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Md. Abdul v. State Of West Bengal
Factual and Procedural Background
This opinion concerns an application for bail filed by the petitioner under Section 439 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (CrPC). The petitioner had previously applied for bail before the learned Chief Judge, City Sessions Court; that application was rejected by an order dated 28-5-1990. The learned judge who rejected the earlier application held that the provisions of Section 167 CrPC were not attracted in a case under the Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act, 1985 (NDPS Act), and that Section 37 of the NDPS Act imposed limitations on the court's power to grant bail. The petitioner had been repeatedly remanded in custody and, according to the opinion, was detained on the strength of repeated remand orders since 12-2-1990. The bail application before this court raised questions about the applicability and interplay of Section 167 CrPC, Section 37 of the NDPS Act, and the powers of special courts and the High Court under Sections 437 and 439 CrPC and Section 36A of the NDPS Act.
Legal Issues Presented
- Whether the provisions of Section 167 of the Code of Criminal Procedure apply to cases under the NDPS Act (in particular, whether an accused detained beyond the 90/60 day period must be released on bail).
- Whether the conditions and limitations imposed by Section 37 of the NDPS Act operate to prevent or qualify release on bail that would otherwise follow from non-compliance with Section 167 CrPC.
- How Section 36A(1) of the NDPS Act — notably clauses (b), (c) and (d) — affects the applicability of Section 167 CrPC and the powers of the special court to remand, release on bail or take cognizance of offences.
- Whether a "police report" for the purpose of Clause (d) of Section 36A(1) must necessarily be a report under Section 173 CrPC, or whether the special court may take cognizance on the basis of other reports or complaints by authorised officers.
- Whether the High Court, in exercising its powers under Section 439 CrPC, is bound by the restrictions and conditions laid down in Section 37 of the NDPS Act.
Arguments of the Parties
Petitioner's Arguments (Mr. Jaiswal)
- The petitioner had been detained in custody for more than ninety days and no charge-sheet had been filed; therefore Section 167 CrPC (specifically Section 167(2) and its proviso) entitled the petitioner to release on bail.
- Reliance was placed on a Supreme Court decision which held that release on bail under Section 167(2) is an order of default (a release due to prosecution's failure to file the charge-sheet within the prescribed time) and that the right to bail under the proviso to Section 167(2) is absolute and mandatory.
State's Arguments (Mr. N. A. Chaudhury, Additional Public Prosecutor)
- The Supreme Court decision relied upon did not consider the impact of the amended Section 37 of the NDPS Act; therefore expiry of the 90/60 day period does not automatically entitle an accused to be released on bail in NDPS cases because Section 37 imposes conditions that must be satisfied before bail can be granted.
- Relied on a Division Bench order of this court (Biswanath Aggarwal, dated 25-7-1990) that had disposed of a bail application on the ground that the conditions of Section 37 NDPS Act were not satisfied, and on other High Court decisions to support the contention that Section 167 CrPC is not directly applicable in NDPS cases in the manner urged by petitioner.
Amicus Curiae's Arguments (Mr. B. C. Roy)
- Submitted that the phrase "police report" in Clause (d) of Section 36A(1) must be read as a report under Section 173 CrPC, relying on the definition of "police report" in the CrPC and on the fact that the term is used in Clause (d).
- Also argued that because Sub-section (2) of Section 37 speaks of limitations in addition to those under the CrPC, the High Court's power under Section 439 CrPC should not be circumscribed by Section 37 — i.e., that Section 37 should not bind the High Court exercising Section 439 powers.
Table of Precedents Cited
| Precedent | Rule or Principle Cited For | Application by the Court |
|---|---|---|
| Unspecified Supreme Court decision (cited by petitioner) | The Supreme Court held that an order of release on bail under Section 167(2) CrPC may be termed an order of default; the right to bail under the proviso to Section 167(2) is absolute and mandatory where the charge-sheet is not filed within the prescribed period; magistrate must release on bail without examining merits. | The court treated this decision as supporting the petitioner's position that Section 167 CrPC can mandate release on bail when the prosecution fails to file a charge-sheet within 90/60 days, but analysed whether that principle is affected by the NDPS Act and Section 37. |
| Division Bench order of this Court — Biswanath Aggarwal (order dated 25-7-1990) | Posed the question whether Section 167(2) CrPC is attracted to NDPS cases; held that the decisions cited were not applicable and disposed of the application because conditions of Section 37 NDPS Act were not satisfied. | The court considered this decision but observed that it did not reach a positive conclusion on whether Section 167(2) applies to NDPS cases and therefore was not directly decisive on the point before the court. |
| Sasibala Nair v. Intelligence Officer, Narcotic Control Bureau (Bombay High Court, single judge; unreported) | The learned single judge held that release under Section 167 CrPC is not automatic in NDPS cases and that the conditions of bail imposed by Section 37 NDPS Act must be considered; concluded Section 167 CrPC has no application in NDPS cases for that reason. | The court noted the decision but did not adopt it as controlling; the Bombay decision was treated as one of several conflicting authorities and not decisive for the ratio adopted by this court. |
| Single bench decision of Jammu & Kashmir High Court (unnamed) | Held that Section 167 CrPC was not attracted where a complaint had been filed and the investigation was not being conducted under Chapter XIV CrPC. | The court found that decision of no assistance for the issues in the present case. |
| Hamidulla v. State of U.P. (Allahabad High Court, single judge) | The learned judge observed that in NDPS cases it is not necessary that the charge-sheet be filed by the investigating officer of a police station as is done under the CrPC; concluded there is no scope for application of Section 167 CrPC in that case (though not a direct conclusion). | The court considered this decision but noted that it did not reach a directly applicable conclusion for the legal questions posed in the present petition. |
Court's Reasoning and Analysis
The court proceeded by analysing the specific provisions of the NDPS Act, principally Section 36A (as amended) and Section 37, in their interaction with the CrPC.
1. Interpretation of Section 36A:
- Section 36A(1)(b) permits a magistrate, in certain circumstances where a person accused or suspected of an NDPS offence is forwarded under sub‑section (2) or (2A) of Section 167 CrPC, to authorise detention for limited periods and, if he deems it unnecessary to detain further, to order the person to be forwarded to the special court.
- Section 36A(1)(c) provides that the special court may exercise, in relation to a person forwarded under clause (b), the same power which a magistrate having jurisdiction to try a case may exercise under Section 167 CrPC in respect of such an accused person.
- Clause (d) permits the special court to take cognizance on the basis of a police report of facts constituting the offence or upon a complaint by an authorised officer, without the accused being committed to it for trial.
2. Application of Section 167 CrPC:
- Because clause (c) expressly imports the powers of Section 167 CrPC to the special court in relation to persons forwarded under clause (b), the court concluded that Section 167 CrPC is applicable "with all its conditions" in such cases; thereby remand and the temporal limits of remand (the 90/60 day proviso) apply when clause (c) is engaged.
- Accordingly, if the prosecution fails to comply with the proviso to Section 167(2) (i.e., fails to file the charge-sheet within the prescribed period), the proviso is automatically attracted and the special judge has no option but to release the accused on bail (a release occasioned by default of the prosecution), without examining merits.
3. Distinction between release under Section 167 and exercise of bail powers under Sections 437/439 CrPC:
- The court emphasised that Sections 437 and 439 CrPC grant judicial power to courts (magistrates, sessions courts, high courts) to exercise discretion in granting bail; by contrast, Section 167 CrPC imposes an obligation to release on bail where the proviso conditions are met (i.e., it is a statutory command triggered by prosecution default).
- Therefore, release compelled by Section 167 cannot be equated with discretionary bail granted under Sections 437 or 439; the two operate differently and the obligations under Section 167 stand on their own when clause (c) of Section 36A(1) applies.
4. Effect of Clause (d) of Section 36A(1):
- If the special court takes cognizance under clause (d) (on the basis of a police report or complaint by an authorised officer), the powers and procedure differ from those under clause (b)/(c); in that event, provisions of Section 167 CrPC will not be applicable even if a formal police report under Section 173 CrPC has not been filed.
- The prosecution decides when and how to ask the special judge to take cognizance; once cognizance is taken under clause (d), clause (c)'s application (and its incorporation of Section 167) is displaced in that case.
5. Meaning of "police report" in Clause (d):
- The court rejected the amicus' contention that "police report" in Clause (d) must be read as a report under Section 173 CrPC, observing that a definition in one enactment generally applies to that enactment unless expressly made applicable elsewhere; there is no such special provision here.
- Therefore the special judge may take cognizance on the basis of any police report of facts constituting the offence or on a complaint by an authorised officer; it is open to the special judge to take cognizance at any time on satisfaction of the conditions laid down in Clause (d).
6. Applicability of Section 37 NDPS Act to exercise of bail powers:
- The court analysed Section 36A(3) which preserves the special powers of the High Court regarding bail under Section 439 CrPC, and concluded that the special court's power to grant bail derives from Section 437 CrPC (as conferred by Section 36A), but that the scheme of the NDPS Act and the non-obstante clause in Section 37 indicate that the special conditions in Section 37 apply "in spite of" provisions of the CrPC.
- Consequently, when the special court exercises its power to grant bail it must take into account the conditions laid down in Section 37(1)(b)(i) and (ii). Likewise, the High Court, when exercising its Section 439 CrPC powers, is bound to respect specific statutory conditions for bail provided by the NDPS Act — Section 37 is not rendered inapplicable to the High Court by Section 36A(3).
- The court reasoned that the power conferred by Section 439 is not arbitrary; if law specifically provides additional conditions for grant of bail in NDPS cases, the High Court must observe them.
Holding and Implications
Holding:
The court directed that the petitioner be released on bail, subject to the satisfaction of the Chief Judge, City Sessions Court, Calcutta. The core operative direction can be stated as:
THE PETITIONER IS TO BE RELEASED ON BAIL (subject to the satisfaction of the Chief Judge, City Sessions Court, Calcutta).
Implications (consequences of the decision, as stated in the opinion):
- Where Clause (c) of Section 36A(1) NDPS Act applies (i.e., when a person forwarded to the special court falls within that provision), Section 167 CrPC is incorporated and applies with full force. If the prosecution fails to comply with the proviso to Section 167(2) (failure to file a charge-sheet within 90/60 days), the special judge is obliged to release the accused on bail — such release arises from statutory obligation and does not require examination of the merits.
- The release mandated by Section 167 CrPC (by reason of prosecution default) is different in nature from discretionary bail under Sections 437 and 439 CrPC; the conditions in Section 37 NDPS Act do not operate to prevent a release that is compelled by Section 167 when clause (c) is engaged.
- If the special court takes cognizance under Clause (d) of Section 36A(1), Section 167 CrPC will not apply in that situation even if no formal Section 173 CrPC report has been filed; the special court may take cognizance on the basis of other police reports or authorised complaints.
- When the special court grants bail in exercise of its power under Section 437 CrPC, it must observe the conditions set out in Section 37 NDPS Act. Similarly, the High Court exercising its Section 439 CrPC power is bound to respect those statutory conditions — Section 37's restrictions bind the High Court despite the general powers under Section 439.
- Direct effect in this case: the petitioner, who had been detained since 12-2-1990 on repeated remand orders and for whom the proviso to Section 167 CrPC operated, was ordered to be released on bail (subject to the Chief Judge's satisfaction).
Shamsuddin Ahmed, J:-
(1) This is an application for bail under section 439 of the criminal procedure code. An application for bail by the petitioner was filed before the learned chief judge, city sessions court and was rejected by an order dated 28 - 5 - 1990. In the said impugned order the learned judge held that the provisions of Section 167 of the criminal procedure code arc not attracted in a case under the provisions of the narcotic drugs and psychotropic substances act, 1985 (hereinafter referred to as ndps act) and further held that provisions of section 37 of the ndps act have imposed limitations on the court for granting bail and accordingly considering the limitations imposed, the learned judge was pleased to reject that application.
(2) Mr. Jaiswal, learned advocate appearing for the petitioner, has submitted that since the petitioner is being detained in custody for more than ninety days and no charge - sheet has been filed, he is entitled to the benefit of Section 167 of the criminal procedure code. Mr. Jaiswal has relied on a decision. In the said decision the supreme court had occasion to consider a case if benefits of section 167 (2) of the criminal procedure code can be attracted to a case under the ndps act? the supreme court held that an order of release on bail under section 167 (2) of the criminal procedure code may be termed as an order of default. Indeed, it is a release on bail for the default of the prosecution in filing chargesheet within the prescribed period. The right to bail under section 167 (2) proviso (a) tereto is absolute. It is legislative command and not courts discretion. If the investigating agency fails to file charge - sheet before the expiry of 90/ 60 days, as the case may be, the accused who is in custody, should be released on bail. At that stage merits of the case are not to be examined. In fact, the magistrate has no power to remand a person beyond the stipulated period of 90/60 days and he must pass an order of bail communicating to the accused to furnish the requisite bail bond.
(3) Mr. N. A. Chaudhury, learned additional public prosecutor appearing for the state has opposed the contention of mr. Jaiswal. According to him, the supreme court in the aforesaid decision did not consider the impact of section 37 of the ndps act, as amended. According to him, any court granting bail has to consider the conditions laid down in section 37. Accordingly only because of expiry of that period, the learned special judge is not bound to release the accused petitioner on bail. In support of this contention, he relied on a decision of this court of a division bench on an application for bail filed by one biswanath aggarwal and the order was passed by that bench on 25/7/1990. We have perused that order. It appears to us that the learned judge posed the question whether section 167 (2) of the criminal procedure code is attracted to a case under the ndps act. Therefore the division bench dealt with the decisions cited before it by the learned advocates for the parties and ultimately held that those decisions were not applicable. The division bench disposed of the application on a finding that because the conditions of section 37 ndps act were not satisfied, the bail to the petitioner in that case could not be granted. Since that division bench has not come to a positive finding on the question whether section 167 (2) is attracted to a case under the ndps act. We are unable to consider this decision as a direct one of the point.
(4) Mr. Chaudhury drew our attention to an unreported decision of the bombay high court circulated by the central board of excise and customs. It is a single bench decision (sasibala nair v. Intelligence officer, narcotic control bureau the learned single judge of that court held that because a person has to be released under Section 167 of the criminal procedure code on bail, the conditions of bail imposed by section 37 has to be considered. There is no case of automatic release on expiry of the period stipulated by that section and in that view alone, the court held that Section 167 of the criminal procedure code has no application in a case under the ndps act.
(5) Mr. Chaudhury has also relied on a decision3. It is a single bcnch decision of jammu and kashmir high court. In the said decision the learned judge has held that Section 167 of the criminal procedure code is not attracted to that case as a complaint has been filed and the investigation is not being conducted under chapter xiv of the criminal procedure code. This decion is of no assistance to us.
(6) Mr. Chaudhury has also relied on a deision (hamidulla v. State of u. P.). A single judge bench of the allahabad high court held lat in a case under the ndps act, it is not necessary that a charge - sheet has to be filed by the investigation officer of a police station as is done in matters investigated under the criminal procedure code. Accordingly the learned judge held that there is no scope of application of Section 167 of the criminal procedure code though this has not been the direct conclusion of he learned judge.
(7) In this background let us now consider the provisions of ndps act. section 36a as amended provides that all offences under this act are triable by the special court. In section 36a (1) (b) , it is provided that a person accused of or suspected of the commission of an offence under this act is forwarded to a magistrate under sub - section (2) or sub - section (2a) of section 167 of the code of criminal procedure, such magistrate may authorise the detention of such person in such custody as he thinks fit for a period not exceeding fifteen days in the whole where such magistrate is a judicial magistrate and seven days in the whole where such magistrate is an executive magistrate. It has further been provided in the said section that upon or at any time before the expiry of the period of detention, if the learned magistrate considers it unnecessary to detain the person further, he shall order such person to be forwarded to the special court.
(8) Clause (c) of the said section takes care of the person so forwarded by the learned magistrate. It provides that special court may exercise, in relation to the person forwarded to it under clause (b) the same power which a magistrate having jurisdiction to try a case may exercise under section 167 of the code of criminal procedure, 1973, in relation to an accused person in such case who has been forwarded to him under that section.
(9) Provisions of clause (c) referred to above clearly lay down that special court has power to remand a person in terms of the provisions of section 167 of the code of criminal procedure. It has been argued that because this is not a case which is being investigated by an officer - in - charge of a police station the provisions of section 167 of the code of criminal procedure are not attracted. But it appears to us that section 167 is attracted in the case by virtue of the fact that the said provisions have been implanted under the ndps act by the aforesaid clause (c). Provisions of section 167 apply because of that provision. Therefore, we need not enquire who is conducting the investigation of the case and when a particular provision has been made applicable by the act itself, it will apply with all its conditions. Accordingly, when a case is forwarded to the learned special judge by the learned magistrate in terms of clause (b) of the said section, the learned judge can remand him to custody in terms of the provisions of section 167 alone. Since proviso to section 167 (2) lays down that no person can be remanded to custody under authority of that section for a period beyond. 90/60 days, if the terms of section 167 of criminal procedure code are not complied with by the prosecution, proviso (ii) to sub - section (2) of section 10 is automatically attracted and the learned special judge has no option but to release the person on bail.
(10) It has been submitted by mr. Chaudhury that since a person can only be released on bail under section 167, the conditions of bail as laid down in section 37 of the ndps act have to be complied with, otherwise he cannot be so released. The substance of the submissions of mr. Chaudhury is that in any case a person, if required to be released on bail, he must fulfil the conditions laid down in section 37 of the ndps act. We regret, we are unable to accept the contention of mr. Chaudhury. It will appear that the provisions of bail as laid down in sections 437 and 430 of the criminal procedure code gives power to the learned magistrate or the learned sessions judge or the high court, as the case may be, to grant bail. Section 167 of the criminal procedure code does not grant such a power but it only imposes obligation on court to release a person on bail, if the charge - sheet is not filed within 90/60 days from the date of arrest of the person concerned. Accordingly, the power exercised under Section 167 of the criminal procedure code and the powers under sections 437 and 439 cannot be equated. Only because a person has to be released on bail in terms of section 167, his release cannot be equated with the release by the order of the court in terms of sections 437 and 439 of the criminal procedure code. Accordingly we hold that in cases where clause (c) to section 36a (1) is attracted, Section 167 of the criminal procedure code will apply with all force and in all cases where charge - sheet has not been submitted and cognizance of the offence has not been taken by the learned special judge, the provisions of section 167 have to be complied with. Clause (d) of the aforesaid section has laid down that a special court may, upon a perusal of police report of the facts constituting offences under this act or upon a complaint made by an officer of the central government or state government authorised in this behalf, take cognizance on that behalf without the accused being committed to it for trial. It will appear that the powers to take cognizance of the offence are different from the powers given to a court by the provisions of the criminal procedure code. In terms of clause (d) , the special court can take cognizance upon a police report or on a complaint filed before him by an officer authorised. Accordingly, it cannot be contended unless a police report is submitted in terms of section 173 of the criminal procedure code, no cognizance can be taken. In the event, the learned special judge takes cognizance of the offence complained of, the provisions of Section 167 of the criminal procedure code will not be applicable even though a formal police report under section 1730f the criminal procedure code has not been filed before him. It is for the prosecution to decide when and how they will ask the learned special judge to take cognizance of the offence complained.
(11) Mr. B. C. Roy, learned senior advocate who appeared in the matter as amicus curiae has submitted that the police report referred to in clause (d) of the said section must be a report under section 173 of the criminal procedure code. In making the submission, mr. Roy referred to us to the definition of police report appearing in the criminal procedure code and submitted that since the expression police reportt is also used in clause (d) and there is no other provision mentioned in the section, the said definition is attracted. We are unable to accept the contention of mr. Roy, as according to us, the definition clause in a particular enactment is applicable to that act alone unless by a special provision it is also made applicable to interpret in other acts. That no being the case here, the learned special judge is competent to take cognizance on the basis of any police report of the facts constituting the offence. He can also take cognizance upon a complaint filed by a competent police officer. Since there is no provision as to when such cognizance can be taken, it is open to the learned special judge to take cognizance of such offence at any time on satisfaction of the conditions laid down in clause (d). If the learned special judge takes cognizance under clause (d) , the provisions of clause (c) will not be applicable. He will not be bound to release a person after 90/ 60 days as the case may be, on the ground that no police report in terms of section 173 of the criminal procedure code has been filed.
(12) Now we come to the other question whether the provisions of section 37 of the ndps act, as amended, are also applicable to an application filed before this court under section 439 of the criminal procedure code. Before entering into that aspect of the matter we must make it clear that on a perusal of the provisions of clause (b) of section 36a (1) , it is clear that the learned magistrate before whom an accused of an offence punishable under the ndps act is produced, is not competent to release him on bail. No magistrate has any power conferred under this. Act to release any accused on bail. In the event, the learned magistrate considers it unnecessary to detain that person, he will have to refer him to the learned special judge. It is only the learned special judge who can release that person on bail. According to the scheme of the section, it appears that powers under section 437 of the criminal procedure code to grant bail has been conferred on the special court and the special court can release a person on bail in exercise of its powers under section 437 only. Though the special court is a sessions judge he is not competent to exercise power under section 439 of the criminal procedure code and this will become apparent from the provisions of sub - section (3) of section 36a, as amended. Sub - section (3) clearly provides that nothing contained in this section shall be deemed to affect the special powers of the high court regarding bail under section 439 of the code of criminal procedure and the high court may exercise such powers regarding bail under section 439 of the criminal procedure code. This provision clearly indicated that the powers of the sessions court under section 439 is not exercisable in a case under the ndps act. Accordingly, when the special court exercise power to grant bail he is bound by section 37 of the ndps act he has to take into account the conditions laid down in clauses (i) and (ii) of clause (b) of section 37 (1) and if he is satisfied that those conditions have been fulfilled, he can release a person on bail under section 437 of the criminal procedure code. The other conditions laid down in section 437 will also apply to him when he intends to grant bail in such a case.
(13) Mr. Roy submitted that because of the provisions of sub - section (2) of section 37 the conditions laid down in sub - section (1) of section 37 of the ndps act do not bind the high court. He submits that sub - section (2) of section 37 of the ndps act lays down that the limitations specified in clause (b) of sat - section (1) of section 37 of the ndps act are in addition to the limitations under the criminal procedure code. Accordingly, he submits that only section 437 of the criminal procedure code has provided for limitations. Limitations under section 37 can only be added to that section and not to the power conferred on the high court under section 439 of the criminal procedure code. He has referred to sub - section (3) of section 36a of the ndps act and has submitted that all the powers of the high court in that section have been written and thus, his conclusion is that the powers of the high court contemplated by section 439 cannot be circumscribed by the provisions of section 37 of the ndps act. With great respect, we have considered the submissions made by mr. Roy. It will appear that section 37 of the ndps act has started with a non - obstinate clause. That the provisions made therein will apply inspite of the provisions of criminal procedure code. In similar terms it cannot be said that the conditions laid down in section 37 are altogether new conditions not provided under the criminal procedure code. In our view, this will apply to all cases where the court exercises powers to grant bail. In this connection, we may also note that in section 439 of the criminal procedure code though no specific conditions have been laid down for the high court to exercise its discretion judicially, the power granted by section 439 of the criminal procedure code is not an arbitrary power. If the law specifically provides that in cases of granting bail some other conditions have to be satisfied, the high court is bound to respect them.
(14) In our considered view, since no exception has been made in application of the restriction imposed by section 37 of the ndps act, this will also bind the high court and in cases of granting bail the high court will have to satisfy itself when the learned public prosecutor opposes the application for bail that there are reasons for believing that the petitioner is not guilty of the offence and that he is not likely to commit any offence while on bail. The two questions that have cropped up for consideration are thus disposed of.
(15) Mr. Roy made submissions with regard to the procedure to be followed after the special court as taken cognizance of the offence. According to mr. Roy, since some of the offences punishable under this act can be sentences to imprisonment for a term of 10 years or more, the trial to be held will be a sessions trial and if it is a sessions trial and the learned judge after taking cognizance intends to proceed in the matter, he is required to do so only under the provisions of section 202 of the criminal procedure code. That being the position of the learned judge has to examine himself all the witnesses and then proceed with the trial of the case. If that be the position, there is no question of submission of a police report. Accordingly, he submits that cognizance ultimately can only be taken only on the basis or a police report submitted under section 173, cr. P. C. In exceptional cases where a complaint is made by a competent officer, cognizance can be taken and in such a case the learned judge has to proceed undert the procedure laid down under section 202, cr. P. C. Since this question is not required to be considered by us in disposing of this bail application, we keep this question open as to what would be the procedure to be followed by the learned special judge, if he takes cognizance under clause (c) of section 36a (1) of the ndps act.
(16) We express our appreciation for the assistance rendered by mr. B. C. Roy.
(17) It appears that the petitioner is being kept in detention on the strength of repeated remand order since 12/2/1990. As. We have stated above section 167, cr. P. C. Will operate in such cases. Accordingly, we direct that the petitioner be released on bail subject to the satisfaction of the chief judge, city sessions court, calcutta. Order accordingly.
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