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Ram Chandra Banerjee And Another v. A.K Chatterjee And The State
Factual and Procedural Background
The rule was initiated by two accused-petitioners, Ram Chandra Banerjee and Sarat Lal Jain, seeking quashing of criminal proceedings pending under section 16(1)(a)(ii) of the Prevention of Food Adulteration Act, 1954, or alternatively transfer of the case and/or recall of the Public Analyst. The prosecution was launched by Dr. A.K. Chatterjee, Divisional Medical Officer, Eastern Railway, Howrah, alleging that a sample of milk taken from the accused's stall was adulterated.
Key procedural steps and dates recorded in the opinion:
- A sample was collected from the accused's stall on 30.12.66 (the opinion also later refers to a sample taken on 30.12.65 in one passage).
- The Public Analyst's report was dated 12.1.67 and indicated the milk was kept in the stall for preparation of tea.
- The complaint was filed on 26.3.68 (described as about 15 months after the date of the incident) and the accused were placed on trial before the Sub-divisional Judicial Magistrate, Hooghly, on a charge under section 16(1)(a)(ii).
- Two prosecution witnesses were examined on 11.11.68 and the Analyst's report was proved.
- On 4.12.70 the accused applied under section 13(2) of the Act to send the part of the sample to the Director of the Central Food Laboratory for a certificate; the Magistrate rejected that application by order dated 12.1.71 on the ground that it was infructuous because the sample had been taken away on 30.12.66.
- The Public Analyst was later examined as a court witness. On 26.5.71 the accused applied for recall of that witness to ask a question about co-relation between fat and solids-not-fat as noted in Richmond's Dairy Chemistry; that application was rejected by order dated 1.9.71.
- The accused feared they would not obtain an impartial trial and sought transfer; that ground was not pressed before the High Court.
Legal Issues Presented
- Whether the learned Magistrate erred in rejecting the accused's application under section 13(2) of the Prevention of Food Adulteration Act, 1954, thereby denying the accused the statutory right to have the part of the sample analysed by the Director of the Central Food Laboratory.
- Whether continuation of the prosecution in the circumstances (notably a belated launch of prosecution and the Magistrate's finding that sending the sample for further analysis was infructuous) would amount to an abuse of the process of the court and therefore warranted quashing of the proceedings.
Arguments of the Parties
Accused's Arguments (Mr. Samarendra Kumar Dutta)
- The continuance of proceedings would be an abuse of process because of non-conformance with section 13(2) of the Prevention of Food Adulteration Act; the accused had been denied a valuable statutory right to have part of the sample sent to the Director of the Central Food Laboratory.
- The sample taken on 30.12.66 was alleged to be "completely rotten" and the Magistrate himself treated the application to send the sample as infructuous; this denied the accused an important right in their criminal defence and was not due to any fault or laches of the accused.
- There was alleged nonconformance with rules relating to the method of taking the sample under the Act (ancillary submission), and uncertainty in the Public Analyst's report as to whether the milk was cow's or buffalo's milk.
- Reliance was placed on the statutory entitlement under section 13(2) to obtain a certificate from the Director which, if obtained, would supersede the Public Analyst's report.
State's Arguments (Mr. Mukti Prasanna Mukherjee)
- Objections under provisions like section 13(2) were raised too late in the day and were more technical than real; the accused should have availed the right under section 13(2) at the proper stage.
- The learned Judicial Magistrate was correct in rejecting the application as infructuous because of the delay and the state suggested that the matter could be remitted to proceed further after giving the accused due opportunity under the statute.
Table of Precedents Cited
| Precedent | Rule or Principle Cited For | Application by the Court |
|---|---|---|
| Municipal Corporation of Delhi v. Ghisa Ram (AIR 1967 S.C. 970; 1975 F.A.C. 186) | When section 13(2) confers on a vendor the right to have the sample analysed by the Director of the Central Food Laboratory, prosecution proceedings should be conducted so that this right is not denied; the Director's certificate supersedes the Public Analyst's report. | The court expressly agreed with the Supreme Court's observation that the right under section 13(2) is a valuable one and should not be denied; this authority supported the conclusion that denial of the right because of belated prosecution prejudiced the accused. |
| Babulal Hargovindas v. State of Gujarat (1972 F.A.C. 18) | The defence that an accused was deprived of the right under section 13(2) due to delay in launching prosecution is not available when the accused has not filed an application under section 13(2) during trial and there is no evidence that no preservative was added to the sample. | The court distinguished the present facts: unlike the cited case, here an application under section 13(2) was in fact filed and rejected as infructuous; the court relied on the authority for the proposition that denial of the statutory right by reason of prosecutorial delay can materially prejudice the accused. |
| Nazir Ahmad v. The King Emperor (63 I.A. 372) | Where a power is given to do a certain thing in a certain way, it must be done in that way; other methods are necessarily forbidden (principle of strict compliance with prescribed procedure). | The court invoked this principle to hold that rejection of the accused's statutory application resulted in non-conformance with mandatory procedure and thereby rendered the proceedings bad and repugnant in that respect. |
| R.P. Kapoor v. State of Punjab (reported authority cited in opinion) | The High Court has inherent jurisdiction to quash criminal proceedings to prevent abuse of the process of any court or otherwise to secure the ends of justice; ordinarily the High Court is reluctant to interfere at an interlocutory stage, but may do so in proper cases. | The court relied on this authority to justify quashing the proceedings where continuation would amount to an abuse of process and result in denial of justice to the accused. |
Court's Reasoning and Analysis
The court concentrated on the accused's contention concerning non-conformance with section 13(2) of the Prevention of Food Adulteration Act, 1954, because that contention went "to the very root of the case." The pivotal analytical steps were:
- The court recited the statutory scheme: after institution of prosecution, the accused may, on payment of prescribed fee, apply under section 13(2) for sending the appropriate part of the sample to the Director of the Central Food Laboratory whose certificate would, by statute, supersede the Public Analyst's report.
- The court observed that the Public Analyst's report (Ext. 6) lacked clarity on essential particulars (for example, identification of the milk as cow's or buffalo's milk) and that the accused sought exercise of the section 13(2) right because the Analyst's report was unsatisfactory in a borderline case.
- The court examined the chronological facts: the sample was taken on 30.12.66 (with a later passage referring to 30.12.65), the Public Analyst completed his report by 12.1.67, but the prosecution was launched only on 26.3.68 — a delay of about 15 months. The court held that the prosecution itself was responsible for the delay that deprived the accused of the opportunity to exercise section 13(2) in time.
- The court compared the statutory position with the Drugs and Cosmetics Act, where the person from whom the sample is taken receives a copy of the analyst's report and has specific time-bound rights; by contrast, under the Prevention of Food Adulteration Act there is no pari materia provision giving the accused prior knowledge of the Public Analyst's report before prosecution is launched.
- Because the accused only became aware of the details of the Public Analyst's report after prosecution was launched and the Public Analyst was examined in court, the court held that the accused acted promptly in seeking recourse under section 13(2) upon learning of the report; any infructuousness of that option was caused by the delayed prosecution and not by the accused.
- The court applied precedents (Municipal Corporation of Delhi v. Ghisa Ram; Babulal Hargovindas v. State of Gujarat) to conclude that the right under section 13(2) is "valuable" and that depriving the accused of that right due to prosecutorial delay materially prejudiced their defence, amounting to a failure of justice.
- Invoking Nazir Ahmad, the court reasoned that statutory powers or rights that must be exercised in a prescribed manner cannot be bypassed; the Magistrate's rejection of the section 13(2) application resulted in material non-conformance with the statutory procedure.
- Considering R.P. Kapoor, the court accepted that while High Courts are generally reluctant to quash interlocutory criminal proceedings, they may exercise inherent jurisdiction to quash where continuance would constitute an abuse of process or where quashing secures the ends of justice. Applying that principle to the facts, the court found continuance without affording the accused the statutory right would be an abuse of process and a denial of justice.
- The State's suggestion that the case be sent back to proceed from the stage already reached was rejected by the court as not useful at such a belated stage, particularly given that the Magistrate had already characterised the application as infructuous because of the efflux of time.
Holding and Implications
Holding: The High Court made the Rule absolute and quashed the proceedings pending in the court below under section 16(1)(a)(ii) of the Prevention of Food Adulteration Act, 1954 (Miscellaneous Case No. 439 of 1968). The court ordered that the records be sent down as early as possible. A.N. Banerjee, J. agreed and the Rule was made absolute.
Implications:
- Direct effect on the parties: The pending criminal proceedings against the petitioners in the subordinate court were quashed, thereby terminating that prosecution at the interlocutory stage in this case.
- Reason for the quash: The court concluded that because of the prosecutorial delay the accused were denied the valuable statutory right under section 13(2) to have a part of the sample analysed by the Director of the Central Food Laboratory, producing a material prejudice to their defence and amounting to an abuse of the process of the court.
- Broader precedential effect: The opinion relies on existing Supreme Court and other authority to justify protection of the accused's statutory right and the use of inherent jurisdiction to prevent abuse of process. The opinion itself resolves the instant dispute on its facts; the text does not purport to state that it is announcing a new legal principle beyond applying established authorities.
N.C Talukdar, J.:— This Rule is at the instance of the two accused-petitioners. Ram Chandra Banerjee and Sarat Lal Jain, praying for quashing the Criminal Proceedings pending in the Court below under Section 16(i)(a)(ii) of the Prevention of Food Adulteration Act, 1954 or in the alternative for transferring the case to some other court a d/or for directing the Public Analyst to be recalled.
2. The facts leading on to the Rule can be put in a short compass. A prosecution was launched under section 16(1)(a)(ii) of the Prevention of Food Adulteration Act, 1954 by Dr. A.K Chatterjee, Divisional Medical Officer, Eastern Railway, Howrah, against the two accused persons stating that he collected a sample of milk from the stall of the accused on 30.12.66 after complying with the necessary formalities and the same when analysed was found to be adulterated. In the report of the Public Analyst dated 12.1.67, the milk was kept in the stall for the preparation of tea by the accused persons at the Bandal Railway Station. The co plaint was filed ultimately on 26.3.68 about 15 months after the date of the incident. The accused persons were placed on their trial before the learned Sub-divisional Judicial Magistrate, Hooghly, to answer a charge under section 16(1)(a)(ii) of Act XXXVII of 1954 The accused-pleaded not guilty. Two witnesses were examined on behalf of the prosecution on 11.11.68 and the Analyst's report was proved. A material application was filed on behalf of the accused persons before the learned Magistrate on 4.12.70 under section 13(2) of Act XXXVII of 1954 exercising the right of the accused to pray for sending the sample in question to the Director of Central Food Laboratory for a certificate. The learned trying Magistrate ultimately by his order dated 12.1.71 was pleased to reject the aforesaid application on the ground that it would be infructuous inasmuch as the sample was taken away back on 30.12.66 There after the Public Analyst was examined as a court witness. On 26.5.71 an application was filed by the accused-petitioner praying that the said court witness may be recalled to put some material question to him on the point of co-relation between fat and solids not fat percentage as observed in Richmond's Dairy Chemistry. The said application was also rejected by an order dated 1.9.71 by Shri D.N Mondal, Judicial Magistrate, 1st Class, Hooghly. The petitioners apprehended that they would not receive an impartial trial and prayed for transfer but the same was also ejected. The aforesaid orders were impugned and the present Rule was issued. Mr. Samarendra Kumar Dutta, Advocate, appearing on behalf of the accused-petitioners, did not press the other two grounds relating to transfer and the recall of the Public Analyst and he pin-pointed one material ground, viz. that a continuance of the proceedings in the court below would be an abuse of the process of the Code because of a non-conformance to the provisions of section 13(2) of the Prevention of Food Adulteration Act, 1954 In this context he further submitted that the sample taken as far back as on 30.12.66 was completely rotten and even the learned Judicial Magistrate himself found that it was infructuous to allow the prayer for sending the other part of the sample to the Director of Central Food Laboratory for the requisite certificate, but there is a clear non-consideration resulting in a failure of justice of the material fact that this had denied a valuable right to the accused in a criminal trial and through no fault of the accused. Mr. Dutta further contended that there is a nonconformance of the provisions of section 1C(1) inasmuch as the Food Inspector had no power to take sample of the article of food which was not meant for sale by the accused persons inasmuch as this was kept there for the purpose of preparing tea by the vendor. Mr. Mukti Prasanna Mukherjee, Advocate, appearing on behalf of the State, joined issue. Mr. Mukherjee contended that it is rather late in the day to raise objections under section 10(1) inasmuch as those are more technical than real. As to the main ground taken by Mr. Dutta, Mr. Mukherjee's reply shortly is that the accused should have availed of the right under section 13(2) at the proper stage and the learned Judicial Magistrate was right in rejecting the said application because at that point of time it was quite infructuous.
3. We will take up for consideration the first ground relating to a non-conformance to section 13(2) of the Prevention of Food Adulteration Act, 1954 as taken up by Mr. Dutta because it goes to the very root of the case. A reference is necessary to the provisions that after the institution of a prosecution under this Act the accused vendor or the complainant may, on payment of the prescribed fee, make an application to the court for sending the part of the sample mentioned in sub clause (1) or sub clause (iii) of clause (c) of sub-section (1) to section 11 to the Director of the Central Food Laboratory for a certificate. It has been laid down in sub-clause (3) to section 13 that the certificate issued by the Director of the Central Food Laboratory under sub-section (2) shall supersede the report given by the Public Analyst under sub-section (1). Mr. Dutta contended that the Public Analyst's report (Ext. 6) was wholly unsatisfactory and one looks in vain to the same to ascertain as to whether the sample was of cow's milk or of buffalo's milk Apart from that he made an ancillary, submission that the manner and the method of taking the sample has also been in contravention of the mandatory rules framed under the Prevention of Food Adulteration Act, 1954. In any event, Mr. Dutta urged, the accused persons were not satisfied with the Analyst's report in such a border line case and, therefore, wanted to exercise their rights enjoined under section 13(2) of Act XXXVII of 1954. The application having been rejected on the ground that the same was infructuous, has materially prejudiced the accused petitioners in establishing their case in a criminal trial and as such the same should not be;allowed to proceed. It is material to consider in this context that the Sanitary Inspector took the sample of the boiled milk from the accused persons on 30.12.65, and that the Public Analyst completed his Report by 12.1.67 Thereafter there was a delay of about 15 months when the sample was taken. The contention raised now on behalf of the State that because of the delay the learned Judicial Magistrate rightly jettisoned the prayer made on behalf of the accused persons. We have given our anxious consideration to the facts of the present case and we hold that the boot is on the other leg. If there has been a delay the prosecution has to thank itself for the same. An accused in a trial under the Prevention of Food Adulteration Act has no access to the report given by the Public Analyst and in this case it was only after the prosecution was launched after 15 months and the Public Analyst was examined in court that the accused could come to know about the details of the report and the purported non conformance. As soon as the accused persons came to know about the same, they exercised their option under section 11(2). If such an option had become infructuous, that is not due to the laches of the accused-persons as the learned Judicial Magistrate appears to be of the view but due to the belated prosecution launched. The position under the Prevention of Food Adulteration Act is quite different from that obtaining under the Drugs and-Cosmetics Act, 1940 wherein there is a material provision in section 25 of the Act relating to the reports of Government Analyst. Under sub-section (1) to section 25 of the Drugs and Cosmetics Act, 1940, the Government Analyst to whom the sample of the drug has been submitted for test delivers to the Inspector with a signed report in ???plicate in prescribed form and under subsection (2) the Inspector on receipt thereof is to deliver one copy of the report to the person from whom the sample was taken. Sub-section (3) provides that any document purporting to be a report signed by a Government Analyst under this Chapter shall be evidence of the facts slated therein, and such evidence shall be conclusive unless the person from whom the sample was taken has within 28 days of the receipt of a copy of the report, notified in writing the Inspector or the Court before which any proceedings in respect of the sample are pending that he intends to adduce evidence in controversion of the report. As we have already observed, there is no provision pari material under Act XXXVII of 1954. Therefore, there is no opportunity for the accused to have any knowledge before the prosecution and the disclosure of the Public Analyst's report. The date of the prosecution makes it abundantly clear that it is a very much belated, one and if the prayer for a further examination by the Director of Central Food Laboratory had become infructuous it is due to this delay and the accused in a criminal trial should not be saddled with the responsibility therefor.
4. We may now refer to the imprimature of Judicial decisions on the point. In the case of Municipal Corporation Of Delhi v. Ghisa Ram, reported in AIR 1967 S.C 970 : 1975 F.A.C 186, Bhargava, J., delivering the judgment of the Court, observed that when a valuable right is conferred by section 13(2) of the Act on the vendor to have the sample given to him analysed by the Director of the Central Food Laboratory, it is to be expected that the prosecution will proceed in such a manner that the right will not be denied to him. It was further observed by the Supreme Court that the said right is a valuable one, because the certificate of the Director supersedes the report of the Public Analyst. We respectfully agree with the principles laid down therein. A reference again may be made to the Babulal Hargovindas v. State of Gujarat reported in 1972 F.A.C 18. P. Jaganmohan, J. delivering the judgment of the Court, laid down that the defence that the accused has been deprived of his right under section 13(2) to send the sample in his custody to the Director, Central Food Laboratory due to delay in launching the prosecution is not open when the accused has not filed an application under section 13(2) during the trial and there is no evidence to show that no preservative was added to the sample. In the instant proceeding such an application was in fact made and rejected on the ground that the same was infructuous. We respectfully agree with the observations made by the Supreme Court in the aforesaid cases and hold that a valuable right has been denied to the accused in a criminal trial, inasmuch as, because of the inordinate delay made by the prosecution it was not possible for the accused to avail of the provision enjoined under section 13(2) of Act XXXVII of 1954, thereby prejudicing them materially in their defence. The failure to take the same into consideration on the part of the learned Judicial Magistrate has resulted in a failure of justice.
5. The point at issue may be approached from another standpoint viz, that the rejection of the application made on behalf of the accused under section 13(2) of Act XXXVII has ultimately resulted in a material non conformance to the procedure established by law. As was observed by Lord Roche in the well-known case of Nazir Ahmad v. The King Emperor, reported in 63 I.A 372 at pages 381-82 that “where a power is given to do a certain thing in a certain way, the thing must be done in that way or not at all. Other methods of performance are necessarily forbidden.” The order of rejection passed by the learned Judicial Magistrate ultimately resulted in a non-conformance to the material provisions of law enuring to the benefit of the accused in a criminal trial and approached from this standpoint also the order of rejection has been bad and repugnant and in any event the proceedings should not be allowed to continue denying such a valuable right to the accused under the Act. The first contention of Mr. Dutta accordingly succeeds.
6. In view of our findings on the said point, we need not enter into the other points. Mr. Mukherjee, appearing on behalf of the State, had submitted that the matter may be sent back for proceeding further from the stage reached, after giving due opportunity to the accused as enjoined under the provisions of the Statute. It will be an ill wind that blows nobody any good and at this belated stage that will not serve any useful purpose, more so, when the learned Judicial Magistrate has himself found the prayer as infructuous because of the efflux of time.
7. It should not also be overlooked that in the absence of any opportunity enjoined under section 13(2) of Act 37 of 1954, the resultant proceedings would be an abuse of the process of the court.
8. As to Mr. Mukherjee's other submission that quashing at an interlocutory stage in an extraordinary procedure and should, therefore, be reluctantly resorted to, Mr. Mukherjee is certainly right on principle but each case must depend on its own facts. We have given our anxious consideration to the facts of the present case and we hold that a continuance of the present proceedings in the present shape without affording to the accused the valuable rights enjoined under the Act would be merely an abuse of the process of the court. A reference in this context may be made to the case of R.P Kapoor v. State of Punjab, Mr. Justice Gajendragadkar (as His Lordship then was) delivering the judgment of the court observed at page 869 that “It is well established that the inherent jurisdiction of the High Court can be exercised to quash proceedings in a proper case either to prevent the abuse of the process of any court or otherwise to secure the ends of justice.” The Supreme Court had undoubtedly observed therein that “Ordinarily criminal proceedings instituted against an accused person must be tried under the provisions of the Code and the High Court would be reluctant to interfere with the said proceedings at an interlocutory stage”. The Supreme Court, however, has ultimately observed that “There may be cases where it may be possible for the High Court to take the view that the institution or continuance of criminal proceedings against the accused may amount to the abuse of the process of the court or that the quashing of the impugned proceedings would secure the ends of justice”. We respectfully agree with the aforesaid observations and we hold, in the facts and circumstances, that a continuance of the proceedings in the court below would amount to an abuse of the process of the court. A failure to do the same would result in a denial of justice. Looked at from this point also the present proceedings pending in the court below under section 16(1)(a)(ii) of the Prevention of Food Adulteration Act should be quashed.
9. In the result, we make the Rule absolute; and we quash the proceedings pending in the court below under section 16(1)(a)(ii) of the Prevention of Food Adulteration Act, 1954 being Miscellaneous Case No. 439 of 1968. Let the records go down as early as possible.
A.N Banerjee, J.:— I agree.
10. Rule made absolute
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