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Jhaverbhai Hathibhai Patel v. Kabhai Becher Patel

Bombay High Court
Jul 19, 1932
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Judgment Summary — Patkar, J. & Murphy, J. (Appeal dismissed)

Factual and Procedural Background

The subject property had been transferred by the father and guardian of Bhavan Girdhar (a Hindu minor) to a predecessor-in-title of the defendants in February 1912. Bhavan Girdhar attained majority on 11 August 1923 and in 1925 sold (assigned) his interest in the property to the appellant. The appellant and Bhavan Girdhar (as plaintiff 2) then instituted a suit seeking declaration and recovery of the property on the ground that the guardian's sale was not for necessity.

Plaintiff 2 (Bhavan Girdhar) applied to withdraw from the suit in August 1926 and was permitted to withdraw without objection from the appellant. After that withdrawal, a preliminary question was argued as to whether the suit by the assignee (the appellant) was within time. The Subordinate Judge held the suit barred by limitation; the District Judge affirmed that view. The present appeal challenges the dismissal on limitation and related grounds.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the suit by the assignee (appellant), after the minor plaintiff (Bhavan Girdhar) withdrew from the suit, could be maintained or was barred by limitation.
  2. Whether Article 44 of the Limitation Act (three-year period for a ward to set aside a guardian's transfer after attaining majority) applies to a transferee/assignee of the ward's rights.
  3. Whether the withdrawal of the ward (plaintiff 2) from the suit amounted to an election or acquiescence that extinguished the ward's interest and thereby prevented the assignee from continuing the suit.

Arguments of the Parties

Appellant's Arguments

  • The originally filed suit was within time because it was instituted within three years of the ward (Bhavan Girdhar) attaining majority.
  • If plaintiff 2 had not withdrawn, both plaintiffs together would have been in a position to obtain a decree setting aside the guardian's transfer; reliance was placed on Hanmant Gurunath v. Ramappa Lagmappa.
  • Article 44 of the Limitation Act applies not only to the ward but also to a transferee from such ward; reliance was placed on Raja Ramaswami v. Govindammal.
  • Even though plaintiff 2 later withdrew, because the suit had been filed within the three-year period, that withdrawal should not defeat the appellant's right to proceed.

Respondent's Arguments (as recorded by the Court)

  • The substantive right granted to a ward who attains majority to set aside a guardian's transfer is a personal right to sue and is not transferable in substance as property under Section 6(e) of the Transfer of Property Act.
  • If Section 6(e) applies, the transferee acquires no title and cannot continue a suit that only the ward could maintain under Article 44; only the ward who attained majority can bring the Article 44 suit within three years.
  • The withdrawal by the ward (plaintiff 2) without objection by the appellant signified that the ward elected not to contest the guardian's sale; consequently the appellant (a mere assignee of the ward's right-to-sue) had no right to continue the suit.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Hanmant Gurunath v. Ramappa Lagmappa Holds that the ward's remedy under Article 44 is available for three years from majority and is not lost merely because the ward purported to transfer his interest; the ward retains the right to sue and a subsequent purchaser may need to join with the ward. The Court relied on its reasoning but noted the case expressed difficulty in applying Article 44 to a transferee and did not decide that question; Hanmant supports that the ward's right to sue survives a transfer, but does not conclusively establish that a transferee may independently proceed after the ward withdraws.
Raja Ramaswami v. Govindammal Held that a suit by a transferee could be governed by Article 44 where the ward was a party (substantially a co-plaintiff). The Court observed that Ramaswami supports the appellant only when the ward remains a party; because the ward had withdrawn here, Ramaswami did not assist the appellant to continue the suit alone.
Fakirappa Limanna v. Lumanna (Full Bench) Article 44 applies to sales by natural guardians (not limited to testamentary or court-appointed guardians); the guardian's sale transfers property subject to the ward's right to set it aside within three years of majority. The Court cited this as authority that Article 44 applies to sales by natural guardians and that until set aside the sale is effective against the ward; this supports the view that the ward's interest may be extinguished if not acted upon within Article 44.
Tilakdhari Lal v. Khedan Lal Refers to enforcement rights of a subsequent purchaser from the minor by Section 43, Transfer of Property Act, or by the doctrine of feeding a grant by estoppel. The Court used this citation to explain that if a guardian's sale is set aside and property reverts to the minor, a subsequent purchaser from the minor might enforce rights under Section 43 or estoppel; it frames possible remedies but does not alter the result when the ward withdraws.
Laxmava Huchappa Nasipudi v. Rachappa Chanbasappa Karveershetti Held that a suit by a purchaser from a minor was barred where the minor's remedy under Article 44 was already barred at the time of institution, extinguishing the minor's interest and leaving the purchaser without right. The Court treated this case as supporting the proposition that if the ward's remedy is already barred, a transferee cannot acquire enforceable rights; Court distinguished it as not authority for the proposition that Article 44 applies to transferees when the ward remains a party.
Bhagwant Govind v. Kondi Advanced a contrary view that relief to set aside the sale was subservient to a suit for possession. The Court noted this contrary view but observed that the Privy Council in Malkarjun v. Narhari rejected the doctrine of subservience, undermining Bhagwant Govind's approach.
Malkarjun v. Narhari (Privy Council) Rejects the doctrine of subservience; states that if a sale is a reality it is defeasible only by the remedies provided by law. The Court cited the Privy Council's language to support the proposition that a guardian's sale, if real, can only be defeated by the statutory remedies (i.e., Article 44), reinforcing that the statutory limitation period governs.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Court's analysis proceeds from two linked legal points: (a) the nature of a guardian's sale and the ward's remedy under Article 44 of the Limitation Act; and (b) the effect of a withdrawal by the ward on the right of a subsequent transferee (assignee) to continue a suit to set aside that sale.

Nature of the guardian's sale and Article 44:

  • The Court accepted that a sale by a guardian is not void ab initio but is voidable: it transfers the property to the purchaser subject to the ward's right to bring a suit to set aside the sale.
  • Article 44 of the Limitation Act prescribes a three-year period for a ward (after attaining majority) to seek to set aside such a transfer. The Full Bench in Fakirappa Limanna was cited to show Article 44 applies to sales by natural guardians as well as other guardians.
  • If the ward does not sue within the Article 44 period, the ward's interest can be extinguished by operation of Article 44 read with Section 28 of the Limitation Act (extinction by limitation).

Transferability of the ward's right-to-sue and Section 6(e), Transfer of Property Act:

  • The Court examined whether the ward's right to set aside the guardian's sale is a transferable interest. The judges treated the right primarily as a personal right to sue — a right of action — rather than an inhering title to the property which could be transferred so as to create a substantive proprietary right in the transferee.
  • Both Patkar, J. and Murphy, J. referred to Section 6(e) of the Transfer of Property Act, which prohibits transfer of mere right to sue; the Court held that what passed by the 1925 assignment from Bhavan Girdhar to the appellant was the ward's right to sue (a right of action) and not the underlying property itself.

Effect of the ward's withdrawal:

  • After Bhavan Girdhar (the ward) withdrew from the suit with the appellant's consent (no objection from appellant), the Court viewed that withdrawal as an election by the ward to acquiesce in the guardian's sale.
  • Given that only the ward can properly bring a suit under Article 44, and the ward had chosen to withdraw, the appellant (a mere assignee of the ward's right-to-sue) was left without the essential party whose personal remedy Article 44 protects.
  • Therefore, the Court concluded the appellant no longer had a right to continue the suit. The withdrawal had the effect of extinguishing the ward's interest as against the sale and left the appellant without a substantive remedy in this proceeding. The Court observed that any remedy the appellant might have would be against his transferor (i.e., contractual or other claims against Bhavan Girdhar), not by continuing a suit under Article 44 as a plaintiff on his own behalf.

Comparison of authorities and reconciliation:

  • Hanmant Gurunath establishes that the ward retains the right to sue notwithstanding a transfer and that a subsequent purchaser and the ward may need to join to make the second sale effective; however, the Court emphasized that Hanmant did not finally decide that Article 44 confers an independent right on a transferee to proceed after the ward withdraws.
  • Ramaswami supports applying Article 44 to suits in which a transferee is a party only where the ward remains involved (substantially a co-plaintiff). The present case differs because the ward has withdrawn.
  • Cases such as Laxmava Huchappa were relied upon to show that if the ward's remedy is already barred the transferee cannot claim rights; Fakirappa and the Privy Council decision in Malkarjun were used to emphasize that statutory remedies and limitation govern the defeat of the guardian's sale.

Conclusion of analysis: The Court found the decisive issue was not strictly one of limitation against the appellant but whether the appellant retained the legal right to continue the Article 44 suit after the ward had withdrawn. Because the ward had withdrawn (thereby electing not to set the sale aside), the appellant could not proceed and the appellate decree was correctly affirmed.

Holding and Implications

Holding: The appeal is DISMISSED. The decree of the lower appellate court is confirmed and the appellant must pay costs.

Immediate consequences for the parties:

  • The appellant, as assignee of the former minor's right-to-sue, has no right to continue the suit after the withdrawal of the ward (Bhavan Girdhar); the appellant's claim to set aside the guardian's sale therefore fails in this action.
  • The sale made by the guardian is binding on the minor because the minor elected (by withdrawal) not to set it aside; any remedy the appellant may have is directed against his transferor (Bhavan Girdhar) and not by continuing a suit under Article 44 in his own name.

Broader legal implications: The Court's opinion focuses on application of Article 44 and established authorities to the facts; it does not purport to establish a new general principle extending Article 44 to permit a transferee to continue a suit after the ward withdraws. The decision affirms the narrow consequence that where the ward withdraws (elects) and thereby does not pursue the Article 44 remedy, a mere assignee cannot continue that specific Article 44 action.

Disposition: Appeal dismissed with costs.

Show all summary ...

Patkar, J.:— The appellant is the purchaser from one Bhavan Girdhar, whose father and guardian had transferred the property to the defendants' predecessor-in-title in February 1912. Bhavan Girdhar attained majority on 11th August 1923, and sold the property to the appellant in 1925. The present suit was brought by the appellant and Bhavan Girdhar. It appears that Bhavan Girdhar who was plaintiff 2 made an application to withdraw from the suit in August 1926, and without any objection on the part of the appellant he was allowed to withdraw from the suit. After withdrawal by plaintiff 2 from the suit a preliminary question was raised for argument as to whether the suit by the assignee, the appellant, was within time. The learned Subordinate Judge held that the plaintiff's suit was barred by limitation. On appeal the learned District Judge agreed with the view of the lower Court. It is contended on behalf of the appellant that the suit which was originally filed was within time, and that ??? plaintiff 2 had not withdrawn from ??? suit, both the plaintiffs would have ??? in getting a decree after the ??? in favour of the defendants had been set aside, and reliance is placed on the decision in Hanmant Gurunath v. Ramappa Lagmappa (1). It is further contended that Article 44, Lim. Act, applies not only to the minor ward but also to the transferee from such ward, and reliance is placed on the decision in the case of Ramaswami v. Govindammal (2), that in any case the suit having been filed by both the plaintiffs within three years of the ward attaining majority the suit was within time, and that the fact that plaintiff 2 withdrew from the suit subsequently would not make any difference.

2. According to the decision of the Full Bench in Fakirappa Limanna v. Lumanna (3), a Hindu minor on his attaining majority cannot sue to recover possession of property transferred by his mother acting as his natural guardian during his minority without suing to set aside the transfer within the period of limitation provided by Article 44, Lim. Act, and that Article 44 is not limited to sales by guardians who are appointed under testaments or by the Court but is wide enough to include sales by natural guardians, who may have some authority however limited, to alienate the property of the minor. When the property is sold by the guardian it ceases to belong to the ward and the interest passes to the purchaser subject to the right of the ward to bring a suit to set aside the sale.

3. After the sale is set aside in a suit by the minor on his attaining majority the property would revert to him, and the subsequent purchaser from the minor would be entitled to enforce his right against the minor under Section 43 of the Transfer of Property Act, or by virtue of the doctrine of feeding a grant by estoppel referred to in Tilakdhari Lal v. Khedan Lal (4). Under the Limitation Act, Article 44, a period of three years is prescribed for award to set aside the transfer by a guardian. In the case of a mortgage the equity of redemption would vest in the minor and he would be competent to sell it notwithstanding the mortgage created by his guardian. But in the case of a sale by the guardian the property would pass to the purchaser, and unless the sale is set aside, the subsequent purchaser from the minor after attaining majority would not be able to enforce his right under the second sale-deed. In Hanmant Gurunath v. Ramappa Lagmappa , the guardian of the minor sold the property, and the minor after having attained majority conveyed his interest to a subsequent purchaser. Both the minor who had attained majority and the subsequent purchaser sued to set aside the alienation made by the mother of the minor during his minority. It was held that the claim was not barred by limitation on the ground that though the cause of action for setting aside the alienation by the mother arose from the date of the alienation, the remedy contemplated by Article 44 was open to the minor for three years from the date of his attaining majority, and that remedy was not lost by the mere fact that the minor purported to transfer his interest, such as it was at the date of the transfer, and that until the sale was set aside it was good so far as the minor was concerned and his interest in the property was subject to the result of a suit, and in order to make the second sale effective both of them, the minor who had attained majority and the subsequent purchaser, had to join in bringing the suit. It was not disputed in that case in the argument that if the suit had been filed by the purchaser alone Article 44 would not apply. An opinion was expressed to the effect that it would be difficult to apply Article 44 to the case of a transferee from the ward, but the question was not decided. It was however held that the cause of action for setting aside an improper alienation under Article 44 arose from the date of the alienation, but the remedy contemplated by Article 44 was open to a ward for three years from the date of his attaining majority, and that remedy was not lost because he purported to transfer his interest to a third party. It was further held that if the right of the minor on his attaining majority at the date of transfer be held to be a mere right to sue it could not be transferred under Section 6(e) of the Transfer of Property Act, and his right to sue would continue in spite of the transfer. In that case, however, a decree was passed in favour, of the subsequent purchaser, and the dismissal of the suit by the minor who attained majority was held not to be strictly correct, but as the sale was set aside in substance, the decree in favour of the second purchaser was not disturbed because it was virtually a suit by the ward.

4. Apart from authority, it appears that when a transfer is made by the guardian of the minor, the property ceases to belong to the minor. If the sale is voidable it has to be set aside by the minor within three years from his attaining majority. It is contended on behalf of the respondent that the right of the minor who has attained majority in such cases is not capable of being transferred under Section 6(e) of the Transfer of Property Act, as it would appear to be merely a right to sue to set aside the transfer made by the guardian. If Section 6(e) of the Transfer of Property Act, applies, the transferee acquires no title and the right to sue to set aside the sale by the guardian resides solely in the minor who has attained majority, and he must bring a suit within three years for that purpose under Article 44, Lim. Act. According to Hanmant Gurunath's case the ward retains the right to sue in spite of the subsequent transfer, and a suit by the minor who has attained majority and also by the subsequent transferee would be good because it is virtually a suit by the minor who has attained majority to set aside the sale. In the present case the minor has withdrawn from the suit without any objection by the appellant, i.e, the subsequent purchaser. It is doubtful whether plaintiff 2 who had attained majority could have been allowed to withdraw from the suit without the consent of the subsequent purchaser, the appellant before us, under O. 23, R. 1, sub-R. 4 of the CPC. But it appears that the appellant raised no objection to the withdrawal of the suit by plaintiff 2, and no ground was taken in the lower Court against the withdrawal of the suit by plaintiff 2. The suit, therefore at present is a suit by the appellant who is a subsequent purchaser from the minor, who attained majority, and has withdrawn his suit for setting aside the sale. He has virtually elected not to dispute the alienation made by the guardian by virtue of his withdrawal from the suit. It is only the minor who can bring a suit under Article 44, Lim. Act, to set aside the sale after his attaining majority.

5. The question in my opinion, is not whether the suit of the appellant is barred by limitation, but the question is whether the plaintiff has a right to continue the suit. After the minor had withdrawn from the suit he has virtually elected to acquiesce in the sale by his guardian, and the interest of the minor in the property has been extinguished under Article 44 read with Section 28 of the Lim. Act. The plaintiff therefore in my opinion, has no right to continue, the suit. In the case of Laxmava Huchappa Nasipudi…Defendant v. Rachappa Chanbasappa Karveershetti…Plaintiff . (5), which has been relied upon on behalf of the appellant in support of the contention that Article 44 applies to a suit by a transferee from the minor, it was no doubt a suit brought by the purchaser from the minor and it was held that the suit was barred under Article 44, Lim. Act. However in that case the guardian sold the property on 31st May 1909, and the minor attained, majority on 29th September 1909, and sold the property to the plaintiff on 25th September 1912. The suit was filed on 12th August 1913. It is clear from the facts that the remedy of the minor to set aside the sale under Article 44, Lim. Act, was barred at the date of the institution of the suit and his interest was extinguished under Article 44 combined with Section 28 of the Lim. Act, and that as the minor's interest was extinguished the purchaser could have no right. It does not appear that the case is an authority for holding that Article 44, Lim. Act, applies to the suit by a transferee of the ward.

6. In the Full Bench case of Fakirappa Limanna v. Lumanna , where the equity of redemption was sold by the guardian of the minor in 1891, and the minor attained majority in 1894 and ??? died in 1901, and the reversioner of the minor sued in 1916, it was held at p. 762 that as the minor could not redeem without setting aside the transfer by the mother and as in fact he did not sue within three years of his attaining majority, the reversioner's suit was barred. A contrary view was taken in Bhagwant Govind v. Kondi (6), on the ground that the relief to set aside the sale was subservient to the suit for possession. The doctrine of subservience was not accepted by their Lordships of the Privy Council in Malkarjun v. Narhari (7), where it was observed as follows (p. 352):

“But if the sale is a reality at all, it is a reality defeasible only in the way pointed out by law.”

7. It was contended on behalf of the appellant that according to the definition of the “plaintiff” in Section 2, Clause 8 of the Lim. Act, a ward would include his transferee. But the word “plaintiff” does not occur in Article 44 and it is difficult to apply the wording of Article 44 in Col. 1 and in Col. 3, viz., “who has attained majority” and “attains majority” to a transferee from a minor. In Raja Ramaswami v. Govindammal , on which the appellant relies, it was held that the suit by a transferee was governed by Article 44, Lim. Act, but in that case the ward was a party to the suit and though he was impleaded as defendant he was held to be substantially a co-plaintiff. Both the lower Courts erred in dismissing the plaintiff's suit on the ground of limitation. After the minor was allowed to withdraw from the suit without any objection by the appellant, the latter had no right to continue the suit. It can no longer be treated as a suit by a ward who has attained majority for setting aside the transfer by his guardian. The minor had a remedy and chose to exercise it in the initial stage of the suit, but by virtue of his withdrawal from the suit he has elected not to set aside the sale by the guardian. The sale therefore made by the guardian is binding on the minor and cannot be set aside. The appellant in my opinion has no right to continue the suit after the withdrawal of the suit by plaintiff 2. The remedy of the subsequent purchaser if any lies against his transferor. On these grounds I would confirm the decree of the lower appellate Court and dismiss the appeal with costs.

Murphy, J.:— The facts on which this suit and appeal are based were the following: Certain property belonging to a minor Bhavan Girdhar was sold by his father as his guardian in 1907 and 1912 to different persons. Some time after attaining his majority in 1923, Bhavan Girdhar, the former minor, in 1925, assigned his existing interest in the property sold by his guardian during his minority to the present appellant.

8. The appellant and Bhavan then filed a, suit for declaration that the sale, effected by, the guardian was not for necessity, with, the object of recovering the property. The suit was in time as being within three years of Bhavan's attaining his majority, and he being a party together with the appellant, to whom whatever Bhavan's interests were had passed, was on the rulings properly framed. But before the decision of the suit Bhavan withdrew from it with the permission of the Court, and apparently without any objection being made by the appellant. The Courts below have found that the suit is time barred as not being within 12 years of the alienation sought to be set aside, and in this connexion, they held that appellant, the assignee could not avail himself of the provisions of Article 44, Lim. Act, which had originally served to bring the suit by Bhavan within time. Mr. Divatia has argued on behalf of the appellant that we should read into Article 44 the words “or his assignee” or “his representatiye-in-interest” or some similar expression, and hold that the assignee of the former minor's rights is in the same position as he was. The article speaks of a “ward” and of a “guardian” and of no other person, and we may only interpret and cannot redraft it; and the argument itself raises the further question of:—What were the former minor's rights which passed by assignment to the appellant? A sale by a guardian of his ward's property is not void, but voidable, provided that the former ward can show that it was not made for necessity, that is, he is allowed to have it set aside, on making such an allegation and proving it within the time set out in the article. It follows that what he assigned to the appellant was not the property in question, but his right to sue for it, and if he could establish his allegation, to have the sale avoided. This I think was no more than a right of suit, and if I am correct such a transfer is forbidden by Section 6, Clause (e) of the Transfer of Property Act.

9. By plaintiff 2's withdrawal from the suit therefore the appellant is left with no remaining rights. He got nothing by his assignment, and is not the ward whose property had been sold by his guardian—he has no derivative rights, and clearly cannot maintain the suit. There is no precedent exactly in point. The case law relating to such transactions has been discussed by my learned brother and I will not repeat his review. My view however derives some support from the cases, for from these it seems that on similar facts this is probably the view the Court would have taken, especially in connexion with the remarks in Hanmant Gurunath v. Ramappa Lagmappa . I agree that both appeals must be dismissed with, costs.

R.K

10. Appeal dismissed.