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Ramkumar Potdar v. Sholapur Spinning & Weaving Co. Ltd.

Bombay High Court
Mar 22, 1934
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Structured Summary of the Judicial Opinion

Factual and Procedural Background

The present litigation arises from the dismissal by the directors of the Sholapur Spinning and Weaving Co. Ltd. of its managing agents, the firm known as Morarjee Goculdas & Co. The plaintiff, a shareholder, sued on behalf of himself and other shareholders seeking (a) a declaration that the directors' resolutions dismissing the agents were in contravention of the company's memorandum and articles of association and therefore not binding on the members, and (b) an injunction restraining the defendants from acting on those resolutions.

Clause 6 of the company's memorandum named “the firm of Morarjee Goculdas & Co., of Bombay, merchants, or whatever member or members that firm may for the time consist of” as the company's agents and specified their commission. The composition of that firm changed over time: at incorporation it consisted of Morarjee Goculdas and Virchand Deepchand; one partner died in 1880 and the other in 1908; subsequent reconstitutions occurred and a materially different composition existed by 1931. A resolution of the directors of June 2, 1932, and later resolutions (notably January 27, 1933) purported to terminate the agency and to install a new committee of management; the new committee took charge from January 27, 1933.

The trial court (Broomfield, J.) dismissed the plaintiff's suit with costs. The plaintiff appealed. The Court of Appeal (Beaumont, C.J., and Rangnekar, J.) heard the appeal and dismissed it with costs. The formal outcome recorded in the opinion is: Appeal dismissed.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether clause 6 of the memorandum of association is a "condition" (an essential and unalterable provision) within the meaning of Section 10 of the Indian Companies Act, 1913, so as to prevent the company (or its directors) from altering or defeating the appointment of Morarjee Goculdas & Co. as managing agents.
  2. Whether a provision in a memorandum appointing a third-party firm as managing agents creates a contractual right enforceable by a shareholder (or by the third party), or instead merely outlines an entitlement that the company may choose to contractually adopt after incorporation.
  3. How clause 6 should be construed: whether the phrase “whatever member or members that firm may for the time consist of” includes the post-1931 firm members (i.e., whether the present firm qualifies as the same firm named in the memorandum).
  4. Whether the directors had an implied power to terminate the agency for sufficient cause (misconduct, incompetence, insolvency, etc.), and whether the court should grant injunctive relief or a declaration that would in substance compel the company to continue the personal services of the agents.
  5. Whether, on the appropriate construction and facts, the plaintiff may obtain a declaration or mandatory injunction under the Specific Relief Act (including whether section 42 authorises the declaration claimed and whether sections 21, 56 and 57 limit equitable relief).

Arguments of the Parties

Appellant (Plaintiff / Shareholder)'s Arguments

  • Clause 6 is an essential condition of the company's constitution: the firm of Morarjee Goculdas & Co. was appointed as managing agents and that appointment is part of the charter (memorandum) and therefore unalterable under Section 10 of the Indian Companies Act.
  • The plaintiff subscribed for shares on the footing that the firm would act as agents; the working capital and financing of the company depended on that firm, so dismissal destroys the substratum of the company's operation.
  • The words “for the time” (in the phrase “whatever member or members that firm may for the time consist of”) should be construed as “for the time being”, and that the clause contemplates successors or continuing members so as to cover later members of the firm; the clause thus binds the company to employ the firm (as constituted from time to time).
  • Relief in equity is sought on the footing that this is not merely an internal management question or a personal service contract: the obligation arises from the memorandum, and shareholders may enforce such provisions.
  • Cited statutes and authorities: Sections 6, 10, 12 and 21 of the Indian Companies Act and case-law supporting that some memorandum stipulations can be essential conditions; reliance was placed on cases like Venkataramana v. Coimbatore M. Bank and Ashbury-related authorities.

Respondents (Company and Directors)'s Arguments

  • The memorandum is the company’s charter but does not create a contractual right enforceable by a third party or by a shareholder as against the company in the sense of binding the company to continue a personal service; precedent holds that stipulations for third parties are not enforceable by them.
  • The clause does not impose an obligation on the firm; it only describes the remuneration arrangement and contemplates that the company will enter into a contract of agency after incorporation; hence the company is not bound ab initio to continue the specified firm as agents.
  • The phrase specifying “whatever member or members that firm may for the time consist of” is uncertain and cannot fairly be construed to include persons who were never partners when the original partners were alive; a firm is not a corporation with perpetual succession.
  • Even if clause 6 remained operative, directors have an implied power consistent with master-and-servant law to terminate for sufficient cause (misconduct, incompetence, refusal to act, insolvency); the court should not force a company to retain agents in whom it has lost confidence.
  • The plaintiff's requested reliefs (declaration and mandatory injunction) would, in substance, seek specific performance of a contract for personal services and an order controlling internal management—relief which equity (and the Specific Relief Act provisions) is reluctant or barred from granting.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Ashbury Railway Carriage and Iron Co. v. Riche; Ashbury v. Watson Memorandum of association is the charter/constitution of a company; conditions in the memorandum are unalterable except as the statute allows. Used to establish the general proposition that conditions in the memorandum cannot be altered except as provided by statute; the Court relied on this as an axiom but recognized it did not resolve the specific construction issue here.
Lord Esher and Lord Justice Fry (observations in Ashbury decisions) Definition of "condition" in a memorandum and that essential parts of constitution are within section limiting alteration. Cited for interpretative support about what constitutes an "essential" condition; the Court considered but found Ashbury not decisive on present clause.
Seodoyal Khemka v. Joharmull Manmull; Brojo Lal Saha Banikya v. Budh Nath Pyarilal & Co.; Sadler v. Whiteman Authority for the proposition that a firm is not a corporation and has no perpetual succession; firm is not a separate legal entity like a corporation. Accepted as an axiom: the Court treated a partnership firm as not a corporate body with perpetual succession when construing clause 6.
Eley v. Positive Government Security Life Assurance Company; Melhado v. Porto Alegre Railway Co.; Browne v. La Trinidad; In re Rotherham Alum and Chemical Company; Hickman v. Kent or Romney Marsh Sheepbreeders' Association Propositions that articles/memorandum provisions for the benefit of third parties do not create enforceable contracts by such third parties against the company; distinction between rights as members and rights as third parties. Relied upon to support the proposition that a provision in the memorandum for the benefit of a third party is not a contractual right enforceable by that third party; the Court extended the reasoning to the memorandum context.
Ahmedabad Jubilee S. & M. Co. v. Chhotalal Chhaganlal Indian authority dealing with memorandum principles akin to English authorities on enforceability and construction. Referred to as an Indian case supporting the general principle that memorandum provisions for third parties are not enforceable by them; used for regional authority support.
Borland's Trustee v. Steel Brothers & Co. Ltd. Rule that the rule against perpetuities does not apply to personal contracts. Cited by appellant's counsel in support of a contention about perpetuity/continuity arguments; Court recorded the citation but did not treat it as decisive of construction issues here.
Nusserwanji Merwanji Panday v. Gordon That an agency vested in a firm "for the time being" can survive death of a partner and that the firm's effectiveness depends on its members from time to time; observations about selection of a firm because of confidence in its members and successors. Extensively examined: the Court accepted its importance but distinguished its facts and language from the clause in the present memorandum and ultimately held it afforded no direct assistance to the appellant's construction argument.
Friend v. Young; Lindley on Partnership Principles about partnership, survival of agency rights and related partnership law authorities. Referred to in argument about whether words in the memorandum were meant to continue agency despite partner deaths; Court noted these authorities but found the clause language and circumstances different.
Boston Deep Sea Fishing and Ice Company v. Ansell That incompetence or misconduct is a ground for dismissal of a servant and that an implied condition exists allowing termination for sufficient cause. Cited in support of the proposition that even where an agency or personal service is established, there is an implied right to dismiss for misconduct or incompetence; the Court relied on this principle when considering whether directors had implied power to terminate for cause.
Halsbury (Volume and pages cited) Statement of law that misconduct, neglect and incompetency are good grounds for dismissal of a servant. Used to support the implied-power-to-dismiss-for-cause proposition considered by the Court when weighing whether injunction should be granted.
Venkataramana v. Coimbatore M. Bank Held (in the cited judgment) that a clause appointing an agent could be a condition of the memorandum and unalterable; the Chief Justice treated such clauses as imposing substantial rights tied to constitution. Cited by appellant; the Court scrutinised that decision and expressed difficulty with aspects of the reasoning (particularly about a company being bound by pre-incorporation contracts and memorandum operating as contract with third parties) and declined to treat Venkataramana as controlling in the present case.
Fischer v. Secretary of State for India in Council; Fischer v. Orr Authorities cited in argument about the scope/exhaustiveness of Section 42 of the Specific Relief Act and whether declarations must be limited to the terms of s.42. The Court noted differences of opinion between High Courts but stated that the binding opinion upon the Court was that section 42 is exhaustive; referenced Pollock and Mulla on Specific Relief Act to that effect.
Foss v. Harbottle Principle that the Court will not generally interfere with internal management of companies acting within their powers. Relied upon in argument framing the general reluctance of courts to interfere with internal management; Court considered it in deciding whether to grant injunctive relief.
Palmer's Company Precedents Form precedents showing language used to preserve a firm's succession (examples and forms for appointing firms and their successors) and illustrations for shareholder remedies. Cited in argument about possible constructions of clause 6 and in support of procedural propositions (shareholder remedies against ultra vires acts); Court referred to the precedent forms when evaluating potential constructions and practical consequences.
Chithambaram Chettiar v. Krishna Aiyangar Referenced in submissions about whether clauses in memorandum may be conditions essential to constitution. Cited by appellant; the Court recorded the reliance but focused on statutory and other case authorities when determining whether clause 6 was a condition.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The courts (first-instance and appellate) proceeded by setting out foundational axioms and then applying them to the particular language and facts of clause 6:

  1. Foundational axioms: the memorandum is the company's charter and its conditions cannot be altered except as provided by statute; a partnership firm is not a corporation with perpetual succession; and provisions in a memorandum purporting to benefit third parties are not, in general, enforceable by such third parties as contractual rights against the company. The Court accepted these as starting legal principles.
  2. Constructional inquiry: the Court then focused on the precise words of clause 6 — including the phrase “the firm of Morarjee Goculdas & Co., ... or whatever member or members that firm may for the time consist of” — and asked which of several possible meanings was the intended one: (a) the literal partners named at incorporation; (b) those partners plus partners admitted by them in their lifetimes or survivors; or (c) an expansive meaning effectively equating the firm to “successors and assigns” so as to include any later partnership using the name.
  3. Assessment of alternatives: the Court rejected (a) as too narrow for some arguments and rejected (c) as unacceptably broad and uncertain (it would vest effectively perpetual succession-like rights in a non-corporate firm with no clear nexus test and could allow strangers who acquire the name/goodwill to claim the agency). The Court found (b) (survivors/partners admitted in the lifetime of then-members) implausible on the specific language and context. The Court concluded it could not be satisfied that clause 6, by its language, covered the firm as constituted from 1931 onwards.
  4. Contractual character and pre-incorporation limits: the Court treated clause 6 as primarily outlining the terms under which the company might enter into an agency contract (a preliminary arrangement), rather than creating an immutable contractual obligation binding the company to employ specified third parties irrespective of subsequent events. The appellate reasons emphasised that a company cannot be bound at its creation by a pre-incorporation contract with a third party that it never actually agreed to after incorporation.
  5. Condition under Section 10: the Court considered whether clause 6 amounted to a "condition" within Section 10. While one judge (Broomfield J.) observed that clause 6 could be seen as a condition in the sense of being important, the decisive practical view was that even if it were a condition, the clause was inoperative as to the present firm composition because of the uncertainty of its application; and, more fundamentally, the clause did not impose a contractual personal-service obligation enforceable by injunction.
  6. Implied power to dismiss for cause: separately and importantly, the Court accepted (applying authorities such as Boston Deep Sea Fishing and Halsbury) that where services are personal or of a confidential nature, there is an implied condition allowing dismissal for misconduct, incompetence or other sufficient cause. Because the directors had purported to dismiss the agents on grounds they considered sufficient (and those grounds were part of the case the defendants raised and relied upon), the Court could not declare the directors' resolutions ultra vires unless it could exclude the possibility they were acting within an implied lawful power. The Court also observed that any damages remedy for the agents is to be pursued in their own suit.
  7. Equitable relief and Specific Relief Act constraints: the Court analysed the plaintiff's requests in light of the Specific Relief Act. It observed that:
    • Section 42 (declarations) is limited to persons entitled to a legal character or right as to property, and the plaintiff did not frame his case as asserting such a legal character or property right; authorities show section 42 is exhaustive on declarations.
    • Equity is reluctant to grant mandatory injunctions that would amount to specific enforcement of a personal service or place the majority-run company under the control of persons the directors and majority no longer trust; sections 21, 56 and 57 of the Specific Relief Act were considered relevant in deciding whether to grant an injunction in substance enforcing personal service.
    The Court emphasised substance over form: although the suit was framed by a shareholder as enforcement of a constitutional provision, in substance it sought to compel the company to retain agents and thereby enforce personal services — relief which courts do not generally grant.
  8. Practical and policy considerations: the Court noted the impracticalities and potential injustices of construing clause 6 so as to force the company to continue to employ a firm irrespective of changed composition or misconduct. The Court pointed out the problem of uncertainty in applying clause 6 to distant successors and the difficulty of determining what degree of nexus would suffice to treat a later firm as the same one named in the memorandum.
  9. Conclusion of analysis: the combination of (a) the Court's constructional conclusion that clause 6 did not clearly apply to the firm as constituted in 1931, (b) the contractual and pre-incorporation legal limitations on binding a company to a third-party contract, (c) the implied right to dismiss for cause, and (d) equitable reluctance to order specific enforcement of personal services, led the Court to dismiss the plaintiff's suit and refuse injunctive relief.

Holding and Implications

Holding: Appeal dismissed. The plaintiff is entitled to no relief; the suit below was rightly dismissed with costs.

Immediate consequences for the parties:

  • The directors' resolutions terminating the agency arrangement were not declared ultra vires by the court; no mandatory injunction was ordered to reinstate the agents.
  • The plaintiff's declaratory and injunctive claims failed; the plaintiff (and the shareholders represented) received no relief and were ordered to pay costs as directed by the courts below and on appeal.
  • If the dismissed agents consider themselves wrongfully dismissed, the appropriate remedy is asserted to be an action for damages by the agents themselves (the Court declined to grant equitable relief that would amount to compelling a company to retain personal services).

Broader implications and precedent: The Court applied established principles rather than announcing a new rule. It reaffirmed that (i) the memorandum is the company's charter and its conditions are not freely alterable, (ii) partnership firms are not corporate entities with perpetual succession, (iii) a memorandum provision benefiting a third party does not necessarily give the third party an enforceable contract against the company, and (iv) equity is ordinarily unwilling to enforce specific performance or mandatory injunctions that would compel continuation of personal service relationships. The opinion did not purport to lay down a novel principle of law beyond these applications to the present facts.


This summary was prepared solely from the material contained in the provided opinion. No facts, authorities, or conclusions not present in that text have been added.

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Broomfield, J.:—

[His Lordship after discussing the facts said:] I propose, first of all, to clear the ground by stating certain axioms, as I may call them, which, though they have been dwelt on to some extent in the argument, are not really disputed or capable of dispute. The first axiom is that neither the company itself nor a fortiori the directors can alter any condition in the memorandum of association. Section 10 of the Indian Companies Act, 1913, provides:—

“A company shall not alter the conditions contained in its memorandum except in the cases and in the mode and to the extent for which express provision is made in this Act.”

Section 11 enables a company to change its name by a special resolution. Section 12 provides for alterations in respect of the place of the registered office and in respect of the objects of the company being similarly made with the sanction of the Court. Section 21 provides as follows:—

“The memorandum and articles shall, when registered, bind the company and the members thereof to the same extent as if they respectively had been signed by each member and contained a covenant on the part of each member, his heirs, and legal representatives, to observe all the provisions of the memorandum and of the articles, subject to the provisions of this Act.”

The memorandum of association is the charter or constitution of the company and the conditions contained in it are unalterable except to the extent and in the manner provided by the Act: see Ashbury Railway Carriage and Iron Co. v. Riche and Ashbury v. Watson.(2) The meaning of the word “condition” is explained in the latter case. Lord Esher said (p. 381):—

“… anything which is laid down as a rule in the memorandum of association must, I think, be taken to be one of the conditions on which the company is established.”

And also said (p. 381):—

“… it seems difficult to me to imagine a case in which any stipulation in the memorandum of association can be altered even by the whole company, save such as is expressly mentioned in the 12th section.”

The 12th section of the English Act corresponded with section 10 of the Indian Act. Lord Justice Fry said (p. 384):—

“I am not prepared to say that there might not be inserted in the memorandum of association, details with regard to the management of the company which would not be conditions within the meaning of the 12th section, but I think that section does apply to all conditions in the memorandum of association, which may fairly be described as essential parts of the constitution of the company, and upon which it was established.”

Further, on the same point at the end of his judgment he said (p. 386):—

“By essential conditions I mean that which in fact is part of the essence of the constitution of the company, whether required by statute or not.”

The second axiom is that a firm is not a corporation with perpetual succession nor a legal entity at all. On that point I need only refer to the authorities cited by Mr. Coltman—Seodoyal Khemka v. Joharmull Manmull, Brojo Lal Saha Banikya v. Budh Nath Pyarilal & Co., and Sadler v. Whiteman.(3)

The third axiom is that a provision in the memorandum of association such as the one we are concerned with for the benefit of a third party is not a contract between the company and such third party and cannot be enforced in a suit by such party, even though at the time of the suit he may be a member of the company: see on that point Eley v. Positive Government Security Life Assurance Company,(4) Melhado v. Porto Alegre Railway Co.,(5) Browne v. La Trinidad,(6) In re Rotherham Alum and Chemical Company,(7) and Hickman v. Kent or Romney Marsh Sheepbreeders' Association.(8) In the last case the previous authorities are reviewed and Mr. Justice Astbury says (p. 900):—

“It is difficult to reconcile these two classes of decisions and the judicial opinions therein expressed, but I think this much is clear, first, that no article can constitute a contract between the company and a third person; secondly, that no right merely purporting to be given by an article to a person, whether a member or not, in a capacity other than of a member, as, for instance, as solicitor, promoter, director, can be enforced against the company; and, thirdly, that articles regulating the rights and obligations of the members generally as such do create rights and obligations between them and the company respectively.”

Although that was a case dealing with articles and not with a memorandum of association, the same reasoning applies to the memorandum. Ahmedabad Jubilee S. & M. Co. v. Chhotalal Chhaganlal(9) is an Indian case dealing with the memorandum of association in which the same principles are laid down.

Mr. Coltman for the defendants does not of course dispute the position that the memorandum is the charter of the company and that the conditions contained therein are unalterable except as provided in the Act. He contends that the particular provision with which we are concerned is not a condition. He also contends that on the true construction of clause 6 of the memorandum there has been no breach of it.

Messrs Setalvad and Desai do not of course argue that the firm of Morarjee Goculdas & Co. referred to in clause 6 was a corporation with perpetual succession. They do not suggest that any meaning other than the accepted legal meaning is to be given to the word “firm” as there used. What they contend is that on the true construction of the clause the expression “the firm of Morarjee Goculdas & Co.” should be taken to mean and include not only the members of the firm at that time and not only partners introduced by those members or the survivors of them, but all persons subsequently introduced as partners from time to time. So that the firm of Morarjee Goculdas & Co. as constituted in 1931, though it contained no single member who was even born when the company was registered, is nevertheless the firm to which the clause in the memorandum applies. If that was the intention, it is argued, there is nothing contrary to the law in such a provision. In that connection Borland's Trustee v. Steel Brothers & Co. Limited was cited. It was held in that case that the rule against perpetuities has no application whatever to personal contracts. The law of contract according to this view has no application at all. Plaintiff relies on section 21 of the Act, that is on the statutory covenant binding all the members of the firm.

It is obvious, therefore, that in order to get to grips with the real issues in the case it is necessary, first of all, to determine the meaning of clause 6, that is of the material words “the firm of Morarjee Goculdas & Co., of Bombay, merchants or whatever member or members that firm may for the time consist of”. Three meanings have been suggested as possible: first, that the words mean the actual partners in 1874, i.e, Morarjee Goculdas and Virchand Deepchand. This is the interpretation for which Mr. Coltman contends, and in connection with it he cited Nusserwanji Merwanji Panday v. Gordon. In that case a firm consisting of four persons was appointed under the memorandum of association and articles of association of a certain company and also under a separate agreement between the company and the said firm to be the managing agents of the company for a period of twenty-five years with certain powers specified in the agreement. In particular the agents were empowered to appoint the company's solicitors and they did so. The directors of the company passed a resolution appointing other solicitors in place of those appointed by the agents and the agency firm then sued the company and the directors upon the agreement between the firm and the company for a declaration that the resolution was ultra vires and for an injunction restraining the defendants from carrying it into effect. One of the many points (it was only a subsidiary point) which came up for argument in the case was, whether the agreement with the plaintiff firm being in the nature of a contract of service was not determined by the fact that one of the members of the firm had died. Sir Charles Sargent, who decided the case, held that was not so. He said (p. 277):—

“… I think that, having regard to the memorandum and articles of association, the contract, however informally and clumsily worded, was that the firm, for the time being, should be the agents of the company for twenty-five years. The right, therefore, to sue on the contract would, by its nature, survive to the three plaintiffs after the death of Merwanji.”

Mr. Coltman also referred to Friend v. Young and to Lindley on Partnership, 9th Edn., p. 167, and his argument, if I understood it correctly, was that the words we have to construe here were merely intended to meet a possible difficulty of that kind, that is to make it clear that on the death of any of the partners the contract of service would continue as regards the survivors. This, however, seems to me extremely improbable, and important as the case of Nusserwanji Merwanji Panday v. Gordon is, in other respects, as I shall show later, it does not, in my opinion, afford any assistance at all on the question of construction. The language to be construed there was quite different. One of the articles of association provided that the then members of the plaintiff firm and such other persons as should for the time being constitute the said firm should be the agents of the company for twenty-five years, and the agreement between the company and the firm provided that the then members of the plaintiff firm who were named and their executors, administrators and assigns, the persons for the time being constituting the partnership firm of Merwanji Framji and Company, were to be the agents of the company as provided in the agreement. Obviously there was no question there of the firm being limited to the persons who were partners at the date of the agreement, and Sir Charles said (p. 283):—

“It was said that the agency in this case was not a personal service, because it was vested by the company in a firm, whose members might be ever changing. But the efficiency of the agency will none the less depend upon the members of the firm for the time being, and the company may fairly be supposed (if, indeed, this company can be said to have had any share in the appointment of the plaintiffs under the circumstances of this case,) to have selected the firm as their agents from the confidence in the members of the firm and their successors.”

To return to this present case, Virchand Deepchand was not admitted a partner until the date on which the company was registered. When the memorandum and articles were drawn up Morarjee Goculdas had no partner. He was the firm, and, so far as the company was aware, it seems he continued to be the firm for two years longer. Therefore, the words “or whatever member or members that firm may for the time consist of” must have been inserted in contemplation of the possible admission of new partners. Lastly, there is the obvious objection that these words would be an almost incredibly clumsy way of expressing the idea that only members of the firm as then constituted came within the intendment. I have no hesitation in holding that this is not the meaning.

Mr. Coltman also suggested—and this was the utmost to which he was prepared to go—that the words might include, beside Morarjee Goculdas and Virchand Deepchand, any partners introduced by them or the survivor in their lifetime. In that connection he cited from Palmer's Company Precedents, Part 1, p. 782, the following form (No. 289):—

“The firm of A. and B. (which now consists of the said A.B.C.D and E.), and their successors, shall be appointed to, and shall hold, the office of ships' husbands of the coy so long as they are able and willing to act as such, or until they shall be removed by extraordinary resolution; and any firm which, by death or retirement of any partner, or by the admission of any new partner or otherwise, shall, from time to time and at any time hereafter, succeed to the business now carried on by the said existing firm, shall, for the purposes of this clause, be deemed the successors of the said existing firm, provided that some member of the said existing firm is a member of such succeeding firm.”

As to this interpretation, I shall only say now that it is conceivable that this is what was meant, but if so, the intention is not expressed.

That only leaves Messrs Setalvad and Desai's interpretation which I have already given. According to that we must read the words as practically equivalent to “the firm, its successors and assigns”. But it is frankly conceded that there must be a qualification. The clause in the memorandum would not cover any firm which might happen to become entitled to use the label Morarjee Goculdas & Co. The process by which one combination of partners succeeds another must be such that it is possible to say that the firm is still the firm of Morarjee Goculdas & Co., to all intents and purposes the same firm. There must be, as Mr. Desai says, a nexus, a connecting principle, by virtue of which each succeeding partnership can be regarded as effectively continuing the original firm. It is said that the nexus consists in the fact that persons entitled from time to time to the good will and reputation of Morarjee Goculdas & Co. admit persons who under the law of partnership become joint owners with them of all the assets, rights and privileges of the firm. In spite of the fact that the death of any partner in law dissolves the partnership, if the surviving members form new partnership, the various groups of partners will be in Mr. Desai's words “owners of the same thing or the same business from time to time”. On this reasoning it is argued that the firm of Morarjee Goculdas & Co., whose services have been dispensed with by the company, answers the description of the firm given in clause 6.

But once it has to be admitted that the language cannot be taken literally and must be read subject to qualifications, difficulties begin to arise. According to this interpretation of the clause, words “for the time” are equivalent to “from time to time,” and the firm of Morarjee Goculdas & Co. includes its successors and assigns, though these very ordinary words are not included in the memorandum. Mr. Pesai himself stated the position in that way. Mr. Setalvad seemed to be reluctant to go so far, or considered it unnecessary to do so, but I can see no logical reason why one should stop short of that conclusion. No doubt, the process we are asked to envisage is one in which new blood is gradually introduced so that there is no break of continuity and the traditions of the original firm are carried on. But obviously that need not be so. Partners representing the original firm by heredity or training might be swamped by the introduction of new partners having no connection or sympathy with the old traditions at all. The good will and reputation of the firm, or so much as might be left after the lapse of years, might be assigned all at once to a stranger or body of strangers. In either case the new firm would answer the description in clause 6 which says nothing about any nexus and contains no condition or qualification whatever except that the firm must do business in Bombay. Besides, how is it to be decided whether any particular new firm of Morarjee Goculdas & Co. is sufficiently connected with the original one to come within the description? If Messrs Setalvad and Desai's arguments are correct, it does seem logically to follow, as Mr. Coltman says, that any person or persons to whom the firm of Morarjee Goculdas & Co. for the time being might choose to assign their business might claim to manage the affairs of this company and the company might be compelled to allow them to do so, although there might be no real connection with the original firm except the name, and although the new firm might have no qualification whatever for the work of managing a company.

It is excessively difficult to say what the founders of this company did mean when they drew up or agreed to clause 6 of the memorandum and the corresponding article, but at any rate they could hardly have intended such a result as that. I think it is quite probable that they did not look beyond the proximate future and did not really consider what was to happen on the death of Morarjee Goculdas. Agreements which are not certain or capable of being made certain are void, and a provision in a memorandum of association may also, I conceive, be void for uncertainty. I think there is no certainty as to the intended application of clause 6, at any fate after the death of the original partners, Morarjee Goculdas and Virchand Deepchand, and the most I find myself able to say on this difficult question of construction is that I am not satisfied that the clause can be taken to apply to the firm of Morarjee Goculdas & Co. as constituted from 1931 onwards. I ought to mention perhaps that I do not think any light is thrown on the question of construction by the history of the relations between the company and the firm or firms of Morarjee Goculdas & Co. It is a fact that the directors in their minutes merely recorded the various changes in the constitution of the agency firm, by death or introduction of new partners, and it never seems to have been suggested that there was any question of reappointing the managing agents. But it is admitted that no estoppel can arise. Moreover, Virchand Deepchand lived till 1908 and Narottam Morarjee, who apparently inherited the liability and succeeded to the reputation of his father, did not die till 1929. It was not till after the re-constitution of the agency firm in 1931 that the question whether that firm should continue to be employed assumed any real importance.

On this view of the case it can make no importance whether clause 6 is or is not a condition within the meaning of section 10 of the Act. But, as I may be wrong in my view of the construction of the clause and as learned counsel have dealt with the point at some length, I may briefly refer to it. Ashbury v. Watson, already cited as the leading authority as to the meaning of the word “condition”, does not, I think, help much on this specific point to be decided here. What was sought to be altered in that case and held to be unalterable was a provision as to the dividends to be paid on the ordinary and preference shares, a matter which affected every shareholder and which was obviously not a mere detail of management. Mr. Setalvad for the plaintiff cited Venkataramana v. Coimbatore M. Bank. The plaintiff in that case had been appointed agent, principal, secretary and director of the bank by virtue of a clause in the memorandum of association. The company by a special resolution altered the clause by revoking the appointment and then applied to the Court for confirmation of the special resolution under section 12. In the course of his judgment Schwabe, C.J said as follows (p. 128):—

“It is, however, argued that this is not a condition but is something else. It was suggested in Ashbury v. Watson by Lord Justice Fry that there might be some details of management of a company, contained in the memorandum, which would be alterable not being conditions. No case of this kind has ever arisen, and I am quite satisfied that this clause is not a detail of management at all. Condition for this purpose is also described as stipulation and, in my judgment, this is one. It is a very important provision. It is not necessary to discuss now the duration of that agreement. That may be a matter for discussion elsewhere, but, at any rate, for the time there was a man set up with, and he agreed himself to have, almost unlimited powers of control in the affairs of this company; and share-holders, who took their shares in the face of the memorandum, would know that they were to have the advantage of that man's efforts. It may indeed have been one of the important reasons guiding people to become share-holders in the company. I think it is a condition, within the meaning of section 10, and is therefore unalterable.”

Now it may be, as Mr. Coltman says, that the case was not fully argued. The learned Chief Justice appears to have treated the provision in the memorandum as a contract between the company and the person appointed agent which he could hardly have done if the authorities on that point had been cited to him. Moreover, the question, whether the provision amounted to a condition or not was really obiter, since the learned Judge held that he had no jurisdiction to interfere under section 12 in any case, because the clause in question did not relate to one of the objects of the company. Nevertheless, if I may say so with respect, I think there is much force in the learned Chief Justice's reasoning. Provisions which purport to place the whole management of a company in the hands of a person or persons other than the directors and to place the directors in a more or less subordinate position cannot be regarded as mere details of management. In that connection I may refer to the remarks of Sir Charles Sargent in Nusserwanji Merwanji Panday v. Gordon, which apply, I think, with almost equal force to the present case. The question, whether a particular provision is a condition or not cannot depend, in my opinion, on whether it is beneficial to the company or the reverse, nor upon whether the person for whose benefit it is made has or has not the legal right of enforcing it himself. In my view then clause 6 of the memorandum would amount to a condition within the meaning of section 10.

But that finding does not assist the plaintiff if I am right in my view that the clause is no longer operative. On the other hand, I have felt some difficulty in understanding haw a contrary finding on this point would materially assist the defendants. Let us assume that clause 6 is not a condition within the meaning of section 10. It is obviously a provision, and under section 21 all the provisions of the memorandum and articles are binding, subject to the provisions of the Act. The clause is binding, therefore, until it is altered. (I am assuming now for the sake of argument that it has not ceased to be operative.) The Act contains no express provision by which anything contained in the memorandum which is not a condition and which is not covered by sections 11, 12 and 50 can be altered. But under Section 20 any alteration or addition even in the articles can only be effected by the company itself by special resolution. Can it be contended that the memorandum, which is the charter of the company, can be altered by a mere resolution of the directors? If I thought that clause 6 required alteration at all, I should have to hold that it was not within the competence of the directors to alter it. But perhaps the real point may be this. If clause 6 be taken to be a detail of management, it would presumably be possible for the company to get it altered somehow, and in that case the rule in Foss v. Harbottle, that is to say, that the Court will not interfere with the internal management of companies acting within their powers, might be invoked. As I hold that the clause is a condition, that point does not arise. Before leaving this part of the case I may mention as a matter of history that an attempt was made to get clause 6 deleted in an application under section 12 in 1922 and it was unsuccessful. I do not consider that matter has any importance. Mr. Justice Kemp who dealt with the application gave no judgment, and his order, which is exhibit S, does not contain any reasons. Moreover, we are not concerned with the powers of the Court under section 12.

There still remains a very important aspect of the case which, I think, is really independent of the question whether clause 6 applies to the present firm of Morarjee Goculdas & Co. or not and whether the clause is still binding upon the company or not. Let us assume that the constitution of the company still requires that the firm of Morarjee Goculdas & Co. should be employed as agents. Even so, Mr. Coltman argues that this article of the constitution must be taken to be subject to the law of master and servant, in this respect at any rate that the right to dismiss for sufficient cause is not taken away. Otherwise, there might be this extraordinary result. The agency firm might refuse to do any work, or it might become insolvent or patently incompetent or even dishonest and criminal. The company would have no power to control the agents. There is no contract as between them, and the memorandum and articles give the agents rights and powers but do not define their duties. Yet they could at any time by getting a friendly shareholder to bring an action of this kind compel the company to continue to employ them. The case of Boston Deep Sea Fishing and Ice Company v. Ansell was cited in support of the proposition that incompetence or misconduct is always a ground for dismissal of a servant, however appointed, and that there is a condition implied in every contract of service that if faithful service is not rendered, the mister may elect to determine. On the same point reference was made to Halsbury, Vol. XX, p. 99, and following, where misconduct, neglect and incompetency are stated to be good grounds for the dismissal of a servant. Mr. Desai was prepared to admit the proposition that it is an implied condition in every contract of service that the employee may be dismissed for good cause. Mr. Setalvad appeared to consider that it might be open to question whether such a condition is to be implied in the case of a covenant in the memorandum, of association. But he adduced no arguments or authorities in support of that view and said that he would assume the rule to be as suggested. Both he and Mr. Desai contended that it was a sufficient answer to this argument of the defendants that the latter have not alleged in their written statement nor produced any evidence to prove that the agents were in fact dismissed for good cause. As to this Mr. Coltman says that it was not open to the defendants to allege dismissal for good cause in the absence of any allegation in the plaint that the agents had been wrongfully dismissed, nor to produce evidence on that matter in the absence of the agents from the record. That question, according to Mr. Coltman, can only be considered in another suit, which, it appears, the agents have already filed, claiming damages for wrongful dismissal. I must confess that the absence of a specific allegation in the written statement and of a specific issue does seem to me to be a difficulty. But there is no doubt whatever that the directors did purport to dismiss the agents for reasons which in their opinion entitled them to do so. I have already referred to the resolution of June 2, 1932, exhibit 1, and the notice convening the meeting of January 27, 1933, exhibit P. There is no doubt also that this is a material part of defendants' case. Mr. Coltman put it in the forefront of his argument and there is no question of the plaintiff being taken by surprise. When the Court is asked to consider whether certain resolutions of the directors are ultra vires, it is entitled and bound to consider the circumstances in which the resolutions were passed. It cannot shut its eyes to the fact that the directors were not capriciously overriding an article of the constitution,, but putting an end to an arrangement, which, in their view, was unworkable, owing to the conduct of the agents. I could not give the plaintiff a conditional declaration that the resolutions were ultra vires “unless the directors had sufficient cause for dismissing the agents,” and if the directors had an implied authority to terminate the employment of the agents for good cause, as I must hold they had, I do not see how I could declare their resolutions to be ultra vires as long as the possibility that they were exercising a lawful power is not excluded. Moreover, if they had the power to dismiss for good cause—and the only question is whether the cause was sufficient—it may well be argued that it then becomes a mere matter of internal management with which the Court will not interfere. If the agents themselves have been damnified that is a matter which will be considered in their own separate suit.

[After recording the findings on the issues raised in the suit His Lordship proceeded:—]

That brings me to the arguments on the question of the reliefs claimed in this suit. Mr. Coltman contends that, whatever the finding may be on the matters in controversy, the Court cannot, and if it could, ought not to grant the reliefs claimed by the plaintiff. He urges, firstly, that no declaration can be given because plaintiff cannot bring his case within the terms of section 42 of the Specific Relief Act. That section is as follows:—

“Any person entitled to any legal character, or to any right as to any property, may institute a suit against any person denying, or interested to deny, his title to such character or right, and the Court may in its discretion make therein a declaration that he is so entitled, …”

It is not suggested that there is any question in this case of the plaintiff's right to any legal character or of his right to any property, and it looks to me as though this is a good point. Mr. Setalvad suggests that section 42 is not exhaustive and cites Fischer v. Secretary of State for India in Council: Fischer v. Orr. There has been a difference of opinion between the High Courts, but the cases cited in Pollock and Mulla's Contract and Specific Relief Act, 6th Edn., pp. 844 to 847, show that the better opinion, or at any rate the opinion which is binding upon me, is that section 42 is exhaustive. However, the declaration would not be a matter of much importance if the injunctions could be granted. The injunctions asked for in the plaint are these, that the defendants may be restrained from carrying the said resolution into effect and from terminating or declaring terminated the appointment of the said firm of Morarjee Goculdas & Co. as the managing agents of the 1st defendant company and that the defendants may be restrained from in any way interfering with the management of the affairs of the 1st defendant company by the firm of Morarjee Goculdas & Co. as the managing agents thereof. The first thing to note is that it is proved and admitted that the employment of the agency firm was in fact terminated and the new committee of management took charge of the affairs of the company from January 27, 1933, i.e, the date on which the resolutions were passed. Therefore, Mr. Coltman argues—and I think rightly—that the injunctions prayed for would not meet the case. No injunction could be granted to restrain what has already been done. No doubt, as Mr. Setalvad says, the act of the directors is a continuing act. That does not alter the fact that any injunction to be effective would have to be in a mandatory form. However, that point, I think, is not very material except that Courts are rather more reluctant to grant mandatory injunctions than preventive injunctions. The real question is, whether in a case of this kind any kind of injunction can be given or ought to be given. Mr. Coltman relies on section 21 of the Specific Relief Act which provides that certain contracts cannot be specifically enforced, inter alia contracts of personal service, contracts the terms of which the Court cannot find with reasonable certainty, and contracts the performance of which involves the performance of a continuous duty extending over a longer period than three years. He also relies on section 56, which provides that an injunction cannot be granted inter alia to prevent the breach of a contract the performance of which would not be specifically enforced. Section 57 contains a proviso to that clause in the preceding section, and provides that where a contract comprises an affirmative agreement to do a certain act, coupled with a negative agreement, express or implied, not to do a certain act, the Court may by injunction compel performance of the negative agreement though it cannot compel performance of the affirmative one. This section, Mr. Coltman says, cannot apply to the case of an employer and he asks the Court to draw that inference from the illustrations to the section. In any case he says the plaintiff has not asked for any injunction to restrain the company from employing anybody else.

On the other hand it is argued that the case does not come under section 57. But the main argument on behalf of the plaintiff is that all these provisions of the Act are irrelevant because this is not a suit by a party to an agreement of personal service to enforce the agreement, but a suit by a shareholder to compel the company to observe an article of its constitution. Now as a matter of form that is so. But, in deciding whether the Court should exercise its discretionary power of interfering by injunction, I think it must look at the substance rather than the form of the suit, and in substance the object of this suit undoubtedly is to compel the company to continue to employ Morarjee Goculdas & Co. as agents as before. Undoubtedly, also, the effect of the injunctions prayed for, or of the mandatory injunction which the Court would have to make to meet the circumstances of the case, would be, as Mr. Coltman says, to place the board of directors almost entirely under the control of a body of persons in whom they no longer have any confidence. It is urged upon me that this is not a matter for the Court to consider, and that if the directors have acted ultra vires, the status quo must be restored whatever the results may be. It is always open to the company to get itself wound up. In my opinion this reasoning is not sound. The Court must have regard to the probable effects of granting an injunction. The fact that the company can get out of its troubles by committing suicide seems to me beside the point. In all the long list of cases cited to me there is not one in which the Court has interfered in circumstances at all comparable to this. I may refer once more to Nusserwanji Merwanji Panday v. Gordon. Sir Charles Sargent, after citing a number of authorities, observed as follows (p. 282):—

“Now, I apprehend that the principle to be deduced from these cases is that the Court will not compel one man to continue to employ another in services of personal nature, by which I understand services of such a nature as to depend for their efficiency upon the personal qualities of those with whom the contract is entered into, and more especially when they are services of trust and confidence. It was said that the agency in this case was not a personal service, because it was vested by the company in a firm, whose members might be ever changing. But the efficiency of the agency will none the less depend upon the members of the firm for the time being, and the company may fairly be supposed (if, indeed, this company can be said to have had any share in the appointment of the plaintiffs under the circumstances of this case,) to have selected the firm as their agents from the confidence in the members of the firm and their successors. Applying this principle to the present case, is it possible to conceive any duties of a more confidential character than those of a manager of a spinning and weaving company, to whom the entire business of buying raw material, creating the manufactured articles, and selling the outcome of the mill is entrusted, together with the largest possible powers for the efficient discharge of those duties? Would it be possible to impose a heavier burden on a company of this character, than by compelling it to retain a firm in the exercise of such duties after it had forfeited the confidence of the directors and shareholders? I can come to no other conclusion than that this Court would not, either by decreeing specific performance or by injunction, compel a company to retain its agents in its employ, but would leave the latter to their action for damages.”

I do not lose sight of the fact that was an action by the agents themselves. Some of them were also shareholders, and an attempt had been made to amend the plaint by alleging a cause of action in two of the plaintiffs as shareholders as well as a cause of action in all the plaintiffs as parties contracting with the company. That amendment was disallowed on the ground that it would amount to misjoinder of plaintiffs. But the manner in which the subject was treated by Sir Charles Sargent does not suggest that his view as to the priority of the Court's interference would have been any different if the form of the suit had been changed. On the whole, though I am not prepared to go so far as to say that the Court could not grant an injunction. I do hold that it is not bound to do so, and that, in the circumstances of the present case, it ought not to do so. I find that plaintiff is entitled to no relief. The suit is dismissed with costs.

The plaintiff appealed.

V.F Taraporewala, with M.C Setalvad, for the appellant.

Sir Chimanlal Setalvad, with M.L Manehshaw and K.M Munshi, for respondents Nos. 1 to 6.

Sir Jamshed Kanga, Advocate General, with C.K Daphtary and D.D Sabnis, for respondent No. 7.

Taraporewala. The act we complain of is the dismissal of the managing agents. It is an essential condition in the memorandum that the firm of Morarjee Goculdas should act as the agents of the company. This is not a case of internal management or of a contract of service. I subscribed to the shares on the footing that the firm of Morarjee Goculdas were to be the agents of the company. The working capital of the company is brought by the managing agents. They are the financiers of the company.

There is no contract between the company and the agents. The contract is between the shareholders inter se as embodied in the memorandum and the articles of association. I am suing on the contract contained in the memorandum. It is an essential condition of the constitution of the company that the firm of Morarjee Goculdas should be its agents.

[Beaumont, C.J What would happen if the agents refuse to act and refuse to resign?]

The company can dissolve itself. The basis of the working of the company is that Morarjee Goculdas & Co. are to be its agents. Even a detail of management may be a condition essential to the constitution of the company. I do not argue that everything in the memorandum of a company is an essential condition of its constitution. In this case there is an obligation on the company to carry on its business with the firm of Morarjee Goculdas & Co., as its agents, and if this is a condition essential to the constitution of the company, then the removal of the managing agents is ultra vires the company. Refers to articles 98, 99, 101 and 102 of the articles of association of the company. In 1922 an attempt was made to delete the clause in the memorandum regarding the appointment of the firm of managing agents, but the firm refused to delete the clause. Reference was made to sections 6, 10, 12, and 21, of the Indian Companies Act.

The company cannot alter any condition contained in its memorandum: Ashbury v. Watson. Every stipulation in the memorandum is a condition. The memorandum is the charter of the company: Ashbury Railway Carriage and Iron Co. v. Riche. The Court below has held that the appointment of Morarjee Goculdas & Co., as the agents is a condition of the constitution of the company. The appointment of the agents is a condition and not a detail of management: Venkataramana v. Coimbatore M. Bank and Chithambaram Chettiar v. Krishna Aiyangar. The memorandum of a company may include stipulations other than those specified in section 6 of the Indian Companies Act.

An outsider cannot enforce a contract contained in the memorandum. But it can be enforced by a shareholder. You cannot construe a stipulation by its consequences.

The scheme of this company is that it is to be conducted by directors and agents. Refers to Article 80-B of the articles of association. If the agents refuse to work, then the substratum of the company would go. The appointment of directors is a condition essential to the working of a company. Supposing no shareholder is willing to serve as a director, then the company could not work and would have to be dissolved. Similarly, if Morarjee Goculdas & Co. refuse to work as the agents of the company, then the only course would be to dissolve the company.

The firm of Morarjee Goculdas & Co., or whoever is a member in that firm for the time being, is appointed the agent of the company.

[Beaumont, C.J On the death of the original partners of the firm of Morarjee Goculdas & Co., that firm came to an end. The firm is not a corporation.]

The particular legal entity did come to an end on the death of the original partners of the firm of Morarjee Goculdas & Co., but it is intended that the successors or assigns of Morarjee Goculdas & Co. should continue to be the agents.

[Rangnekar, J. It is more in the nature of a Hindu joint family firm with perpetual succession.]

The words “for the time” in clause 6 of the memorandum mean “for the time being”: Bachubai and L.A Watkins v. Shamji Jadowji.

Where an act is ultra vires, any shareholder can come to Court to restrain the directors: Palmer's Company Precedents, 13th Edn., Part 1, page 1240, and illustrations (c) and (d) to section 54 of the Specific Relief Act.

Sir Jamshed Kanga, supported the appellant.

The other respondents were not called upon.

Beaumont, C.J:—In this case the plaintiff sues on behalf of himself and the other shareholders of the Sholapur Spinning and Weaving Co. Ltd., and he asks, first, for a declaration that certain resolutions passed by the directors, which resolutions were for the dismissal of the company's agents, are in contravention of the memorandum and articles of association of the company, and are not binding on the members of the defendant company, and, secondly, for an injunction to restrain the defendants from acting upon the resolutions. Defendant No. 1 is the Sholapur Spinning and Weaving Co. Ltd., and the other defendants are the directors. It is a well-settled principle in company law that the Court does not generally interfere with the internal management of the affairs of a company, and, if the majority of the shareholders consider that a particular contract of employment should be terminated, the Court would not as a rule consider the matter at the instance of a minority of share-holders. To get over that difficulty, it is contended by the plaintiff that the dismissal of these agents is an act ultra vires the company, and, no doubt, the case of acts ultra vires the company does constitute an exception to the general rule that the Court will not interfere in the management of a company. But it is, on the face of it, startling to find it suggested that the dismissal of persons in the employment of the company, or under contractual relations with the company, is an act ultra vires the company. To get over that difficulty, the plaintiff alleges that the rights of the agents arise under the memorandum of association of the company, and, therefore, cannot be altered. But, at that point, another difficulty arises, i.e, that the memorandum of association, as it has been held many times, does not constitute a contract between the company and a third party who may be named therein. So that, ultimately, the argument assumes some such form as this, that it is a vital part of the constitution of the company that the company should employ the agents, and that the company should conduct its business through the services of the agents, that obligation arises apart from any contract with the agents, and that it is an obligation imposed upon the company as part of its charter which cannot be altered, having regard to the terms of section 10 of the Indian Companies Act. In my opinion, the argument is quite untenable and the plaintiff's action is wholly misconceived. With whatever skill the real object of the plaintiff is concealed, it is quite plain that the order which he asks for would have the effect of restraining the company from dismissing the agents, and it is well-settled that the Court will not make an order the effect of which is to enforce specifically any contract of personal service.

But, I think, the case may be based on another ground, because I am not prepared to accept the argument of the plaintiff that the material clause in the memorandum is really a vital part of the constitution of the company, or a condition of the memorandum within the meaning of section 10 of the Indian Companies Act. The clause in question, which is clause 6, is not incorporated amongst the objects of the company, but is an independent clause, and it is in these terms:—

“That the firm of Morarjee Goculdas & Co., of Bombay, merchants, or whatever member or members that firm may for the time consist of, shall be the agents of the company, so long as the said firm shall carry on business in Bombay or until they shall resign, and they shall receive a commission of ¼ anna per lb. on all the yarns and other material manufactured and sold by the company; should, however, the company during any one year be unable to declare a dividend of 4 per cent, owing to their profits being less than that amount, the agents shall only be paid one-third of the above commission.”

The clause does not purport in terms to impose any obligation of service upon the agents. It merely provides what remuneration the agents shall receive. Now, properly construed, it seems to me that what that clause really does is to provide that the company shall enter into a contract of agency, on the terms indicated, with the firm of Morarjee Goculdas & Co., that it confers a power upon the company and might more properly have been included amongst the objects of the company. Mr. Taraporewala for the plaintiff objects to that view of the matter, and says that there is no question of any contract between the company and the agents; but directly the company, after its incorporation, employs the agents, which it can only do with the agents' consent, contractual relations must arise, and the clause must in effect impose on the company an obligation to enter into a contract with a third party. It has been held many times that a company cannot be bound by a contract entered into on its behalf before the company was formed, and, in my opinion, it is not competent to bring a company into existence bound to enter into a contract with a third party, the terms of which have been arranged before the company was formed. It is for the company to consider after its formation whether it will enter into the contract or not.

There is a further objection to the plaintiff's case in that, in my opinion, clause 6 of the memorandum of association, even if construed as the appellant desires, merely imposes on the company an obligation as to management and is not a vital part of the constitution of the company. In support of the view that a clause of this nature is a condition of the constitution of the company, Mr. Taraporewala relies on the case of Venkataramana v. Coimbatore M. Bank. That was an application to the Court on a petition, under section 12 of the Indian Companies Act, asking the Court to confirm a special resolution for the alteration of a memorandum of association by striking out a clause somewhat in the terms of clause 6 in the present memorandum. The Court refused to strike out the clause, but in giving judgment Sir Walter Schwabe, the Chief Justice, did no doubt say that a clause of this nature is a condition of the memorandum, but he based his view expressly on the ground that the clause in the memorandum constituted a vital contract between the company and the person to be employed as agent, and, I think, it cannot have been present to the mind of the learned Chief Justice, first, that a company cannot be bound by a contract made before it comes into existence, and, secondly, that the memorandum of association does not operate as a contract between the company and persons who are not members of the company. I think, therefore, that the views of the learned Chief Justice as to the nature of a clause of this character cannot be supported. It is, to my mind, almost impossible to conceive of a case in which the Court would, at the instance of a minority of shareholders, compel a company to enter into, or carry out, a business contract which the majority of the shareholders and the directors considered to be detrimental to the interests of the company, the terms of which contract had actually been arranged before the company was brought into existence.

There is an alternative ground which, I think, is equally fatal to the plaintiff's case, and that is, that even assuming that clause 6 of the memorandum has the effect for which the appellant contends, the present members of the firm of Morarjee Goculdas & Co. do not come within the terms of that clause. The clause provides, as I have said, that the “firm of Morarjee Goculdas & Co.” or “whatever member or members that firm may for the time consist of” shall be the agents, etc. Strictly speaking, as soon as new members are introduced into the firm, a new firm is constituted. The plaintiff relies on the words, “whatever member or members that firm may for the time consist of”, but the facts are that at the date of the incorporation of the company the firm consisted of two individuals, one of whom died in 1880, and the other of whom died in 1908, and none of the present members of the agency firm were ever partners with either of those two individuals. Whatever meaning may be given to the words, “whatever member or members that firm may for the time consist of”, it seems to me quite impossible to say that the present members of the firm of Morarjee Goculdas & Co., who were never members of the firm at a time when either of the persons who constituted the firm at the date of the incorporation of the company were alive, can be said to be members of the firm named in the memorandum. The argument of the appellant really seeks to endow this firm with the attributes of a corporation having perpetual succession so far as concerns its relations with the company. It is further suggested by Sir Chimanlal Setalvad that if the clause has the extended meaning contended for by the appellant, it would be void in law, but it is not necessary, in my opinion, to consider that argument.

There is another point taken against the appellant, namely, that, again giving to clause 6 the effect for which he contends, at the most it only outlines the nature of the contract into which the company was to enter with the agents. It is contended, I think rightly, that the company, when entering into an actual contract with the agents, would be entitled to incorporate proper provisions including power to terminate the agency for sufficient reason.

For all these reasons, I think the learned Judge was quite right in dismissing the action with costs, and that the appeal must be dismissed with costs.

Rangnekar, J.:—I agree. In my opinion there is more than one fatal answer to the claim of the plaintiff in the suit. Apart from the fact that the clause in question is one-sided in that it does not impose any obligation on the firm of Morarjee Goculdas, it is nothing more, in my opinion, than a preliminary contract such as promoters make before incorporation of the company, and means nothing more than that the company should enter into a contract of agency with the firm of Morarjee Goculdas. In fact that seems to be the plaintiff's case, and that is clear from paragraph 6 of the plaint. Then one answer to the plaintiff's claim would be that a company cannot before its incorporation enter into a contract, for it is non-existent, and another that, except by any act of legislature, it is not possible to bring a company into existence under the Indian Companies Act bound by a contract previously made, for such a contract cannot be ratified after incorporation. In order to get over this difficulty, the plaintiff contends that this is not a contract of employment, but it is really a vital condition on which the company was constituted. Now the authorities show that a memorandum of association may contain conditions essential as well as conditions non-essential, and the question is, whether this is an essential condition. Undoubtedly, it is not mentioned in the objects, where perhaps, properly speaking, it might have been mentioned, and it stands by itself. What are conditions essential is indicated by the frame of the Indian Companies Act, and the scheme contained therein, and it would be very unreasonable to hold that a condition of this nature which is after all, whatever way you look at it, nothing more than a detail of management for the purpose of carrying on the business of the company, can be considered to be a vital condition and cannot be altered, when the Act provides that conditions which are vital to the very existence of the company, such as for instance, the name of the company, the objects of the company, and so on, can be altered, undoubtedly in a limited way, in accordance with the provisions of the Indian Companies Act. The learned counsel for the appellant says that the rights of the agents are created by the memorandum of association, but the answer to that is that the memorandum of association does not constitute a contract between the company and a third party, though named therein.

Then there is another point, and it is that the condition, on the face of it, is unreasonable, and it is no use saying that the shareholders subscribed on the faith of it. There is no obligation imposed on the agents either to act as agent or go on acting as agent. Supposing, for instance, the agents refuse to work as agents, I do not think it can be contended that the company, or the shareholders, or majority of the shareholders interested in the continuance of the company, have no power to appoint other agents in their place. Similarly, if the agents are found guilty of fraud, or are not properly managing the business, it cannot be contended that the company cannot appoint other agents in their place. Then it is said that it is open to the shareholders to dissolve the company. But supposing, for instance, that the majority of the shareholders are of opinion that the company is in flourishing condition, and that there was no necessity to have it wound up, what then? Can it be contended that the substratum of the company is gone, or it is just and equitable that the company should be wound up because A, B, C, who were agents, refuse to act and refuse to resign? In my opinion the clause in question does not constitute a vital condition.

Then assuming, however, it is a vital condition, I have no doubt that the plaintiff must fail on a true and proper construction of the clause in question. It was conceded that unless that clause was construed to mean that the agents of the company should be “the firm of Morarjee Goculdas & Co., its successors or assigns”, the plaintiff must fail. There is nothing in that clause which would justify such a construction. In my opinion the clause really means this, that Morarjee Goculdas & Co. or those who, as the facts show, were then about to carry on business in the name of Morarjee Goculdas & Co. were to be appointed agents of the company. But the utmost length to which one can go is, that under this clause the agents were to be the then firm of Morarjee Goculdas or its surviving partners. The original surviving partner having died in 1908, the firm came to an end, and, although, for reasons into which it is not necessary to enter, the heirs of Morarjee Goculdas were admitted into partnership, and the company went on employing them and utilised their services, it is difficult to see how in 1930 the present members of the firm who, admittedly, have no connection with Morarjee Goculdas, or any of his surviving partners, could be said to be members of the firm within the meaning of clause 6 of the memorandum. Assuming, however, that the construction which the plaintiff seeks to put upon the clause is correct, even then, I think, the Court would be justified in refusing an injunction. No Court will grant an injunction in a case the effect of which will be to compel specific performance of a contract of personal service. The plaintiff relies upon Venkataramana v. Goimbatore M. Bank. With all respect to the learned Judges of the Madras High Court, I am unable to agree with their decision for the reasons given in the judgment of my Lord the Chief Justice.

The appeal fails, and must be dismissed with costs.

Attorneys for appellant: Messrs Edgelow, Gulabchand, Wadia & Co.

Attorneys for respondents: Messrs Payne & Co. Madhavji & Co.

Appeal dismissed.
B.K.D
Indian Companies Act