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Pallikoiloth Syama Prasad v. Chief Commissioner Andaman And Nicobar Islands
Concise Analytical Summary of the Opinion
Factual and Procedural Background
The petitioner was an assistant in the office of the Chief Inspector of Explosives (pay scale Rs. 130–300) at Nagpur and was selected on deputation as a higher grade clerk (steno-typist) under the Andaman and Nicobar Islands Administration. The deputation was on terms (memorandum dated 29 April 1964) providing for a three-year deputation period commencing effectively 23 April 1964. The petitioner joined the deputation post on 12 May 1964.
After joining, the petitioner became president of the recognised Non-Gazetted Government Officers Association (Andaman & Nicobar Islands). Following the association's activities and a decision to pursue certain claims, the petitioner applied for leave on 11 September 1964. Shortly thereafter, by order dated 14 September 1964 the respondent reverted the petitioner to his substantive post at Nagpur with effect from his sailing on or about 25 September 1964. The petitioner handed over charge and left Andaman on 2 October 1964.
The petitioner challenged the reversion order before the court and obtained a rule seeking, inter alia, quashing of the reversion. No interim injunction had been granted preventing the respondents from giving effect to the impugned order prior to the expiry of the deputation term.
Legal Issues Presented
- Whether the respondents could revert the petitioner from the deputation post before the expiry of the agreed three-year deputation period (i.e., whether the reversion breached the deputation contract and could be remedied by writ).
- Whether the order of reversion amounted to a punitive reduction/demotion or dismissal within Article 311(2) of the Constitution (i.e., whether reversion without observance of Article 311(2) procedures rendered the order invalid).
Arguments of the Parties
Petitioner's Arguments (as presented by Mr. A. P. Chatterjee)
- The deputation contract fixed the deputation period at three years; reverting the petitioner before expiry was a breach of those terms and therefore wrongful — entitling the petitioner to reinstatement by writ.
- The reversion was, in effect, a punitive reduction in rank or dismissal without compliance with Article 311(2) of the Constitution, because it (allegedly) entailed forfeiture of pay and allowances and loss of seniority and promotions; hence the order was invalid for lack of the protections required by Article 311(2).
- Alternatively, even if the petitioner had no right to the deputation post, the reversion produced penal consequences (loss of emoluments and seniority), making it a punishment inflicted without Article 311(2) safeguards.
The opinion does not contain a detailed account of the respondents' legal arguments; the court's recounting focuses on the petitioner's contentions and the judge's analysis in response.
Table of Precedents Cited
| Precedent | Rule or Principle Cited For | Application by the Court |
|---|---|---|
| Guruswami v. State of Mysore, A.I.R. 1954 S.C. 592 | The court should not issue a futile writ; writ jurisdiction is not used to give ineffective relief after the relevant period has expired. | Applied to hold that because the deputation period had expired and no interim relief had preserved the status quo, any writ would be infructuous; therefore the rule was effectively moot. |
| Satish Ch. v. Union of India, A.I.R. 1953 S.C. 250 | A breach of a special contract of employment is primarily a contractual matter; the remedy lies in ordinary courts (specific performance or damages) and not by writ to enforce the contract. | Relied on to conclude that the alleged breach of deputation terms raised a contractual question not ordinarily remedied by issuance of a writ; the petitioner had ordinary contractual remedies. |
| Purushottamlal Dhingra v. Union of India, A.I.R. 1958 S.C. 36 | Termination under a purported contractual right does not necessarily amount to dismissal/removal/reduction within Article 311(2); reduction in rank may, in some cases, be by way of punishment. | Used to support the view that reversion effected under an asserted contractual right does not automatically engage Article 311(2) protections; the court cited this to reject the argument that reversion here was a reduction requiring Article 311(2) procedure. |
| A.I.R. 1965 S.C. 868 (unnamed in the text) | In some circumstances, service while on deputation is treated as service in the parent department for purposes of increments, promotions and seniority; reversion can thus affect pay, allowances and seniority. | The petitioner relied on this decision to argue loss of pay/seniority. The court found the facts distinguishable and held the precedent inapplicable to the present case. |
| Bikash Chatterjee v. Director General of Health Services & Ors., (1968) Lab. I.C. Calcutta 320 | Addressed loss of seniority in the parent department following deputation/reversion. | Relied on by petitioner; the court held this decision was not on point because the grievance in that case concerned seniority in the parent department, which was not established in the present case. |
| State of Bombay v. F. A. Ebraham, A.I.R. 1962 S.C. 794 | Reversion from an officiating/temporary higher post to the substantive post does not necessarily amount to punishment, even if the officer loses higher pay or advantages. | Applied by the court to support the proposition that reversion to a substantive/parent post from a temporary deputation post does not of itself constitute punishment requiring Article 311(2) safeguards. |
| State of West Bengal v. Dhajadhari Dutta, A.I.R. 1966 Cal. 402 | Bench decision of the court adopting the same view as State of Bombay v. Ebraham regarding non-punitive nature of reversion from temporary posts. | Relied upon to reinforce the conclusion that reversion from temporary deputation is not necessarily punitive and therefore not caught by Article 311(2) procedure in the present facts. |
Court's Reasoning and Analysis
The court's reasoning proceeded in a sequence of connected legal points, grounded in the factual matrix and established authorities:
- Preliminary and procedural assessment: The court observed that the deputation was expressly for three years from 23 April 1964. By the time the matter reached adjudication the contractual deputation period had expired and no interim order had preserved the petitioner's deputation status. Relying on established practice (see Guruswami), the court emphasized that it will not issue a writ that would be futile. Consequently the rule seeking quashing of the reversion had become infructuous and could not produce effective relief.
- On the first substantive contention (breach of the deputation contract): The judge treated the alleged premature reversion as essentially raising a contractual question — whether the respondents could terminate deputation before the three-year term. The court held that such matters are contractual in nature and give rise to ordinary contractual remedies (specific performance or damages) rather than the extraordinary relief of a writ. The court relied on Satish Ch. to support the principle that a writ is not the proper remedy to compel performance of a contract accepted voluntarily by the petitioner.
- On whether reversion amounted to reduction in rank within Article 311(2): The court analyzed whether the reversion was a "dismissal, removal or reduction in rank" that would attract Article 311(2) procedural protections. It concluded that a termination or reversion effected by exercise of a contractual right does not necessarily constitute such an executive punitive action under Article 311(2), even if the underlying motive were to punish. The court cited Dhingra and related authorities for this legal proposition and found no substance in the contention that Article 311(2) was engaged.
- On the contention that the reversion inflicted penal consequences (forfeiture of pay, allowances, loss of seniority/promotions): The petitioner relied on authorities holding that deputation service may sometimes be treated as service in the parent department for purposes of seniority and promotions. The court reviewed those authorities but found the factual matrices distinguishable: in the cited cases the deputation/service conditions and promotion rules produced consequences in the parent department that are not shown to exist here. Since the petitioner’s deputation was temporary and he had no established right to retain the deputation post indefinitely, the mere loss of higher emoluments or future promotion prospects did not, on the facts, convert the reversion into a punitive measure calling for Article 311(2) safeguards. The court relied in particular on State of Bombay v. F. A. Ebraham and its own bench decision in Dhajadhari Dutta to support this conclusion.
- Final assessment: Given (a) the procedural futility because of expiry of the deputation period and lack of interim relief, and (b) the substantive conclusions that the reversion raised contractual issues and did not amount to punishment/deprivation under Article 311(2) on the facts, the court found no merit in the petitioner's grounds.
Holding and Implications
Final Holding: The petition is dismissed and the rule obtained by the petitioner is discharged. (As stated by the court: "The petition fails. The rule is discharged but there will be no order as to costs.")
Direct consequences for the parties:
- The petitioner is not reinstated to the deputation post by this court; no writ relief was granted.
- No order as to costs was made (i.e., each party bears their own costs as ordered).
- The petitioner retains available ordinary contractual remedies (specific performance or damages) if appropriate; the court made clear that the alleged breach of deputation terms is essentially a contractual matter for ordinary courts, not for writ enforcement in these circumstances.
Broader implications:
The opinion applies and reaffirms established principles rather than announcing new law: (i) a court will not grant a writ that would be futile when the relevant period has expired and no interim relief was obtained; (ii) premature termination of a fixed-term deputation ordinarily raises contractual remedies rather than mandating writ relief; and (iii) reversion from a temporary deputation or officiating post does not, without more, constitute punitive reduction or dismissal within Article 311(2). The judgment does not purport to lay down any new precedent beyond applying these established authorities to the facts before the court.
(1) This rule was issued at the instance of the petitioner inter alia for quashing an order of reversion of the petitioner to - ms substantive post. The facts set out by the petitioner are substantially as follows : -
(2) The petitioner while working as an assistant in the scale of pay of rs. 130 - 300j - in the office of the chief inspector of explosives in india, department of explosives, government of india at nagpore was selected to a post of higher grade clerk (steno - typist on deputation under the andaman and nicobar islands administration on certain terms and conditions contained in a memorandum dated 29th april, 1964 (marked as annexure a to the petition). One of such terms was that the deputation was to last for a period of 3 years. By an office order dated 22nd april, 1964 the petitioner was relieved of his duties in the office of the chief inspector of explosives with effect from the afternoon of 22nd april, 1964. The petitioner eventually joined the said post of higher grade clerk|steno - typist at andaman on. 12th may, 1964. Then by another office order dated 9th june, 1964 issued by the assistant secretary to the chief commissioner, andaman and nicobar islands terms of the employment of the petitioner on deputation were set out which inter alia provided that deputation period would be for a period of 3 years in the first instance; with effect from the forenoon of 23 - 4 - 64. Soon after the petitioner joined the said post he was elected as president of non - gazetted government officers association, andaman and nicobar islands, recognised by the government of india. The respondents, it is alleged, did not like the activities f the association as it was bringing to the notice of the government of india many cases of injustice done to the non - gazetted government servants by the local administration. This association took up certain issues regarding special pay, leave for passage and other benefits of the employees and decided to file a suit in this court. The petitioner pursuant to such decision of the association applied fon leave on llth september, 1964 to the respondent no. 3. Almost immediately thereafter the respondent no. 2 by an order dated 14th september, 1964 suddenly reverted the petitioner to his substantive post in the office of the chief inspector of explosives at nagpur with effect from the date of his sailing by m. V. Andamans ex - port blair on or about 25 - 9 - 1964. Thereafter, in spite of repeated representation and appeals this order was not withdrawn and the leave asked for was also not granted. The petitioner in obedience to this order had to hand over the charge and leave andaman on 2nd october, 1964. That is how the petitioner felt aggrieved and came up to this court and obtained a rule.
(3) Although several grounds were taken but the order of, reversion was challenged by mr. Arun prokash chatterjee, learned advocate for the petitioner, before me on twofold grounds. First is that since the petitioner was employed on deputation for a period of three years he could not have been reverted to the substantive post in breach of such terms. The other ground is that the order of reversion was made by way of punishment without complying with the provisions of the article 311 (2) of the constitution of india and, therefore, such order was totally invalid and ineffective, before i take up these grounds for consideration it is noticed that the period of petitioner's employment on deputation was only to last for three years under the terms and conditions of such employment with effect from 23 - 4 - 64. So, after the expiry of that period it cannot be said that the petitioner had any right to continue in that post on deputation at andaman. The only consequence is that even assuming, that there is any substance in the ground taken by the petitioner, the writ he has sought for from this court would be ineffective due to the expiry of the stipulated period of his employment. It is well settled that it is not the practice of this court in writ jurisdiction to issue a futile writ. See the case of (1) guruswami v. State of mysore, reported in a. I. R. 1954 s. C. , 592. In this rule there was no interim injunction given to the petitioner restraining the respondents from giving effect to the impugned order. Since, therefore, no relief can be granted to the petitioner, this rule has become infructuous. In the above view of the matter, it is unnecessary to enter into the above two grounds taken by the petitioner. Even so, i will deal with them on merits.
(4) In support of the first ground mr. Chatterjee contended that the respondents had no power to terminate the petitioner's employment on deputation at least before the expiry of the period of three years under the terms and conditions of the employment. So, there was clearly breach of terms of the petitioner's employment committed by the respondents and, therefore, he was liable to be reinstated and this court will compel such reinstatement of the petitioner by issue of an appropriate writ. I cannot agree. Whether or not the petitioner's service on deputation was liable to be terminated before the expiry of the stipulated period related at best to a contractual power. So if there was breach of such a contract the petitioner might have other remedies either in specific performance of contract or of damages. For, it is well settled that no writ will lie to compel performance or enforcement of the contract. This view finds support in one of the earliest decision of the supreme court reported in (2) a. I. R. 1953 s. C. , 250, satish ch. V. Union of india. While dealing with the identical question relating to employment of civil service on the basis of the special contract for a certain term bose j. Who delivered the judgmemt of the court observed inter alia at page 252) paragraph 10 of the report as follows :
"there was no compulsion on the petitioner to enter into the contract he did. He was as free under the law as any other person to accept or to reject the offer which was made to him. Having accepted, he still has open to him all the rights and remedies available to other persons similarly situated to enforce any rights under his contract which have been denied to him, assuming there are any, and to pursue in the ordinary courts of the land such remedies for a breach as are open to him to exactly the same extent as other persons similarly situated. He has not been discriminated against and he has not been denied the protection of any laws which others similarly situated coruld claim. The remedy of a writ is misconceived".
(5) Mr. Chatterjee alternatively argued that the impugned order of reversion had the effect of termination of service of the petitioner on deputation before the expiry of the contractual period and, therefore, such reversion was a reduction in rank within the meaning of art. 311 (2) of the constitution and since such reduction in rank was brought about without compliance with the provisions of this article, the order of reversion must be set aside. In the instant case, it is more so, as evidently the petitioner was sent back to his - office at nagpur as he took active part in the agitation of the non - gezetted staff of the andaman administration and therefore, the motive operating in the government was clear. This argument, it seems to me, is also misconceived. If a civil servant's employment under a contract is terminated on the basis of purported exercise of a contractual right that by itself will not constitute dismissal, removal or reduction in rank within the meaning of art. 311 (2) of the constitution. Even though it may be, the motive behind such termination was to punish a civil servant for misconduct, negligence or inefficiency. See the case of (2) satish ch. (supra) and (3). Puru - shottamlal dhingra v. Union of india, a. I. R. 1958 s. C. 36. That being so, i do not find any substance in the first ground raised by the petitioner.
(6) In support of the second ground mr. Chatterjee contended that by such order of reversion the petitioner was visited with penal consequences by way of forfeiture of pay, allowances or right to his seniority or promotions and, therefore, such reversion was made by way of punishment without complying with the provisions of art. 311) 2) of the constitution. In support cf this contention mr. Chatterjee relied an the decision of dhingra's case (supra) and drew my attention to paragraph 28 of the report, (3) a. I. R. 1958 s. C. 36 to show that a reduction in rank may be by way of punishment. If the government servant has right to a particular rank then the reduction from that rank will operate as a penalty for he will lose the emoluments and privileges of that rank. In other words, mr. Chatterjee wanted to say that since the petitioner was sent on deputation for a period of three years he had a right to the rank and as he was reverted to his substantive post before the expdry of contractual period of his employment his reversion will operate as a penalty. This argument, i think, is not again, well conceived. The petitioner in the instant case was merely sent on deputation for a limited period; so he had no right to that post and reversion from such post will not normally operate as a punishment.
(7) Mr. Chatterjee then argued that even assuming that this petitioner had no right to that post then also this order of reversion entailed forfeiture of his pay and allowances and loss of seniority in his substantive rank and, therefore, the petitioner must be deemed to have been punished and such a. Punishment was inflicted without complying with the provision of art. 311 (2) of the constitution. In support of this branch of argument reliance was placed on a decision reported in a. I. R. 1965 s. C. 868 and it was contended that a person on deputation would be regarded as still working in parent department and by order of reversion he would lose pay and allowances and such order of reversion would entail loss of his seniority. I fail to see how this case is of any assistance to the petitioner. What happened in this case was that the petitioner who was substantively appointed as a junior assistant in the political department, while so working, was transferred on deputation to the office of controller of rationing, bombay to work as a senior assistant in the newly started rationing department which was a temporary department. On successive promotions there at the material time he was drawing a pay of rs. 468/ - in the grade of rs. 350 - 30 - 650. As rationing officer. With the abolition of that department in march 1954 he was reverted to parent department namely the political department. The petitioner's complaint was that he was entitled to be posted as an assistant secretary at the material time had he not been deputed to the department of civil supplies on 17th september, 1943 but this post was given to one nadkarni who was next below him superseding his claim on seniority cum merit. Basis rule of mysore government. So, while dealing with this point on interpretation of rule 50 (b) of the service rules it was held inter alia that the service of an officer is treated by the rule as equivalent to service in the parent department and, therefore, so long as the service of the employee in the new department was satisfactory he was obtaining the increment and promotion of that department. It stood to reason that he actually filled in (sic) should be deemed to be rendered in the parent department also so as to enable him to promotions which are open on seniority cum merit basis. In the instant case the facts are totally different. It is not the case of the petitioner that some body else below him in the parent department was promoted nor any relevant rule regarding such promotions was placed before me. Therefore, the above decision of the supreme court has no manner of application to the facts of the present case. Mr, chatterjee next relied on a decision of this court of b. C. Mitter, j. Reported in (4) 1968 lab. I. C. Calcutta 320 (bikash chatterjee v. Director general of health services and ors.) also in support of the above contention but this case, as appears, is also besides the point involved in the case under consideration before me, because in this case also the loss of seniority complained of was in the parent department.
(8) Then again, there cannot be any question of loss of pay and allowances or future chances of promotions because the petitioner was sent on deputation to work temporarily, may be for a particular period, in a temporary post ;and he had no right to hold that post :for all times. Therefore, even if, the petitioner is reverted in the substantive post in the parent department from a higher officiating post that by itself would not indicate that the reversion was made by way of punishment even though it may be that the government servant lost the benefit of the appointment to the higher rank and necessarily loss of some higher pay or allowances or even of promotion. This view finds support in a decision of supreme court in (5) state of bombay v. F. A. Ebraham reported in a. I. R. 1962 s. C. 794. In a bench decision of this court in (6) state of west bengal v. Dhajadhari dutta, reported in a. I. R. 1966 cal. 402 same view was taken relying on the above decision of the supreme court. That being the position in law, it cannot be said that reversion of the petitioner to his substantive post in the instant case was made by way of punishment. I, therefore, do not find any substance in these grounds even on merits.
(9) The result is, the petition fails. The rule is discharged but there will be no order as to costs.
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