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Kamal Prasanna Roy And Another v. Maurice Hyam

Calcutta High Court
Jul 14, 1972
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Summary of the Opinion (Sankar Prasad Mitra, J.)

Factual and Procedural Background

This rule challenges Order No. 12 dated 15 December 1970 made by the District Judge, Darjeeling, in Miscellaneous Appeal No. 27 of 1970. The District Judge was hearing an appeal from an order made on 1 July 1970 by an Authority constituted under the Payment of Wages Act, 1936. The principal question raised in the rule was whether the Authority has jurisdiction under Section 15(2) of the Payment of Wages Act to decide the question of the relationship between employer and employee.

On the facts, the applicant (identified in the record as Maurice Hyam) had filed a claim alleging he was employed by Mahalderam Tea Estate (Private) Ltd. The opposite parties contended that the applicant's service ended on 7 October 1968 when the Mahalderam Tea Estate (the garden) was sold and possession delivered to the purchaser; they also stated that the applicant was paid salary up to 31 January 1969 because he had to attend to conveyancing matters. Relevant documentary material included an appointment letter dated 21 April 1966 (appointing the applicant as "general supervisor" of two tea estates) and an office order dated 13 February 1967 (redesignating him as "labour officer" of the company and stating he would remain at the gardens for at least fifteen days in every month). The Authority examined these documents and correspondence (letters dated March–May 1969) and held that the applicant continued to be an employee of the company after the sale of the garden.

The Authority's decision was impugned in appeal before the District Judge and thereafter in the present rule proceedings.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the Authority constituted under Section 15 of the Payment of Wages Act, 1936 (particularly under S.15(2)), has jurisdiction to decide the question of the relationship of employer and employee (i.e., whether determining employer–employee relationship falls within matters incidental to claims under S.15).
  2. Whether the provisions of Section 25-FF of the Industrial Disputes Act apply to the facts of this case and, if so, whether that would oust the Authority's jurisdiction under the Payment of Wages Act because the matter involves complicated questions of law or prolonged enquiry.

Arguments of the Parties

Petitioners (as advanced by Sri Dutt)

  • Argued that Maurice Hyam's appointment letter of 21 April 1966 made him general supervisor for the two estates and that, upon transfer of Mahalderam Tea Estate, his services stood transferred to the purchaser.
  • Contended that, even after redesignation, he remained a labour officer of the two tea estates and was not expected to discharge duties in relation to other affairs of the company (i.e., his duties were confined to the gardens, so sale of the garden terminated employment with the company as regards that estate).

Opposite Parties

  • Asserted that applicant's employment ended with effect from 7 October 1968 when the Mahalderam Tea Estate was sold and possession delivered to the purchaser.
  • Stated that applicant was nonetheless paid salary up to 31 January 1969 because he had to attend to conveyancing-related matters.
  • After arguments, filed a petition asserting that the company had orally and in writing terminated the applicant's services; the Authority rejected this as an afterthought.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Ambica Mills Company, Ltd. v. S.B. Bhatt, A.I.R. 1961 S.C. 970 (1961-I L.L.J. 1) Authority under S.15 can entertain only claims arising out of deductions from wages or delay in payment of wages; jurisdiction is exclusive to those categories. The Authority may determine terms of contract and incidental questions, but its limited jurisdiction must not be unreasonably extended or curtailed. The court relied on this decision to underline that the Authority's jurisdiction is limited to wage-deduction or payment-delay claims and their incidental matters; it observed that the amendment introducing the phrase "including all matters incidental to such claims" did not change the legal position established by this precedent.
Payment of Wages Inspector, Ujjain v. Surajmal Mehta, A.I.R. 1969 S.C. 590 (1969-I L.L.J. 762) The Authority under the Payment of Wages Act cannot adjudicate claims under S.25-FF of the Industrial Disputes Act when the defence raises complicated questions of law. The court cited this authority to support the proposition that if a dispute involves complicated questions of law or prolonged enquiry (for example, issues under S.25-FF), the Authority should refuse to exercise jurisdiction under S.15.
Town Municipal Council, Athani v. Labour Court, Hubli, (1969) 1 SCC 873; A.I.R. 1969 S.C. 1335 (1969-II L.L.J. 651) Where there is no dispute as to rates of wages and the only question is whether a particular payment at the agreed rate is due (e.g., minimum wages, overtime), S.15 of the Payment of Wages Act is the appropriate remedy; if S.15 is inadequate, remedies exist under S.33-C of the Industrial Disputes Act or by raising an industrial dispute. The court employed this precedent to delineate the appropriate forum for simple wage disputes and to explain that more complex disputes should be pursued under industrial dispute procedures rather than by S.15 proceedings.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The court began by setting out the text of Section 15 of the Payment of Wages Act, 1936, noting the amendment (Act 53 of 1964) that added the phrase "including all matters incidental to such claims." It reviewed Supreme Court authority (Ambica Mills) explaining that S.15 confers a limited and exclusive jurisdiction to the Authority to decide claims arising out of wage deductions or delays and matters incidental thereto, while cautioning against unreasonable extension or curtailment of that incidental jurisdiction.

Applying these legal principles, the court observed that where a question involves prolonged enquiry or complicated questions of law and fact (for example, claims under Section 25-FF of the Industrial Disputes Act implicating transfer of undertakings), the Authority under the Payment of Wages Act should decline jurisdiction (a view supported by subsequent decisions such as Payment of Wages Inspector, Ujjain v. Surajmal Mehta).

Turning to the facts, the court examined the applicant's appointment letter dated 21 April 1966 and the office order of 13 February 1967. The appointment letter named him general supervisor of two estates; the later office order redesignated him as "labour officer" of the company and specified he would remain at the gardens at least fifteen days each month, but said nothing about duties for the remainder of each month. The Authority also considered correspondence from 1969 showing the applicant acted on the company's behalf in various matters (certificate cases, commercial tax, provident fund and criminal cases).

On this documentary basis the Authority concluded that:

  • The company continued to exist despite sale of the Mahalderam Tea Estate;
  • Maurice Hyam was an employee of the company (not of the garden) and therefore his employment did not automatically terminate upon sale of the garden;
  • One month's notice as stipulated in the appointment letter was not served;
  • Correspondence to as late as May 1969 treated Hyam as employed by the company.

The court found that no complicated questions of law or fact were raised that would require a prolonged enquiry; the Authority's task was essentially to construe the documents and correspondence and determine whether the applicant remained in the company's employ. The court rejected the petitioners' argument that the office order confined Hyam's duties exclusively to the gardens, noting that the office order designated him a company "labour officer" and was silent about duties outside the specified fifteen days in the gardens — thus supporting the Authority's inference that he had wider company duties.

Although the appellate authority had examined whether Section 25-FF of the Industrial Disputes Act applied, the court observed there was no scope on the facts to invoke S.25-FF; consequently the court did not address in detail the appellate authority's findings on S.25-FF. The court therefore concluded that the Authority properly exercised its jurisdiction under S.15 to decide the employer–employee relationship on the documentary record before it.

Holding and Implications

Holding: The court RULE DISCHARGED — it dismissed the challenge to the Authority's order and upheld the Authority's and appellate findings that the applicant continued to be employed by the company.

Immediate consequences and directions given in the order:

  • The opposite parties were awarded costs of the rule; the hearing fee was assessed at two gold mohurs.
  • The petitioners were directed to deposit Rs. 4,225 with the Authority under the Payment of Wages Act within one month from the date of the judgment (or to deposit the balance if a portion had already been deposited).
  • The operation of the order in the rule was stayed for three weeks from the date of the judgment.
  • The short opinion records that A.K. Janah, J. agreed with the judgment.

Broader implications: The opinion reaffirmed the settled principle (as stated in the cited Supreme Court authorities) that the Authority under Section 15 has limited jurisdiction to decide wage-related claims and their incidental matters but should decline jurisdiction where a dispute involves prolonged enquiry or complicated questions of law (for example, legal questions under Section 25-FF). The opinion does not state that it purports to lay down a new precedent beyond applying those established principles to the facts of this case.

Show all summary ...

Sankar Prasad Mitra, J.:— In this rule Order No. 12, dated 15 December, 1970, made by the District Judge, Darjeeling, in Miscellaneous Appeal No. 27 of 1970, has been challenged. The District Judge was hearing an appeal from an order made on 1 July, 1970, by the Authority under the Payment of Wages Act, 1936. The point that has arisen in this rule is whether the said authority has jurisdiction to decide the question of relationship of employer and employee under S. 15(2) of the said Act. We would, therefore, at the outset set out the relevant portions of S. 15 of the Payment of Wages Act, 1936. These are as follows:

“15. Claims out of deductions from wages or delay in payment of wages and penalty for malicious or vexatious claims— (1) The State Government may by notification in the official gazette appoint a Presiding Officer of any Labour Court or Industrial Tribunal, constituted under the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, or under any corresponding law relating to the investigation and settlement of industrial disputes in force in the State or any Commissioner for Workmen's Compensation or other officer with experience as a Judge of a civil Court or as a stipendiary Magistrate to be the authority to hear and decide for any specified area all claims arising out of deductions from the wages, or delay in payment of wages of persons employed or paid in that area, including all matters incidental to such claims …

(2) Where contrary to the provisions of this Act any deduction has been made from the wages of an employed person, or any payment of wages has been delayed, such person himself, or any legal practitioner or any official of a registered trade union authorized in writing to act on his behalf, or any Inspector under this Act, or any other persons acting with the permission of the Authority appointed under Sub-sec. (1) may apply to such Authority for a direction under Sub-sec. (2) …”

2. The expression

“including all matters incidental to such claims”

was introduced into S. 15(1) by an amendment Act being Act 53 of 1964. Before, however, this expression came into the statute book the Supreme Court in Ambica Mills Company, Ltd. v. S.B Bhatt [A.I.R 1961 S.C 970 : 1961-I L.L.J 1] made certain observations with respect to the jurisdiction of the Authority under S. 15 of the Payment of Wages Act. The Supreme Court has said that the only claims which can be entertained by the Authority under S. 15 are claims arising out of deduction or delay made in payment of wages. The jurisdiction thus conferred on the authority to deal with these two categories of claims is exclusive. In dealing with claims arising out of deductions or delay made in payment of wages the authority inevitably would have to consider questions incidental to the said matters. In determining the scope of these incidental questions their lordships of the Supreme Court pointed out care must be taken to see that under the guise of deciding incidental matters the limited jurisdiction is not unreasonably or unduly extended. Care must also be taken to see that the scope of these incidental questions is not unduly limited so as to affect or impair the limited jurisdiction conferred on the authority. It would be inexpedient to lay down any hard and fast or general rule which would afford a determining test to demarcate the field of incidental facts which can be legitimately considered by the authority and those which cannot be so considered. The Authority under S. 15, says the Supreme Court, has jurisdiction to determine what the terms of the contract between the parties are, and if the terms of the contract are admitted and the only dispute is whether or not a particular employee falls within one category or another, that would be incidental to the decision of the main question as to what the terms of the contract are. Whether the terms of a contract are admitted and the only point in dispute is which of the two subsisting contracts applies to the particular employee in question the authority has jurisdiction to decide the same. This judgment of the Supreme Court laid down, therefore, that the Authority under S. 15 has jurisdiction to determine all matters incidental to deductions from wages or delay in payment of wages. In other words, the amendment introduced by Act 53 of 1964 did not alter the legal position so far as the extent of the authority's jurisdiction was concerned. One has, however, to be conscious that this jurisdiction is a limited one and should not either be unreasonably extended or unreasonably curtailed. After the amendment, however, the Supreme Court had to deal with this question of jurisdiction in other cases that came up before it. For instance in Payment of Wages Inspector, Ujjain v. Surajmal Mehta, Director, Barnagar Electric Supply and Indus-trial Company, Ltd. [A.I.R 1969 S.C 590 : 1969-I L.L.J 762], the Supreme Court had to consider whether the Authority under the Payment of Wages Act could adjudicate upon claims under S. 25-FF of the Industrial Disputes Act. This section runs thus:

“Whether the ownership or management of undertaking is transferred, whether by agreement or by operation of law from the employer in relation to that undertaking to a new employer, every workman who has been in continuous service for not less than one year in that undertaking immediately before such transfer shall be entitled to notice and compensation in accordance with the provisions of S. 25-F as if the workman had been retrenched:

Provided that nothing in this section shall apply to a workman in any case where there has been a change of employers by reason of the transfer, if—

(a) the service of the workman has not been interrupted by such transfer;

(b) the terms and conditions of service applicable to the workman after such transfer are not in any way less favourable to the workman than those applicable to him immediately before the transfer; and

(c) the new employer is, under the terms of such transfer or otherwise, legally liable to pay to the workman in the event of his retrenchment, compensation on the basis that his service has been continuous and has not been interrupted by the transfer.”

3. The Supreme Court is of the view that the Authority under the Payment of Wages Act in an application under S. 15(2) cannot entertain a claim for compensation under S. 25-FF of the Industrial Disputes Act, when the defence raised involves complicated questions of law. In Town Municipal Council, Athani v. Labour Court, Hubli [(1969) 1 SCC 873 : A.I.R 1969 S.C 1335 : 1969-II L.L.J 651] it has been stated that in cases where there is no dispute as to rates of wages, and the only question is whether a particular payment at the agreed rate in respect of minimum wages, overtime or work on off days is due to a workman or not, the appropriate remedy is provided in S. 15 of the Payment of Wages Act. In cases where S. 15 of the Payment of Wages Act may not provide adequate remedy, the remedy can be sought either under S. 33-C of the Industrial Disputes Act or by raising an industrial dispute under the Act and having it decided under the various provisions of that Act.

4. Upon going through the views expressed by their lordships of the Supreme Court it seems to us that the legal position is that the Authority under the Payment of Wages Act has a limited jurisdiction in deciding claims arising out of deductions from wages or delay in payment of wages and penalty for malicious or vexatious claims. This jurisdiction extends to all matters incidental to such claim. As to what are incidental matters no hard and fast rule can be laid down. But the limited jurisdiction of the authority should not be unreasonably extended under the garb of deciding incidental matters in other words, if a question involves a prolonged enquiry or enquiry into complicated questions of law and fact the Authority under the Payment of Wages Act would refuse to exercise his jurisdiction. Keeping these propositions in mind we have to examine the facts of the instant case. The applicant before the authority has alleged that he is “a person employed in the industrial establishment entitled Mahalderam Tea Estate (Private), Ltd.”, vide Para. 1 of the claim petition. In Para. 3 of the written statement of the opposite parties it was stated that although the applicant was an employee as alleged his service ended with effect from 7 October, 1968 on which date, the garden (that is the Mahalderam Tea Estate) was sold away and delivery of possession was given to the purchaser thereof and finally the conveyance after obtaining sanction of the Deputy Commissioner was registered in or about the month of January 1969. That although his services were terminated along with the delivery of possession of the tea estate as aforesaid, as the matters for completion of conveyance was still to be attended by him, he was paid salary in full up to 31 January, 1969.

5. On these pleadings the dispute between the parties appears to be that the applicant was claiming to be an employee of the private limited company. The opposite parties were contending that the applicant's employment came to an end when the garden was sold away and possession delivered to the purchaser. It was also alleged by the opposite parties that although the garden was transferred on 7 October, 1968, the applicant was paid his salary up to 31 January, 1969 as the applicant had to attend to matters relating to completion of the conveyance.

6. We have to see, on the facts of this case, whether the dispute set out above involves any enquiry into complicated questions of law or fact. To answer this problem it is necessary to examine the terms of the applicant's employment. It appears that a letter of appointment was addressed to him on 21 April, 1966 by the managing director of the private limited company. The material portion of this letter runs thus:

“We are pleased to appoint you as general supervisor for Mahalderam Tea Estate and Mullctar Tea Estate, both gardens on the following terms and conditions:

(1) That your appointment is with effect from 1 April, 1966.

(2) That your salary shall be at Rs. 300 (rupees three hundred only) per month,

(3) That you will be entitled to such amenities as are admissible under the rules in force of the tea estate.

(4) That this appointment is subject to termination on one month's notice from either side.

This letter says that the applicant was appointed as “general supervisor” for the two tea estates mentioned therein. But on 13 February, 1967, the managing director of the private limited company passed an “office-order.” The office-order was as follows:

“Hereafter Maurice Hyam, general supervisor, will be redesignated as “labour officer” of the company and he will remain at least fifteen days in every month in the gardens to attend to all sorts of labour issues, tackle labourers in order to improve cultivation, raise production and quality and effect better labour relation.”

7. The Authority under the Payment of Wages Act has examined these two documents and has also read a few letters produced before him. These letters are, dated 14 and 22 March 12 and 26 April and 19 May, 1969, signed by one A.K Chakraborti for Director, Mahalderam Tea Estate (Private), Ltd. The authority upon reading these letters comes to the conclusion that during the period of the correspondence the applicant was being treated as an employee of the company and he dealt with certificate cases, commercial tax cases, provident fund cases and criminal cases on behalf of the company.

8. The authority ultimately holds as follows:

(i) That the Mahalderam Tea Estate (Private), Ltd., only sold the Mahalderam Tea Estate, and the company, which was the employer, did not cease to exist.

(ii) Maurice Hyam was an employee of the company and not of the garden which was sold and therefore sale of the garden could not mean automatic termination of his service,

(iii) One month's notice as required by the appointment letter was not served either orally or in writing.

(iv) Correspondence was carried on with Maurice Hyam till as late as May 1969 as if Hyam was still an employee of the company,

The authority then says that

“the conclusion is inescapable that the petitioner continues to be in the employ of the company and the plea of the opposite parties that he is no longer in their employ is without any basis.”

9. Incidentally, after the arguments were closed the opposite parties filed a petition stating that the company orally intimated to the applicant that his services had been terminated and he was also informed about this in writing. This plea the authority has rejected on the ground that it was an afterthought.

10. Going through the judgment of the authority it does not appear to us that any complicated questions as to the relationship of employer and employee were raised before him. The authority had to construe only a few documents for his conclusion, that the applicant was an employee of the company and continued to be an employee even after the sale of the tea garden.

11. The matter then came up before the District Judge at Darjeeling. Before the District Judge arguments were advanced on whether the employee in this instant case was governed by the provisions of S. 25-FF of the Industrial Disputes Act. The appellate authority, it appears, has gone into this question and has come to its findings. In our opinion on the facts of this case there is no scope for invoking the provisions of S. 25-FF. We need not, therefore, deal either with the findings of the appellate authority on S. 25-FF or with the reasons therefore.

12. Sri Dutt for the petitioners has argued before us that Maurice Hyam by the letter of 21 April, 1966, was appointed general supervisor for Mahalderam Tea Estate and Mullotar Tea Estate. Sri Dutt says that the undertaking known as Mahalderam Tea Estate has been transferred and the lease in respect of Mullotar Tea Estate has expired. The only conclusion, therefore, is upon the transfer of the Mahalderam Tea Estate, the services of Maurice Hyam also stood transferred to the purchaser. This argument of Sri Dutt does not appear to us to be sustainable. It is true that by the letter of 21 April, 1966, Maurice Hyam was appointed as general supervisor of the two estates (tea) but subsequently by the document of 13 February, 1967 his designation as general supervisor of the two tea estates was altered and he was redesignated as “labour officer” of the company. Sri Dutt submits that he was labour officer of the two tea estates and was not expected to discharge any duty in relation to any other affairs of the company. From the terms of document of 13 February, 1967 we cannot arrive at this conclusion. In this document Maurice Hyam is redesignated as “labour officer” of the company. This document provides further that he will remain at the tea gardens only for fifteen days in the month. Regarding his duties for the rest of the month the document is silent. But since he is a labour officer of the company it is to be presumed that he had to undertake other duties in connexion with the company's business. On the basis of the document, dated 13 February, 1967, therefore, we cannot hold that Maurice Hyam was labour officer exclusively of the tea gardens. From this point of view it seems to us that both the Authority under the Payment of Wages Act and the appellate authority have come to the correct conclusion, namely, that Maurice Hyam continued to be in the service of the company even after the transfer of the Mahalderam Tea Estate, and his services in the company were not terminated by one month's notice as stipulated in the letter of 21 April, 1966.

13. If we were of opinion that prima facie the provisions of S. 25-FF of the Industrial Disputes Act applied to the facts and circumstances of this case we might have been inclined to hold that the disputes raised involved prolonged enquiry and, as such, the Authority under the Payment of Wages Act, had no jurisdiction so entertain the matter. But on the documents produced before us, as we have already stated, we do not think that the provisions of S. 25-FF of the Industrial Disputes Act can be invoked in aid of the petitioners in the instant case.

14. In the result we discharge the rule. The opposite parties are entitled to the costs of this rule, hearing fee being assessed at two gold mohurs.

15. The petitioners are directed to deposit a sum of Rs. 4,225 with the Authority under the Payment of Wages Act within one month from date if the said sum has not already been deposited. If a portion of the said sum has already been deposited the balance thereof is to be deposited within a month from date.

16. Let the operation of this order in his rule be stayed for three weeks from this date.

17. A.K Janah, J.:— I agree.