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Sarju Sharan v. The State Of Bihar & Ors.
Structured Summary of the Opinion (S.B. Sinha, J.)
Factual and Procedural Background
The petitioner (a member of Bihar Engineering Service) sued under Article 226 challenging an order dated 1.11.1975 (Annexure 1) and sought directions for payment of arrears of salary for the periods 30 March 1963 to 22 October 1964 and 17 July 1967 to 21 January 1971. The material facts, as recorded in the opinion, are as follows:
- The petitioner was admittedly senior to certain officers (including Satya Narain Prasad and Hira Lal Tiwari).
- On 30 March 1963, Satya Narain Prasad and another were promoted to Executive Engineer (Class I), while the petitioner was not promoted then. The petitioner subsequently made representations claiming promotion on the ground of seniority.
- The petitioner was posted as Incharge of a Division (a function normally performed by Class I officers) and held additional charge from 5 June 1964 while continuing his substantive duties as P.A. to the Superintending Engineer (a Class II post).
- The petitioner received a regular promotion in Class I effective 23 October 1964.
- By a notification dated 31 July 1967, the period of the petitioner's promotion in Class I was extended only up to 16 June 1967, but he was allowed to continue as Incharge of the Division up to 30 March 1968.
- The petitioner was posted as Assistant Engineer of Ganga Bridge Project, Patna on 30 March 1968 (joined 11 April 1968) and was allowed to hold charge of a Division during various periods between 5 June 1964 and 21 January 1971, sometimes as Assistant Engineer in charge.
- A combined seniority list published by notification dated 17 February 1969 was challenged in C.W.J.C No. 290 of 1969; this Court struck down that combined list and directed respondents to prepare a fresh seniority list. An appeal by respondents to the Supreme Court was dismissed.
- Following the Supreme Court's pronouncement, the State issued a seniority list (Annexure 7) and by notification dated 26 July 1972 (Annexure 8) promoted the petitioner with retrospective effect from 21 January 1971; in that list the petitioner occupied serial no. 71.
- The petitioner and similarly situated officers made representations seeking fixation of pay and arrears treating their promotion as effective from 30 March 1963. The State, by the impugned order dated 1 September 1975 (referred to as impugned order in the judgment), directed the Accountant General to fix the petitioner's pay as if promoted with effect from 30 March 1963 but directed that no arrears of salary would be paid.
- The impugned order dated 1 November 1975 (contained in Annexure 1) thus granted pay fixation prospectively or with retrospective effect to a point but withheld arrears; the writ petition challenging the denial of arrears was filed on 30 January 1981 and admitted on 5 March 1981.
Legal Issues Presented
- Whether the petitioner is entitled to arrears of salary from the dates he claimed (30 March 1963 and other specified periods) on the basis that he was senior to officers promoted earlier.
- Whether the petitioner's unexplained delay and alleged laches in challenging earlier seniority lists and in prosecuting his claim disentitle him to relief in writ jurisdiction.
- Whether the impugned order of the State (which fixed the petitioner's pay as if promoted from 30 March 1963 but denied arrears) supplies adequate relief, and whether the High Court should exercise its discretionary jurisdiction under Articles 226 and 227 to grant further monetary relief.
Arguments of the Parties
Petitioner's Arguments
- Counsel for the petitioner (Mr. N.K. Prasad) argued that the petitioner was senior to the officers who were promoted on 30 March 1963 and that the petitioner could not be made to suffer for mistakes by the respondents.
- It was contended that, because the State later corrected the record and promoted the petitioner with retrospective effect, the petitioner is entitled in law to be paid salary from the earlier date (30 March 1963) and could not be denied arrears arising from that date.
- Counsel relied on decisions including Alappat Narayana Menon v. State of Kerala (1977) and Shri Charan Das Chadba v. The State of Punjab (1980) to support the claim for arrears arising from an earlier rightful date of promotion.
The opinion does not set out detailed adversarial submissions made on behalf of the State; the State's position appears through the orders and notifications it issued (notably the impugned order which fixed pay but denied arrears). The judgment does not record separate, detailed legal arguments advanced by the respondents in opposition.
Table of Precedents Cited
| Precedent | Rule or Principle Cited For | Application by the Court |
|---|---|---|
| Alappat Narayana Menon v. State of Kerala (Kerala High Court, reported 1977 Vol 2, Services Law Reporter page 626) | Authority relied upon by petitioner's counsel for the proposition that an employee promoted retrospectively may be entitled to consequential benefits (as argued by counsel). | The court noted the decision was relied upon by petitioner but stated that, in view of the order it proposed to pass, it was not necessary to examine that decision in depth. |
| Shri Charan Das Chadba v. The State of Punjab (Punjab & Haryana High Court, reported 1980 Vol 3, Services Law Reporter page 702) | Authority relied upon by petitioner's counsel to support entitlement to retrospective monetary relief on correction of promotion/seniority anomalies. | The court observed the decision was relied upon but did not examine it in depth because of the dispositional approach adopted in this case. |
| Haryana State Electricity Board v. State of Punjab, (1974) 3 SCC 91 | Establishes that delay/laches are not always fatal where discrimination is shown and representations were made and departmental remedies exhausted; court may grant relief despite delay in such circumstances. | The court distinguished that principle: it acknowledged the precedent but found the facts of the present case did not establish similar continuing representations or denial that would require relief despite delay. The court used the case to canvass the proposition that delay is not automatically fatal. |
| Arun Kumar Chaterjee v. Eastern Railway, (1985) 2 SCC 451 | Holds that where administrative error delayed promotion, employees should be granted correct seniority and proforma pay fixation as if promoted at the proper time (illustrating entitlement to retrospective monetary relief in appropriate cases based on Board/Circulars). | The court summarized the principle from this decision (regarding administrative error and proforma pay fixation) and noted that the impugned order similarly fixed pay as if promoted from 30 March 1963 but denied arrears; the Court nonetheless proceeded to deny further relief because of delay and laches in the present case. |
| K.V. Rajalakshmi Setty v. State of Mysore, A.I.R. 1967 S.C. 993 | Illustrates that a writ petition may be dismissed on the ground of delay alone where delay/laches are satisfactorily shown. | The court relied on this authority to support the proposition that unexplained delay (laches) can justify refusing relief in writ jurisdiction; it quoted the decision and applied the principle to find the petitioner guilty of latches. |
| State of M.P. v. Nandlal Jaiswal, (1986) 4 SCC 566 : A.I.R. 1987 SC 251 | Affirms that the High Court's power under Article 226 is discretionary and that courts ordinarily do not assist the tardy, indolent or acquiescent; if delay is inordinate and unexplained the court may decline relief. | The court cited this decision for the well-settled discretionary principle and applied it to the facts, concluding that because of inordinate and unexplained delay the writ jurisdiction should not be exercised in favour of the petitioner. |
| Dr. (Mrs.) Rohatgj v. The State of Bihar (1986 P.L.J.R. 1160) | Decision of the same High Court taking into consideration various Supreme Court authorities and endorsing dismissal of writ petitions where the petitioner approaches after long and unexplained delay. | The court referred to this recent High Court authority as consistent with the line of Supreme Court precedents and used it to reinforce the conclusion that writ petitions should be dismissed if the petitioner approaches the High Court after long and unexplained delay. |
Court's Reasoning and Analysis
The court's reasoning proceeds in a sequence of factual recap and application of discretionary principles concerning delay (laches):
- Factual examination: The court set out the chronology — the juniors were promoted on 30 March 1963; the petitioner claims seniority and performed duties of higher posts at various times; he received some promotions subsequently and was ultimately placed at serial no. 71 in the combined list prepared after litigation and notifications culminating in 26 July 1972 and a promotion retrospective to 21 January 1971.
- State's corrective action: The State, by the impugned order (1 November 1975 / or 1 September 1975 as recorded in the petition), accepted there was an error and directed the Accountant General to fix the petitioner's pay treating his promotion as with effect from 30 March 1963, but refused to direct payment of arrears of salary.
- Delay and laches: The court emphasised that the petitioner did not challenge the earlier seniority list and did not take timely steps to assert his rights. Although the impugned order was passed in 1975, the writ petition was filed in 1981 — a significant lapse. The petitioner also failed to provide detailed explanations for the delay and annexed only one late representation dated 1 October 1980; there was an earlier pay-slip issued by the Accountant General in October 1978.
- Precedent application: The court considered precedents relied upon by the petitioner as well as authorities emphasising the discretionary nature of Article 226 relief where delay is involved. It acknowledged authorities (Haryana State Electricity Board and Arun Kumar Chaterjee) which show delay is not always fatal where discrimination is proved and representations were pursued; however, the court found the facts in the present case distinguishable.
- Substantial relief already given: The court observed that the State had corrected its mistake to a considerable extent — fixing pay as if promoted from the earlier date and thereby removing the pay-scale discrimination with juniors. The petitioner had thus obtained substantial relief from the State's order.
- Exercise of discretion: Balancing the fact that substantial relief had been granted against the petitioner's unexplained, inordinate delay and acquiescence, the court concluded it should not exercise its discretionary writ jurisdiction to grant further monetary relief (arrears) under Articles 226 and 227.
- Conclusion drawn from combined analysis: For these reasons — the petitioner’s lack of prompt action, the State’s corrective order, and the discretionary bar on granting relief where there is gross laches — the court declined to grant the additional monetary relief sought (arrears).
Holding and Implications
HOLDING: The writ petition is DISMISSED. There will be no order as to costs.
Direct consequences for the parties:
- The petitioner will not receive the arrears of salary sought for the specified periods (30 March 1963 to 22 October 1964 and 17 July 1967 to 21 January 1971) because the Court declined to grant further monetary relief in view of the petitioner's unexplained delay and acquiescence.
- The State's impugned order (which fixed the petitioner’s pay as if promoted from 30 March 1963 but withheld arrears) stands; the court found that substantial relief had already been afforded by the State.
- No costs were awarded against either party.
Broader implications: The judgment applies established discretionary principles governing writ jurisdiction under Articles 226 and 227 — inordinate and unexplained delay (laches) may bar relief even where a legal entitlement might otherwise exist; the court reaffirmed that it will not ordinarily assist the tardy or acquiescent applicant. The opinion does not purport to lay down a new legal precedent beyond applying the existing authorities and discretionary principles to the facts of this case.
S.B Sinha, J.:—This writ petition is directed against an order dated 1.11.1975 as contained in Annexure 1 to the writ petition and the impugned portion whereof has been mentioned as Annexure 2 thereto and further for a direction for payment of arrears of salary for the period 30th March, 1963 to 22nd October, 1964 and 17th July, 1967 to 21st January, 1971.
2. The facts of the case lie in a very narrow compass.
3. Admittedly the petitioner was senior to various persons named in Annexure 1 i.e Satya Narain Prasad and Hira Lal Tiwari.
4. By an order dated the 30th March, 1963 the aforementioned Satya Narain Prasad and another were promoted to the post of Executive Engineer from the post of Assistant Engineer.
5. The petitioner has stated in this application, which facts are not disputed, that after the promotion of the aforementioned two persons, the petitioner made a representation claiming promotion in Bihar Engineering Service Class I as admittedly he was senior to them. It is alleged that thereafter the petitioner was posted as Incharge of a Division which are held by Class I Officers of Bihar Engineering Service. The petitioner took charge of the Division with effect from 5.6.64 in addition to his own duties which he was performing, as a P.A to Superintending Engineer, P.W.D, Chotanagpur Circle which was a post in the cadre of Class II service in Bihar Engineering Service.
6. The petitioner, however, was promoted on a regular basis in Class I of the Bihar Engineering Service with effect from 23.10.64
7. However, the respondents by a notification dated 31.7.67 extended the period of promotion of the petitioner in Class I post only up to 16.6.67 but he was allowed to continue on the said post as Incharge of the Division upto 30th March, 1968.
8. The petitioner, was posted as Assistant Engineer of Ganga Bridge Project, Patna with effect from 30th March, 1968 afternoon on which post the petitioner joined on 11.4.1968 The petitioner thereafter was, however, allowed to hold the charge of a Division with effect from 5.6.64 to 30th March, 1968 although by a notification the respondent was notified as Executive Engineer which as stated hereinfore is a Class I post in Bihar Engineering Service from 16.10.64 to 16.6.67
9. Thereafter a combined seniority list was prepared which was published by a notification dated the 17th February, 1969. The said notification was challenged in the High Court of Judicature at Patna by persons who were similarly situated to that of the petitioner. The said notification was struck down by this Court in C.W.J.C No. 290 of 1969 and the respondents were directed to prepare a fresh seniority list fixing the seniority of the petitioners thereof who were direct recruits and the respondents of the said writ petition which were promotees, in the light of the observation made therein. The respondents of the said writ petition against the aforementioned judgment passed by this Court in C.W.J.C No. 290 of 1969 preferred an appeal before the Hon'ble Supreme Court of India which was dismissed.
10. It is alleged that the State of Bihar after the pronouncement of the aforementioned judgment of the Supreme Court issued a seniority list which is contained in Annexure 7 to the writ petition as a result whereof the petitioner was again promoted to the post of Bihar Engineering Service Class I by a notification dated the 26th July, 1972. By the said notification the petitioner was given promotion with retrospective effect with effect from 21.1.71 The said notification is contained in Annexure 8 to the writ petition.
11. The petitioner's position in the combined seniority list as constained in Annexure 7 to the writ petition was 71.
12. The petitioner in paragraph 23 of the writ petition has stated that the petitioner and the persons similarly situated made many representations to the Government for fixation of pay and payment of arrears treating them promoted in Bihar Engineering Service Class I Service from the date when the junior officer's position at serial nos. 87 and 89 were promoted in Class I i.e 30th March, 1963. By the impugned order dared the 1st September, 1975, the State of Bihar pursuant to the aforementioned representation directed the Accountant General of Bihar to fix the pay of the petitioner treating his promotion to be with effect from 30th March, 1963, but, however, directed that no arrears of salary would be paid by reasons thereof.
13. Mr. N.K Prasad, learned counsel appearing on behalf of the petitioner submitted that from a perusal of Annexure I to this writ petition itself it would appear that the petitioner was not promoted with effect from 30th March, 1963 for no fault to his,. He further submitted that the petitioner cannot be made to suffer for the mistakes on the part of the respondents. Mr. Prasad further submitted that the very fact that the petitioner was promoted with retrospective effect from 30th March, 1963, he cannot, in law, be denied the right to get the salary with effect from the aforementioned date as evidently the same was done owing to a mistake on the part of the respondents in this connection Mr. Prasad has placed strong reliance upon a decisions of Kerala High Court in Alappat Narayana Menon v. State of Kerala reported in 1977 Vol 2, Services Law Reporter page 626 and a decision of Punjab and Haryana High Court in Shri Charan Das Chadba v. The State of Punjab reported in 1980 Vol 3, Services Law Reporter page 702.
14. The decisions, relied upou by Mr. Prasad although apply in the facts and circumstances of the case but in view of the order proposed to be passed, it is not necessary to examine the said decision in depth.
15. It would appear from the statments made hereinbefore that the petitioner did not challenge the earlier seniority list. The petitioner admitted that the earlier writ petition was filed at the instance of some other persons. It is also admitted in the writ petition that combined gradation list was prepared, in accordance with the judgment of this Court which was confirmed by the Supreme Court on or about 26.7.72
16. The petitioner, however by a notification dated 27.1.72, as contained in Annexure 3 to the writ petition was promoted with effect from 21.1.71
17. In the instant case those persons, who were junior to the petitioners were placed at serial nos. 87 and 88, wherein the petitioner was placed at serial no. 71 in the seniority list dated 26.7.72 as contained in Annexure 7 to the writ petition, were promoted as far back as on 30th March, 1963. The petitioner even thereafter although was allowed to hold the charge of a Division for a limited period, he was made to perform the jobs of Assistant Engineer from 30th March, 1963 to 4.6.64 The petitioner has again worked as Assistant Enginner in charge of a Division from 5.6.64 to 22.10.64
18. Although he worked as Executive Engineer from 23.10.64 to 16.6.67, he was again posted as Assistant Engineer Incharge of a Division from 17.6.67 to 30th March, 1968 and again from 31st, March, 1968 to 21st January, 1971, the petitioner worked as Assistant Engineer. From the facts as stated hereinbefore it would appear that the petitioner worked either as Assistant Engineer or Assistant Engineer Incharge of Division for a long time. He was promoted to the Bihar Engineering Service Class I on a regular basis before 27.1.72
19. As stated hereinbefore the petitioner even did not challenge the earlier seniority list nor challenged the orders passed by the State of Bihar whereby and whereunder he was made to work as an Assistant Engineer.
20. Although the impugned order was passed on 1st November, 1975 but this writ petition was filed on 30th January, 1981 and was admitted by this Court by an order dated 5.3.81
21. By the impugned order the petitioner has been granted the reliefs substantially by the State of Bihar. There is no doubt that in law of the petitioner might have been entitled to the salary from 30th March 1963, but, in my opinion, the petitioner cannot be granted any relief by this Court in this writ petition in view of the gross latches on his part.
22. Mr. N.K Prasad, however relied upon two decisions of the Supreme Court for the proposition that delay by itself cannot be fatal for granting any relief. The said decisions are Haryana State Electricity Board v. State of Punjab, reported in (1974) 3 SCC 91 and Arun Kumar Chaterjee v. Eastern Railway, reported in (1985) 2 SCC 451.
23. The case of Haryana State Electricity Board arose out of a matter with regards to confirmation of some officers from a later date within the date of confirmation of others. In that decision it was found that the discrimination made was wholly without any basis and was made on irrelevant grounds. In the facts and circumstances of that case it was held that as the petitioner had been making representations before the appropriate authorities and was finally denied reliefs departmental whereafter the petitioner filed a writ petition the same should not have been thrown out on the ground of delay and latches.
24. In Arun Kumar Chaterjee's case (supra) the Supreme Court held that the petitioner was entitled to the reliefs as the South Eastern Railway Administration did not give effect to the ??? Boards Circular dated the 16th October, 1964 wherein it was provided that if a person had been promoted on the date on which he should have been promoted due to some administrative errors, then employees should be assigned correct seniority vis-a-vis his juniors already promoted irrespective of the date of promotion and further made a provision that the pay of such employees in higher grade on promotion would be fixed at proforma at the stage which he would have reached if he had been promoted at the proper time.
25. In the instant case also from the impugned order it would appear that the State of Bihar directed that id view of the error committed by it the petitioner should be placed in the same scale of pay as if he was promoted on 30th March, 1963 but only the arrears salary of the petitioner was not directed to be paid.
26. In the instant case it would appear that by the impugned order as contained in Annexure-1 substantial justice has been done to the petitioner. It is an admitted fact that the petitioner did not work for a long time in the post of Bihar Engineering Service, Class I.
27. He although was denied promotion with effect from 30th March, 1963 but he never challenged the seniority list nor did he take any other action against the Government. He has merely reaped the benefit of the judgment of this Court in the aforementioned writ petition which was filed by other persons.
28. The State of Bihar has corrected its mistake at an early date and even has given substantial reliefs to the petitioner on the basis of his representation by the impugned order dated the 1st November, 1975, as contained in Annexure 1 to this writ petition.
29. The petitioner did not even challenge the said order within a reasonable period.
30. In the writ petition the petitioner has stated that the Accountant General even issued the pay slip in October, 1978. In the writ petition the petitioner has not given the details of his alleged representation but merely mentioned that his last representation was sent on 1.10.80
31. From the aforementioned facts it would be evident that the petitioner has also not seriously tried to explain the delay. The very fact that only one such representation has been annexed which was also made on 1.10.80, it is a clear proof of latches on the part of the petitioner. I am, therefore, of the opinion that the petitioner is guilty of serious delay and latches and on that ground he is not entitled to any relief.
32. In K.V Rajalakshmi Setty v. State of Mysore reported in A.I.R 1967 S.C 993 a writ petition was dismissed on the ground of delay alone. In the aforementioned decision the Supreme Court held as follows:—
“There is also a good delay of force behind the contention that the appellants are guilty of latches. After the passing of the order of May 17, 1950, they should have made an application within a reasonable time thereafter. Merely because the Chief Engineer had espoused their cause and was writing letters from time to time to the State Government to do something for them did not mean that they could rest upon their oars if they were really being discriminated against.”
33. Recently the Supreme Court again in State of M.P v. Nandlal Jaiswal, reported in (1986) 4 SCC 566 : A.I.R 1987 SC 251 held as follows:—
“Now, it is well settled that the power of the High Court to issue an appropriate writ under Article 226 of the Constitution is discretionary and the High Court in the exercise of its discretion does not ordinarily assist the tardy and the indolent or the acquiescent and the lethargic. If there is inordinate delay on the part of the petitioner in filing a writ petition and such delay is not satisfactorily explained, the High Court may decline to intervene and grant relief in the exercise of its writ jurisdiction.”
34. Recently, this Court also in Dr. (Mrs.) Rohatgj v. The State of Bihar, reported in 1986 P.L.J.R page 1160 after taking into consideration various decisions of the Supreme Court in (1970) 1 SCC 84 : A.I.R 1970 S.C page 470, AIR S.C 898, (1973) 1 SCC 811 : AIR 1973 S.C 1343 and (1973) 4 SCC 163 : AIR 1973 S.C 1168 held that a writ petition should be dismissed if the petitioner approaches the High Court after long and unexplained delay. The same view has also been adopted by the Division Bench decision of this Court in AIR 1985 Patna 70 : 1985 PLJR 779 and 1985 P.L.J.R 1148.
35. In any event, in my opinion, as the petitioner's grievances have been substantially met by the State of Bihar while passing the orders as contained in Annexure 1 and the discrimination which the petitioner would have faced with regards to the scale of pay vis-a-vis his juniors has also been wiped out by the impugned order, I am not inclined to exercise my jurisdiction under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution in favour of the petitioner.
36. In any event by the impugned order only some monetary relief has been denied to the petitioner and in the facts and circumstances of the case, I do not think it expedient to interfere with the order impugned in this writ petition.
37. This writ petition is, therefore, dismissed. There will be no order as to costs.
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