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Shivlal Gulabchand v. Taniram Sadashiv
Judgment Summary — Mirza, J. (Appeal from decree concerning mortgage bond dated 11 December 1917)
Factual and Procedural Background
The appellant-plaintiff sued to recover a sum secured by a simple mortgage bond dated 11 December 1917. The bond was executed by defendants 1, 2 and 3. Defendants 1 to 8 were sued as members of a joint undivided family; defendants 1 to 6 were sons of one Sadashiv, defendant 7 a grandson of Lotan (a brother of Sadashiv), and defendant 8 a son of another brother Ananda. The appellant alleged that defendants 1 to 8 were jointly interested in a family shop carried on in the name of Sadashiv Narayan Shimpe and that the mortgage secured indebtedness arising from that business.
Defendants 9 and 10 were auction-purchasers of the two survey numbers which were the subject-matter of the mortgage; they purchased the properties in execution of certain decrees. The learned trial Judge held that the mortgage bond was not binding on defendants 4, 6, 7 and 8 (defendant 5 being dead) and that the plaintiff's claim was enforceable against the two properties only to the extent of the shares of defendants 1 and 3. The plaintiff appealed; defendants 9 and 10 filed cross-objections asserting that the plaintiff's mortgage was void as against them and that the shares sold to them were not subject to the plaintiff's mortgage.
Legal Issues Presented
- Whether the mortgage bond of 11 December 1917 bound all members of the joint family (defendants 1 to 8), including minors and those who did not execute the bond, to the extent of their interests in the joint family property.
- Whether the mortgage bond executed on 11 December 1917 was void as against defendants 9 and 10 by reason of prior attachments before judgment and decrees, making any alienation during the subsistence of the attachment void under section 64 of the Code of Civil Procedure (CPC).
- Whether mention of the mortgage in the proclamation of sale or the auction-purchasers' applications for execution estops the purchasers (defendants 9 and 10) from questioning the validity of the mortgage.
- Whether the attachments before judgment were treated as terminated or continued after consent decrees, and whether any alleged substitution of a charge for the attachment amounted to a waiver of rights by defendants 9 and 10.
Arguments of the Parties
Appellant / Plaintiff (represented by Mr. Pradhan)
- The plaintiff asserted that defendants 1 to 8 were jointly interested in the family shop and that the mortgage bond secured indebtedness of that shop arising from trade (sales of cloth and advances).
- Mr. Pradhan argued that where an attachment before judgment exists but a consent decree is taken, the attachment should be deemed merged in the decree and that defendants 9 and 10, by taking consent decrees which created a charge on the properties, had effectively substituted a charge for the attachment (i.e., they waived the attachment so far as it related to parties to the consent decrees).
- He further argued that the mention of the mortgage in the proclamation of sale ought to prevent the auction purchasers from asserting that the properties were not subject to the mortgage.
Defendants 9 and 10 (represented by Mr. Nadkarni)
- Mr. Nadkarni did not dispute that defendants 1 to 8 were members of a joint family but contended that defendants 1, 2 and 3 (adult members) were in possession and that the plaintiff failed to show any legal necessity for the mortgage; therefore the mortgage was void as against the family members not bound by proper authority.
- Defendants 9 and 10 contended that the mortgage bond was void as against them because the attachments before judgment (orders for attachment obtained in mid-1916, made absolute in 1917) preceded the mortgage, and any alienation during the subsistence of an attachment before judgment is void as against rights claimed under that attachment (relying on the proposition in Ganu Singh v. Jangi Lal).
- They also maintained that notifying the mortgage at the time of sale did not estop them from disputing its validity, and that there was no proof that they waived their attachment rights by substituting a charge for the attachment.
Table of Precedents Cited
| Precedent | Rule or Principle Cited For | Application by the Court |
|---|---|---|
| Raghunathji Tarachand v. Bank of Bombay | The managing member of a joint family carrying on a business has implied authority to contract debts for family business purposes and to mortgage family properties for repayment; creditor need not inquire into the purpose to bind the family. | The Court relied on this principle to hold that where a family shop was being carried on (cloth trade here) adult members who manage the shop may bind the family by borrowing and mortgaging property for business purposes; used to support liability of defendants 1–8 to the extent of their interests. |
| Ganu Singh v. Jangi Lal | Where an attachment under the CPC exists (whether before or after decree), its effect as against alienations is the same if a decree is subsequently made for the plaintiff at whose instance the attachment was made. | The Court treated this authority as supporting the proposition that a mortgage or alienation executed during the subsistence of an attachment before judgment would be void as against the interest claimed under that attachment, and applied it in concluding that the mortgage dated 11 December 1917 would be void against defendants 9 and 10 if the attachments had continued. |
| Roshan Lal v. Lallu | The notification of a mortgage at a sale does not prevent auction-purchasers from disputing the validity of that mortgage. | The Court agreed with the Allahabad High Court's ruling and used it to reject the argument that mentioning the mortgage in the proclamation of sale or in execution papers estopped the purchasers from challenging the mortgage's validity. |
| Vithal Yeshvant v. Shivappa Mallappa | Qualification of the Raghunathji position: mortgagee must prove not only that the mortgagor carried on a family business but also that the money was required for that business; burden of proof is on the mortgagee. | The Court acknowledged this criticism and held that, unlike the criticized case, the trial court's findings and the plaintiff's accounts in the present case showed the money was required for the family business, so the Raghunathji principle applied here. |
| Ganesh v. Purshottam | An auction-purchaser's reference to a mortgage in execution applications does not preclude the purchaser from questioning the mortgage's validity. | The Court cited this authority to support its view that defendants 9 and 10 could challenge the validity of the mortgage despite having referred to it in applications for execution and in the proclamation of sale. |
| Narayan Sadoba Halwai v. Umbar Adam Memon (and related citation) | Same principle as Ganesh v. Purshottam: notification or mention of a mortgage in execution proceedings does not bar questioning validity. | The Court cited this decision alongside Ganesh v. Purshottam to reinforce that mentioning the mortgage does not prevent defendants from setting up Section 64 CPC defenses and challenging the mortgage's validity. |
Court's Reasoning and Analysis
The Court reviewed factual findings and documentary evidence and proceeded in two main strands: (A) liability of joint family members for the mortgage debt; and (B) the effect of prior attachments and subsequent execution-sale on the validity of the mortgage as against auction purchasers.
A. Liability of joint family members
The trial Judge disbelieved the plaintiff's gumasta (employee) who deposed that defendants 1–8 were joint on the date of the bond and consequently held the bond not binding on certain defendants. On appeal the Court examined other evidence in the record—evidence of a family shop dealing in cloth since 1908, dealings between the plaintiff and the shop, and promissory notes and accounts showing purchases and indebtedness—and concluded there was "considerable evidence" of a family shop in which defendants 1–8 had an interest.
Relying on the principle in Raghunathji Tarachand v. Bank of Bombay, the Court reasoned that when a joint family carries on a business and an adult member manages it, that manager has implied authority to borrow for the business and to mortgage family properties for repayment. The Court also addressed the narrower point raised in Vithal Yeshvant v. Shivappa Mallappa that the mortgagee must show the money was required for the family business; here the Court found the Subordinate Judge's findings and the plaintiff's accounts sufficed to show the money was required for the family business.
Thus the appellate Court concluded that defendants 4, 6, 7 and 8 (minors at the date of the mortgage) and the other family members should have been held liable by the lower Court to the extent of their interest in the joint family property.
B. Validity of the mortgage as against auction purchasers (defendants 9 and 10)
The Court carefully recited the procedural history of prior suits by defendants 9 and 10: both had filed suits in 1916 and obtained orders for attachment before judgment (mid-1916), those attachment orders were made absolute in 1917, and decrees were obtained (some ex parte and some by consent) before the mortgage bond was executed on 11 December 1917. The properties were subsequently sold in execution (Suit No. 287 of 1916), with one survey number purchased by defendant 9 and the other by defendant 10. The proclamation of sale mentioned the plaintiff's mortgage, and the plaintiff received notice of the proposed sale.
The Court applied the principle from Ganu Singh v. Jangi Lal that an attachment under the CPC has the same effect as a decree for the plaintiff at whose instance the attachment is made, and therefore an alienation made during the subsistence of such an attachment is void as against any interest claimed under the attachment. The Court observed that it did not appear the executing Court had enquired into or decided that the attachment was subject to the mortgage.
Addressing the plaintiff's submission (through Mr. Pradhan) that the attachments were merged in the subsequent consent decrees (and thus the attachment was terminated as to parties to the consent decrees), the Court held that in the absence of a specific order raising the attachment or a definite statement in the decree abandoning the attachment, the attachment must be taken to have continued. The appellate Court rejected the trial Judge's view that the attachment came to an end as between the parties to the consent decree and the auction purchasers as a matter of law.
The Court also considered whether the auction purchasers' references to the mortgage in execution applications and the proclamation of sale estopped them from challenging the mortgage. Relying on Roshan Lal v. Lallu and Ganesh v. Purshottam (and Narayan Sadoba Halwai v. Umbar Adam Memon), the Court concluded that mentioning the mortgage in such documents did not prevent the purchasers from disputing its validity. The Court further found no evidence of any intentional waiver by defendants 9 and 10; indeed, defendant 9's execution application explicitly stated that the attachment remained continuing and had not been raised.
Combining these findings, the Court determined that because the mortgage was executed during the subsistence of attachments which had not been shown to have been raised or waived, the alienation effected by the mortgage was void as against the rights of defendants 9 and 10 under the attachment and consequent decree (i.e., Section 64 CPC applied).
Holding and Implications
Core Rulings:
- The Court held that the mortgage bond executed on 11 December 1917 is void as against defendants 9 and 10 to the extent that it alienated property during the subsistence of prior attachments and decrees in their favour (application of Section 64 CPC and Ganu Singh v. Jangi Lal).
- The Court held that defendants 4, 6, 7 and 8 (minors at the date of the mortgage) and other joint-family members should have been held liable to the extent of their interests in the joint family property for the mortgage debt, because evidence supported that the mortgage related to the family business (application of Raghunathji Tarachand and its qualification in Vithal Yeshvant v. Shivappa Mallappa).
- The decree of the lower Court as to sale of the two properties in favour of the plaintiff was set aside (i.e., the mortgage decree for sale of these two properties was not upheld) and was varied to a personal decree against certain defendants for the decretal amount and interest.
Direct consequences and orders made by the appellate Court (as recorded):
- The Court substituted for the lower Court's decree for sale against defendants 9 and 10 a decree against defendants 1 to 3 for Rs. 7,080 and costs of the suit, with interest on Rs. 5,019-3-0 at 6% per annum from the date of suit to the date of payment.
- The Court directed a decree against defendants 4, 6, 7 and 8 to pay the same amount to the extent of their shares in the joint family property.
- The Court reversed the order that the plaintiff should pay the costs of defendants 4 to 6 and substituted an order that their costs shall be borne by them.
- As to costs relating to other defendants, the Court did not interfere with the order for costs in regard to defendants 2, 3 and 9; but directed that in regard to the costs of defendants 10 and 11 the plaintiff-appellant shall bear one set of costs in respect of them both in the lower Court (as recorded in the opinion).
- Final note in the opinion: "Decree varied." (The appellate order thus modifies the relief awarded by the lower Court rather than affirming the sale under the mortgage.)
No broader precedent beyond the application of the cited authorities was announced; the Court applied existing principles (authority of manager to bind joint family in business-related liabilities; consequences of subsisting attachments under the CPC; and the ability of auction-purchasers to question a mortgage despite mention of it in sale proclamations) and varied the relief accordingly.
Mirza, J.:— The appellant-plaintiff in this case sued to recover a certain sum on a simple mortgage bond dated 11th December, 1917. The mortgage bond is executed by defendants 1, 2 and 3. Defendants 1 to 8 are sued as members of a joint undivided family, defendants 1 to 6 being the sons of one Sadashiv, defendant 7, as grandson of one Lotan, who was a brother of Sadashiv, and defendant 8, a son of another brother of Sadashiv, one Ananda. The appellant's case was that defendants 1 to 8 were jointly interested in a family shop carried on in the name of Sadashiv Narayan Shimpe. Defendants 9 and 10 are auction-purchasers of the two survey numbers, the subject-matter of the mortgage bond, being purchasers at an auction sale held in execution of a certain decree. The learned Judge held that the mortgage bond was not binding on defendants 4, 6, 7 and 8, defendant 5 being dead. The learned Judge also held that the claim of the plaintiff which he decreed held good against the two properties to the extent only of the shares of defendants 1 and 3 therein. Against this decree the plaintiff has appealed and defendants 9 and 10 have filed cross-objections. The contention of defendants 9 and 10 is that the plaintiff's mortgage is void as against them and the shares of defendants 1 and 3, which form part of the sale to defendants 9 and 10 are not subject to the plaintiff's mortgage.
2. The respondents other than defendants 9 and 10 have not appeared. Mr. Nadkarni, on behalf of defendants 9 and 10, does not contend that defendants 1 to 8 are not members of a joint family. He contends that defendants 1, 2 and 3 were in possession of the properties, the subject-matter of the mortgage as adult members of the family, the other defendants at the time were minors and the plaintiff has failed to show that there was any legal necessity for the mortgage. The ground taken by Mr. Nadkarni is not the same as the ground taken by the learned Judge. The learned Judge held that on the evidence before him he did not believe the plaintiff's gumasta, Gangaram Nago, that defendants 1 to 8 were joint on the date of the bond. The learned Judge was of opinion that there was no other evidence worthy of consideration on the point. We find, however, that in addition to the deposition of Gangaram Nago there is considerable evidence on the record to show that there existed about this time a family shop in which defendants 1 to 8 were interested. The shop dealt in cloth from the year 1908. There is evidence of certain dealings between the plaintiff and this shop. Several promissory notes were passed from time to time by the predecessors in-interest of the defendants and by some of the defendants to the plaintiff in respect of the indebtedness of the shop to the plaintiff for goods supplied or moneys advanced. The mortgage bond of 11th December, 1917 is in respect of such indebtedness. Where a family shop is being carried on for the benefit of a joint family-the powers of the adult members in charge of such shop to borrow money for purposes of the business and mortgage family properties to secure repayment of such money are clearly very wide, as was laid down by this Court in Raghunathji Tarachand v. Bank of Bombay(1). Chandavarkar, J., remarks p. 78:
The rule of Hindu law that debts contracted by a managing member of a joint family are binding on the other members only when they are for a family purpose, is subject to at least one important exception ….. where a family carries on a business or profession, and maintains itself by means of it, the member who manages it for the family has an implied authority to contract debts for its purposes, and the creditor is not bound to inquire into the purpose of the debt to bind the whole family thereby, because that power is necessary for the very existence of the family.
3. The evidence shows that defendants 9 and 10 filed suits and obtained decrees-against the representatives of the three branches of Sadashiv, Lotan and Ananda as members of a joint family in respect of their respective business dealings with the shop. From a consideration of these points the finding of the lower Court that the remaining defendants 4, 6, 7 and 8, are not liable to the plaintiff, appears to me to be incorrect. In my opinions they would be so liable as members of a joint family to the extent of their interest in the joint family properties. With regard to the contentions of defendants 9 and 10: it appears that defendant 9 had filed a suit against the members of the joint family in June 1916 being Suit No. 267 of 1916. On 12th July 1916 he obtained an order in that suit for attachment before judgment. That order was made absolute on 1st March 1-917. On 21st July 1917 the suit was decreed ex parte against some of the defendants in that suit and a consent decree was taken between the plaintiff and the defendants who appeared at the hearing. By the consent decree the decretal amount was made payable by installments and in the meanwhile a charge was created on the properties, the subject-matter of the attachment before judgment. There is nothing in the decree to indicate that the attachment before judgment was raised. Defendant 10 had also filed a suit against the joint family about the same time, being Suit No. 324 of 1916. On 1st August 1916, he obtained an order in the suit for attachment before judgment of properties belonging to the joint family including the properties in suit. That order was made absolute on 9th July, 1917. The claim of defendant 10 was decreed on 11th July, 1917 ex parte against some of the defendants who did not appear, and a consent decree was taken between him and the other defendants who appeared.
4. The mortgage bond in the suit was executed on 11th December, 1917, which is subsequent to the dates of the two orders of attachments and the two decrees obtained in the two suits. The properties were sold in execution proceedings in Suit No. 287 of 1916, one survey number being purchased by defendant 9, the other survey number being purchased by defendant 10. In the proclamation of sale the fact that there was a mortgage on these properties in favour of the appellant was mentioned. The appellant was served with a notice of the proposed sale. The property sold in the execution proceedings, however, was not the equity of redemption to which the members of the joint family would be entitled subject to the mortgage, but was the-property itself. It does not appear from the record that the executing Court held any enquiry into the mortgagee's claim or decided that the attachment was subject no the mortgage. It is contended on behalf of defendants 9 and 10 that at the date of this sale, the original attachment before judgment of 12th July, 1916, was still subsisting and the mortgage bond was executed during the subsistence of the attachment. If that contention is correct the alienation of the property by means of the mortgage bond dated 11th December, 1917 would be void against any interest claimed under the attachment. The case of Ganu Singh v. Jangi Lal(2) is an authority for that proposition. It is there laid down that the effect of an attachment of a property under the Code of Civil Procedure, whether made before or after decree, is the same, provided that in the former case a decree is made for the plaintiff at whose instance the attachment takes place.
5. Mr. Pradhan has argued that the attachment before judgment must be deemed to be merged in the decree. He contends that defendants 9 and 10 by their respective decrees have chosen to substitute for the attachment, a charge on the properties and the fact of the mortgage claim being mentioned in the proclamation of sale is tantamount to the sale having taken place subject to the mortgage claim. Under O. 38, R. 9 of the CPC, it appears that where an order is made for attachment before judgment, the Court shall order the attachment to be withdrawn when the defendant furnishes the security required, together with security for the costs of the attachment, or when the suit is dismissed. Under R. 11, where property is under attachment by virtue of the provisions of O. 38, and a decree is subsequently passed in favour of the plaintiff, it shall not be necessary upon an application for execution of such decree to apply for re-attachment of the property. In the absence of a specific order by the Court raising the attachment before judgment, and in the absence of a definite statement in the decree that the attachment before judgment was being abandoned by the plaintiff, we must take it that the attachment continued. In that view of the case the alienation of the property on 11th December, 1917, by means of the mortgage bond would be void against defendants 9 and 10 under section 64 of the cpc. Mr. Pradhan has argued that the mention of the mortgage in the proclamation of sale debars defendants 9 and 10 from contending that they have not purchased the property subject to the mortgage. In Roshan Lal v. Lallu(3), a similar contention was raised but overruled. The facts in that case were very similar to those with which we have here to deal. I respectfully agree With the ruling of the Allahabad. High Court that the notification of the mortgage at the time of the sale does not prevent the auction-purchasers from disputing its validity.
6. The learned Judge has held that the attachment before judgment must be deemed to have continued as against such of the defendants as were not parties to the consent decree but against whom esparto decrees ware passed. He is of opinion that by the consent decree the attachment came to an end as between the parties to the consent decree and defendants 9 and 10. Defendant 2 was not a party to the consent decree. Defendants 1 and 3 were. On that ground he has held that the shares of defendants 1 and 3 in the properties would be liable for the mortgage debt. I do not agree with that statement of law. In my opinion the attachment continued against all the defendants whether they were parties to the consent decree, or only ex-parte decrees were passed against them. The objection taken by defendants 9 and 10 on this point should, in my opinion, be allowed.
7. Fawcett, A.C.J:— I agree. With regard to the first point, the liability of defendants 4 to 8, no doubt they ware minors at the data of this mortgage bond, and the general rule applies that, where the manager of a joint family business has contracted debts for the ordinary purpose of the family business, the minor coparceners are liable to the extent of their interest in the joint family property. With regard to Raghunathji Tarachand v. Bank of Bombay the judgment of Chandavarkar, J., has been criticized in Vithal Yeshvant v. Shivappa Mallappa(4), where it was held that it was necessary for the mortgagee to prove not only that the mortgagor was carrying on a family business, but also that the money was required for that business. In that particular case it was held that burden of proof was not discharged. In the present casa, however, I think that the findings of the Subordinate Judge on issue 4 clearly suffice to show that the money was required for this family business. The plaintiff's accounts show that defendants 1 to 3 had been purchasing cloth from the plaintiff for their cloth shop from time to time and that the suit bond was passed for the balance of the price.
8. Then the contention that the bond was executed by defendants 1 to 3 in order to prejudice the other defendants, who are members of this joint family was not proved, and, in fact, no evidence was given in support of that contention. Accordingly I think that it is a case where defendants 4 to 8 should have been held liable by the lower Court to the extent of their interest in the joint family property.
9. In regard to the second point, about the mortgage bond being void under Section 64 of the CPC, it is clear that defendants 9 and 10 set up the plea that the mortgage bond was invalid, and the mere fact that they referred to the mortgage in their applications for execution and asked for the property to be sold subject to the mortgage does not preclude them from questioning its validity. This has been ruled in Ganesh v. Purshottam(5), and Narayan Sadoba Halwai…(Original Defendant), v. Umbar Adam Memon…(Original Plaintiff), .*(6). Nor does the fact that this mortgage was also mentioned in the proclamation of sale prevent the provisions of S. 64 applying, if they can otherwise be properly applied. The Subordinate Judge would have applied them but for his view that defendants 9 and 10 must be taken to have substituted a charge for the attachment, so far as the defendants who were parties to the consent decree were concerned. That is to say, he sets up a waiver by defendants 9 and 10 of their rights under the attachment before judgment. But any such waiver must be properly proved; the ordinary principle is that waiver is an intentional act; and a clear act showing such an intention to waive must be shown. In the present case there is no evidence of any such waiver; on the contrary, I find that in the application for execution that was made by defendant 9 in regard to his decree in Civil Suit No. 287 of 1916 (Ex. 82) he expressly says in para. 10:
I apply as follows: firstly that the immovable property mentioned at the end of the darkhast application as belonging to the said … has been already attached previously and that attachment still remains and is continuing and is not raised. Clearly, far from being any waiver, he says the attachment is still continuing. It is not clear whether a similar statement was made in the application of defendant 10 (Ex. 71), because the paper containing para. 10 in that application—according to the translation—appears to have been torn. But even if he did not make a similar assertion that does not establish that he intended to waive his right under the attachment. Accordingly, in my opinion, the view of the lower Court on this point cannot be sustained, and I agree that the mortgage decree for the sale of these two properties should not be upheld.
10. Mr. Pradhan asks that the plaintiff should be allowed to have the properties sold upon his payment of the decretal amounts that defendants 9 and 10 obtained in satisfaction of their decrees. Mr. Nadkarni for defendants 9 and 10 objects to this, and it seems to us that we could not properly pass any such order as defendants 9 and 10 are not in the position of mortgagees but are now auction purchaser with the rights that this involves. It is, of course, open to the plaintiff to try and come to some arrangement with defendants 9 and 10, or their assignees. But it is not possible for us to give relief in this particular form. We, therefore, substitute for that part of the lower Court's decree against defendants 9 and 10 that the property be sold, etc., a decree against defendants 1 to 3 for the sum of Rs. 7,080 and costs of the suit, with interest on Rs. 5,019-3-0 at 6 per cent, per annum from the date of suit to the date of payment, and a decree against defendants 4, 6, 7 and 8 to pay the same amount to the extent of their shares in the joint family property. We also reverse the order that the plaintiff should pay the costs of defendants 4 to 6, and substitute an order that their costs shall be borne by them. As to the order as to costs of defendants 2, 8, 9, 10 and 11, we do not interfere with the order for costs in regard to defendants 2, 3, and 9; but in regard to the costs of defendants 10 and 11, we direct that the plaintiff-appellant shall bear one set of costs in regard to them both in the lower Court. No order as to the costs of the cross-objections.
11. Decree varied.
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