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Dodbasappa Dharmappa v. Pradkanappa Venkappa And Others

Bombay High Court
Jul 10, 1925
Smart Summary (Beta)

Concise Analytical Summary of the Opinion

Factual and Procedural Background

The plaintiff-appellant, Dodbsappa, purchased the right, title and interest of defendant No. 3 (Shiddappa) and defendant No. 4 (Pundappa) in the land in suit in execution of a money decree obtained by Rangrao in Suit No. 62 of 1905. The sale was confirmed and the appellant received the Bale certificate in 1907. The present suit was instituted by the appellant for possession of the land.

Defendants-respondents Nos. 1 and 2 resisted possession on the ground that they were mortgagees in possession and that the mortgage had not expired. Defendants Nos. 3 and 4 resisted on the ground that the appellant was guilty of fraud in execution. Both the trial Court (Subordinate Judge) and the appellate (Assistant Judge) Court upheld the respondents' pleas and dismissed the plaintiff's suit. The plaintiff appealed to the Court giving rise to this opinion.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether respondents are barred from asserting the present defence because they failed to set aside the execution sale within the time or procedure provided (reference to Order XXI, rule 90 was raised by the appellant).
  2. Whether respondent No. 4's pleadings were deficient because they did not give particulars of the alleged fraud (reference to Order VI, rule 4 and the requirement of particulars).
  3. Whether the trial Court improperly and without jurisdiction framed additional issues (issues Nos. 8–11) after perusing execution records, and whether findings of fraud or misrepresentation were based on surmise rather than admissible evidence (issues under Order XIV, rule 3 and rule 5).
  4. Whether findings of collusion between the appellant and defendant No. 3 were res judicata in light of earlier Suit No. 46 of 1912 and therefore could not be reopened against the appellant as to defendant No. 3's portion.
  5. Whether lack of service of notice on defendant No. 4 (absence of notice) was proved and, if not proved, whether the sale by which appellant obtained title was thereby rendered a nullity.
  6. Whether the low price fetched at auction, and representations as to mortgage amount, establish fraud or are otherwise explainable by lawful circumstances (e.g., encumbrance rights and effect of mortgagee's possession).

Arguments of the Parties

Appellant's Arguments

  • The respondents, having failed to pursue the remedy of setting aside the sale under Order XXI, rule 90 (or by suit), cannot now set up their present defence without first having set aside the sale.
  • Respondent No. 4 failed to plead necessary particulars of the alleged fraud; particulars were lacking in the written statement and the fraud relied upon was developed later by the trial Court.
  • The findings of fraud are not based on legal evidence but on surmises arrived at by an irregular procedure; additional issues were framed by the trial Court suo motu and were outside the pleadings.
  • Defendant No. 3 did not defend as owner of the northern half; as against him the appellant's claim should have been allowed (implying the effect of res judicata or lack of contest).

Respondents' Arguments

  • No serious objection to the trial Court's procedure was taken below; the appellant consented to certain depositions being put in, and therefore the lower Courts' findings should be accepted.
  • Although issues Nos. 8–11 (relating to misrepresentation as to mortgage amount) were raised late by the trial Court, both sides were given ample opportunity to adduce evidence and the appellant suffered no prejudice from that late framing of issues.
  • More generally, respondent No. 4 maintained that notice had not been duly served and that there had been misrepresentation and conspiracy connected with the execution sale (as developed during trial).

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Wallingford v. Mutual Society Emphasis on requirement that particulars of misrepresentation/fraud be given (relevance to Order VI, rule 4 and section 65 CPC). The Court relied on this principle to note that respondent No. 4 should have provided particulars of the alleged misrepresentation/fraud in pleadings; absence of particulars was a procedural defect.
Naro Hari v. Anpurnabai Warning against a Judge moulding a case for a party or travelling outside the parties' averments when framing issues. The Court held that the Subordinate Judge followed the course described in this precedent (framing issues after perusing records and effectively making a case for respondent No. 4), which was improper.
Bal Gangadhar Tilak v. Shrinivas Pandit Reprobation by the Privy Council of the course where findings are made without proper examination or procedure. The trial Court was criticized for following a course reprobated in this case by arriving at a conspiracy finding without proper questioning of witnesses and appropriate procedural steps.
Shankar Daji v. Battatraya Vinayak Authority showing that a defence may be set up even if the same claim could not be advanced by the same person as a plaintiff. Fawcett, J. relied on this precedent (with Mahadev Narayan v. Sadashiv Keshari) to hold that defendant No. 4's defence attacking the validity of the Bale is not necessarily barred by his failure to sue earlier.
Mahadev Narayan v. Sadashiv Keshari See Shankar Daji v. Battatraya Vinayak — supports that such a defence can be set up. Used with Shankar Daji to support the position that the defence to the Bale being a nullity can be raised even if the remedy to set aside the sale was not previously pursued.
Mahomad Mira Favuthar v. Savvasi Yijaya Raghunadha Gopalar Held that concert among bidders to obtain a low price does not of itself amount to fraud; proof of such concert does not necessarily invalidate a sale. The Court indicated that the principle would apply to the present allegation of collusion among bidders—concert alone would not automatically amount to fraud invalidating the sale.
Goree Monee Dossee v. Juggut Indro Narain Leading Privy Council authority on limits to a Judge framing issues and the necessity of keeping within the parties' pleadings. The opinion invoked this precedent to criticize the Subordinate Judge for framing additional issues after trial and effectively deciding matters not properly raised by parties.
Surajmal v. Triton Insurance Company Exception where a Court may enforce invalidity despite lack of pleading because a statute declares something void in public interest. The Court noted this as an exception but held it inapplicable to the present case (i.e., the present matter was not one where statutory prohibition justified a late raising of issue).
Khiarajmal v. Daim Deals with cases where persons were not properly represented or parties to proceedings and where the Court had not applied its mind to representation; used for comparison. The Court held the present case was distinguishable from Khiarajmal v. Daim and similar cases because here a return of service had been filed and accepted by the Court at the time of sale.
Paresh Nath Mallick v. Hari Charan Dey Authority that a purchaser may rely on the Court's finding that summons/service was duly made; Court will hesitate to visit purchaser with consequences of procedural irregularities not apparent on the face of the record. The Court relied on this case to justify that even if service was later found defective, the purchaser who relied on the Court's apparent finding of valid service should not be lightly deprived of title where the irregularity was not apparent on the record.
Malkarajun v. Narhati (as cited) Grouped with Khiarajmal as cases of a certain character (citation (11) in the opinion). The Court treated prior cases of that class as distinguishable from the present facts and therefore not controlling here.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The opinion contains parallel reasoning by Madgavkar, J. (majority reasoning in the text) and Fawcett, J. (concurring in outcome and adding further analysis). Their analysis can be summarized in sequential legal steps as follows, using only material from the opinion:

  1. Pleadings and particulars: The written statement filed by respondent No. 3 (Exhibit 15) contained vague allegations of collusion, absence of notice and an agreement with the decree-holder; it did not set out particulars of the alleged fraud. Order VI, rule 4 requires particulars and the Court referred to Wallingford v. Mutual Society to stress the importance of particulars. The Court concluded that respondents did not adequately plead particulars of the misrepresentation/fraud.
  2. Additional issues framed by Judge after perusal of execution record: The Subordinate Judge, after adjourning to peruse the execution record, suo motu framed issues Nos. 8–11 relating to misrepresentations such as the alleged mortgage figure (Rs. 2,500). The Court held that the power to frame issues is governed by Order XIV, rule 3 (and rule 5), and that the judge exceeded his jurisdiction by framing issues that were outside the pleadings and based on materials neither party had put in. The judge thereby "took the case out of the hands of the litigants" (citing Naro Hari v. Anpurnabai and Goree Monee Dossee v. Juggut Indro Narain).
  3. Evidentiary basis for findings: The findings of misrepresentation as to the mortgage amount and conspiracy rested largely on the endorsement in the sale proceeding (Ex. 54) and inferences from execution records. That endorsement was signed by Hanmant Balaji (one of the bidders), not by the appellant; the vernacular record contains no admission by the appellant and the English record shows a retraction immediately after the admission. The Court observed that it is not a bidder's duty to inform the Court of the amount of an encumbrance. Therefore the inference against the appellant was unsupported and rested on surmise rather than proper evidence.
  4. Absence of notice / service: On the contested issue of absence of notice to respondent No. 4, the Court found procedural shortcomings in the proof on which the lower Courts relied. The bailiff who made the return (Balakrishna, Exhibit 47) was not called; Harimant Venkaji (the karkun) was called but not questioned about service; other witnesses' evidence did not address service. The Subordinate Judge relied on Rangrao's application (Ex. 52) for time to produce Hanmant as a basis for inferring improper service, which the Court found insufficient. The Court therefore held that respondent No. 4 failed to prove absence of service or the alleged conspiracy and that the lower Courts' inferences could not be supported.
  5. Res judicata as to collusion between appellant and defendant No. 3: There had been earlier litigation (Suit No. 46 of 1912) in which a collusion case between the same parties had been decided (judgment Ex. 58). The Court held that the collusion allegation between appellant and defendant No. 3 was res judicata as between those parties and, in any event, that six years' delay made setting aside the sale on that ground unlikely even if proved. The Subordinate Judge erred by effectively re-deciding points already adjudicated between the same parties without proper jurisdiction to do so.
  6. Concert among bidders is not necessarily fraud: The Court referred to Privy Council authority (Mahomad Mira Favuthar v. Savvasi Yijaya Raghunadha Gopalar) that concert among bidders to obtain a low price does not of itself amount to fraud sufficient to invalidate a sale; hence the allegation of agreement between bidder(s) and defendant No. 3 to purchase cheaply and reconvey did not as such prove fraud.
  7. Explanation for low price: The Court noted a factual element not emphasized in the lower Courts' judgments — until 1918 the auction purchaser could not obtain possession because mortgagees had a right to possession for twelve years. This factor (and interest on purchase-money) could explain a low price without resorting to fraud or conspiracy. The Court used this to show that the low price at auction was not necessarily evidence of fraud.
  8. Application of protective principle for purchaser: Fawcett, J., relying on Paresh Nath Mallick v. Hari Charan Dey, explained that where the Court accepted a return of service and ordered sale, a purchaser who relied on that judicial finding is entitled to protection; a subsequent finding that service was defective does not necessarily render the sale a nullity when the irregularity was not apparent on the record.
  9. Procedural and fundamental errors necessitate interference: Both judges concluded that the Subordinate Judge had committed procedural errors by framing and deciding issues outside the pleadings, relying on surmise rather than proper evidence, and effectively acting beyond his jurisdiction. These substantial errors in procedure and fact-finding led the Court to interfere in the appeal.

Holding and Implications

Holding:

APPEAL ALLOWED. The Court reversed the decrees of the two lower Courts which had dismissed the plaintiff's suit and his first appeal, and substituted a decree in favour of the plaintiff for possession of the land as prayed.

Direct consequences and directions:

  • The Court directed an inquiry as to mesne profits from the institution of the suit until delivery of possession to the plaintiff, or until the expiration of three years from the date of this decree, whichever first occurs.
  • The Subordinate Judge was ordered to ascertain the amount of such mesne profits and to pass a final decree in accordance with Order 20, rule 12 of the Code of Civil Procedure as to the amount of such profits.
  • The plaintiff-appellant was awarded costs throughout against defendants Nos. 3 and 4, each being jointly liable for the costs of the appeal to this Court.

Broader implications: The opinion does not purport to establish a novel legal precedent; rather, it applies existing principles (including limitations on a judge framing issues outside pleadings, the need for particulars of fraud, the protection of purchasers who rely on Court findings, and the operation of res judicata) to reverse the lower Courts' decrees. No broader new doctrine is announced beyond these applications to the facts.

Show all summary ...

Madgavkar, J.:— The plaintiff-appellant Dodbsappa purchased the right, title and interest of defendant No. 3, Shiddappa and defendant No. 4, Pundappa, in the land in suit in execution of a money decree against them in favour of Rangrao in Suits No. 62 of 1905. The sale was confirmed and the appellant got the Bale certificate ire 1907. The present suit is for possession. Defendants-respondents Nos. 1 and 2 refuse to give him possession on the ground that they are in possession as mortgagees and that the mortgage has not expired. The suit is also resisted by defendants Nos. 8 and 4 on the ground that the appellant has been guilty of fraud in execution. Both the lower Courts have upheld the respondents' plea and dismissed the suit. The plaintiff appeals.

2. The precise issues found in both the lower Courts were that the execution had proceeded without notice to respondent No. 4 and that the appellant was guilty of this fraud as well as of misrepresenation to the Court at the time of sale that there was a mortgage of Rs. 2,500 on the property, whereas the actual mortgage amount was less. He thus induced the Court to confirm the sale though the price realised was Rs. 325. Four main points are taken in the appeal for the appellant. (1) The respondents having failed to pursue their remedy to set aside the sale as ??? down under Order XXI, rule 90, cannot now sub-up the persent defence without first getting aside the sale by way of application or suit. (2) Respondent No. 4 failed in his pleadings to give the necessary particulars of the fraud; and the fraud held proved was based on a new case set up by the trial Court and not raised by respondent No. 4(3) The findings of fraud were based not upon the legal evidence bub were surmises arrived at by irregular procedure. (4) As in any case, defendant-respondent No. 3, who was admittedly as owner of the northern half, had not defended the suit, as against him at least, the appellant's claim should have been allowed.

3. It is contended for the respondents that in the judgment appealed against no serious objection to the procedure in the trial Court appears to have been taken, that the appellant consented to certain previous depositions being put in and that therefore the findings of the lower Courts should be accepted; and although as regards misrepresentation as to the amount of the mortgage, issues Nos. 8 to 11 were raised by the trial Court at a late stage, ample opportunity was given to both sides to adduce evidence, and the appellant was therefore in no way prejudiced. In view of our conclusion on the other points, it is not necessary to express a definite opinion on the first contention of the appellant. But, speaking for myself, it appears be me, to be too wide a proposition that a defence is barred because a suit might be barred, or that a judgment-debtor, who has allowed the sale to, be confirmed, cannot subsequently set up a defence of fraud, as in the present ease.

4. In this appeal it is necessary to enter into some detail as to the actual trial and of the pleadings. In his written statement, Exhibit 15, respondent No. 3 set up (para 3), firstly, collusion between the appellant and respondents Nos. 1 and 2, secondly, (para 6), absence of notice of the execution proceedings, and thirdly, agreement between the decree holder Rangrao and the appellant to purchase the property for a small amount. Apart from this, no particular fraud was alleged. Order VI, rule 4, is clear that the appellant was entitled to, particulars of the misrepresentation and fraud set up to resist the title ordinarily, vesting in him under section 65 of the CPC—a principle emphasised by Lord Selborre, L.C, in Wallingford v. Mutual Society(1).

5. These particulars of fraud were only added in the respondents' evidence, Ex. 37. What the precise collusion consisted of had not been even set up and, therefore, he refers presumably to the collusion set up by respondent No. 3, in the previous suit No. 46 of 1912, that was decided against respondent No. 3 in the judgment Ex. 58. Apart from its vagueness the case of collusion as between the appellant and respondent No. 3 may briefly be dismissed as having been res judicata in the litigation between the two parties concerned, when it was raised by respondent No. 3 as plaintiff; and even if proved, it would hardly suffice for the sale to be set aside by the parties concerned six years after the event. Similarly no particulars were given in the pleadings of the alleged collusion between the appellant and respondents Nos. 1 and 2. In the written statement the only substantial ground alleged is the absence of notice. It would have been preferable perhaps if the second issue in the trial Court had been defined and confined to this allegation of fraud instead of its being generally framed as was the case namely, “Is this Court sale fraudulent and illegal as alleged by defendant No. 4?” However that may be, the trial proceeded on issues Nos. 1 to 7 as originally framed. Thereafter the learned Subordinate Judge, if his anxiety to do justice between the parties, felt that a perusal of the record of the execution proceedings was necessary and adjourned the case in order to enable him be send for the record and to deliver judgment. He sent for the record and went through it, evidently with very great care. It appeared to him that other suspicious circumstances not brought to his notice in the pleadings existed; and thereupon suo motu he framed issues Nos. 8 to 11 and adjourned the suit to enable both sides to offer evidence if they chore. The oral evidence actually proof erred consisted of Rangrao and his dark Hanmant. They were merely called pro forma and their former evidence in suit No. 46 of 1912, instituted by defendant No. 3, was pub in by consent. The learned Subordinate Judge then came to the conclusion (1) that the alleged notice served upon, respondent No. 4 was never served; (2) that the appellant in conspiracy with Ringrao and his dark Hanmant fraudulently represented to the Court that it was duly served; and (3) that ab the time of the sale the appellant had deliberately misrepreseated to the executing Court that the mortgage was for Rs. 2,500 instead of a smaller amount.

6. Conceding the wide powers under Order XIV with regard to the framing of issues, there can be no question, I think, on the record that this issue of misrepresentation of the mortgage amount was an issue completely outside the pleadings and was raised by the learned Subordinate Judge himself on a perusal of the record of the execution proceedings, which he himself had sent for and which neither party had put in. The materials, on which the Court may frame issues, are dearly laid down in Order XIV, rule 3 and these issues ware outside the rule. In his very anxiety to do justice, the learned Subordinate Judge followed the course reported by this Court in Naro Hari v. Anpurnabai(2) and took the case altogether out of the hands of the litigants and made for the respondent a case which he had no intention of making out for himself. Moreover, the findings on these issues are based on inferences or rather on surmises founded on certain circumstances in the execution records before the learned Subordinate Judge, particularly the endorsement as to the mortgage amount of Rs. 2,500 on the sale proceeding, Ex. 54. This endorsement, however, was signed not by the appellant, but by one Hanmant Balaji who was one of the bidders. In the vernacular record there is no admission of the appellant that he had made any such representation to the Court. In the English record this admission is immediately followed by a retraction. Under the Code of Civil Procedure the vernacular record is more authoritative. Moreover, it is no part of the duty of a bidder to inform the Court of the existence of the amount of encumbrance; and it appears to us therefore that this issue I should never have been raised and that in any case the inference against the appellant as based on the irregular procedure cannot be supported.

7. It remains to consider the only substantial ground namely, the absence of notice to respondent No. 4. Here again, on the evidence produced, both the Courts have arrived at an adverse conclusion against the appellant similar to that stated above. The bailiff Balakrishna, who has made the affidavit of proper ??? on the summons, Exhibit 47, has not been called. Harimant Venkaji, the kirkun of Ringrao, who accompanied the bailiff to identify respondents Nos. 3 and 4, was called but, not a single question has been put to him in regard to the service or the alleged conspiracy of which he alone would be the direct agent along with the bailiff. The record of his evidence put in is, silent on the matter of service, and the further evidence is entirely directed to quite a different point than the point now in issue. The same observations apply with reference to Rangrao and the appellant. The learned Subordinate Judge has arrived his conclusion mainly on the basis of the application, Exhibit 52, by Rangrao for time to present Hanmanli before the Court. This ground is dearly insufficient as a pleader's karkun need not necessarily always be present to Court. In any case these are all questions which ought to have been pub to Ringrao and Hanmant. Yet without a single question to either, both the Courts have in fact held proved a conspiracy on the part of Rangrao, his karkun and the bailiff and the appellant in addition, to make a false representation of service, which was never effected. The trial Court has again followed a course reprobated by their lordships of the Privy Council in Bal Gangadhar Tilak v. Shrinivas Pandit(3). Hanmant, it should be observed, stated that respondent No. 4 was present at the sale. We are of opinion that respondent No. 4 has failed be prove absence of service, much lass the fraud and conspiracy set up, and that the procedure and the inference of the lower Courts on this point cannot be supported.

8. It is not necessary to consider the question of collusion as between respondent No. 3 and respondent No. 4, with regard to their dealing with the property in the sale deed, Ex. 38 of 1903, and the sale deed and resale of half in 1907, except be observe that this course of dealings between the two respondents Nos. 3 and 4 inter se is not easily reconcileable with the present contention of respondent No. 4 that he was on hostile terms with respondent No. 8 and had no information of the execration or the sale.

9. As regards the value or the small price paid by the appellant, there is one element which does not find place in the judgments appealed against. Till 1918 the auction-purchaser could not obtain possession of the property by reason of the right to possession for another twelve years of the mortgagees, respondents Nos. 1 and 2. This period and the interest on the purchase amount accumulating would, to a certain extent, reduce the amount paid, and might together with the comparatively smaller value, twelve years ago, of the land purchased, explain to some extent, at all events, the price obtained in execution without the necessity of fraud or conspiracy of the kind alleged.

10. I would, therefore, allow the appeal.

11. Fawcett, J.:— I agree with my learned brother's view, over-ruling the first contention of appellant's counsel, and holding that the defence as to the Bale being a nullity is not necessarily barred because defendant No. 4 did not sue to set the sale aside within the time allowed by law or take the other remedies available to him in execution under the Code of Civil Procedure. The decisions of this Court in Shankar Daji v. Battatraya Vinayak(4) and Mahadev Narayan v. Sadashiv Keshari(5) show that such a defence can be set up, even though it rests on a claim, which could not be set up by the same person as a plaintiff. It is unnecessary to consider this point further, because I agree that the appeal should be allowed on other grounds.

12. Assuming that the defence that the sale by which the plaintiff obtained his title to the land is vitiated by fraud or illegality can to set up, it is necessary to see what exactly is the fraud or illegality that is pleaded by defendant No. 4. So far as illegality is concerned, although in paragraph 8 of the written statement defendant No. 4 says that there were many legal defects in the sale by which it was rendered null and void, the only actual illegality specified is that notice had not been duly served upon him in the period execution proceedings. Under the ordinary rule that fraud or illegality must be specifically pleaded and particulars given, that is the only illegality that was really raised by his pleadings.

13. In regard to fraud, the allegation in paragraph 7 is very vague and merely says that the plaintiff managed to get the property for a small amount, without the knowledge of defendant No. 4 and with fraudulent intent. That plea in itself would not really raise a case of fraud as it should be pleaded. But we can take into consideration the fact that the plea of fraud was developed during the trial and is taken by the Subordinate Judge in considering issue No. 2 to be the allegation that the plaintiff deceived defendant No. 3 by persuading him to believe that he (the plaintiff) would purchase the property for a small sum with a view to resell it to defendant No. 3, whenever he returned the amount with interest.

14. There is also an allegation of collusion between the plaintiff and defendant No. 3 for defrauding defendant No. 4 of his half share in the land. The latter part of this allegation has not been found proved, as I read the Subordinate Judge's judgment, bub he did find that the plaintiff induced defendant No. 3 to consent to the final bid that he made at the auction, representing, to him that he would reconvey the land-to defendant No. 3 as soon as the amount was paid, and that since the plaintiff never intended to keep his promise and other bidders were prevented from raising the pried as a result of this ??? the Court sale was fraudulent and illegal. The Assistant Judge in appeal has bald that the depositions of Rangrao and Hanmant in the previous Suit No. 46 of 1912 show that the bidding at the sale was low because there was an understanding that the plaintiff should purchase the land at a low period and then reconvey it to defendant No. 3. But this is not made the basis of hip final order and it appears to me to be incidentally referred to. His final conclusion is one confirming the finding of the lower Court that the confirmation of sale was due to fraud practised on the Court and that the plaintiff was a party to he fraud. However, even assuming that such collusion is a finding of fact on which the lower Court's decrees are partially based it is in my opinion quite clear that those findings are not supported by admissible evidence and have been arrived at in a manner that is clearly opposed be the provisions of be law as to res judicata, and as to the method of obtaining a reversal of a conclusion arrived at in a trial. This particular collusion or understanding was she subject-matter of the Suit No. 46 of 1912 between defendant No. 3 and the plaintiff, and the finding that understanding was not proved, is clearly res judicata as between the plaintiff and defendant No. 3, who were the principal persons concerned in the alleged arrangement. The Subordinate Judge, therefore, so for as defendant No. 3's portion of the land is concerned, clearly had no jurisdiction to arrive at a contrary finding to that which had been come to in the previous suit. No doubt it was open to defendant No. 4, who was not a party to that litigation, and was a prior assignee as to his half of the land, to set up this alleged agreement or collusion and prove it. But such proof must obviously he based on something more than mere consideration of the testimony of some of the witnesses in the previous litigation. The Subordinate Judge, in his exercise of such jurisdition, was virtually acting as if he was a Court of appeal from the Subordinate Judge who tried the prior suit, and he was deciding that appeal not on all the materials of that suit, but on two particular depositions which were given in that suit and which had been put in this litigation, without any further cross-examination of the two witnesses in regard to the matter. He was not in such a good position as the Subordinate Judge, who tried the suit of 1912 and who had the witnesses before him, to decide the question; and he had, in my opinion, mo power to decide that the collusion and agreement set up were proved merely in the scanty materials that satisfied him and the Assistant Judge. There has, in my opinion, been an error in regard be the fundamental rules on which an issue can be decided in a suit, and the findings, so far as they affect defendant No. 3, offend against the law of res judicata.

15. It is also further open to question whether in any case the agreement or collusion set up would amount to fraud. For it has been held by their lordships of that Privy Council in Mahomad Mira Favuthar v. Savvasi Yijaya Raghunadha Gopalar(6), that “the charge against a bidder that he and those who have acted in concert with him will have acted in such a manner as to prevent the best price being obtained does not of itself amount to a charge of fraud, nor will proof of such concert invalidate the sale to him.” It seems to me that this ruling would apply to the present allegation, but it is unnecessary to go into this because, on the grounds I have already given, the findings of the two lower Courts can clearly not be accepted and should be interfered with in second appeal.

16. Then as regards the fraud that has been actually found by the Subordinate Judge on the additional issues, raised in Ex. 63 and confirmed by the Assistant Judge in appeal, I entirely agree with my learned brother that in raising those issues the Subordinate Judge was acting without jurisdiction and against the fundamental principles as to how a suit should be tried and determined, which have been laid down by the Privy Council in the leading case of Goree Monee Dossee v. Juggut Indro Narain(7). I give all credit to the Subordinate Judge for being actuated by a desire to do justice in the case, and I also do not in any way desire be limit the power that a Court has under Order XIV, rule 5 of the CPC, to frame additional issues but the additional issues authorised by this rule are such as may be necessary for determining the matters in controversy between the parties, and that I think is a dear indication that it was not the intention of the legislature that the judge should travel outside the actual averments and counter-averments of the parties. My learned brother has already referred to the remarks on this point in Naro Hari v. Anpurnabai and I may further draw attention be the observation in that judgment that what is to be considered is the case made by a party and not the case as “moulded by the astuteness of the Judge.” I think that is vary applicable to the present case. The Subordinate Judge on a perusal of the record has made out a case for defendant No. 4, which he never set up and never intended to set up, because apparently it was not within his knowledge that the representation had been made which is mentioned by the Subordinate Judge who confirmed the sale and this applies all the more to a case like the present where the additional issues are framed after the whole trial has been finished and the case is reserved merely for judgment. The mere fact that the parties were given an opportunity of adducing additional evidence in regard to the further issues does not suffice to validate a procedure opposed to the law, laid down by the Code of Civil Procedure and the Privy Council in the matter. He doubt there are exceptions when a Court is justified in holding a thing invalid on a ground which has not been pleaded. An instance of such an exception is afforded by Surajmal v. Triton Insurance Company(8), where the Privy Council says:—

“No Court can enforce be valid, that which competent enactments have declared shall not be valid, nor is obedience to such an enactment a thing from which a Court can be dispensed by the concent of the parties, or by a failure to plead or to argue the point at the outset (L.R 2 Ex. 338). The enactment is prohibitory. It is not confined to affording a party a protection, of which he may avail himself or not as he pleases. It is not framed solely foe the protection of the revenue and to be enforced solely at the instance of the revenue officials, nor is the prohibition limited to cases, for which a penalty is exigible.

17. Clearly this is not a case which comes under the abovecategory. The Privy Council have frequently drawn our attention to the undesirability of upsetting titles which appear to be valid on the face of them in execution proceedings of Civil Courts, and the law provides a limited period and a limited method for obtaining a cancellation of a Court sale, so as to upset the title based upon it. In any case I agree with my learned brother that the finding about this misrepresentation is based on surmises which do not afford a proper ground for holding it proved that the plaintiff was a party to this alleged fraud. There has been a further disregard of the ordinary requirement that a person who is charged with fraud should, when he is examined in Court, be cross-examined is regard to it and his explanation taken into consideration. But, apart from that, it seems to me that the lower Courts were dearly not justified in considering this particular question of fraud, which had not been raised in the pleading or evidence of defendant No. 4 and which is not a case of fraud prohibited by statute in the public interest.

18. Then, as regards the finding that the sale was illegal because no notice had been served upon defendant No. 4, it seems to me that this is not a case like that of Khiarajmal v. Daim(9), or that of Shankar Daji v. Dattatraya Vinayak. In cases of that kind there is no proper representations of the party or they have not been parties to the proceedings in which the sale takes place and even if there had been an objection that a person was not a proper legal representative, the Court had never applied its mind to the matter. But in this case a notice was ordered to issue to defendant No. 4 and the bailiff made return that it had been duly served by fixing it upon the house, where defendant No. 4 was living ab the time. The Court naturally accepted this report, which was supported by the affidavit of the bailiff even assuming that it is true that as a matter of fact defendant No. 4 was not in that house and that the notice was not properly served, still this is no sufficient ground for now saying that the sale by which the plaintiff obtained his title was a nullity on this account. I think there can be no dearer authority on this point than that provided by a very similar case in Paresh Nath Mallick v. Hari Charan Dey(10). There it was alleged that the decree was a nullity because the summons had not been served upon the party can testing the validity of the sale, which arose out of a decree. In subsequent proceeding it was actually held that the summons had not been served and the ex parte, decree was set aside. But the question still remained whether the sale was a nullity on that account, and Sir Lawrences Jenkins, in his judgment, ab page 627 says:—

“Therefore, those conditions we re established which entitled the aggrieved defendant to have the decree set aside under section 108. But though the decree was thus set aside in September, 1906, the Court could not have passed its decree in 100 without holding that the summons has been duly served; that is the condition laid down, by section 100 of the cpc of 1883. So we have this position, that the Court wrongly, as events have subsequently shown, found that through the defendant was not present the summons had been duly served. The purchaser was entitled to rely on that finding. He had not the opportunity of the means of questioning the propriety of the decision at which the Court had arrived when it determined that the conditions were established entitling it to pass an ex parte decree; and the Court should have much hesitation in visiting a purchased at one of its sales with the consequences of an irregularity of defect of procedure which was not discovered by the Court, or its officers and was not apparent on the lace of the record.”.

19. Those remarks apply appositely to the present case, where the Court could not proceed to order a sale unless it found that notice had been duly served on defendant No. 4. I am quite aware that in this case it is alleged that the plaintiff himself procured an improper service, but that aspect of the case is not supported by any actual evidence and is based on pure surmises from a perusal of the record in the execration proceedings, be it is not a finding which can, in my opinion, be held to have been arrived at on proper materials.

20. Accordingly, in my opinion, the case is not one like those considered in Khiarajmal v. Daiim and Malkarajun v. Narhati(11). I think, therefore, that the decrees of the lower Courts are viciated by substantial errors in the procedure provided by the Code or any other law for the time being in force, which has led to error in the decision of the case upon the merits. I am very reluctant to interfere in cases where two Courts have held that fraud has been established. But in determining whether there has or has not been any fraud, the lower Courts have gone outside the proper foundation for determination of each a question, and there has been substantial error, which, I think, necessitates our interference. I agree, therefore, in allowing the appeal. We accordingly reverse fine decrees of the two lower Courts dismissing the plaintiff's suit and his first appeal with costs and substitute a decree in favour of the plaintiff or possession of the land in suit as prayed and directing an inquiry as to mesne profits, from the institution of the suit until delivery of possession to the plaintiff, or the expiration of three years from the date of this decree, whichever event first occurs. The Subordinate Judge should, after ascertaining the amount of such mesne profits, pass a final decree in accordance with order 20, rule 12 of the CPC, as to the amount of such profits.

21. The plaintiff-appellant must get his costs throughout from defendants Nos. 3 and 40 each being jointly liable for the costs of the appeal to this Court.

22. Appeal allowed.