street and No. 22, Sukeas Lane, Calcutta do not form part of the estate and all the co-sharers are not interested therein inasmuch as the tenancy rights belong to the husband of the defendant No. 1 Satish Kant Jindal. Further in the dispute regarding the tenancy right only the appellant and Satish Kant Jindal are interested. The other co-sharers are not interested in the said dispute. Therefore, inasmuch as no immovable property belonging to the estate is situate within the jurisdiction the court has no jurisdiction to decide this suit and leave u/cl. 12 should be revoked. Counsel has relied on the case of Ranjit Kumar Palchowdhury v. Murari Mohan Pal Chowdhury, AIR 1958 Cal 710 and an unreported Bench decision of this Court in the case of Promod Kumar Jalan v. Shyam Lal Jalan. It was further submitted that the appellant's application for amendment of the plaint was dismissed the question of validity with regard to the dissolution of partnership and assignment of the tenancy right in respect of the shop room and the godown cannot be decided in this suit.

8. From the judgment and order appealed against it appears that the leave under Clause 12 was revoked on the ground that the tenancy right in respect of the shoproom and the godown belonged to Satish Kant Jindal and not to the estate and that the application for amendment of plaint and addition of party was rejected. According to the learned trial Judge, the only property that remained to be partitioned by and between the parties is the property situated at New Alipore outside the original side jurisdiction of this Court.

9. From the decided cases it appears that the question of jurisdiction must be decided on the allegation in the pleadings and it must be decided before the case begins whether or not there is a jurisdiction. If, on the face of the pleading, the court has jurisdiction, it matters not that later the suit as against the person who carried on business or resided within the jurisdiction is dismissed. Where leave has been granted under Cl. 12 of the Letters Patent and application by defendant for revocation may raise questions far too difficult to determine upon affidavit evidence and in such case the question should not be decided on affidavit evidence. In a proper case an application to revoke the leave granted under Cl. 12 may be entertained by the court, but the question of difficulty and importance should not be dealt with by an application to revoke the leave under Cl. 12 and to take the plaint off the file. The proper course is to dismiss the application to take the plaint off the file and to direct that the cases do proceed on all points in the usual way. See the cases of Dominion of India v. Jagdish Prosad Pannalal, (1949) 84 Cal LJ 175 : (AIR 1949 Cal 622); Himatsinghka Timber Ltd. v. Narendra Nath Banerjee, (1946) 50 Cal. WN 624; Secretary of State v. Golabari Poliram, AIR 1932 Cal 146 and United Commercial Bank… v. Sanatan Bastushilpa Pratisthan Pvt. Ltd.…., AIR 1981 Cal 146.

10. Applying the above principle it appears that on the basis of the allegations made in the plaint it cannot be said that this court has no jurisdiction to entertain the suit because part of the immoveable property namely, the tenancy rights are in respect of the shoproom and the go-down situated within the jurisdiction. Further, we have by our judgment and order made today allowed the appeal No. 154 of 1980 preferred against the judgment and order dismissing the appellant's application for amendment of the plaint and addition of parties. In that view of the matter the question will arise to the suit as to whether the tenancy rights in respect of the shoproom and the godown belong to all the co-sharers or not. In view of our judgment at this stage it cannot be said that all the co-sharers are not interested in the tenancy rights of the said shoproom and the godown. In our view, the question as to whether the said tenancy rights belong to the estate or not or in other words, all the co-sharers are interested in the said tenancy rights or not are complicated questions of fact and law which, in our view, should be decided in the suit itself and not on affidavits in the application. For the aforesaid reasons and in view of our judgment in Appeal No. 154 of 1980, in our view, it cannot be said at this stage on the basis of the plaint that this Court has no jurisdiction to try the suit.

11. For all the reasons stated above, in our view, this appeal should succeed. The appeal, therefore, is allowed. The cost of the appeal will abide by the result of the suit.

S.C Ghose, C.J:— I agree.

Appeal allowed.