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Secy. Of State v. Vedavyas Venkatesh Bhatta

Bombay High Court
Sep 20, 1935
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Structured Summary of the Provided Opinion

Factual and Procedural Background

The plaintiffs (sureties of Ganpat Prabhu) sued seeking a declaration and injunction after Government authorities applied the excess proceeds from a sale of Ganpat's property to certain forest dues. Facts stated in the opinion:

  • Ganpat owed Rs. 1,844 to the Ankola Firewood Depot; the Divisional Forest Officer sent that claim to the Collector on 21 May 1925 to be recovered as arrears of land revenue under the Land Revenue Code.
  • Sale proclamation for Ganpat's property issued 2 August 1926; sale held 15 and 17 September 1926.
  • In July 1926 (before the sale), the Ankola Urban Co-operative Credit Bank obtained award decrees against Ganpat and his brother (and the plaintiffs as sureties) for just over Rs. 2,011. Under Section 59 of the Bombay Co-operative Societies Act 7 of 1925, those decrees were to be realized as arrears of land revenue and were sent to the Collector; the Mamlatdar received them on 3 August 1926, before the sale.
  • On 6 September 1926 Ganpat's brother Govind applied for Rs. 5,971 (Sunksal dues) to be realized from any excess arising from the sale. That application was forwarded by the Collector and the Mamlatdar reported on 1 October that Rs. 2,756 remained as a revenue deposit from the sale proceeds.
  • The Collector initially directed that the deposit be kept pending further orders and noted that a formal requisition for Sunksal dues was not then properly received. A formal requisition was later sent on 12 October, and on 21 October the Collector credited Rs. 2,756 to the Forest Department for the Sunksal dues. The Collector then issued notices (12 January 1927) proposing attachment to recover the Bank's award decrees as if they were arrears of land revenue.
  • Plaintiffs sought a declaration that decrees obtained by the Bank against them had been fully paid (to the extent the surplus should have satisfied the Bank) and an injunction restraining Government from coercive recovery against them.
  • The trial Judge held Government claims paramount under Section 137 of the Land Revenue Code and dismissed the suit. The District Judge (appellate) varied that decision, holding the Government had no priority over the Bank and that the proceeds should be rateably distributed under Section 183; he awarded the society (Bank) Rs. 694-11-5. The Government appealed and the plaintiffs filed cross-objections.
  • Divatia, J. (original appellate judge) set aside the lower appellate decree and directed rateable distribution among three claims (Ankola forest dues, Sunksal forest dues, and the Bank's award decree), awarding the Bank Rs. 962-15-0; injunction granted to plaintiffs restraining coercive measures beyond the credited amount. The Secretary of State for India in Council appealed under Letters Patent. A panel (Barlee, J. and N.J. Wadia, J.) heard and dismissed the appeal.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the Government's claim (Crown/forest dues) enjoys statutory priority over private claims (the Bank) in the distribution of surplus sale proceeds arising from a sale held to realize arrears of land revenue—in particular the scope and effect of Section 137 of the Bombay Land Revenue Code.
  2. Whether Sections 150, 151 and 183 of the Land Revenue Code modify or limit the priority conferred by Section 137 (i.e., whether Section 137's priority applies only to current year demands and whether competing claims recoverable as arrears of land revenue should be rateably distributed under Section 183).
  3. Whether the Sunksal dues could validly be satisfied from the sale-proceeds given the timing and formality of the requisition (i.e., whether the formal requisition sent after the sale prevented those dues from being charged against the excess).
  4. Whether, if rateable distribution applies, the surplus should be distributed between only the Government (Sunksal dues) and the Bank, or among all three claimants (Ankola forest dues, Sunksal dues, and the Bank's award decree).

Arguments of the Parties

Government's Arguments (Defendant 1)

  • The Crown's claims are paramount and have priority over other claims by virtue of Section 137, Land Revenue Code; therefore the Sunksal dues had precedence over the Bank's claim.
  • Section 183 (distribution of balance of sale-proceeds to claims recoverable as arrears of land revenue) must be read subject to Section 137, so where Government and private claims compete, Government is entitled to priority; only after Government claim satisfied can private creditors receive anything.

Plaintiffs' / Bank's Arguments (Respondents)

  • Section 137 must be read together with Sections 150, 151 and 183; Section 151 limits the preference given by Section 137 to demands for the current year only, so statutory priority does not extend to arrears of past years.
  • Section 183 grants a substantive right to persons whose demands are to be realized as arrears of land revenue; those claims (Government and private) should be rateably distributed under Section 183, with no distinction drawn between Government and private claims in that section.
  • The Sunksal dues were not properly or legally notified before the sale and the formal requisition was sent after the sale; therefore Sunksal dues could not be satisfied from the sale-proceeds (an alternative argument).
  • In the alternative, if distribution is required, the proceeds must be rateably distributed among all three claims (Ankola forest dues, Sunksal dues and the Bank's decree) because all three arrears were before the Collector at the date of confirmation of the sale.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
36 Bom LR 1103 Held that Sections 137 and 151 of the Bombay Land Revenue Code should be read together and that they confer priority only in respect of arrears for the current year (i.e., statutory priority limited to current year demands). The court relied on this decision as the only decision of the Court on point brought to its notice and followed it in holding that statutory priority under S.137 is curtailed by S.151 and thus applies only to current year arrears.
5 BHC (OCJ) 23 Leading case on the common law priority of the Crown: "A judgment-debt due to the Crown is in Bombay entitled to the same precedence in execution as a like judgment-debt in England, if there be no special legislative provision affecting that right in the particular case." The court acknowledged this common law priority but observed that it is confined to unsecured debts and that statutory provisions (Sections 137 and 151) may modify or limit that prerogative. The court held that S.151 does alter the common law prerogative as declared by S.137.
45 Cal 653 Holds that common law priority of the Crown is confined as between creditors: in respect of immovable property (including fixtures), a secured creditor (first mortgagee) can rank ahead of the Crown; illustrates limits of Crown's common law priority. Used by the court to illustrate that common law priority is not unlimited (it is confined to unsecured debts), thereby aiding the analysis of the relationship between common law prerogative and statutory priority under S.137 and S.151.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The court's analysis proceeded in stages, addressing statutory construction, the sequence of events, and competing claims' entitlement to the sale surplus:

  1. Interpretation of statutory scheme:
    • Divatia, J. (and the panel on Letters Patent) examined Sections 137, 150, 151 and 183 of the Land Revenue Code together with the facts. Section 137 gives Government precedence for sums recoverable under Chapter 11; Section 183 provides for distribution of sale-proceeds among persons entitled to have claims satisfied as arrears of land revenue; Section 151 addresses application of processes to arrears of former years and current year.
    • The court concluded that read together, S.151 and S.183 limit the effect of S.137 so that the statutory priority conferred by S.137 applies only to current year demands; for other arrears the claims recoverable as arrears of land revenue should be rateably distributed under S.183.
  2. Relation between common law prerogative and statute:
    • The court acknowledged the Crown's common law priority (citing 5 BHC (OCJ) 23) but held that S.137 does not merely add to common law rights; it embodies the statutory declaration of the Crown's whole rights to priority. Because S.151 expressly confines the preference given by S.137 to demands for the current year, the statute has in effect modified the common law prerogative.
    • Barlee, J. reasoned that where a statutory provision is clear (as S.151 was found to be), the Court cannot avoid its plain effect even if it produces awkward results; accordingly the statutory modification stands.
  3. Application to facts (timing and validity of requisition / competing claims):
    • The court rejected the respondents' contention (plaintiffs) that the Sunksal dues could not be satisfied from the sale-proceeds simply because the formal requisition was forwarded after the sale: there was an earlier application forwarded by the Collector (9 September) and no statutory provision was pointed out that required a formal requisition before sale. The Collector's initial apprehension did not render the sale invalid as to those dues.
    • Because at the date of confirmation of the sale all three arrears (Ankola forest dues, Sunksal dues and the Bank's award decree) were before the Collector, Section 183 required distribution rateably among all three claimants.
  4. Outcome of competing contentions:
    • The court concurred with the view that the statutory scheme (S.150, S.151, S.183 read with S.137) confines the priority given to Government to current year arrears and entitles claims recoverable as arrears of land revenue to a rateable share of sale surplus.

Holding and Implications

Holding (core ruling):

APPEAL DISMISSED

The court dismissed the Government's appeal. It set aside the lower appellate Court's decree and substituted a decree directing that the proceeds of the sale for the Ankola forest dues (sale of 15 and 17 September 1926), after defraying sale expenses, shall be applied to the payment of:

  • Ankola forest dues;
  • Sunksal forest dues; and
  • The dues under the award decree obtained by the Ankola Urban Co-operative Credit Bank against Ganpat and others.

The sale-proceeds were ordered to be rateably distributed among these three creditors. As a concrete result, the Bank was held entitled to recover Rs. 962-15-0 out of the sale-proceeds. The plaintiffs were granted an injunction restraining the Government (defendant 1) from taking coercive measures against them for any amount beyond what remains due after crediting the Bank for that sum. Because each party partly succeeded, the court made no order as to costs of the appeal or the cross-objections.

Implications: The decision holds, as applied in this dispute, that the statutory scheme of the Land Revenue Code (notably S.151 and S.183 read with S.137) limits the statutory priority of Government claims to current year arrears and requires rateable distribution of surplus sale-proceeds among competing claims recoverable as arrears of land revenue. The court treated this construction as a statutory modification of the Crown's common law prerogative insofar as the statute's language clearly effects that result. The opinion does not purport to set a broader novel precedent beyond the interpretation and application to the facts before the Court, but it expressly follows and applies the earlier decision reported at 36 Bom LR 1103.

Show all summary ...

Divatia, J.:— This appeal has been preferred by the Government in a suit filed by the plaintiffs who were sureties of one Ganpat Prabhu. The plaintiffs' case was that certain property belonging to their principal-debtor was sold at the instance of Government for certain forest dues, that the plaintiffs had become sureties for Ganpat for another claim, which defendant 2, the Ankola Urban Co-operative Credit Bank, had against Ganpat as well as his joint brother Govind, and that the excess amount which remained after the sale was held to satisfy forest dues, was liable to be applied for the debt which the plaintiffs' principal-debtors owed to the Bank with the result that the plaintiffs' liability would be discharged to that extent but that as the excess was applied by Government to another forest claim known as the sutiksal dues against the same person Ganpat, the Bank could not get anything from the excess amount with the result that the plaintiff's liability continued, and hence they asked for a declaration that the amount of the decrees obtained by the Bank against the plaintiff had been fully paid, and also for an injunction restraining the Government, defendant 1, from taking any coercive measures against the plaintiffs for the recovery of the amount due by them under the decrees as arrears of land revenue or otherwise. The facts which have led to this litigation can be shortly narrated thus:

Ganpat had taken advances from Ankola Firewood Depot, and on 21st May 1925, the Divisional Forest Officer sent a claim for Rs. 1,844 against Ganpat to the Collector in order that the said amount may be recovered as arrears of land revenue under the Land Revenue Code. On 2nd August 1926, the sale proclamation of Ganpat's property was issued, and the sale was ultimately held on 15th and 17th September 1926. But before the sale took place, in July 1926 there were award decrees passed against Ganpat and his brother as the principal-debtors and the plaintiffs as sureties for Rs. 2,011 and odd in favour of the Ankola Urban Co-operative Credit Bank. It is provided in Section 59 of the Bombay Co-operative Societies Act 7 of 1925, that those claims were to be realised according to the law and under the rules for the time being in force for the recovery of arrears of land revenue, and therefore, those decrees were sent by the Registrar of the Co-operative Societies to the Collector to be realised as arrears of land revenue. The proceedings were sent to the Mamlatdar who received them on 3rd August, before the sale actually took place. In the meanwhile on 6th September 1926, Ganpat's brother Govind applied to the Conservator of Forests that the amount of Rs. 5,971 which was jointly and severally payable by both these brothers to the Government for the Sunksal dues may be realised from the excess remaining with the Mamlatdar in the sale proceedings to be held for the realisation of the Ankola Forest dues by the sale of Ganpat's property.

2. The application was forwarded by the Collector to the Conservator of Forests on 15th September and it was stated therein that the excess of that sale may be kept in revenue deposit for those dues, and the Mamlatdar made a report on 1st October, that the balance of the sale which was held in the meanwhile on 15th and 17th September, consisting of Rs. 2,756 was credited as revenue deposit. Then on 4th October 1926 the Collector sent a memo to the Mamlatdar to the effect that the said revenue deposit be kept as such pending further orders and that no amount out of should be restored to the defaulter or given to the Ankola Bank, and on the same day the Collector wrote a letter to the Conservator of Forests to the effect that a regular requisition for the Sunksal dues was not received in proper form, and that unless a demand was received in proper form and properly verified, any order to recover the Sunksal dues as arrears of land revenue from the deposit money might be irregular and perhaps illegal, and that, therefore, the requisition should be sent at once, and on 12th October the formal requisition was sent by the Forest Officer, and ultimately on 21st October the Collector wrote to the Conservator of Forests that the balance of Rs. 2,756 was credited to the Forest Department for the Sunksal dues, and as the dues of the Bank were taken as not satisfied out of the sale proceeds, a notice was issued on 12th January 1927, by the Collector to the present plaintiffs as well as to Ganpat as to why the property should not be attached for recovery of the claims of the Bank which were to be recovered as if they were arrears of land revenue. The plaintiffs have, therefore, filed the present suit for the declaration and injunction as stated above.

3. The defence of the Government to the suit was that the claims of the Crown were paramount and had priority over other claims, that the Sunksal dues had, therefore, a priority over the claims of the Bank, and that, therefore, the Government was entitled to appropriate the whole of the excess to the Sunksal dues, and the plaintiffs were not entitled to the reliefs asked for. The learned trial Judge, after framing the appropriate issues, came to the conclusion that the claims of the Government were paramount under S. 137, Land Revenue Code, and that the Collector had, therefore, the power to give the forest out standings, i.e, the Sunksal dues, precedence over all other claims including those of the Bank even though the dues of the Bank were recoverable as the arrears of land revenue. He, therefore, dismissed the suit. The plaintiffs appealed against the decree, and the learned District Judge varied it by holding that the claims of the Government for the Sunksal dues had no priority over the claim of the Bank, but that both these claims were entitled to rateable distribution under S. 183, Land Revenue Code, and that, therefore, the society was entitled to Rs. 694-11-5, and to this extent the Bank, and therefore, the plaintiffs must be given credit out of the excess amount lying with the Collector. The reasoning of the learned Judge was that the Government had priority as to their claims only with respect to the demand of the current arrears of revenue, but that subject to that all claims were to be rateably distributed between all persons who had claims against the excess from the sale-proceeds, that under S. 183, Land Revenue Code, Ganpat could have asked for the return of the whole of the balance and he could have got that balance, but that as there were two other claims, that balance could not be given to him, but that balance should be rateably distributed between the two rival claimants. Against this decree of the appellate Court the present appeal has been filed by the Government and the plaintiffs have also filed cross-objections.

4. It has been contended by the learned Assistant Government Pleader that the decree of the lower Court was not correct because it ignored the imperative provisions of S. 137, Land Revenue Code, according to which the claim of Government to any moneys recoverable under the provisions of Ch. 11 shall have precedence over any other debt, demand or claim, and he says that S. 183 which speaks of the balance of the sale-proceeds being liable to the payment of claims recoverable as arrears of land revenue, has to be read as subject to the provisions of S. 137, with the result that if there was any competition between a Government claim and a private claim even though that private claim was to be realised as if it was an arrear of land revenue, the Government in all cases is entitled to have priority, and it is only after the claim of the Government was satisfied that a private creditor was entitled to have his claim satisfied from the balance thereof, and that, therefore, the order of the trial Court was correct. On the other hand, it has been contended on behalf of the respondents-plaintiffs that S. 137 is not to be read by itself but is to be read with three other sections appearing in the same chapter, namely Ss. 150, 151 and 183; and S. 183 speaks of the payment of the arrears due by a defaulter recoverable as arrears of land revenue, and they were to be recovered under any of the sis modes laid down in S. 150, Land Revenue Code, and though S. 151 expressly enacts that the said modes or processes may be applied in the recovery if arrears of former years as well as for the current year, the preferences given by Ss. 137 and 138 would apply only to demands for the current year, and that, therefore, where there was a rival claim between several persons, one of whom may be the Government as against a private creditor, and where all the claims were to be recovered as arrears of land revenue, then in that case the Government's claim to priority under S. 137 had been modified by S. 151 to this extent that it is only for the demand for the current year that the Government would have priority, but that with respect to the rest there is no such priority and that the demands of all those persons were to be rateably distributed and divided under S. 183. It is further contended that, really speaking, in this case the Sunksal dues had not been properly and legally notified before the sale took place and that the regular, requisition was sent after the sales were held, and that, therefore, the Sunksal dues cannot be regarded as the dues for which the excess of the sale proceeds was liable, and that therefore the whole of the remaining amount should be devoted for the liquidation of the Bank's claim. It is urged in the alternative that if the excess lying in the Court is liable to be rateably distributed then it is to be distributed not simply between the Bank and the Government for the Sunksal dues but for the claims of all the three dues, namely, the Ankola forest dues, the Sunksal dues as well as the Bank's dues, because S. 183 speaks of the arrears due by a defaulter at the date of the confirmation of such sale, and that all the three claims for arrears were sent to be realized before the sale took place. Therefore, if there is to be any distribution, then the excess is to be distributed rateably for all the three claims.

5. Now, as between these rival contentions, I think, looking to the scheme of the Code for realisation of claims as arrears of land revenue, there is force in the contention of the respondents that in settling the claims of all those persons who are entitled to have the claims satisfied as arrears of land revenue, and therefore to seek the help of the revenue authorities under S. 150 of the Land Revenue Code, the right of priority given to the Government under S. 137 has been curtailed and limited only to the demands for the current year, and if these sections are to be read together, and if SI 151 is to have any meaning at all, it can have only this meaning that Government has no right of priority as against claims recoverable as arrears of land revenue except to the extent of the demand for the current year. When the legislature has given certain rights to persons, namely that their demands are to be realised as arrears of land revenue, then it must be regarded that they are given a substantial right under S. 183 of the Land Revenue Code which clearly says that the sale-proceeds were to be distributed between all those who were entitled to have their claims satisfied as arrears of land revenue. No such distinction is made in this section between Government claims on the one hand and private claims on the other. S. 151 also does not make any such distinction, and I, therefore, think that instead of regarding S. 183 as being governed by and subject to the provisions of S. 137, the proper construction of this section is that the right of priority given to Government has been modified by the two Ss. 151 and 183. I, therefore, think that there is force in the respondent's contention that the Government is not entitled to priority but that there should be a rateable distribution between these claims.

6. I think there is force also in the further argument that the sale-proceeds should be distributed among all the three claims and not between only Sunksal dues and the Bank's dues. S. 183 clearly speaks of the arrears due by a defaulter at the confirmation of the sale, and as I have stated above, all these three arrears were before the Collector at that time. Therefore, it would follow that all the three claims must be rateably satisfied out of the sale-proceeds. I do not accept the respondents' contentoin that the Sunksal dues cannot be satisfied at all from the sale-proceeds, because there had been he regular requisition before the sales were held. No provision in the Forest Act or any other enactment is pointed out to show that before a property can be sold as arrears of land revenue for the forest dues a regular requisition should have been sent. The Collector's letter shows that he was apprehensive that course may be irregular, but it does not follow that because a regular requisition had not been sent, the sale could not take place as if it was for arrears of land revenue. On the other hand, it appears that before the sale was held, an application by Govind, Ganpat's brother, that the Sunksal dues should be satisfied out of the excess of the sale-proceeds, was forwarded by the Collector to the Conservator of Forests on 9th September, and therefore the Sunksal dues would certainly be those dues which are to be rateably distributed under S. 183. The result, therefore, will be that the decree of the lower appellate Court will be set aside and in its place the following decree would be substituted, that the plaintiffs are entitled to a declaration that the proceeds of the sale for the Ankola forest dues, which took place on 15th and 17th September 1926, shall, after defraying the expenses of the sale, be applied to the payment of the Ankola forest dues, the Sunksal forest dues and the dues under the award decree obtained) by the second defendant Bank, against Ganpat and others, and that the sale-proceeds shall be rateably distributed between these three creditors, with the result that the second defendant Bank would be entitled to recover Rs. 962-15-0 out of the sale-proceeds and to an injunction restraining defendant 1 from taking any coercive measures against the plaintiffs to recover any amount in excess of the amount due after credit is given to the Bank for the said sum of Rs. 962-15-0. As each party has partly succeeded, there will be no order as to costs of the appeal as well as of the cross-objections. The Secretary of State for India in Council appealed under the Letters Patent.

Letters Patent Appeal.

Barlee, J.:— This is an appeal from a judgment of Divatia, J. The facts on which his decision is based are shortly these: The Divisional Forest Officer had a claim against one Ganpat under the Forest Act for Rs. 1,844 in respect of advances from the Ankola Firewood Depot, and he sent his claim to the Collector in order that the said amount might be recovered as arrears of land revenue under the Land Revenue Code. Ganpat's property was sold and thereafter two other claims were put forward, one claim in respect of money due to the Forest Department from Ganpat and his brother, known as Sunksal dues, and a claim made on behalf of the Ankola Urban Co-operative Credit Bank. Before the sale had taken place this Bank had obtained award decrees against Ganpat and his brother, and the plaintiffs, their sureties, and they claimed a share of the proceeds of the sale. The question for determination was whether the claims made by Government were to be preferred to the claims that were made by the Bank, which was a private person. Divatia, J., held that the right of priority given to Government by S. 137 of the Bombay Land Revenue Code was curtailed by S. 151 of the Bombay Land Revenue Code, and on reading these two sections together he decided that the Government had a right of priority only for the land revenue demand for the current year. He therefore ordered that the decree of the lower appellate Court should be set aside and that the sale-proceeds should be applied, after defraying the expenses of the sale, to the payment of Ankola Forest dues, the Sunksal Forest dues and the dues under the award decree obtained by the Bank rateably. The Government of Bombay have appealed.

7. The view taken by Divatia, J., has been taken by the learned Chief Justice in 36 Bom LR 1103 (1), where he held that Ss. 137 and 151 should be read together and that they confer priority only in respect of arrears for the current year and not for arrears of past years. This is the only decision of our own Court on this point which has been brought to our notice. It is not disputed that the Crown is given priority by common law. 5 BHC (OCJ) 23 (2) is the leading case on the subject. There it was held, after an exhaustive survey of the authorities:

A judgment-debt due to the Crown is in Bombay entitled to the same precedence in execution as a like judgment-debt in England, if there be no special legislative provision affecting that right in the particular case.

8. But this common law priority is confined to unsecured debts: cf. 45 Cal 653 (3), where it is held:

that so far as the immoveable properties were concerned including the fixtures, the Grown was not entitled to priority, that the Alliance Bank as first mortgagee ranked first, but the Delhi and London Bank as second mortgagee was not entitled to priority over the drown.

9. It follows that the priority given to the claim of Government by S. 137, Bombay Land Revenue Code, is very much more extensive than that given by the common law, since it creates on behalf of the Government a right to priority over all debts of every kind whether secured or unsecured, and the learned Advocate General contends that S. 151 which restricts the preference given by S. 137 to the demands for the current year, merely takes away this statutory priority and does not interfere with that given by common law. It is common ground that the Crown has a common law priority and that it exists until it is modified by the legislature; and it is not denied that the provincial legislature had power to modify the common law prerogative. The narrow question before us, then, is whether the legislature has not interfered with the common law prerogative. In my opinion it has done so. S. 137 does not merely create additional rights in excess of those given by the common law but embodies a declaration of the whole of the rights of the Crown to priority. It includes not only the right of priority over secured debts which is new, but also declares the right of priority over debts of all sorts. Therefore S. 151 which confines the preference given or declared by S. 137 to demands for the current year, does in terms restrict what was the common law prerogative of the Crown. The learned Advocate-General has pointed out that this may lead to awkward results, but where a section is dear—and in this case we think the section is clear—we cannot allow such considerations to influence our decision. For this reason we agree with the former decision of Divatia, J., and dismiss this appeal with costs (two sets).

N.J Wadia, J.:— It has been held in 36 Bom LR 1103 that Ss. 137 and 151, Bombay Land Revenue Code, should be read together, and they confer priority only in respect of arrears for the current year and not for arrears of past years. The contention of the learned Advocate-General is that apart from S. 137, Bombay Land Revenue Code, the Crown has under its prerogative a right to precedence for its debts over the unsecured debts of private persons, and that this right which is independent of S. 137, Bombay Land Revenue Code, cannot be affected by S. 151. S. 137 admittedly goes further than the ordinary prerogative of the Crown, and gives to the claims of Government under the provisions of Chap. 11 precedence over any other debts, secured or unsecured. S. 151 provides that the preference given by S. 137 to Government claims shall apply only to demands for the current year. It, therefore, expressly takes away the precedence which S. 137 gives to Government demands for arrears other than those of the current year, and it takes away that precedence without any qualification, i.e, with regard to unsecured as well as secured debts. It undoubtedly has the effect of reducing the right of precedence for its debts over unsecured debts of private persons which the Grown would have under its ordinary prerogative. But we cannot, merely because it has this result, assume in the face of the express language of the section that such a result was not intended by the section. The prerogatives of the Crown can be affected with the consent of the Crown, that is by statute. I am, therefore, of opinion that the view taken by Divatia, J., is correct, and that the appeal must be dismissed with costs.

V.B/R.K

10. Appeal dismissed.