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State Of West Bengal v. Sati Prosad Roy
Structured Summary of the Provided Opinion
Factual and Procedural Background
The petitioner, Sri Sati Prosad Roy, a clerk attached to Karimpore Primary Health Centre (under suspension), was the subject of departmental disciplinary proceedings begun by Directorate memo No. 22963 dated 19.9.68. An initial enquiry officer (opposite party no. 7, Dr. M. L. Dutta Roy) directed the petitioner to file a written defence; the petitioner filed his defence on 27 September 1968. On 30 October 1968, the Director of Health Services appointed Dr. J. Nath (opposite party no. 8) as the enquiry officer in place of Dr. Dutta Roy. The petitioner alleged a strained relationship with Dr. Nath and apprehended bias; his representations against Dr. Nath's appointment were rejected. The petitioner did not attend the enquiry on the ground that he questioned its legality and propriety; the enquiry proceeded ex parte on 10–12 December 1968, witnesses were examined and documents marked. The enquiry officer submitted a report recommending that the petitioner was unsuitable to be retained in service and that the period 31.7.68 to 29.8.68 be treated as extraordinary leave without pay.
On 10 February 1969 the Director of Health Services issued an order proposing penalties (including dismissal) and directing the petitioner to show cause within 15 days. The petitioner submitted a show cause reply (a copy was not annexed to the petition). On 1 March 1969 the Director, after examining the representation dated 25.2.69 and the enquiry report, passed an order of removal (dismissal) from government service with immediate effect and imposed consequential directions concerning pay, suspension period and service book entry.
The petitioner approached the High Court under Article 226 of the Constitution seeking writs (certiorari to quash the suspension order, charge-sheet, punishment order and connected proceedings; mandamus restraining respondents from giving effect to the order). The respondents filed an affidavit-in-opposition denying malafice, bias and procedural illegality. The learned judge in the High Court examined the matter, found certain charges vague and held that the proceedings were vitiated because the charge-sheet and other circumstances gave rise to a reasonable apprehension of prejudice; consequently the proceedings were quashed. The State appealed; the appellate court (text of the opinion) considered the appeal and dismissed it.
Legal Issues Presented
- Whether the issuance of a charge-sheet that includes expressions that the delinquent "have been found guilty" and the proposal of the penalty of dismissal at the charge-sheet stage vitiates the disciplinary enquiry by creating a reasonable apprehension of prejudice and pre-judgement.
- Whether an enquiry officer who is subordinate to the disciplinary authority can hold a fair and impartial enquiry where the disciplinary authority has expressed conclusory views about guilt and proposed dismissal in the charge-sheet.
- Whether mere mention of proposed punishments in a charge-sheet (including major penalties) necessarily indicates bias, or whether such inclusion can be cured by subsequent procedures (e.g., a second show cause after the enquiry).
Arguments of the Parties
Appellant (State Government and its officers) - Arguments
- The learned High Court judge erred in holding that the disciplinary authority had prejudged the case so that the enquiry officer was put in an embarrassed or prejudiced situation.
- The finding that several charges were vague was untenable and did not result in prejudice to the petitioner.
- There was a fair and proper enquiry conducted according to law and evidence established misconduct; therefore the High Court's order quashing the charge-sheet and entire proceedings was bad in law.
Respondent / Petitioner (Sri Sati Prosad Roy) - Arguments
- The charge-sheet was defective because it indicated the proposed punishment (dismissal) at the stage when guilt was not yet established, which prejudiced the petitioner and showed a closed or biased mind on part of the disciplinary authority.
- Most of the charges were vague; cumulative effect of vagueness and the prejudicial wording of the charge-sheet made the resulting finding and order unsustainable.
- There was reasonable apprehension of a lack of impartiality because the enquiry officer (Dr. J. Nath) had strained relations with the petitioner and the disciplinary authority had expressed conclusions that would likely embarrass a subordinate enquiry officer.
Table of Precedents Cited
| Precedent | Rule or Principle Cited For | Application by the Court |
|---|---|---|
| State of Orissa v. Bidyabhusan, A.I.R. 1963 S.C. 779 | The court may uphold an order based on some grounds if those grounds are serious enough to warrant the punishment. | The High Court followed this decision to note that an order might be valid based on some established grounds even if other charges were vague; the decision informed the Court's analysis of whether parts of the charge could sustain the order. |
| High Commissioner for India v. I.M. Lall, A.I.R. 1948 P.C. 121 | Interpreting the pre-amendment provision (section 240(3), Government of India Act): no action proposing punishment can be validly taken until a conclusion on the charges is reached; suggested punishments before that stage are hypothetical. | Used to support the principle that proposals for punishment arise only after charges are established and that including punishment at the charge-sheet stage is premature. |
| Khem Chand v. Union of India, A.I.R. 1958 S.C. 300 | Article 311(2) requires reasonable opportunity including to deny guilt, defend, and to make representation on proposed punishment only after the competent authority tentatively proposes punishment post-enquiry. | Applied to emphasise that the opportunity to show cause on punishment arises after the authority has applied its mind to evidence and tentatively proposed punishment. |
| Hukum Chand Malhotra v. Union of India, A.I.R. 1959 S.C. 536 | Reiterates that no opportunity to show cause against punishment is meaningful unless the authority proposes punishment after the enquiry has established guilt. | Reinforced the Court's view that second opportunity to show cause post-enquiry is required and that premature proposal of punishment is inconsistent with principles embodied in Article 311. |
| Sudhir Ranjan v. State of West Bengal, A.I.R. 1961 Cal. 626 | Combined notice to show cause against charges and proposed dismissal does not conform with section 240 of Government of India Act, 1935; punishment without a second opportunity to show cause after charges established is void. | Relied upon to show that combined notices of charges and proposed dismissal are legally defective unless cured by subsequent compliant procedures. |
| Bibhuti Bhusan v. State of West Bengal, A.I.R. 1967 Cal. 29 | Where a show cause notice contains several penalties, it may indicate that the authority has not made up its mind; presence of several proposed penalties does not necessarily show bad faith. | Cited for the proposition that mere listing of several penalties in a charge-sheet may not taint an enquiry if a second show cause and proper enquiry occur. |
| Adyodhaya Prosad v. Sr. General Manager, S.E. Railway, C.R. 820W of 1964 (May 23, 1968) | Charge-sheet listing dismissal and lesser penalties can indicate that authorities had not made up their mind and were informing the delinquent of possible penalties. | Used to show that mention of multiple penalties can reflect flexibility rather than prejudgement in some circumstances. |
| Gopendra Mohan v. General Manager, S.E. Railway, C.R. No. 2301W of 1966 (Aug 26, 1969) | Similar holding that mentioning a range of penalties may indicate lack of a closed mind. | Reinforced the position that the mere proposal of several penalties is not invariably indicative of bias. |
| S. Manickram v. Superintendent of Police, Nilgiris, A.I.R. 1964 Madras 375 | Where a charge-sheet asks a delinquent to show cause why he should be dismissed, the government servant may be prejudiced. | Applied to illustrate that direct asking for cause against dismissal in the charge-sheet can and has been held prejudicial to the delinquent. |
| M. Chinnappa, A.I.R. 1969 A.P. 234 | Expression in charge-sheet of proposed penalty of dismissal indicates prejudice of the disciplinary authority. | Used to support the conclusion that expressing proposed dismissal in the charge-sheet can create reasonable apprehension of prejudice. |
| Collector, Customs, Calcutta v. Biswanath, A.I.R. 1972 Cal. 401 | Distinguished on facts where charge-sheet contained factual presumption about assets but evidence was still required; demonstrates charge-sheet wording can differ materially in legal effect. | The Court treated the present charge-sheet as far more prejudicial than the one in Biswanath and distinguished Biswanath on its less prejudicial wording. |
| Hareram Samanta v. Superintendent of Police, Hooghly, 66 C.W.N. 54 | Bias is seldom demonstratively proved; where there are good reasons to think an authority is prejudiced, its finding should not be allowed to stand. | Invoked to support the conclusion that reasonable apprehension of bias suffices to invalidate a proceeding even if direct proof of bias is difficult. |
| State of Uttar Pradesh v. Om Prokash Gupta, A.I.R. 1970 S.C. 679 | In assessing breaches of natural justice, courts consider whether non-observance likely resulted in deflecting the course of justice. | Applied as the standard: the Court examined whether procedural breaches were likely to have deflected justice and concluded they were. |
Court's Reasoning and Analysis
The appellate court proceeded by first recalling the text and effect of the amended Article 311(2) of the Constitution, which requires that no person be dismissed except "after an inquiry in which he has been informed of the charges against him and given a reasonable opportunity of being heard" and that where a penalty is proposed after such enquiry the person be given reasonable opportunity to make representation on the penalty proposed but only on the basis of evidence adduced during the enquiry.
The Court reviewed prior judicial authorities interpreting the same or analogous provisions (including I.M. Lall; Khem Chand; Hukum Chand Malhotra; Sudhir Ranjan) establishing the principle that a proposal of punishment properly arises only after the enquiry has established the charges and that a second opportunity to show cause on punishment is required. The Court also reviewed jurisprudence holding that mere listing of several penalties in a charge-sheet will not automatically demonstrate bias (Bibhuti Bhusan; Adyodhaya Prosad; Gopendra Mohan), but that inclusion of specific proposals of major penalties may cause reasonable apprehension of prejudice in particular factual settings (S. Manickram; M. Chinnappa).
Applying these principles to the present record, the Court observed that the charge-sheet did not merely list possible penalties but stated that the delinquent "have been found guilty of gross misconduct" and that he was "prima facie unsuitable to be retained in the service of government" and that it was "proposed to impose upon him the penalty of dismissal". The Court found that such express assertions in the charge-sheet went beyond informing the delinquent of possible penalties and effectively communicated the disciplinary authority's concluded view about guilt and the severe penalty appropriate.
The Court analysed whether this communication would have the practical effect of prejudicing the enquiry officer who was subordinate to the disciplinary authority. The learned judge below had found, and the appellate court agreed, that where a subordinate enquiry officer is confronted with an express concluded view of his superior, a reasonable apprehension arises that the enquiry officer would be embarrassed or prejudiced in conducting an impartial enquiry. The Court noted that contemporaneous representations did not initially articulate bias against Dr. Nath, but that the charge-sheet's expressions combined with surrounding circumstances justified the petitioner's apprehension of lack of impartiality.
The Court further observed that the enquiry officer's report went beyond his functions by finding the petitioner unfit to be retained in service and recommending dismissal — a conclusion that reflected the disciplinary authority's expressed view and strengthened the inference that the enquiry had been improperly influenced. Relying on authorities concerning reasonable apprehension of bias (Hareram Samanta; Om Prokash Gupta), the Court concluded that the procedural defects and the express prejudicial language in the charge-sheet were likely to have deflected the course of justice in the enquiry.
Holding and Implications
Holding: The appellate court affirmed the High Court's conclusion that the disciplinary proceedings were vitiated. The court concluded that the charge-sheet, by stating that the delinquent had been found guilty and proposing dismissal at the inception, created a reasonable apprehension of prejudice and pre-judgement and that the subordinate enquiry officer was likely to be prejudiced as a result. The Court therefore held that the entire disciplinary proceeding commencing with the issue of the charge-sheet was vitiated. The appeal was dismissed and there was no order as to costs.
Appeal dismissed.
Implications: The direct consequence as recorded in the opinion is that the disciplinary proceedings (including the charge-sheet, enquiry and consequential order of removal) were found vitiated. The Court did not in this opinion purport to lay down any novel legal principle beyond the application and synthesis of existing authorities; rather it applied established principles concerning Article 311(2), reasonable opportunity on penalty and reasonable apprehension of bias to the particular facts. No broader novel precedent or decree beyond the case outcome is stated in the text.
(3) Dr. M. L. Dutta roy opposite party no. 7 was appointed enquiry officer who directed him to file his written statement of defence. The petitioner filed his defence on september 27, 1968 denying the allegations made against him. Thereafter the petitioner was informed on october 30, 1968 by the director of health services that in place of opposite party no. 7 the opposite party no. 8 dr. J. Nath was appointed the enquiry officer. The petitioner made a made a representative stating that his relation with dr. Nath was strained while both of them were at jalpaiguri and dr. Nath had expressed his vendetta and personal displeasure against him. As the petitioner apprehended no fair trial in hand of such biased officer, he made representations against the appointment of dr. Nath as enquiry officer but the representations were rejected. The petitioner was duly informed of the dates of enquiry but he did not attend the enquiry as he raised questions of legality and propriety of the said enquiry by a prejudiced officer. The enquiry was held by dr. Nath exparte on december 10, 11 and 12, 1968 when it appears witnesses were examined and documents were marked exhibits. The petitioner was thereafter served with the following order: ; government of west bengal, directorate of health services, writers' buildings, calcutta.
order no. 2315 ; calcutta, the 10th february, 1969. Whereas departmental proceedings were drawn up against sri satiprosad roy, clerk (under suspension) attached to karimpore primary health centre, nadia in this directorate memo. No. 22963 dated 19. 9. 68 read with this directorate memo no. 259660 dated 30. 09. 68 on the charges contained therein.
; and whereas the charges were enquired into by dr. J. Nath chief medical officer or health, hooghly, who after enquiry submitted his report wherein he has recommended that sri roy is not suitable to be retained in service any longer and the period from 31. 7. 68 to 29. 8. 68 should be treated as extra ordinary leave without pay.
; and whereas after careful examination of the enquiring officer's report and other evidence or record including statement of witness i the director of health services, west bengal agree with the enquiring officer to his findings and find him guilty of the charge contained in this. Directorate memo. Referred to above beyond all reasonable doubt.
; now, therefore, i the director of health service, west bengal being the appointing authority propose to impose upon him the following penalties.
1) that he shall be dismissed from govt. Service with immediate effect.
; 2) the no pay and allowances beyond subsistence grant be paid to him during the period of his suspension.
; 3) that the period of suspension shall be treated as the period spent on suspension.
; 4) that the period from 31. 7. 68 to 29. 8. 68 shall be treated as extraordinary leave without pay.
sri roy, is therefore, directed to show cause as to why the proposed penalties should not be imposed upon him, within fifteen days from the date of receipt of this order. The reply should be submitted through proper channel.
; a copy of the enquiring officer's report is enclosed.
sd/ - illegible, 10. 2. 69 director of health services, west bengal.
; to ; sri sati prosad roy, clerk, (under suspension) , karimpore primary health centre, nadia.
(4) The petitioner showed cause to the same but it appears no copy thereof was annexed to the petition. Thereafter on march 21, 1969, order was passed removing the petitioner from service which is set out below: government of west bengal directorate of health services writer's buildings, calcutta. Calcutta, the 1st march, 1969 no. 4961 order: i, the director of health services, west bengal after careful examination of the representation submitted on 25. 2. 69 by sri sati prosad roy, clerk (under suspension) , karimpore, primary health centre, nadia in reply to this directoraee order no. 2314 dated 10. 2. 69 the enquiring officers report and other documents on record, find no reason to alter the previous decisions that he is guilty of the charges contained in this directorate memo. No. 22963 dated 19. 9. 68. Now, therefore, i the director of health services, west bengal being the appointing authority do hereby impose upon him the penalty of 'removal' from the service of the government with immediate effect and further order. 1) that no pay and allowances beyond subsistence grant during such pension period be paid to him. 2) that the suspension period shall be treated as the period spent on suspension. 3) that a note to this effect shall be recorded in his service book. Sd/ - illegible.
(5) The petitioner submitted that the entire disciplinary proceeding was vitiated with fatal irregularities - even in the charge - sheet punishment was indicated, a biased officer was made the enquiry officer in spite of objection and the second show cause notice was bad in view of the decision to dismiss the petitioner which was already taken by the director. On these allegations and contentions the petitioner moved this application under article 226 (1) of eh constitution and the connected rule was issued on the respondents to show cause why a writ in the nature of certiorari should not issue quashing the said order of suspension, order of punishment and final order, charge - sheet and all connected proceedings. There was also a prayer for issuance of a writ in the nature of mandamus calling upon the respondents to forbear from giving effect to the said order. An affidavit - in - opposition was filed y bharat ch. Dutta, deputy assistant director of health services (administration branch) affirmed on may 16, 1972, on behalf of the respondents denying all material allegations made in the petition in particular the allegations of malafides and bias against the opposite parties nos. 4 and 8. It was stated that the petitioner was a trouble - some person and the reports submitted by him to the police were without basis. It was further stated that there was no illegality in the disciplinary proceeding which was held in accordance with law. Further there was no want of jurisdiction or procedural irregularity or bias or violation of principles of natural justice. The petitioner accordingly was not entitled to any relief. The petitioner field an affidavit - in - reply reiterating his allegation and contentions made in the petition.
(6) On hearing the parties the learned judge found that charges (a) to (d) were vague, as no particulars were given. It was however held that the charges (e) to (f) were not vague and no prejudice was caused to the petitioner in respect thereof. Following the decisions in (1) state of orissa v. Bidyabhusan a. I. R. 1963 s. C. 779 it was held that the order based on some of the grounds would otherwise be valid if they are serious enough to warrant the punishment. It was noticed that the petitioner had trouble in all places. Further dr. Nath was not at jalpaiguri when trouble started involving the petitioner nor did he suspend the petitioner while at jalpaiguri. In the contemporaneous representation, there was no case of bias or prejudice against dr. Nath was made by the petitioner. As to the charge - sheet, which the learned judge called a strange order, it ws held the director opened the said charge - sheet with his conclusion that he found the petitioner guilty of misconduct set out in the charge - sheet. It was further stated in the charge - sheet that the petition was consider unsuitable retention in service. The learned judge was of opinion that if the enquiry officer who was a subordinate officer was faced with concluded or express decision of his superior officer it was not possible for him to hold an unbiased enquiry. The question was not how the authority is "likely to taken the thing" the real question was whether there was reasonable ground for apprehending that the enquiry office would be seriously embarrassed or prejudiced by the express view of the director. It was accordingly held that the enquiry was not fair. The learned judge further held that the inclusion of the proposed punishment in the charge - sheet did to vitiate the proceeding nor such grievance was made in this case. It may however be mentioned here that before us mr. Kashi kanta maitra learned advocate for the petitioner respondent has made serious grievance on the inclusion of the proposed punishment in the charge - sheet itself which we shall consider in due course.
(7) Mr. Paritosh mukherjee learned advocate for the appellant state government and its officers submitted that the leaned judge was in error in holding that the disciplinary authority had already prejudged the case so that it could be said that the enquiry officer was put in an inconvenient and embarrassed situation. It was further submitted that the finding that the other charges in the charge - sheet were vague was also untenable and it was evident that the petitioner was not thereby in any way prejudiced on that ground. It was contended that there was a fair and proper enquiry and the misconduct was established by evidence. It was submitted that the order quashing the charge - sheet and the entire proceeding was bad in law and the order under appeal should not be upheld. Mr. Maitra submitted on the other hand that the charge - sheet was bad in that it contained the proposed punishment when at that stage the petitioner's guilt was yet to be established and the same seriously prejudiced the petitioner as there was bias in the disciplinary authority even against the petitioner at the inception of the hearing. Further as most of the charges were found vague, the finding and order following could not be sustained as such finding and order was the result of cumulative effect on the disciplinary authority. It was further submitted that the enquiry officer found that the petitioner guilty which was obviously the result of the positive finding of guilty of the petitioner by the superior officer of the department and in the context of the attending circumstances there was reasonable apprehension in the mind of the petitioner that justice was not done to him.
(8) We shall now consider the respective contentions on behalf of the parties. It is strange that even after the amendment of article 311 of the constitution on october 6, 1963 such charge - sheet should be issued by the authorities. Article 311 (2) as amended provides: "no such person as aforesaid shall be dismissed or removed or reduced in rank except after an inquiry in which he has been informed of the charges against him and given a reasonable opportunity of being heard in respect of the charges and where it is proposed after such enquiry, to impose on him any such penalty, until he has been given a reasonable opportunity or making representation on the penalty proposed but only on the basis of the evidence adduced during such enquiry. " (9) It has been held in judicial decisions that the unamended article 311 contemplated the similar procedure which has now been provided expressly. Thus question of imposing penalty arises only after the public servant is found guilty of misconduct at the enquiry. In (2) high commissioner for india v. I. M. Lall a. I. R. 1948 p. C. 121, in interpreting section 240 (3) of the government of india act which was in terms with the article 311 prior to amendment it was held that no action under the sub - section could be proposed until a conclusion is arrived on the charges, and the actual punishment to follow it is provisionally determined. Before that stage the charges are unproved and suggested punishments are merely hypothetical. In (3) khem chand v. Union of india a. I. R. 1958 s. C. 300 it was observed that reasonable opportunity envisaged by article 311 (2) of the constitution included (a) an opportunity to the government servant to deny his guilt and establish his innocence (b) an opportunity to defend himself (c) an opportunity to make his representation as to why proposed punishment should not be inflicted on him which he can only do if the competent authority after the enquiry is over and after applying its mind to the gravity of the offence tentatively proposes to inflict. The supreme court in (4) hukum chand malhotra v. Union of india a. I. R. 1959 s. C. 536 observed that the real point of the decision both in i. M. Lall's case and khem chand's case was that no opportunity was given to the government servant concerned to show cause after the charges had been established and the authority considering the nature of the offence proposes the punishment to be inflicted on such government servant.
(10) In (5) sudhir ranjan v. State of west bengal, a. I. R. 1961 cal. 626 it was held that combined notice to show cause, against charges and the proposed punishment of dismissal was not in conformity with the section 240 of government of india act, 1935. It was further held that the punishment inflicted without a second opportunity to show cause against the proposal punishment, after the charges were established, was bad, inoperative and void.
(11) The position where along with issue of charge - sheet the disciplinary authority also proposes punishment of dismissal or removal as also minor penalties followed by second show cause notice proposing a penalty after establishment of charges, has been considered by this court in many cases. It has been observed that where several major or minor penalties are proposed along with the issue of charge - sheet, there is really no formation of opinion against the delinquent to his prejudice the same was cured by the issue of second show cause notice of proposed punishment after the enquiry. In bibhuti bhusan v. State of west bengal a. I. R. 1967 cal. 29 it was held that where the show cause notice contained several penalties, and the delinquent was asked to show cause against the charges it will be absurd to suggest that the sole object was to punish him and accordingly it could not be said that the enquiry was tainted with bad faith at its inception. In (6) adyodhaya prosad v. S. General manager s. E. Railway. C. R. 820w of 1964 dated may 23, 1968 the charge - sheet mentioned penalty eight of the list (dismissal) and lesser penalties which, it was held, only indicated that the authorities did not made up their mind but were merely informing the delinquent the various penalties that could be imposed if he failed to show cause. Similarly in (7) gopendra mohan v. General manager s. E. Rly. In c. R. No. 2301w of 1966 dated august 26, 1969 in which in the charge - sheet the delinquent was asked to show cause against penalty specified in item eight or lesser penalties, it was held that the same indicated that the disciplinary authority did not made up his mind with regard to the guilt of the petitioner.
(12) In the light of the consistent uniform view taken by this court in decisions referred to above and others, we are also of the opinion that mere proposal of several punishments major or minor in the charge - sheet will not by itself indicate that the disciplinary authority was biased or prejudiced against the delinquent as it indicates the flexibility and openness of mind of the disciplinary authority. This, without more, will not vitiate the disciplinary proceeding where in fact the enquiry is held according to rules and principles of natural justice and the delinquent is given a second opportunity to show cause against the proposed punishment. It is however describable that punishments should not at all be mentioned in the charge sheet consistent with provisions of article 311 (2) , since proposal for punishment arises only after charges are established. The position however will be different when in the charge - sheet the disciplinary authority proposes the penalty of dismissal or other major penalties which may indicate the closed mind of the disciplinary authority and his prejudice against the delinquent. Expressions of such proposals for punishments in the charge - sheet before the start of the enquiry may cause reasonable apprehension in the mind of the delinquent that his case has been prejudged which will vitiate the enquiry. In (8) s. Manickram v. Superintendent of police, nilgiris a. I. R. 1964 madras 375 it was held in facts of the case that where in the charge - sheet the delinquent was asked to show cause why he should not be dismissed, the government servant was prejudiced. In (9) m. Chinnappa a. I. R. 1969 a. P. 234 it was held that expression in the charge - sheet of the proposed penalty of dismissal indicated prejudice of the disciplinary authority against the delinquent even before the enquiry has started leading to a misapprehension in the mind of such delinquent.
(13) There may again be cases where the charge - sheet itself may indicate the bias or prejudice of the disciplinary authority against the delinquent as for example by mention of major penalties or otherwise in the facts of the case. In such cases even whether there may or may not be actual prejudice or bias, the delinquent may suffer from reasonable apprehension that he has been prejudiced or prejudged. The charge - sheet we are concerned with states that "it has been made to appear" that the delinquent. "have been found guilty of gross misconduct" on several charges. For those reasons the delinquent was "prima facie unsuitable to be retained in the service of government" and for those reasons again it was "proposed to imposed upon him the penalty of dismissal from civil service of the government under clause (vii) of rule (37) of the bengal subordinate service (discipline and appeal) rules, 1936". The delinquent was asked to submit his defence before the enquiry officer appointed for the purpose showing caused why the penalty of dismissal from civil service of government or such other penalty as may be deemed fit should not be imposed on him. A perusal of the charge - sheet like this before us would in out opinion lead to the reasonable apprehension in the mind of the delinquent that the disciplinary authority had expressed his mind and views against the petitioner and there would be no fair or impartial enquiry. It is an well known accepted proposition of law that justice must not only be done but must be demonstrated to have been done. In this state of affairs there is no scope from the conclusion that the entire disciplinary proceeding commencing with the issue of charge - sheet was vitiated by the mention of the proposal of the penalty of dismissal in the charge - sheet and of the other existing circumstances likely to lead to a reasonable apprehension of the delinquent of a fair and impartial enquiry against him.
(14) The learned judge further found that the enquiry officer who was subordinate officer to the disciplinary authority was put in embarrassing position in view of the expressed view of the superior authority the director of health services. There was, as held by the learned judge, also reasonable apprehension that such enquiry officer subordinate to the director was likely to be prejudiced by the various expressions about the delinquent in the charge - sheet. This charge - sheet is a far cry from the charge - sheet in the case of (10) collector, customs calcutta v. Biswanath a. I. R. 1972 cal. 401 whereby the disciplinary authority stated in the charge - sheet that in view of the assets of the same rs. 61,000/ - found with the delinquent there was a presumption that the same was obtained by unlawful means. It was held that while evidence was led to prove assets no presumption was made against the petitioner at that stage.
(15) In (11) hareram samanta v. Superintendent of police hooghly, 66 c. W. N. 54 it was held that bias can seldom be demonstratively proved and if there are good reasons to think that the mind of the tribunal or the authority is prejudiced against the delinquent by reason of something proceeding it the finding should not be allowed to stand. In (12) state of uttar pradesh v. Om prokash gupta, a. I. R. 1970 s. C. 679 while dealing with the principles of natural justice it was laid down that all the courts have to see is whether the non - observance of any of those principles in a given case is likely to have resulted in deflecting the course of justice. On an over all consideration of the facts and attending circumstances it appears to us that on various expressions in the charge - sheet about expressions in the charge - sheet about the guilt of the petitioner with he proposal for the dismissal of the petitioner and the final order of dismissal the apprehension of the petitioner that his case was prejudiced and prejudged was reasonable and further in view of such expression the enquiry officer being an officer subordinate was likely to be prejudiced leading to the deflection of justice. In fact the enquiry officer finding the petitioner guilty also found that he was unfit to be retained in government service and should be dismissed from service which was no part of the duties enjoined under the rules on the enquiry officer. For these reasons we are in agreement with the learned judge that the entire proceeding had been vitiated. The appeal fails and is dismissed. There will be no order as to costs. B. C. Ray, j. : i agree. Appeal dismissed.
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