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State Of West Bengal & Ors. (Through The Secretary Housing Deptt.) v. Deb Kumar Mukherjee & Ors. S
Structured Summary of the Opinion (Sen, J.)
Factual and Procedural Background
This appeal challenges an order of the Learned Single Judge which had made the Rule absolute in a writ petition filed by certain Inspectors of the Housing Department. The Single Judge directed, inter alia, that the petitioners' pay scale be revised to Rs. 425-1030 after unifying and abolishing two grades in the post of Inspectors of the Housing Department with effect from 1 April 1981, and ordered payment of all arrears of salaries and allowances within four months of communication of that order.
Relevant factual history (as recited in the opinion): The post of Inspector was created circa March 1956 in the Development Department (later transferred to the Housing Department) originally on a temporary basis and with a pay scale of Rs. 100-200. Recruitment regulations allowed graduates in government service to be eligible and the duties included office and field inspection tasks such as verification of income, examination of accounts, verification of title deeds and land matters. By notification in 1961 the pay scales were revised and the Inspectors' scale was fixed at Rs. 150-250 (a scale also prescribed for Lower Division Clerks), which prompted challenge as arbitrary. A Government Order dated 4 June 1965 created a gradation into Inspector Grade-I (higher scale) and Inspector Grade-II (lower scale). Subsequent Pay Commission recommendations (notably recommending Rs. 350-600 and abolition of gradation) were not fully implemented as alleged by the petitioners, and later revisions (including rules of 1981) again left differential scales for Grade-I and Grade-II Inspectors. The petitioners challenged the gradation and pay fixation as discriminatory and violative of Articles 14 and 16 (and invoking the constitutional goal of equal pay for equal work).
On the writ petition the Single Judge ruled in favour of the petitioners and issued the directions described above. The State (appellants) appealed against that judgment. The Division Bench (Sen, J. delivering the judgment; Sengupta, J. agreeing) dismissed the appeal and declined to interfere with the Single Judge's order; there was no order as to costs.
Legal Issues Presented
- Whether the creation of two grades of Inspectors (Grade-I and Grade-II) and fixation of different pay scales for Inspectors of the Housing Department was arbitrary or irrational and therefore violative of Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution of India.
- Whether the principle of "equal pay for equal work" (drawing on Article 39(d) as a constitutional directive and its interpretation in case law) required abolition of the gradation and revision of pay scales to a single, common scale for all Inspectors performing identical duties.
- Whether the pay fixation and gradation among Inspectors of the Housing Department could be justified by any intelligible differentia or relevant considerations (including differing duties, qualifications, or promotional prospects) as contemplated by the twin test for permissible classification.
- Whether Inspectors of the Housing Department could be equated with clerical posts (Lower Division/Upper Division Clerks) for the purpose of pay fixation, or whether their duties and status justified pay parity with Inspectors in other departments.
- Whether the appellate court should interfere with the Learned Single Judge's order that made the writ petition Rule absolute and directed revision of pay and payment of arrears.
Arguments of the Parties
Respondents / Writ Petitioners' Arguments
- The gradation into Inspector Grade-I and Grade-II and the fixation of different pay scales lack any rational nexus to differences in duties, responsibilities or qualifications and are therefore arbitrary and discriminatory.
- From 1961 onward the Inspectors formed an integrated cadre; their duties (including significant field work, verification of income, title deeds and assuming responsibilities in absence of senior staff) were identical and not merely clerical, and could not justify lower pay for some Inspectors.
- The 1961 Pay Commission and subsequent Pay Commission recommendations (including recommendation of Rs. 350-600 and abolition of gradation) recognised that the lower scale was not commensurate with duty; the Government's failure to adopt such recommendations and continuing disparity amounted to denial of equal pay for equal work in violation of Articles 14 and 16 and the constitutional goal under Article 39(d).
- The persistence of discrimination by equating some Inspectors with Lower Division Clerks (scale for LDC) and keeping gradation alive is unconstitutional; where relevant considerations are same, persons holding identical posts cannot be treated differently in pay.
- The petitioners sought relief via representation to authorities and by making presentations to Pay Commissions; they then moved the writ petition and obtained relief from the Single Judge.
Appellants / State Government's Arguments
- There are only seven posts of Inspectors in the Housing Department; Grade-I posts were created (1965) mainly to provide promotional opportunities for senior incumbents.
- Respondents Nos.1 and 2 (Grade-I) are senior and therefore rightly have higher scales; Grade-II Inspectors were recruited later and may continue to have separate status and promotional avenues (including lien with Lower Division Clerk posts).
- The duties of the Inspectors are general in nature and not technical or specialised; the contention that they perform higher duties than clerks is exaggerated.
- Recruitment and promotion patterns (including transfers from Lower Division Clerk cadre, and promotions to clerical posts) reflect administrative policy and justify the classification; recruitment rules framed later (referred to in the record) allow different modes of recruitment and promotion between grades.
- Implementation of the Single Judge's order would cause administrative difficulties and financial burden on the State.
Table of Precedents Cited
| Precedent | Rule or Principle Cited For | Application by the Court in this Case |
|---|---|---|
| Budhan Choudhury v. State of Bihar, AIR 1955 SC 191 | Sets out the "twin test" for permissible classification under Article 14: (i) classification must be founded on an intelligible differentia; (ii) the differentia must have a rational nexus to the object sought to be achieved. | The court relied on this twin test to evaluate whether the Grade-I/Grade-II classification of Inspectors had an intelligible differentia and rational nexus to any legitimate objective. The court found no basis for two different pay scales where qualifications and duties were the same. |
| D.S. Nakra v. Union of India, (1983) 1 SCC 305 : AIR 1983 SC 130 | Discusses "equal pay for equal work": (a) matters of pay fixation generally for Executive and Pay Commissions but courts intervene when there is identical work and no justification for differential pay; (b) equal pay for equal work is a constitutional goal deducible from Articles 14, 16 and Article 39(d). | The court applied the principle that when all relevant considerations are the same, identical posts cannot be paid differently merely because they belong to different departments; used this to support the view that the Housing Department Inspectors could not be kept on a lower scale without explanation. |
| P.K. Ramchandra Iyer v. Union of India, (1984) 2 SCC 141 : AIR 1984 SC 541 | Affirms that "equal pay for equal work" is deducible from Articles 14, 16 and 39(d) and that irrational or no-classification-based differential pay can be corrected by courts; demonstrates issuance of mandamus where classification was irrational. | The court cited this authority to reinforce that an irrational classification (or no classification) leading to unequal pay among identical incumbents warrants judicial correction; this supported upholding the Single Judge's order in favour of petitioners. |
| Dhirendra Chamoli v. State of U.P., (1986) 1 SCC 637 | Holds that employees cannot be denied equality simply because they accepted lesser terms on joining; equality under Article 14 cannot be avoided on grounds such as prior acceptance of lower wages and relief may be given even where there is delay if fundamental rights violated. | The court used the reasoning to reject any suggestion that earlier acceptance of lower terms bars relief; it observed that silence in the State's affidavit as to why Housing Department Inspectors were paid less is significant and that arguments of exploitation cannot justify unequal treatment. |
Court's Reasoning and Analysis
The Division Bench undertook the following analytical steps (summarised as presented in the opinion):
- Examined the creation of two grades (by Government Order dated 4 June 1965) for Inspectors in the Housing Department and noted that, within the Housing Department, qualifications and the nature of duties of Inspectors in both grades were the same. On that basis the court concluded there was no rational basis for maintaining two different pay scales for Inspectors of the Housing Department.
- Considered the petitioners' contention that the Pay Commission recommendations (which recognised parity and recommended abolition of gradation and a higher uniform scale) had not been implemented for the Housing Department Inspectors, and that some Inspectors were equated to Lower Division Clerks contrary to those recommendations.
- Weighed the State's contention that Grade-I posts were created to provide promotional benefits and that Inspectors' duties were "general" and akin to clerical work. The court tested this against the record and recruitment rules.
- Reviewed the proposed and subsequently accepted recruitment rules (as placed before the court) which indicated mechanisms of appointment and promotion: Inspector Grade-I by promotion from Grade-II; Inspector Grade-II by selection from Lower Division Clerks or by direct recruitment requiring a degree (where direct recruitment was used). The court treated this documentary material as relevant to the question of status and duties.
- Compared the scope for further promotion: noted that Inspector Grade-I did not appear to have promotion avenues similar to Upper Division Assistants who could progress to Section Officer posts; this undermined the State's claim that Grade-I was identical in status to Upper Division Assistants.
- Applied the precedents cited (Budhan Choudhury, D.S. Nakra, P.K. Ramchandra Iyer, Dhirendra Chamoli) to the facts: the twin-test for classification and the constitutional goal of "equal pay for equal work" were used to assess whether differential pay could be sustained. The court observed the State's pleadings were silent about any material distinctions justifying lower pay for some Inspectors.
- Concluded that the Inspectors could not be equated with clerks and that the duties of Housing Department Inspectors were similar to Inspectors in other departments; therefore the State's justification for differential pay failed.
- On this basis, the court found no reason to interfere with the Single Judge's order that had remedied the discriminatory pay fixation; consequently, the appeal was dismissed.
Holding and Implications
Holding: APPEAL DISMISSED.
Implications (direct effects recorded in the opinion):
- The Division Bench declined to interfere with the Learned Single Judge's decision which had made the writ petition Rule absolute and issued directions including revision/unification of pay scales for the petitioning Inspectors and payment of arrears. Those directions therefore remain effective as the appellate court dismissed the appeal.
- The court expressly found no sustainable justification for the Grade-I/Grade-II classification within the Housing Department where qualifications and duties were the same; accordingly the classification was treated as lacking rational basis for differential pay. This is an application of established principles (Articles 14 and 16 and the doctrine of equal pay for equal work) to the facts of the case rather than the creation of a novel legal principle.
- There was no order as to costs.
- The opinion does not purport to lay down any new precedent beyond applying established authorities to the facts; the decision’s immediate consequence is the upholding of the Single Judge's remedial orders for the petitioners in this case.
Note: This summary strictly reflects only the information contained in the provided opinion and does not add or infer facts or legal conclusions beyond that text.
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by
Sen, J.:— This appeal is directed against an order of the Learned Single Judge whereby the Learned Judge made the Rule absolute in the writ petition filed by the respondents. Learned edge also passed, inter alia, the following directions:
“The respondents are directed to revise the Pay Scale of the petitioners in the Scale of Rs. 425-1030/- after unifying and abolition of the two grades in the post of Inspectors of Housing Department with effect from the 1st April, 1981. Respondents are directed to pay to the petitioners all arrears of salaries and allowances within four months from the date of communication of this order.”
2. The facts, inter alia leading to this appeal are that the post of Inspectors were created in or about March, 1956 in the Development Department under the Government of West Bengal. For the purpose of appointment to the said post of Inspectors, the Government prescribed recruitment regulations and according to the said regulations graduates working in the Government offices were eligible for selection and appointment. For the purpose of appointment to the said post of inspectors knowledge of Civil and Criminal Law and their applications were essential, apart from the fact that they should be well conversant with the office procedures and accounts matters. Though the said posts were originally created for the Development Department the said posts were transferred to the Housing Department and the Inspectors were to look after the Middle Income Group Housing and Low Income Group Housing and the scale of pay prescribed for the said post of Inspector was Rs. 100-200/-. Originally the posts were created on temporary basis. By a notification issued by the Department of Finance, Government of West Bengal being Notification No. 5472-F bated 27th December, 1961 published in the Calcutta Gazette Extraordinary dated 2nd January, 1962 the said department amended the West Bengal Service Rules 1961, by prescribing and/or reviving the scale of pay of the employees under the Government of West Bengal notwithstanding the fact that the respondents as Inspectors were employees under the Government of West Bengal and notwithstanding the fact that as inspectors were employees under the Government of West Bengal and the cadre of Inspector was borne in the cadre of Civil servant, the said Pay Commission kept silent with regard to scales prescribed for the said post of Inspectors and though the said revision in the scales of pay was for abolishing the different scales of pay for the same post earning same and similar nature of responsibilities recommended the scale of pay Rs. 150-250/- for the Inspectors of the Housing Department. As a matter of fact this revision in the scale of pay and fixation of the scale of pay at Rs. 150-250/- was challanged in the writ petition as wholly arbitrary and the said fixation was alleged to have been made without making any assessment, without considering the responsibilities and the performances attached to the said post. It is significant to note that the said scale of pay was prescribed for the Lower Division Clerk. It is further contention of the respondents/writ petitioners in the writ petition that from the very beginning i.e from 1961 the post of inspectors in the Housing Department were included in the proper cadre and the status of the inspectors were not at all maintained and, therefore, the posts of Inspectors were even lower in status than the Upper Division Clerk. It is the further case of the writ petitioners that for the purpose of appointment as a Lower Division Clerk the required qualification was Matriculate and the nature of job is stereotyped and completely clerical. From the recruitment regulations and prescription of eligibility criteria it would reveal that post of Inspector could in no way be equated with Upper Division Clerk even not to speak of Lower Division Clerk. As a matter of fact the nature of job of Inspectors was prescribed by the Government Order No. 1900-I E-87/55 dated 2.3.1956 and from the said Government Order it would reveal that the duties and responsibilities of the Inspectors are verification of income of the applicants and that of the surety by examining the trade licence and various other licences and examination of books of accounts and verification of pay certificate and verification of title deeds and documents in the matter of agricultural land for ascertaining the income from the source of agriculture. Secondly, to verify the title to the land where the proposed building was to be erected and mortgaged to the Government.
3. It is the further contention of the writ petitioners/respondents that it would be crystal clear that duties and responsibilities of the Inspectors are not only in office but also in the field in the nature of inspection. From the said Government order it would also reveal that if on any occasion the Head Clerk is absent, Inspectors are to take the charge of the work of the Head Clerk and in absence of Officer-in-Charge of the department to meet the visitors. In the said Government order the official works were also prescribed. It is very unfortunate that the Pay Commission which prescribed the scale of pay on the basis of duties and responsibilities attached to the said post revised the scales of pay and on that basis recommended a scale of pay which is wholly unwarranted for the post of Inspector of Housing Department. It is further significant to note that the said pay Commission recommended the scale of pay as Rs. 175-325/- for inspectors of other departments who possess less academic qualification and perform less duties and responsibilities. Therefore, the recommendation of the Pay Commission with regard to the scale of pay for inspectors was made not on any objective and or rational materials but the said was made on some subjective and on imaginary grounds.
4. That against the aforesaid arbitrary fixation of pay of the Inspectors of the Housing Department the writ petitioners/respondents submitted representation before the appropriate authority and the appropriate authority could well realise the contention and/or grievances of the Inspectors of the Housing Department and in order to meet the grievances of the Inspectors instead of abolishing the discrimination, the respondents further reiterated their discriminatory action by creating gradation among the same grades of Inspectors. As a matter of fact by Government Order No. 2044 dated 4th June, 1965 the post of Inspectors were graded one as Inspector Grade-I in the scale of pay Rs. 175-325/- and another as inspector Grade-II in the scale of pay Rs. 150-250.
5. It is the further contention of the writ petitioners/respondents that the said gradation of the post of Inspectors as Grade-I and Grade-II and prescribing a higher scale of pay for grade-I has no rational nexus between the performance, duties and responsibilities and this scale of pay attached to the said post and as such this Government order is on the face of it arbitrary, devoid of any reason and capricious. It has been alleged that there was and there is no intelligible differentia amongst the Inspectors for the purpose of enabling the Respondents to make a rational discrimination amongst the Inspectors. The writ petitioners/respondents submitted that the Inspectors performing same and identical nature of job cannot be discriminated with regard to fixation of scale of pay. It is the case of the respondents/writ petitioners that the Inspectors of the Housing Department are a class by themselves and there is no difference between the work of Inspectors Grade-I and Inspectors Grade-II and, therefore, the fixation of higher scale of pay for a particular group of Inspectors and fixation of pay in lower scale for another group are highly discriminatory and violative of rights guaranteed under Articles 4 and 16 of the Constitution of India. The writ petitioners respondents submitted that the respondents as inspectors of Housing Department are performing the same and identical nature of job and as such the respondents according to their accepted principles have issued different notifications in similar circumstances the discrimination, distinction, difference among the same class of Government employee, should be abolished and one scale of pay should be introduced for Inspectors of Housing Department as they are engaged in similar same and identical nature of job.
6. It is the further contention of the writ petitioners respondents that the respondents submitted a memorandum to the Chairman of the pay Commission of 1961 and the Commission after perusing the record and going through the memorandum was prima facie satisfied that the scales of pay fixed for the Inspectors Grade-I and Grade-II are discriminatory and also realised that the scale of pay that was prescribed in 1961 for all the inspectors as Rs. 150-250/- is also not commensurate with the work and or duties and responsibilities attached to the said post of Inspector and as such the Commission recommended revised scale of pay of Rs. 350-600/- and also they further recommended to abolish the artificial gradation that was made purporting to mitigate the grievances of the inspectors of Housing Department.
7. It is very significant to note that though the Government could well realise that the Inspectors of the Housing Department have been deprived of scale of pay commensurate with their duties and responsibilities and notwithstanding the fact that the Chairman of Pay Commission, 1970 clearly recommended the scale of pay of the Inspectors as Rs. 350-600/- and abolition of gradation by the West Bengal Services Rules, 1970, the scale of pay for the inspectors of L.I.G.H Scheme, Howrah, Collectorate was equated with the scale of pay of the Lower Division Clerk, i.e Rs. 230-05/- later on the Housing Department allowed the inspectors Grade-I the scale of pay of Rs. 350-600/- and the inspectors Grade-II were kept in the cadre of Lower Division Clerk by forcing them to draw scale of pay of Rs. 230-425/-. The learned advocate for writ petitioners/respondents submitted that the discrimination that was started from 1961 was reaffirmed by the 2nd Pay Commission and or second revision of the scales of pay in 1981. It has further been submitted that by this fixation of scale of pay for Inspectors of the Housing Department and keeping gradation alive the respondents authorities have violated the constitutional provisions guaranteed under Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution of India. That this fixation of scale of pay in 1970 for Inspectors Grade-I AND Grade-II has no relevant connection between the pay and performance of duties and obligations of respective offices and that such fixation of the scale of pay is wholly arbitrary devoid of any reason and on the face of it capricious. The writ petitioners respondents contended that there was no reason and there cannot be any reasonable ground and/or any intelligible differentia in keeping alive the discrimination among the same categories of persons and making an artificial differentia among the same categories of persons by grading Grade-I and Grade-II posts of Inspectors carrying different scales of pay but the duties and responsibilities remaining same and identical. The writ petitioners respondents further contended that this prescription of higher scale of pay for some Inspectors and lower scale of pay for some other Inspectors though they were appointed on same basis and same qualification and for performing the same and identical nature of job, amounted to unreasonable and irrational classification and treated equals as unequals. Whatever be its activity the Government is still the Government and is subject to restrain inherent in its position in a democratic society. Constitutional power conferred on the Government cannot be exercised by it arbitrarily or capriciously or in unprincipled manner. The case of the writ petitioners/respondents is that the powers conferred on the Government or public authority were to be exercised for the public good and that every activity of the Government must have a public element in it and it must, therefore, be with reasons and guided by public interest. Every action taken by the Government must be in public interest and Government cannot act arbitrarily without any reason, in the instant case the fixation of scale of pay of the Inspectors as was observed by the Chairman, Pay Commission of 1961 and from his recommendation it would reveal that the gradation among the Inspectors and fixation of separate scale of pay for each grade is wholly arbitrary and, therefore, recommended one single scale of pay i.e Rs. 350-600/- but the Government in refusing to accept the said recommendation did not assign any reason and on the contrary, the respondents reiterated their discriminatory action and equated a group of Inspectors with the Lower Division Clerk and kept alive the gradation which is the artificial gradation without any intelligible differentia and therefore, this fixation of scale of pay which is artificial gradation created among the same categories of persons is wholly unconstitutional and invalid.
8. It is the further contention of the writ petitioners/respondents that the fixation of scale of pay of Inspectors and their gradation amounts to treating equal as unequals. Article 14 forbids class legislation but permit reasonable classification for the purpose of legislation which classification must satisfy the twin test of classification being founded on intelligible differentia which distinguishes persons from things that are group and that such differentia must have a rational nexus to the object sought to be achieved by the gradation. The respondents submitted that the privilege of the scale of pay of Rs. 350-600/- given by the Government to Inspectors Grade-II keeping other Inspector out of the paid cadre has destroyed the bed of equality as enshrined in Article 14 of the Constitution of India. The writ petitioners/respondents further submitted that gradation among the same categories of persons and fixation of the same scale of pay according to the gradation without keeping in mind the duties and responsibilities and the jobs performed by the Inspectors affects the interest relating to public employment and it is violative of Article 16 of the Constitution of India and the same in violative of well settled principle and/or concept of equal pay for equal work. It has been submitted that when it was found that there cannot be any differentia between the Inspectors, they should have acted fairly and should have given equal treatment to all Inspectors of the Housing Department who perform the same and identical nature of job. The writ petitioner/respondents further submitted that Article 39D of the Constitution of India imposes upon the respondents an obligation to see that the constitutional goal as enshrined in the said Article i.e equal pay for equal work is maintained. The respondents stated that where all relevant considerations are same persons performing same and identical nature of job cannot be treated differently in the matter of their pay merely because they belong to different offices.
9. It is further contention of the writ petitioners/respondents that when the 3rd Pay Commission was set up, it was expected that in order to sationalise scales of pay among the public servant the said Pay Commission would definitely abolish the discrimination in fixation of pay which was made earlier but unfortunately by the Revision of Pay and Allowances Rules, 1981 the scales of pay of Grade-I Inspectors have been revised in the scale of Rs. 380-910/- and whereas the scale of pay of the Inspectors Grade-II has been revised as Rs. 340-750/-. This revision in the scale of pay is nothing but revising and/or keeping alive the discrimination which was started since 1971. The writ petitioners/respondents submitted that from instance given, below it would be crystal clear that the Inspectors of the Housing Department have been deprived of their legitimate claim and the scale of pay which is commensurate with the position status and duties and responsibilities of the same post.
10. Inspector, Animal Husbandary and Dairy Department whose scale of pay was revised as Rs. 200-400/- in 1961, was given Rs. 300-600/- in 1971 and Rs. 425-1050/- was given in 1982 though the qualification for the said post is intermediate.
11. From the chart mentioned in the writ petitioner it appears that the Inspectors attached to the Housing Department were and are always discriminated from the Inspectors of other department in as much as Inspectors of Housing Department were and are discriminated among themselves with regard to fixation of their scales of pay. The writ petitioners-respondents further submitted that there cannot be any gradation among the same categories of persons and there cannot be any discrimination in fixation of pay of same categories of persons. The categorisation of Grade-I and Grade-II is nothing but manifestation of the ??? autocracy in order to create a division among the same categories of person. As stated herein before there cannot be any reason and/or ground for categorising the Inspectors into two categories when all considerations are the same. It has been submitted on behalf of the respondents that gradation of the Inspectors as Grade I and Grade II is violative of Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution of India as it makes a discrimination among the same ??? of Inspectors of the Housing Departments were appointed alike on the basis of the same qualification and experience and eligibility and the said Inspectors formed an integrated cadre, no discrimination could thereafter be made in favour of some Inspectors. It was submitted that this fixation of scale of pay and the gradation among the same categories of persons is wholly arbitrary and as such per se amounts to denial of protection of law.
12. It is the further contention of the writ petitioners/respondents that all the respondents formed one single integrated category i.e Inspectors of Housing Department as such the scale of pay of the respondents should be fixed in the scale of Rs. 200-400/- from 1961, Rs. 350-600/- in 1971 and Rs. 425-1050/- from 1981 and non-granting of the said scale of pay is wholly arbitrary. The respondents/writ petitioners submitted that as Inspectors of Housing Department formed one integrated category there cannot be two scales of pay among the same categories of employees.
13. The learned advocate for writ petitioners/respondents further submitted that the respondents/writ petitioners were represented before the Pay Commission set up in 1977 by the Association to which they belong but without any offer.
14. They demanded justice but justice has not been done.
15. Under such circumstances, they moved the aforesaid writ petition and succeeded therein.
16. It has been submitted on behalf of the appellants that in the Housing Department and under its control, there are in all seven posts of Inspectors and out of the said seven posts the respondents Nos. 1 and 2 are Grade-I. Inspectors and they are senior in service to respondents Nos. 3, 4, 3 and 6 who are Grade-II Inspectors of the said Department. Respondents Nos. 3, 4, 5 and 6 entered into service much latter than the respondents Nos. 1 and 2. The respondents Nos. 1 and 2 are now in the scale of Rs. 380-910/- whereas the scale of respondents Nos. 3 to 6 who are grade-II Inspectors, have been placed in the scale of Rs. 340-750/-. It has been alleged that initially in the Department in the cadre of Inspector there was no scope for any promotion. In 1965, the authorities by Government Order dated 4.6.1965 as contained in Memo No. 2044 H.E decided that a few posts of Grade-I Inspectors would be created for giving promotion on the basis of Seniority. It has been submitted that the Grade-I and Grade-II Inspectors of the same cadre was made just only to open promotional benefits to the members belonging to the said cadre.
17. It has further been submitted that the recruitment Rules for the posts of the Inspectors were framed in 1988. In the said Rules it has been provided that the method of recruitment to Inspectors Grade-I is by way of promotion from the cadre of Inspectors Grade-II. But the method of recruitment to the said cadre of Inspector is by way of Selection or by transfer from the cadre of Lower Division Clerk. But the qualification for the said direct recruitment to the cadre of Inspector is Higher Secondary or its equivalent but for recruitment to the cadre of Inspector by way of transfer it equivalent to the qualification of a Lower Division Clerk. It may be mentioned that Lower Division Clerks did not require Higher Secondary pass Certificate or its equivalent. Only Graduate in Government Service is considered for appointment to the post of Inspector is not the correct fact. It is further pointed out that the Inspector, Grade-II can also avail themselves of Promotion of the next higher post. It may be pointed out that Grade-II Inspectors already continue their lien in the post of Lower Division Clerks and accordingly, they get promotion to the Upper Division Clerks. To be more clear it has been submitted that in the Housing Department Inspectors Grade-II are transferred from Lower Division Clerks with lien in the said clerical post. Thereafter those Grade-II Inspectors get promotion to the Upper Division Clerks when their turn comes. This practice has been continuing in the said department for the last more than 20 years.
18. It has also been contended that regarding the nature of job of the Inspectors of both the groups there is nothing peculiar. According to the appellants the contention of the writ petitioners respondents as made in the writ petition regarding the nature of there job is not correct and the same has been rather exaggerated. The duties of higher officers in the department have been shown to be discharged by the respondents but this contention of the respondent is far from the truth. To be more clear the nature of duties of the Inspectors is of general nature. There is nothing about any technical, legal or any other specified branch of knowledge.
19. It has further been submitted that in the Housing Department the recruitment to the posts of Upper Division Clerk is generally made from the Lower Division Clerks. The employees get promotion to various channels including Grade-II, Inspectors wherefrom an employee may either be promoted to Grade-I or to Upper Division Clerk. Thus the weight (scale) status of Inspector Grade-I and Upper Division Clerk is same. The claim of the writ petitioners/respondents is that they discharge higher duties, better responsibilities and have got higher qualification than the clerks though they should be treated as a separate class and they should be given higher monetary benefit by way of higher scale of pay cannot have any basis. It has further been submitted that the recruitment to the posts of Inspectors is purely an affair of the regional office of the Housing Department. Their appointments and thereafter promotion either to the Inspector or to the clerical line it purely a policy of the Government and these qualifications have been brought only just to have better and more classified allotment of duties. This classification at Inspectors from the clerical staff is only meant for the qualification as well at allotment of duties of the Housing Department. It has been submitted on behalf of the appellant that the claim of the respondents it that they belonged to a higher cadre, consequently they can claim higher scale of pay is not correct.
20. It has also been submitted that impugned judgment and order if given effect to will create serious administrative troubles and there will be financial burden on the State Government.
21. It appears to us that firstly, the Government order dated June 4, 1963 by which the Government has created two grades i.e Inspector Grade-I and Inspector Grade-II only in so far as the Housing Department is concerned providing two different series as mentioned above, even though the qualifications, the nature of duties are same and that there it no basis for making or providing two scales in the facts and circumstances of the case.
22. Secondly, it has been urged that when the Inspectors of other department have been given the pay scale of Rs. 450-1050/- the respondents should also give that pay scale to the writ petitioners on the principles of equal pay for equal work.
23. It was further submitted by the Learned Advocate for the writ petitioner that in the instant case the respondents refused to pay equal pay for equal work in respect of the Housing Department Inspectors among themselves as well as in comparison with the other Inspectors of other department under the Government of West Bengal. It was submitted by the writ petitioners that the action in this behalf taken by the respondent state Government, was highly illegal, arbitrary, discriminatory and violative of Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution. It was farther submitted that there was no rational basis for making classification of Inspectors into two Grades-Grade-I & Grade-II ignoring the principle of equal pay scale for equal work and inspire of the fact that they all perform the same nature of duties and take up similar responsibilities. In this connection reference was made to the case reported in (1) AIR 1955 SC 191 at page 193 (Budhan Choudhury v. State of Bihar) wherein the Supreme Court held that Article 14 only forbids class legislation:—
“It does not forbid reasonable classification for the purpose of legislation. In order, however, to pass the test of permissible classification two conditions must be fulfilled (Twin Test) viz.:
(i) That the classification must be founded on an intelligible differentia which distinguishes persons or things that are grouped together from others left out of the group and (ii) that the differentia must have a rational relations to the object sought to be achieved by the status in question. What is necessary is that there must be a nexus between the basis of classification and the object of the Act under consideration. It is also well established by the decision of the Hon'ble Supreme Court that Article 14 condemns discrimination not only by a substantive law but also by a law of procedure.”
24. Further reference was made from time to time to the case of (2) D.S Nakra v. Union of India reported in (1983) 1 SCC 305 : AIR 1983 SC 130 at page 134 where the Supreme Court considered the scope of “equal pay for equal work”, Supreme Court observed in that case as follows:—
“In that case, the writ petitioner before the Supreme Court was a driver cum Constable in the Delhi Police Force and he demanded that his scale of pay should at least be the same at the scale of pay of other drivers in the service of the Delhi Administration. There, the Supreme Court held as follows:—
“We conclude that equation of posts and equation of pay are matters primally for the Executive Government and expert bodies like the Pay Commission and not for Courts but we must hasten to say that where all things are equal that is, where all relevant considerations are the same, persons holding identical posts may not be treated differentially in the matter of their pay merely because they belong to different departments. Of course, if officers of the same rank perform dissimilar functions and the powers, duties and responsibilities of the posts held by them vary, such officers may not be heard to complain of dissimilar pay merely because the posts are of the same rank and the nomenclature is the same.”
“It is true that the principle of ‘equal pay for equal work’ is not expressly declared by our Conciliation to be a fundamental right. But it certainly is a Constitutional goal. Article 39(d) of the Constitution proclaims ‘equal pay of equal work’ for both men and women as a Directive Principle of State Policy, ‘Equal pay for equal work for both men and women’ means equal pay for equal work for everyone and as between the nexus. Directive principles as has been pointed out in some of the judgments of this Court have to be read into the fundamental rights at a matter of interpretation. Construing Articles 14 and 16 in the light of the preamble and Article 39(d), we are of the view that the principle ‘Equal pay for equal work’ is deducible from those Articles and may be properly applied to cases of in equal scales of pay based on no classification or irrational classification though those drawing the different scales of pay do identical work under the same employer.”
25. The Supreme Court also observed in that case that “the respondents in their affidavit did not explain how the case of driver in the Police Force was different from that of the drivers in the other departments and what special factors weighed in fixing a lower scale of pay for them.”
“In the case of (3) P.K Ramchandra Iyer v. Union of India, reported in (1984) 2 SCC 141 : AIR 1984 SC 541 the Supreme Court followed the decision of Ramadhir Singh (Supra) and held that ‘equal pay for equal work’ is deducible from Articles 14, 16 and 39(d) and may be properly applied to cases of unequal scales of pay based on no classification or irrational classification though those drawing the different scales of pay do identical work under the same employer. The Supreme Court held in that case that no attempt was made to sustain the scales of pay of Professor on the doctrine of classification because the classification of existing incumbents as being ??? and separate from newly recruited hands with flimsy change in essential qualification would be wholly irrational and arbitrary. The Supreme Court, therefore, issued a writ of Mandamus directing the Government to put the petitioners in the revised scale of pay where all relevant considerations are the same the parsons holding identical post and discharging similar duties cannot be treated differently.
26. Supreme Court observed as follows in the case of (4) Dhirendra Chamoli v. State of U.P reported in (1986) 1 SCC 637:
“It is peculiar on the part of the Central Government to urge that there persons took up employment with the Nehru Yuvak Kendras knowing fully well that they will be paid only daily wages and therefore they cannot claim more. Tale argument lies ill in the mouth of the Central Government for it is an all two familiar argument with the exploiting class and a welfare state committed to a socialist pattern of society cannot be permitted to advance such an argument. It must be remembered that in this country where there is so much unemployment, the choice for the majority of the people is to starve or to take employment on whatever exploitative terms are offered by the employer. The fact that these employees accepted employment with full knowledge that they will be paid only daily wages and they will not get the same salary and conditions of service as other Class-IV employees, cannot provide as escape to the Central Government to avoid the mandate of equality enshrined in Article 14 of the Constitution. This article declares that there shall be equality before law and equal protection of the law and should not be permitted to challenge the validity of the same on the ground of inordinate delay. On this question it was submitted by the learned Advocate for the petitioner that the delay should not debar the petitioner from obtaining any relief when it established that the impugned action violates the fundamental rights guaranteed under the Constitution of India. Further, the Affidavit-in-Opposition is totally silent on the question why the Inspectors of other departments have been paid higher scale of pay of Rs. 425-1050/- without giving the same to the Inspectors of the Housing Department.
27. Learned Advocate for the State Government stated that the Inspectors of the Housing Department are performing the same duty as that of Clerks. We have considered the records and it appears to us that the Inspector cannot be equated with the Clerks and, as such the contention of the appellants they cannot get same pay as that of the Inspector of other departments cannot be accepted. It appears from the proposed amendment to the recruitment Rules for the posts of Inspector on 6th August, 1986 that the Inspector Grade-I to be appointed by promotion from the cadre of Inspector Grate-II is to be appointed by selection on the basis of merit-cum-seniority from the cadre of Lower Division Clerks of the respective district/housebuilding loan office having at least five years experience in departmental work, and they should have as minimum qualification a degree of an Indian University in the event of direct recruitment by selection. A xerox copy of the letter addressed from the Deputy Secretary to the Government of West Bengal, the Secretary, Public Service Commission regarding proposed recruitment rules has been produced in court. The same proposed rules were subsequently incorporated and accepted by the Government. The said rules are set out herein below:—
Proposed Recruitment Rules
‘A’ Inspector Gr. I by promotion from the cadre of Inspector, Gr. II ‘B’ Inspector G. II(i) By selection on the bails of merit-cum-seniority from the cadre of Lower Division Clerks of the respective district/house building loan office having at least five years experience in departmental work.
(ii) By direct recruitment through selection:
a) Qualification: A degree of an Indian University.
b) Age: Not more than 33 years on the first day of January of the year of recruitment.
28. That apart, it does not appear to us that there is any scope for promotion from the post of Inspector Grade-I whereas from the Upper Division Assistants there are promotions to the post of Section Officer etc. Under such circumstances, the contention of the Learned Advocate for the State Government that the post of Inspector Grade-I is identical with that of grade of Upper Division Assistants cannot have any basis. Their duties are different from that of Clerks. They are discharging duties and functions similar in nature to Inspector of other departments.
29. Accordingly, we do not find any reason to interfere with the judgment and order under appeal. The appeal is, accordingly, dismissed.
30. There will be no order as to costs.
31. Sengupta, J.: I agree.
32. S.K.G
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