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Emperor v. Ramrao Mangesh Burde And Others

Bombay High Court
Jan 29, 1932
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Structured Summary of the Opinion (Wadia, J.)

Factual and Procedural Background

This opinion concerns criminal charges arising from a conspiracy alleged to have taken place in or about October 1930. The accused were charged inter alia with being parties to a conspiracy to commit offences under the Indian Penal Code. Accused Nos. 1 and 5 were additionally charged with forging two letters addressed to the manager of the Bank of India Ltd., Bombay, and five cheques drawn on the same bank in the name of Maneklal Purshottam Seth; the remaining accused were charged with abetment of that forgery. The accused were also charged with using the cheques knowing or having reason to believe them to be forged, and with cheating the Bank of India by dishonestly inducing payments on those cheques, together with abetment in that respect.

At the outset an objection was raised that the accused could not be charged with more than three offences within twelve months under section 234 of the Criminal Procedure Code. The court rejected that objection, relying on section 235 as an exception and on precedent (Abdul Salim v. Emperor) to hold that the charges formed one transaction and could be tried together. The accused were arrested on various dates in May and June 1931. During investigation, police officers asked accused Nos. 1 and 5 to write on blank slips and sheets in the presence of panchas; similar writings were taken by other police officers. Counsel for accused Nos. 1 and 5 objected to the admissibility of those writings and raised related legal objections which are dealt with in this judgment.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the accused could be charged and tried jointly for the array of offences alleged (including conspiracy, forgery, cheating and abetment), in light of the statutory limit on charging multiple offences within twelve months (section 234 CrPC) and the exception in section 235.
  2. Whether writings and impressions obtained from accused persons by police officers during investigation (blank slips and sheets written by accused Nos. 1 and 5 in the presence of panchas) are admissible in evidence, given provisions of the Indian Evidence Act and the City of Bombay Police Act.
  3. Whether a police officer of the rank of Sub-Inspector, Deputy Inspector or Inspector has power to require an accused to write or give finger-impressions during investigation, and whether such material amounts to inadmissible statements or confessions under relevant statutory provisions (including sections 25, 26, 47, 45 and 73 of the Indian Evidence Act and section 63 of the City of Bombay Police Act).

Arguments of the Parties

Counsel for the Accused (summarised)

  • Objected that the accused could not be charged with more than three offences within twelve months under section 234 CrPC.
  • Contended that Inspector Achrekar (and other police officers) had no power to make accused Nos. 1 and 5 write on blank slips and sheets during investigation, and that therefore those writings were inadmissible in evidence.
  • Referred to Bazari Hajam v. King-Emperor to argue that taking thumb/finger impressions (or forcing writing) in Court or during investigation is an objectionable practice and may lead to manufactured evidence.
  • Argued that the writings taken by police amounted to "statements" within the meaning of section 63 of the City of Bombay Police Act and were thus not admissible; alternatively, contended that the writings were confessions under sections 25 and 26 of the Indian Evidence Act and hence inadmissible.
  • Initially contended that even a Court could not direct an accused to give finger-impressions or to write in Court, invoking a strict reading of section 73 of the Indian Evidence Act (which mentions "any person present in Court").

The opinion does not contain a detailed account of the prosecution's separate, developed arguments in the same structured way; the judgment addresses and responds to the objections raised by the accused and discusses relevant statutory provisions and precedent.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Abdul Salim v. Emperor That a charge of conspiracy to cheat by means of several forged documents and inducements to pay different sums is really a charge of one offence (conspiracy), and acts of cheating may be laid as acts in pursuance of the conspiracy. Used to support the conclusion that the conspiracy and the offences alleged as committed in pursuance of it formed one transaction and could be jointly tried; thus there was no misjoinder.
Bazari Hajam v. King-Emperor Expressed disapproval (Bucknill, J.) of the practice of taking thumb-impressions of accused in Court as a method which might permit manufacture of incriminating evidence; conviction based on such practice was set aside in that case. Referred to by counsel for the accused; the court noted the case but observed that later decisions did not follow it and that it does not stand as binding against the more recent authorities permitting the practice under certain statutory provisions.
The Superintendent & Remembrancer of Legal Affairs of Bengal v. Kiran Bala Dassi Held that taking a thumb-impression of an accused person was permitted by section 5 of Act XXXIII of 1920 and that the opinion of an expert formed by comparison of such thumb-impressions was admissible; the practice of taking thumb-impressions in Court was held to be in accordance with the law. Relied upon to show that taking thumb/finger impressions and admitting expert comparison evidence is permissible; cited as a later authority consistent with admitting such evidence.
King-Emperor v. Virammal Expressed a similar view to Kiran Bala Dassi regarding permissibility of taking thumb-impressions and admitting expert comparison. Referred to as supporting authority for the admissibility of fingerprint/thumb-impression comparison evidence.
Basgit Singh v. King-Emperor Held that it was not improper for a Court to take thumb-prints of the accused in its presence and to have them compared by an expert with disputed fingerprints. Referred to as an authority approving the Court's power to take prints for comparison and admit expert evidence based on that comparison.
Zahuri Sahu v. King-Emperor Held that the Court was entitled to ask the accused to allow his thumb-impression to be taken in Court for the purpose of comparison. Referred to by the court as another authority supporting the permissibility of taking impressions in Court for comparison and admissibility.
Public Prosecutor v. Kandasami Thevan Dissenting view from Bazari Hajam: held there was no objection in law to a Judge taking a thumb-mark of an accused if relevant, and that conviction based on comparison with a thumb-mark taken in Court was not improper. Used to show that Bazari Hajam's cautionary approach had been dissented from and that later authorities allowed taking impressions in Court and admitting comparison evidence.
King-Emperor v. Tun Hlaing (Full Bench, Rangoon) Held that the Court has power to direct even an accused person present in Court to make his finger-impression for the purposes described in section 73 of the Indian Evidence Act; if legislature intended to exempt an accused it could have said so. Adopted and agreed with by the court to support that section 73 extends to accused persons and that the Court may direct fingerprints/writings for comparison.
Emperor v. Monghibai (Rangnekar, J.) Rangnekar, J. gave a ruling similar to the present court's view, supporting the admissibility of writings taken for comparison. Referred to as persuasive support strengthening the court's ruling that police-obtained writings for comparison are admissible and that the practice is not illegal.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The court's analysis proceeded in two main strands: (A) whether the charges could be joined and tried together; and (B) whether writings and impressions obtained by police during investigation were admissible.

A. Joinder and Single Transaction Analysis

The court acknowledged the objection under section 234 CrPC (limiting charging of more than three offences within twelve months) but relied on section 235 as an explicit exception to the principle in section 233. The judge explained that where a series of acts are so connected together as to form the same transaction, multiple offences committed by the same person may be charged and tried at one trial. Applying that statutory provision, and relying on Abdul Salim v. Emperor, the court concluded that the conspiracy and the various offences alleged to have been committed in pursuance of it constituted one transaction in point of purpose and in point of time. Consequently, the joinder of charges was proper and did not render the trial illegal.

B. Admissibility of Writings and Finger/Thumb Impressions

The court set out the three modes under the Indian Evidence Act for proving disputed handwriting or signature: (i) under section 47 by calling a person acquainted with the handwriting; (ii) under section 45 by calling a handwriting expert; and (iii) under section 73 by comparison with writings either admitted or proved to the Court to have been written by the person in question. The court noted that section 73 expressly empowers the Court to direct "any person present in Court" to write words or figures for purposes of comparison, and stated that section 73 applies, with necessary modifications, to finger-impressions.

Addressing counsel's reliance on Bazari Hajam v. King-Emperor, the court reviewed subsequent authorities (including Kiran Bala Dassi, King-Emperor v. Virammal, Basgit Singh, Zahuri Sahu, Public Prosecutor v. Kandasami Thevan) which either permitted or expressly approved the taking of thumb/finger impressions and their comparison by experts. The court observed that Bazari Hajam had not been followed in those later cases and had been dissented from.

On the contention based on section 63 of the City of Bombay Police Act (that statements to police taken down in writing by the person making them shall not be used in evidence), the court found that the blank slips and sheets on which accused Nos. 1 and 5 were asked to write did not amount to "statements" within the meaning of that section. The court analysed the purpose of such writings in forgery investigations — as part of the investigative process to determine whether the accused should be placed before the Magistrate — and held that they were not statements or confessions under sections 25 and 26 of the Indian Evidence Act.

The court emphasised that handwriting comparison is a hazardous and inconclusive mode of proof and must be treated with caution. It distinguished admissibility from weight: admissibility is for the judge to decide, whereas the jury (or fact-finders) determine what weight to give the writings and the results of expert comparison. The court noted that no objection had been taken when the writings were tendered in the Magistrate's Court, which would have been the appropriate place to raise coercion issues; even if coercion had been alleged, that would affect evidentiary value, not admissibility in principle.

Finally, while holding that it was not illegal for police officers of the ranks mentioned to obtain such comparison material, the court recommended that as a matter of good practice the accused should, for comparison purposes, be made to write or give finger-impressions in Court under the direction of a Magistrate or Judge. The court added that if an accused refuses to write or give a finger-impression in Court, an adverse inference might be drawn against him on the charge for which he is tried.

Holding and Implications

Core Rulings:

  • The joinder of the conspiracy charge with the various offences alleged to have been committed in pursuance of that conspiracy was lawful — the acts formed one continuous transaction and could be charged and tried together.
  • Writings and finger/thumb impressions obtained from accused persons by police officers during investigation are admissible in evidence, subject to the court's usual role in determining admissibility and the jury's role in assessing weight.

Implications and Direct Consequences

  • Direct effect on the parties: The accused cannot rely successfully on the objection under section 234 CrPC to prevent joinder; the writings taken by police may be placed before the jury, subject to the judge's admissibility ruling and the jury's assessment of evidentiary weight.
  • The court stressed caution: handwriting/fingerprint comparison evidence is often hazardous and should be treated with caution by fact-finders; admissibility does not equal cogent proof.
  • Recommended practice: Although not prohibited by statute, it is generally desirable for the accused to be asked to write or give finger-impressions in Court under Magistrate/Judge direction for comparison; refusal in Court may attract an adverse inference.
  • No new broad legal principle was proclaimed beyond application and clarification of existing statutory provisions and precedents; the decision primarily applies those established authorities and statutes to the facts before the court.
B.K.D
Show all summary ...

The arguments of counsel in support of and against the objections are dealt with at length in his Lordship's judgment.

Wadia, J.:—The accused in this case are charged with being parties to a conspiracy in or about October 1930 to do certain illegal acts consisting of offences under the Indian Penal Code. Accused Nos. 1 and 5 are also charged with having forged between them two letters addressed to the manager of the Bank of India. Ltd., Bombay, and five cheques of various amounts drawn on the same bank, in the name of one Maneklal Purshottam Seth, and the remaining accused are charged with abetting accused Nos. 1 and 5 in the commission of the said offence. The accused are also further charged with using the said cheques as genuine, knowing or having reason to believe that they were forged, and also with cheating the Bank of India by dishonestly inducing the bank to deliver the various amounts of the cheques, and with abetment in respect of the same. An objection was raised at the outset that the accused could not be charged with having committed more than three offences within the space of twelve months under section 234 of the Criminal Procedure Code. This objection, however, is unfounded, as section 235, which is one of the exceptions to the principle laid down in section 233, provides that if in one series of acts so connected together as to form the same transaction, more offences than one are committed by the same person—which word would include persons—he or they may be charged with, and tried at one trial for, every such offence. In my opinion the charges against the accused are based on a series of acts alleged to have been committed by them with one continuous purpose and design, and the acts are also so connected together in point of time that they really form one transaction. It has also been laid down in Abdul Salim v. Emperor that a charge of conspiracy to cheat a person by means of several forged documents and fraudulently and dishonestly inducing that person to pay different sums of money to different persons, in pursuance of which conspiracy that person was so deceived and induced to pay the said sums, is really a charge of one offence only, viz., conspiracy, the acts of cheating being laid not as offences, but as acts done in pursuance of the conspiracy. In my opinion, the offence of conspiracy and the different offences alleged to have been committed by the accused in this case in pursuance of that conspiracy formed one and the same transaction and could be jointly tried. There is, therefore, no misjoinder of charges which may render the trial illegal.

The accused were arrested on different dates in May and June 1931, and in the course of investigation Inspector Achrekar of the C.I.D, Bombay, asked accused Nos. 1 and 5 separately to write on blank slips and sheets of paper in the presence of “panchas” in order to send the writings along with the letters and cheques alleged to have been forged in the name of Maneklal Purshottam Seth and also certain admitted signatures of the same party to the hand-writing expert for comparison prior to the examination of the expert in Court. Similar writings were also taken from the accused separately by Sub-Inspector D'Sa, Deputy Inspector Mahankal, and Sub-Inspector Pednekar of the Bombay Police, in the presence of “panchas”. Counsel for accused No. 5 objected to those writings being shown to the jury in the opening address of the counsel for the prosecution on the ground that Inspector Achrekar had no power to make accused Nos. 1 and 5 write upon those slips and sheets in the course of investigation, and that they were, therefore, inadmissible in evidence. Counsel for accused No. 1 also joined in the objection. Under the indian evidence act there are three ways of proving a disputed handwriting or signature as being the handwriting or signature of a particular person, viz., under section 47, by calling another person who knows or is acquainted with the handwriting of the person whose writing is in dispute; secondly, under section 45, by calling a handwriting expert; and, thirdly, under section 73, by a comparison of the disputed handwriting or signature with others that are either admitted or proved to the satisfaction of the Court to have been written or made by the person whose handwriting or signature is in dispute. It is further provided by this section that “the Court may direct any person present in Court to write any words or figures for the purpose of enabling the Court to compare the words or figures so written with any words or figures alleged to have been written by such person”. It may be here stated that the onus of proving the genuineness of the signature on a deed or a document in a criminal proceeding lies on the party impeaching it, viz., the Crown, and not as in a civil suit, in which the onus lies on the party setting up the deed or document and asserting its validity. The question, however, for consideration is in what manner the genuineness of the signature or the document can be impeached by the Crown in the discharge of that onus. Counsel for accused No. 5 referred me to Bazari Hajam v. King-Emperor, in which case it was alleged that a certain deed purporting to have been executed by a person was not in fact executed by him but by the accused. When the accused was brought in the Magistrate's Court and in the Sessions Court, his thumb-print was taken, and on a comparison of the thumb-print on the deed and the thumb-prints taken in Court he was convicted. In appeal the conviction was set aside, and Bucknill, J. deprecated the practice of taking thumb-impressions of the accused in Court which, according to him, was “for the purpose of possible manufacture of the evidence by which he (i.e the accused) could be incriminated”. Das, J. agreed in setting aside the conviction, but all that he added at the end of his judgment was that it was extremely dangerous to take the finger-print impression of an accused person in Court. Evidently the learned Judge did not go so far as to say that he considered the practice as being “repugnant to all thought of the proper administration of justice” in a British country. This case was decided in 1921. In The Supdt. & Rembr. of Legal Affairs of Bengal v. Kiran Bala Dassi, which was decided in 1925, the learned Judges of the Appeal Court referred to section 5 of Act XXXIII of 1920, being an Act to authorise the taking of measurements and photographs of convicts and others, and to section 45 of the Indian Evidence Act, and held that the taking of a thumb-impression of an accused person was permitted by section 5 of that Act, and that the opinion of the expert formed by a comparison of such thumb-impressions was admissible in evidence. They, therefore, held that the procedure adopted by the Magistrate of taking thumb-impressions in his Court was one in strict accordance with the provisions of the law. A similar view was taken in King-Emperor v. Virammal. Both these cases are referred to in Basgit Singh v. King-Emperor, in which it was held that it was not improper for the Court to take thumb-prints of the accused in its presence and to have them compared by an expert with the disputed finger-prints. The case of Bazari Hajam v. King-Emperor, is also referred to in Zahuri Sahu v. King-Emperor, in which it was held that the Court was entitled to ask the accused to allow his thumb-impression to be taken in Court for the purpose of comparison. I may here mention that section 73 of the Indian Evidence Act also applies with any necessary modifications to finger-impression. The case of Bazari Hajam v. King-Emperor, has not been followed in the cases that I have referred to above, and it has actually been dissented from in Public Prosecutor v. Kandasami Thevan, in which it was held that there was no objection in law to a Judge taking the thumb-mark of an accused person if the Judge thought it relevant, and a conviction based on a comparison of a thumb-mark of an accused person taken in Court with the thumb-mark on the document in question was not improper. Counsel for accused No. 5 at first contended that even the Court had not the power to take the finger-impression of an accused person or make him write in Court, on the ground that section 73, which refers to “any person present in Court”, does not contemplate an accused in a criminal trial. It has, however, been decided by a full bench in the High Court at Rangoon in King-Emperor v. Tun Hlaing that the Court has the power to direct even an accused person present in Court to make his finger-impression for the purpose described in section 73, and that if it was the intention of the legislature to exempt an accused person from the operation of section 73, there was nothing to prevent it from saying so. I agree with the judgment.

Counsel subsequently argued that if the Court had the power given to it by section 73 of the Indian Evidence Act, a police-officer, of the rank of a Sub-Inspector, a Deputy Inspector or even an Inspector of Police, had no such power, and he referred to section 63 of the City of Bombay Police Act (Bom. IV of 1902), which provides that no statement made by any person to a police-officer in the course of an investigation under this Act shall, if taken down in writing, by the person making it, nor shall such writing be used in evidence. It was argued that the writings, namely, the blank slips and sheets of paper on which accused Nos. 1 and 5 were asked to write by the police-officer, were statements within the meaning of that section. In my opinion they do not amount to statements. On a charge of forgery or making a false document and offences cognate thereto such writings often form part of the investigation itself, the object being to see whether there is any ground for placing the accused before the Magistrate on that charge. It was further argued that the writings amount to confessions within the meaning of the indian evidence act and were, therefore, inadmissible under the provisions of sections 25 and 26. That contention, in my opinion, is equally unsound, for the writings do not state nor in the case of forgery do they really suggest an inference that the accused must have committed the crime. In fact a comparison of handwriting as a mode of proof is often hazardous and inconclusive, and as a method of proving disputed handwriting it is accepted by the Courts with great caution. I may also state here that no objection was raised to these writings when they were tendered in evidence in the Magistrate's Court which the accused could have taken, if they wished to suggest that they had been made to write under coercion. Even so, the objection would have affected the cogency or the evidentiary value of the writings, but not their admissibility. The jury are the judges of fact, and when the writings are tendered in evidence, it will be for them to say what weight they should attach to them, and also to the result of the comparison made by the handwriting expert. It is, however, within the province of the Judge to say whether the documents are admissible in evidence, and I hold that they are. I am strengthened in the ruling I have given by a similar ruling given by Mr. Justice Rangnekar in the case of Emperor v. Monghibai.

I should only like to add in conclusion that although there is nothing illegal in the accused having been made to write by the police-officers of the rank I have referred to, especially when the charge against the accused is one of forgery, as there is nothing either in the Criminal Procedure Code or in the City of Bombay Police Act which prohibits it, it would be generally desirable in the interests of the administration of justice in a criminal trial that for the purposes of comparison the accused should be made to write or give his finger-impression in Court under the direction of a Magistrate or a Judge. If the accused refuses to write or to give his finger-impression in Court, an adverse inference may even be drawn against him in respect of the charge on which he is brought to trial.

B.K.D