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Tarabai v. Dattaram Govindbhai Gujar

Bombay High Court

Dec 15, 1924

Judgment

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Judgment Summary — Extracted from the Provided Opinion

Factual and Procedural Background

The suit concerns watan lands originally mortgaged in 1870 by Hanmantrao to Govindbhai Gujar and Antaji Parchure for Rs. 12,000 (Govindbhai advancing Rs. 8,000 and Antaji Rs. 4,000). Through a series of mesne assignments beginning in 1872 the equity of redemption vested in Balkrishna Agashe and Antaji Parchure in equal moieties. Govindbhai died leaving a minor son Dattaram; his guardian assigned Dattaram's interest to Antaji in 1881. Balkrishna died leaving a son Vinayak.

In 1896 Vinayak sued for redemption of the 1870 mortgage; a final decree was delivered on 9 April 1912 declaring (inter alia) the assignment by Dattaram's guardians to Antaji void, that Antaji had to pay Vinayak Rs. 35,000, and that the mortgage money had been paid off with surplus profits due to Vinayak. Vinayak obtained possession of his half in July 1913.

Separately Ramrao (son of Hanmantrao) sued Antaji in April 1913 seeking a declaration that the mortgage and the 1872 auction did not survive Hanmantrao's death and for possession; after Ramrao's death his widow Tarabai continued and obtained a decree in December 1914 and obtained possession in August 1915. Dattaram purchased Antaji's share at a court sale in September 1914 and alleged taking possession in February 1915; he later recovered possession jointly with Tarabai in April 1918 after applying for restoration. The heirs of Vinayak (plaintiffs in the appeal under consideration) sued to recover possession of the other moiety, but the trial court dismissed their suit and the appellate court largely agreed.

Legal Issues Presented

Whether the heirs of Vinayak Agashe (the plaintiffs) had acquired a title by adverse possession to a moiety of the suit lands.
Whether an equity of redemption can be acquired by adverse possession, particularly where the claimant was not in physical possession of the mortgaged property.
What effect the 1912 decree (declaring the mortgage paid off and setting aside the assignment to Antaji) and Tarabai's subsequent decree and possession had on the plaintiffs' claim to possession.

Arguments of the Parties

Appellants / Heirs of Vinayak (Plaintiffs)

They argued that the Agashes had acquired title to a moiety of the lands by adverse possession.
Implicitly, their claim relied on possession obtained in July 1913 (symbolical possession) and retention of possession thereafter as the basis for acquiring title.

Respondents / Tarabai and Antaji (Defendants and Other Parties)

It was contended (by respondents) that Antaji's possession as mortgagee could not be treated as possession adverse to the true owners once the 1912 decree declared the mortgage paid off, because the owners of the equity of redemption became entitled to possession under their decree and purchases.
A faint argument was raised (by appellants) that Antaji had been in possession of half the lands in trust for Dattaram and thus Dattaram could claim by adverse possession; the Court rejected this as inconsistent with the legal effect of the setting aside of the assignment.
The defendants relied on Tarabai's successful suit against Antaji and her possession (and related execution process) as extinguishing plaintiffs' rights to possession.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent	Rule or Principle Cited For	Application by the Court
Puttappa v. Timmaji	The case was cited in connection with whether an equity of redemption can be acquired by adverse possession; it appears to have been regarded as a case where the defendant's adverse possession argument stood because of actual delivery of possession to the vendee in 1856.	The court distinguished Puttappa: it noted that in that case actual physical possession had been given to a vendee, and therefore the present case did not compel the conclusion that an equity of redemption can generally be acquired by adverse possession when the claimant was not in physical possession.
Chunto v. Janki	Held that there may be possession adverse to the interest of a mortgagee which nevertheless is not adverse to the interest of the mortgagor.	The court relied on this principle to explain that a trespasser or a person holding adversely to a mortgagee may not thereby hold adversely to the mortgagor, and thus an equity of redemption cannot be acquired by adverse possession unless the claimant is in physical possession of the mortgaged property.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Court's analysis proceeded in several linked steps:

The Court observed that the 1912 decree in Vinayak's suit declared the assignment by Dattaram's guardians to Antaji void and that the mortgage had been paid off; therefore the owners of the equity of redemption were entitled to possession under their decrees and purchases. This undercut any suggestion that Antaji's prior possession as mortgagee could operate as adverse possession against the true owners after that decree.
The Court rejected the notion that Antaji held half the mortgaged lands "in trust" for Dattaram in a way that would permit Dattaram to acquire title by adverse possession: when Antaji's title under the assignment was set aside he became liable to account for half the profits, and there was no viable trust-based adverse-possession claim.
On the central question whether an equity of redemption can be acquired by adverse possession, the Court emphasized that possessory title arises from physical possession which ripens into ownership by the true owner's failure to recover possession. The Court found it difficult to see how one could be in possession of an equity of redemption adversely to the true owner when the claimant was not in physical possession of the mortgaged property.
The Court considered Puttappa v. Timmaji and distinguished it on its facts, noting that in Puttappa actual delivery of possession to a vendee had occurred; thus Puttappa did not establish a general rule that an equity of redemption can be acquired by adverse possession where the claimant lacks physical possession.
The Court further relied on the principle from Chunto v. Janki that possession adverse to a mortgagee may not be adverse to the mortgagor; this supported the conclusion that a trespasser holding against the mortgagee cannot necessarily bar the mortgagor's right to redeem or transfer the equity.
The Court examined the chronology of possession: Antaji / Parchure had physical possession up to 1913; Agashe's heirs obtained possession only in July 1913 and held it for about two years. Given the limited period of possession and absence of earlier physical possession by Agashe's heirs, the Court concluded they could not have acquired title by adverse possession sufficient to oust Tarabai (who held the only other non-possessory title to the moiety).
Justice Crump concurred, remarking that after Hanmantrao's death in 1897 any alienation by him became void and that only those in actual possession after that date could potentially acquire title by prescription; because Agashe's heirs were not in physical possession until 1913 and, before that, Parchure had actual possession, Agashe's heirs could not acquire title by adverse possession.

Holding and Implications

Holding: The appeal was dismissed. (The Chief Justice expressly stated the appeal should be dismissed with costs; the formal record concludes "Appeal dismissed.")

Implications:

Direct effect on the parties: The decree in favour of Tarabai (upholding her possession of the moiety she claimed) was affirmed; the heirs of Vinayak Agashe were not permitted to recover possession or to assert title by adverse possession in respect of that moiety.
The Court declined to recognize a general rule that an equity of redemption can be acquired by adverse possession absent physical possession of the mortgaged property; it treated earlier authorities (notably Puttappa v. Timmaji) as distinguishable on their facts. The opinion therefore limits the availability of adverse-possession claims to circumstances involving physical possession of the land itself.
The opinion did not purport to establish a novel broad precedent beyond the application of these principles to the facts of the case; its practical consequence was to sustain the existing decrees and possession rights obtained by Tarabai and related execution proceedings.

Appeal dismissed.

Summarized strictly from the text of the provided opinion. No information has been added that was not present in the original excerpt.

Show all summary ...

Sir Norman Macleod, C.J:— The facts in the second appeal are somewhat complicated, they are set out correctly at length in the judgment of the lower appellate Court and for the purposes of this judgment may be summarised as follows:—

One Hanmantrao in 1870 mortgaged the lands in suit, which were watan properties, to Govindbhai Gujar and Antaji Parchure for Rs. 12,000 of which 8,000 were advanced by Govindbhai and 4,000 by Antaji.

The equity of redemption after divers mesne assignments commencing from 1872 became vested in Balkrishna Agashe and Antaji Parchure in equal moieties. Govindbhai died leaving a minor son, Dattaram, whose guardian assigned his interest in the mortgage to the co-mortgagee, Antaji, in 1881. Balkrishna Agashe died leaving his son Vinayak. In 1896, Vinayak filed a suit against Antaji and Dattaram and three others for redemption of the mortgage of 1870.

Hanmantrao died in 1897. A final decree was passed in Vinayak's suit on April 9, 1912. It was decided that the assignment by Dattaram's guardians to Antaji was a nullity and as between the two Antaji had to pay Vinayak Rs. 35,000. In favour of Vinayak it was declared that the mortgage money had been paid off and surplus profits were due to him.

On April 16, Ramrao, son of Hanmantrao, filed a suit against Antaji for a declaration that the mortgage of the watan lands in 1870 and the auction sale in 1872 did not survive the death of Hanmantrao, and for possession. It was contended that the heirs of Vinayak, who had died, were necessary parties but unfortunately the Judge decided that it was not clear that they were interested in the suit property as holders of any share in the equity of redemption. In September 1914, Dattaram executed his decree against Antaji and at a Court sale purchased Antaji's share in the suit lands. It is alleged he got possession from the Court in February 1915. Meanwhile Ramrao having died, his widow, Tarabai, continued the suit against Antaji and obtained a decree in December 1914. In August 1915, she obtained possession from Dattaram. Dattaram applied to the Court for restoration of possession, and recovered possession in April 1918 jointly with Tarabai, who had also obtained possession of the half claimed by the heirs of Vinayak Agashe.

[After dealing with, and deciding, the questions arising in the other appeals, the learned Chief Justice proceeded, with reference to Appeal No. 76 of 1923:]

The heirs of Vinayak filed the suit to recover possession of the other half of the watan lands. After the final decree in the suit of 1896 was passed in April 1912, Vinayak obtained possession of his half share in July 1913. In August 1915, Tarabai, in execution of her decree against Antaji, dispossessed the tenants of Vinayak as well. Jankibai, widow of Vinayak's uncle, sought to recover possession, but her application was rejected in 1916. After her death her grand-daughter filed this suit against Tarabai making Vinayak's grandson and nephew party defendants.

The trial Judge held that the validity of the mortgage ceased at the death of Hanmantrao, and Parchure who was then in possession became a trespasser. But the plaintiff did not claim through Parchure and until July 1913 neither they nor their predecessors had any possession at all. From July 1913 they had only symbolical possession. As Tarabai sued Parchure for possession and was successful, plaintiff's right to possession also ceased. Consequently the suit was dismissed. The appellate Judge agreed with this decision except that he found that the Agashes obtained possession in 1913.

In appeal before us it was argued that the Agashe had acquired a title by adverse possession to a moiety in the suit lands. Now Antaji Parchure was in possession as sole mortgagee till it was declared in the suit of 1896 that the assignment of Dattaram's share in the mortgage was void, and it was further held that the mortgage had been paid off. If Antaji could have been considered as holding adversely to the next heir of Hanmantrao while holding possession as mortgagee any suggestion of that sort is put an end to

(1) by the finding that the mortgage was paid off so that the owners of the equity of redemption became entitled to possession under their purchases;

(2) by the decision in Tarabai's suit against Antaji.

It was faintly argued that Antaji must be considered as having been in possession of half the mortgaged lands in trust for Dattaram and consequently that Dattaram had acquired some interest by adverse possession. But this was an impossible argument. There could be no question of trust while Antaji was holding under the assignment in his favour; when that was set aside he became liable to account for half the profits.

But it was argued that the Agashes had acquired a title to the equity of redemption by adverse possession. It is difficult to see how a person can be in possession of an equity of redemption adversely to the true owner. A possessory title to property can only be acquired by physical possession which ripens into ownership by the failure of the true owner to take steps to recover possession. It is true that it appears to have been considered in Puttappa v. Timmaji that an equity of redemption can be acquired by adverse possession, but in that case Narsibai actually delivered possession to her vendee, Ramappa, in 1856 and it was contended that the plaintiff's suit was barred by his adverse possession for more than twelve years, and consequently it did not become necessary to determine what right Narsibai had when she sold. In Chunto v. Janki it was held that there may be possession adverse to the interest of a mortgagee which nevertheless is not adverse to the interest of the mortgagor. Puttappa v. Timmaji was considered and I think that though a trespasser by holding possession against the mortgagor can bar the mortgagor's right to redeem, it cannot be said that an equity of redemption can be acquired by adverse possession unless the person claiming is in physical possession of the mortgaged property. In the case of a possessory mortgage where possession has been delivered to the mortgagee, a trespasser obtaining possession may hold adversely to the mortgagee but not to the mortgagor. Since Tarabai must be considered as the only person with a title other than possessory to the moiety in suit she is entitled to succeed against the plaintiffs who are out of possession unless they can show not only that her rights have been extinguished but that they have already acquired a good title. But at the most they obtained possession in July 1913 and retained it for two years. It is impossible, therefore, to say that they have a right to oust Tarabai and in my opinion the decree in her favour was correct and the appeal should bo dismissed with costs.

Crump, J.:— [In so far as the judgment related to Appeal No. 76 of 1923.]

This is a suit by the heirs of Agashe against Tarabai. As regards this moiety of the lands Agashe's heirs hold the rights of both mortgagor and mortgagee by virtue of the order of the High Court in 1907. The question is whether they or those through whom they claim have acquired any title by adverse possession. It is obvious that on Hanmantrao's death in 1897 any alienation by him became null and void, but it may be that persons who remain in possession after that date could acquire a title by prescription against the heirs of Hanmantrao who were at that date entitled to immediate possession. It is necessary, therefore, to consider the possession of the lands from 1897 onwards.

If I apprehend the position correctly the only persons who could acquire any title by adverse possession, would be the persons in actual possession of the lands. The actual possession up to 1913 was with Parchure. Up to 1907 the heirs of Agashe held one-half of the equity of redemption, and in 1912 they became the full owners but they got no possession until 1913. If the possession of Parchure as mortgagee was adverse to the heirs of Hanmantrao, they might have become entitled to hold as mortgagees, but from 1907 their possession was also adverse to the heirs of Agashe whose share was then declared free of the mortgage. It is difficult, therefore, to see how the heirs of Agashe could acquire a title by adverse possession and as between Parchure and the heirs of Ramrao the matter is concluded by the suits of 1912. As regards the suggestion that there was adverse possession of the equity of redemption it is clear that Agashe's heirs could not hold that equity adversely when they were never in physical possession of the property. As matters stood Hanmantrao's heirs could not at any time have sued the heirs of Agashe alone as holders of the mere right to redeem.