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Bahadursinh Gsambhirsinh Parmar v. Commissioner Of Police

Gujarat High Court
Jan 20, 2009
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Judicial Opinion Summary

Factual and Procedural Background

The petitioner challenged, by way of a writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, an order of detention dated 16.9.2008 passed by respondent No.1, the Commissioner of Police, Ahmedabad City, under sub-section (2) of section 3 of the Gujarat Prevention of Antisocial Activities Act, 1985 (PASA). The petitioner is a businessman who apprehended that an order similar to that passed against his co-accused (Nagjibhai Sagarbhai Rabari) would be passed against him; he approached this Court at the pre-execution stage.

The co-accused's detention under the PASA (dated 16.9.2008) was revoked by the State Government on the recommendation of the Advisory Board. The petitioner submitted a representation dated 3 November 2008 against the detention allegedly passed against him. The detaining authority filed an affidavit in reply (18 February 2009) alleging that the petitioner was evading execution and was absconding and asserting subjective satisfaction under Section 2(c) of the PASA that the petitioner was a “dangerous person.”

The Court granted interim relief on 19 February 2009 restraining execution of the detention order pending final disposal. The detaining authority's communication dated 13 November 2008 set out the factual basis for the detention (reference to one offence in 2005 and two offences in the current year, allegations of possession of dangerous weapons, and statements that the petitioner’s activities created fear and hindered maintenance of public order).

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the detention order dated 16.9.2008 passed under the PASA against the petitioner is illegal and liable to be quashed at the pre-execution stage under Article 226.
  2. Whether the offences relied upon by the detaining authority affect the maintenance of public order (justifying preventive detention) or relate only to law and order / private disputes, which would not justify preventive detention under PASA.
  3. Whether the petitioner is entitled to parity of treatment with a co-accused whose detention, based on materially similar grounds, was revoked by the State Government on the recommendation of the Advisory Board.
  4. Whether the petitioner’s alleged evasion/absconding disentitles him from seeking pre-execution relief.

Arguments of the Parties

Petitioner's Arguments

  • The offences relied upon as the basis for detention include a 2005 offence which is stale and a private dispute; they do not have the requisite proximate connection to the maintenance of public order.
  • In the Bapunagar C.R. No.208/2008 incident (mob incident), the petitioner's name did not appear in the FIR; the petitioner was not a leading participant in the mob — leading roles were attributed to others not booked under PASA.
  • Because the detention order against the co-accused (similarly placed) was revoked by the Advisory Board and State Government, parity requires that the petitioner not be detained and the impugned order be quashed.
  • Reliance was placed on Supreme Court and High Court authorities (including Alpesh Navinchandra Shah; Deepak Bajaj; Ashokbhai Jivraj) for propositions that preventive detention should not be used where only law-and-order / private disputes are involved and that courts can exercise pre-execution jurisdiction where a detention order is clearly illegal.
  • The allegation of evasion/absconding lacked supporting material; the petitioner had been enlarged on bail and promptly moved the Court seeking relief.

Respondents' Arguments (Detaining Authority / State)

  • The detaining authority was subjectively satisfied under Section 2(c) of the PASA that the petitioner was a dangerous person whose activities were prejudicial to the maintenance of public order; the order was passed after considering all relevant materials.
  • The petitioner had been evading execution and was absconding, which the respondents say disentitles him to pre-execution relief.
  • The facts of the petitioner’s case differ from those of the co-accused (co-accused had two cases; petitioner had three), so parity with the co-accused is not appropriate.
  • Reliance was placed on Hare Ram Pandey v. State of Bihar (AIR 2004 SC 738) to argue that when a detenue has not surrendered, the proper course is to call upon him to surrender and then examine grievances; hence pre-execution relief should not be granted in such circumstances.
  • The respondents contended that the Supreme Court’s decision in Alka Subhash Gadia did not apply to these facts.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Additional Secretary to the Government of India & ors v. Smt. Alka Subhash Gadia & another, 1992 Supp. (1) SCC 496 Laid down five grounds/criteria on which courts may exercise discretionary jurisdiction under Article 226/32 at the pre-execution stage (including ground (iv): orders passed on vague, irrelevant or extraneous grounds). The Court held that the present case falls within ground (iv) — the detention order was passed on irrelevant and extraneous grounds — and therefore pre-execution interference was justified.
Alpesh Navinchandra Shah v. State of Maharashtra & others, (2007) 2 SCC 777 Principle that where a similarly placed person (e.g., a co-accused) had his detention revoked, the similarly placed detenue ought to receive like treatment. The Court relied upon this authority to support parity: because the co-accused’s detention was revoked by the State Government on the Advisory Board’s recommendation, the petitioner — similarly placed — was entitled to the same treatment.
Ashokbhai Jivraj alias Jivabhai Solanki v. Police Commissioner, Surat & others, 2000 (1) GLH 393 Used to illustrate that some cases fall under the maintenance of "law and order" and not "public order", making preventive detention impermissible. The petitioner relied on this decision to argue that the offences here concerned only law and order / private disputes and not public order; the Court considered this reasoning in concluding the detention was not justified for public order.
Ram Manohar Lohia v. State of Bihar, AIR 1966 SC 740 Referred to in the context of distinguishing "law and order" from "public order" (as applied in other High Court reasoning cited by petitioner). The Court noted that prior Supreme Court delineation between law-and-order and public-order was used in earlier authority relied on by the petitioner; that reasoning informed the Court's assessment that the present offences did not amount to affecting public order.
Deepak Bajaj v. State of Maharashtra, 2009 (1) GLH 140 Proposition that where a preventive detention order is clearly illegal, a person who comes to Court at the pre-execution stage should not be compelled to go to jail only to be released later; courts may grant pre-execution relief in such cases. The Court applied this principle: since the impugned order was held to be clearly illegal (passed on irrelevant grounds), there was no reason to compel the petitioner to undergo detention before release.
Hare Ram Pandey v. State of Bihar & others, AIR 2004 SC 738 Held that if the detenue has not surrendered, the court should call on the respondent to surrender and then examine grievances; also considered whether pre-execution interference is appropriate when the order and grounds are not before the Court. The respondents relied on this decision, but the Court distinguished it: here the grounds were before the Court (via the 13 November 2008 communication) and the detention order had been made; therefore Hare Ram Pandey did not block pre-execution relief in this case.
Sayed Taher Bawamiya v. Joint Secretary to the Government of India, (2000) 8 SCC 630 Referenced for its treatment of the Alka Subhash Gadia criteria and the limits on pre-execution interference. Referenced in the Court’s discussion distinguishing prior authority (Hare Ram Pandey) and in explaining the scope of Alka Subhash Gadia; the Court concluded Alka’s exceptions applied here (ground (iv)).

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Court proceeded by (a) examining the material relied upon by the detaining authority (including the communication dated 13 November 2008), (b) considering the nature and chronology of the offences relied upon, and (c) applying the relevant precedents governing pre-execution interference with preventive detention orders.

Step-by-step analysis as recorded in the opinion:

  1. Identification and classification of the offences: the petitioner was said to be involved in three offences. One was from 2005 (a state case, with cross-cases) and was characterized by the Court as stale and lacking proximate connection to the detention decision. Of the two remaining offences, one was the same incident (Bapunagar C.R. No.208/2008) that formed the basis for the co-accused's detention (which was later revoked), and the other was a private dispute that the Court found did not affect public order.
  2. Application of the Alka Subhash Gadia criteria: the Court referenced the five grounds identified in that precedent for permitting pre-execution interference. It concluded the present matter fell squarely within ground (iv) — detention made on vague, irrelevant, or extraneous grounds — because the offences did not amount to activities prejudicial to the maintenance of public order.
  3. Consideration of parity with co-accused: since the co-accused’s detention (insofar as the common offence) had been revoked by the State Government on the Advisory Board’s recommendation, the Court applied the reasoning in Alpesh Navinchandra Shah that a similarly placed person should ordinarily receive similar treatment.
  4. Distinguishing counter-authorities: the respondents relied on Hare Ram Pandey to contend that pre-execution relief was inappropriate when the detenue had not surrendered. The Court distinguished that authority because, unlike in Hare Ram Pandey, the grounds were available to the Court here (via the detaining authority’s 13 November 2008 communication) and the detention order had been shown to be in existence though not executed. Thus the factual basis that prevented pre-execution relief in Hare Ram Pandey did not obtain here.
  5. Reliance on Deepak Bajaj: the Court endorsed the principle that where a detention order is clearly illegal on the material before the Court at the pre-execution stage, it is a futile exercise to compel incarceration before release; liberty under Article 21 should not be lightly transgressed.
  6. Conclusion of illegality: synthesizing the above, the Court found that the impugned detention order had been passed on irrelevant grounds and was therefore clearly illegal within the meaning of the authorities cited; pre-execution interference was warranted.

Holding and Implications

Holding:

The petition is allowed; the impugned order of detention dated 16th September 2008 passed by the Police Commissioner, Ahmedabad City against the petitioner Bahadursinh Gambhirsinh Parmar is hereby quashed and set aside. Rule is made absolute accordingly.

Implications (direct effects recorded in the opinion):

  • The immediate legal consequence is quashing and setting aside of the specific detention order dated 16.9.2008 against the petitioner; the petition succeeds.
  • The Court's reasoning rests on (i) a finding that the offences relied upon did not amount to activities prejudicial to public order and (ii) parity with a co-accused whose detention had been revoked by the Advisory Board and State Government.
  • The opinion does not purport to lay down a novel precedent beyond applying established authorities (Alka Subhash Gadia; Alpesh Navinchandra Shah; Deepak Bajaj). The judgment resolves the dispute between these parties by quashing the specific detention order rather than announcing a broader new rule of law.

This summary is based exclusively on the contents of the provided judicial opinion and does not add or infer facts beyond that text.

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JUDGEMENT :-

H.N.Devani, J.

1 By this petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, the petitioner challenges the order of detention, dated 16.9.2008 passed against him by the respondent No.1 Commissioner of Police, ahmedabad city in exercise of powers under sub-section (2) of section 3 of the Gujarat Prevention of Antisocial Activities Act, 1985 (hereinafter referred to as the PASA Act).

2 The facts of the case stated briefly are that the petitioner is a business man. It appears that in connection with certain first information reports registered against him, an order of detention dated 16th September 2008 has been passed against him, which is subject matter of challenge before this Court at the pre-execution stage. It is the case of the petitioner that, in respect of the offence registered vide Bapunagar Police Station I C. R. No.208/2008, a co-accused of the petitioner, namely, Nagjibhai Sagarbhai Rabari had been detained under the PASA Act vide order dated 16th September 2008. That the petitioner being a co-accused, he was apprehending that a similar order has been passed against him and therefore, has approached this Court by way of the present petition. According to the petitioner, the order of detention passed against the co-accused has been revoked by the State Government, upon the advice of the advisory Board. It is also the case of the petitioner that he has made a representation before the Joint Secretary, Home Department as well as other concerned authorities on 3rd November, 2008 against the order of detention allegedly passed against him. According to the petitioner, since the order in case of the co-accused has already been revoked by the State Government, no useful purpose would be served by executing the order against the petitioner on the same grounds.

3 Pursuant to issuance of notice, an affidavit in-reply dated 18th february 2009 came to be filed by the detaining authority wherein it has been alleged that the petitioner has been evading execution of the order of detention and is absconding. It is further stated that the detaining authority, after carefully considering, perusing, examining and applying his mind to all the relevant materials placed before him as well as legal provisions applicable to the same, was subjectively satisfied that the petitioner is a dangerous person as defined under Sec.2 (c) of the PASA Act and has, therefore, passed the order of detention against the petitioner to prevent him from acting in any manner prejudicial to the maintenance of public order. It is stated in the affidavit that the case of the petitioner does not fall within any of five criteria laid down in the decision of the supreme Court in Additional Secretary to the Government of india and others V/s. Smt. Alka Subhash Gadia and another, 1992 Supp. (1) SCC 496, hence, the petition is required to be dismissed. Vide order dated 19th February 2009, this Court, after considering the affidavit in-reply filed by the respondent No.1, observed thus:

4 It has become routine for the detaining authorities to pass detention orders without application of mind. Prima facie, it appears that this is a fit case where the prayer made in this petition deserves to be granted.

5 By way of interim relief, pending final disposal of this petition, no order of detention shall be executed / passed against the petitioner.

6 Pursuant to the representation dated 3rd November 2008 made by the petitioner, the respondent No.1 addressed a communication dated 13th November 2008, wherein it has been stated that the order under the PASA Act has been passed against him, keeping in view his involvement in one offence under the Indian Penal Code in the year 2005 as well as two IPC offences in the current year. Considering the said cases, it appears that he has a fanatic nature and possesses a criminal mind and always keeps dangerous weapons in his possession. The authority has thereafter referred to the facts of the cases registered against the petitioner and has stated that by being involved in the said offences, the petitioner is committing criminal antisocial activities which have created an atmosphere of fear amongst the people which is a hindrance to the maintenance of public order. It is further stated therein that in connection with the offences registered against him, he has been enlarged on bail, hence, there are all possibilities of his continuing with his criminal antisocial activities and that after being fully satisfied, he has passed the order of detention against him on September 2008. However, with a view to see that the order is not executed, the petitioner is evading the same and is absconding. That as the order of detention has not been executed upon him, his representation cannot be considered.

7 Subsequently, the petitioner moved an amendment bringing on record the aforesaid communication dated 13th September 2008. The petitioner has also filed an affidavit in-rejoinder dated 13th April 2009.

8 This Court has heard Mr. H. R. Prajapati, learned advocate with Mr. Sanjay Prajapati, learned advocate for the petitioner and mr. D. G. Sejpal, learned Assistant Government Pleader on behalf of the respondents.

9 Mr. H. R. Prajapati, learned advocate for the petitioner has invited the attention of the court to the three offences in which the petitioner is alleged to have been involved which form the basis for making the impugned order of detention. It is submitted that the first offence is of the year 2005 and is, as such, a stale matter and could not have been taken into consideration at this stage. It was further submitted that in the said case, they had also filed a cross complaint and that it was private dispute which has no proximity or live link with the passing of the order of detention. So far as the second offence is concerned, it was also a private dispute and had nothing to do with the disturbance of public order whereas insofar as the third offence registered vide C. R. No.208/2008 is concerned, his name was not reflected in the first information report which refers to a mob of 500 persons who came to the Ashram and started damaging the properties of the Ashram and the mob was led by one Kamlesh tomar. It is submitted that it was the last incident which had prompted the respondent No. l to exercise powers under the PASA act and therefore, two orders of detention came to be passed on 16.9.2008, one against Shri Nagjibhai Sagarbhai Rabari and the other against the petitioner relying upon the same offence. It is submitted that persons whose names are mentioned in the first information report and who took leading roles have not been booked under the pasa Act and though the petitioner was not there in the mob, his name is shown at this stage and the powers of detention have been exercised against him by the detaining authority. It is submitted that, in any case, in the case of the co-accused, the order of detention has already been revoked by the State Government on the recommendation of the Advisory Board, hence, on the ground of parity also, the impugned order of detention is required to be quashed as when the order is even otherwise likely to be revoked by the Advisory Board, the petitioner should not needlessly be made to suffer detention.

10 In support of his submissions, the learned advocate has placed reliance upon decision of the Apex Court in Alpesh Navinchandra shah V/s. State of Maharashtra and others, (2007) 2 SCC 777, wherein in the facts of the said case, the petitioner's brother on identical facts had already been released on the ground that there was no sufficient cause for detention of the detenue under Section 3 (1) of the COFEPOSA Act. The Government had, accordingly, revoked the detention order issued against him and considering the report of the Advisory Board and the material on record and in exercise of powers conferred under Sec.8 (f) of the COFEPOSA Act, revoked the detention order and directed that the petitioner's brother be released forthwith. The Court was of the opinion that the petitioner therein who was also similarly placed, was entitled to the same treatment.

11 The next submission advanced by the learned advocate for the petitioner is that the offences alleged against the present petitioner do not affect the maintenance of public order and are related to law and order. Reliance is placed upon a decision of this court in Ashokbhai Jivraj alias Jivabhai Solanki V/s. Police commissioner, Surat and others, 2000 (1) GLH 393 and more particularly, to the contents of paragraph 22 thereof, wherein the court has observed thus :

"so far as the cases against the detenu are concerned, they have already been registered. They were against persons mentioned therein which is stated in the grounds of detention by the detaining authority. Regarding two statements, having taken into account the law laid down by the Supreme Court in Ram Manohar Lohia vs. State of Bihar, AIR 1966 SC 740 and reiterated from time to time including the decisions referred to by us hereinabove, the case falls under the maintenance of "law and order and not "public order". The subjective satisfaction arrived at by the detaining authority, therefore, cannot be said to be legal, valid and in accordance with law. Since in the facts and circumstances, an order of detention could have been passed by the detaining authority for maintenance of "public order", the order deserves to be quashed and is hereby set aside. The detenu is ordered to be set at liberty forthwith unless required in any other case. Appeal is accordingly allowed. No order as to costs. "

12 It was submitted that once this Court rules that such offences are related to law and order, the detaining authority does not have jurisdiction to rule such offences as affecting the maintenance of public order. It was further submitted that when on the basis of the same material the Advisory Board has come to the conclusion that there is no sufficient material against the co-accused, the petitioner should not be made to undergo imprisonment.

13 As regards the contention that the case does not fall within the criteria laid down in the case of Smt. Alka Subhash Gadia (supra), it was submitted that the present case would be covered by the fourth illustration therein. Reliance was placed upon the decision of the Apex Court in Deepak Bajaj V/s. State of Maharashtra, 2009 (1) GLH 140 for the proposition that if a person against whom a preventive detention order has been passed comes to the Court at the pre-execution stage and satisfies the Court that the detention order is clearly illegal, there is no reason why the Court should stay its hands and compel the petitioner to go to jail even though he is bound to be released subsequently. It is also held in the said case that the five grounds mentioned for setting aside a detention order at the pre-execution stage in Additional Secretary, GOI V/s. Alka subhaeh Gadia are only illustrative and not exhaustive.

14 On the other hand, Mr. D. C. Sejpal, learned Assistant government Pleader has vehemently opposed the petition. It is submitted that the decision of the Apex Court in Smt. Alka Subhash gadia (supra) would not be applicable to the facts of the present case as the same was rendered in a totally different factual background. It further is submitted that the case of the petitioner does not fall within any of the criteria laid down in the case of Smt. Alka Subhash Gadia (supra) and as such, the petition ought not to be entertained. It is pointed out that the facts of the case in respect of the co-accused are not identical to that of the petitioner inasmuch as against the co-accused there were only two cases, whereas against the petitioner, there are three cases. Referring to the affidavit in-reply made by the respondent No. l, it is submitted that the petitioner had been absconding and as such, is not entitled to the relief prayed for. Reliance is placed upon a decision of the Apex Court in Hare ram Pandey V/s. State of Bihar and others, AIR 2004 SC 738 and more particularly, to the observations made in paragraph 11 thereof which are to the following effect:

When the writ petition was filed, the respondent had not surrendered. Under these circumstances, the proper order which was required to be passed was to call upon the respondent first to surrender pursuant to the detention order and then to have all his grievances examined on merits after he had an opportunity to study the grounds of detention and to make his representation against the said grounds as required by Article 22 (5) of the Constitution.

15 It was submitted that the detaining authority has considered all relevant material and has arrived at the subjective satisfaction that the petitioner is a dangerous person as envisaged under Section 2 (c) of the PASA Act and that, his activities are prejudicial to the maintenance of public order and has, accordingly, passed the impugned order of detention which is just, legal and proper, and does not call for any interference by this Court.

16 In rejoinder, Mr. H. R. Prajapati, learned advocate has submitted that the allegation that the petitioner was evading the execution of the order of detention and was absconding, is not borne out by any material on record. It is submitted that the petitioner was released on bail in connection with the last offence in September 2008 and thereafter, he had immediately moved this Court and stay was granted. It is further submitted that the allegations made in the FIR are in the nature of private offences and have nothing to do with the public order. Attention is invited to the averments made in the petition and more particularly, to paragraph 10 (d), 10 (e) and 10 (e) thereof, wherein it is inter alia stated that the powers of prevention detention are required to be exercised in the rarest of the rare cases and that, it is the duty of every Police Commissioner in the cities and District magistrates, as the case may be, to maintain situation of law and order in their respective areas. The power of preventive detention under PASA is to be exercised only in cases where there is a failure of law and order and there is no other way left out but to prevent a person from indulging him in alleged activities which are affecting or likely to affect the maintenance of public order. It is submitted that since 1985, the orders of detention under PASA Act are being passed for oblique motives and in total disregard of the judicial pronouncements of this Court as well as of the Supreme Court. It is further submitted that looking to the number of orders of detention passed within the State of Gujarat, more particularly in commissionerate areas, it clearly gives a message that there is a failure of law and order situation within the State itself and for that, the executives who fail to maintain law and order situation are themselves required to be held responsible. It is further stated that an order of detention under PASA Act can only be passed when there is material on record to show that the activities of a person are either that of a bootlegger or dangerous person or property grabber or cruel person etc., and further that the activities of such person are prejudicial to the maintenance of public order. It is contended that from the material considered by the detaining authority as it appears from his communication dated 13th November 2008, it can never be said that the alleged activities of the petitioner are in any manner affecting or likely to affect the maintenance of public order. It is, accordingly, submitted that the impugned order of detention having been passed on extraneous, vague and irrelevant materials as well as for a wrong purpose, is illegal, invalid and contrary to the provisions of law and as such, is required to be quashed and set aside.

17 From the facts noted hereinabove as well as in view of the rival submissions advanced by the learned advocates for the parties, it is apparent that an order of detention came to be passed against one Nagjibhai Sagarbhai Rabari, who is a co-accused of the petitioner herein in the first information report registered vide Bapunagar Police station I C. R. No.208/2008 for the offences punishable under Sections 143, 147, 149, 436 and 295a of the Indian Penal Code and Section 135 (1) of the Bombay Police Act. The said co-accused is also stated to be involved in one more offence. The order of detention dated 16th september 2008 passed against the co-accused had been revoked by the State Government on the recommendation of the Advisory Board, insofar as the present petitioner is concerned, it is true that the order of detention has not been placed on record as the same has not been executed and the petition has been filed at the pre-execution stage. However, from the communication dated 13.11.2008 of the detaining authority, it is apparent that the said order has been passed in connection with the three offences registered against the petitioner. Out of the three offences, one offence was registered in the year 2005 wherein there were two cross cases and in any case, the said case is a state case and has no proximity to the order of detention. Insofar as the other two cases are concerned, one case is common to the case wherein the co-accused was involved, in whose case the order of detention has been revoked under the recommendation of the Advisory Board. The third offence registered against the petitioner is in the nature of a private dispute and in no manner, can be said to be affecting the maintenance of public order. Therefore, prima facie, the order of detention has been passed against the petitioner on grounds which are not germane inasmuch as the alleged illegal and antisocial activities of the petitioner cannot be said to be prejudicial to the maintenance of public order. In additional Secretary, GOI V/s. Smt Alka Subhash Gadia (supra) the supreme Court laid down five grounds on which courts can interfere with orders of detention at the pre-execution stage. Ground (iv), which is relevant for the present purpose, reads thus: Dthat it is passed on vague, irrelevant and extraneous grounds. The present case squarely falls within the said criteria inasmuch as the order of detention has been passed on irrelevant grounds as the offences alleged against the petitioner can in no manner be said to be affecting the maintenance of public order. In the circumstances, the learned advocate for the petitioner is justified in contending that the case at hand falls within the criteria laid down in the case of smt. Alka Subhash Gadia (supra ).

18 Besides, it has been brought on record that the order of detention passed against the co-accused insofar as the offence registered vide Bapunagar Police Station I C. R. No.208/2008 is concerned, has been revoked by the State Government on the recommendation of the Advisory Board. In the circumstances, the learned advocate for the petitioner is justified in submitting that when on the same material, the Advisory Board has come to the conclusion that there is no sufficient material for detaining the said detenue, the petitioner should not be made to undergo imprisonment only to have the order revoked by the Advisory Board at a subsequent stage.

19 Insofar as the decision of the Supreme Court in Hare Ram pandey (supra), on which strong reliance has been placed by the learned Assistant Government Pleader is concerned, the Court referred to the decision in Sayed Taher Bawamiya V/s. Joint secretary to the Government of India, (2000) 8 SCC 630, wherein the Court had referred to the criteria laid down in the case of Smt. Alka Subhash Gadia (supra), and observed that the said case shows that it is only in these five types of instances that the court may exercise its discretionary jurisdiction under Article 226 or Article 32 at the pre-execution stage. The Court held that the said case did not fall under any of the five exceptions laid down therein. In the facts of the said case, the appellant had sought to contend that the order which was passed was vague, extraneous and on irrelevant grounds, but there was no material for making such an averment for the reason that the order of detention and the grounds on which the said order had been passed were not placed on record as the order had not been executed and the appellant did not have a copy of the same. In the circumstances, the Court held that it was not open for the appellant to contend that the non-existent order was passed on vague, extraneous or on irrelevant grounds, whereas in the facts of the present case, it is an admitted position that the detention order dated 16th September 2008 has been made against the present petitioner; though the order of detention has not been placed on record, the grounds of detention are very much there before the Court in the form of the communication dated 13th November 2008 of the respondent No. l detaining authority. In the circumstances, the said decision would not come to the aid of the respondents.

20 In Deepak Bajaj V/s. State of Maharashtra, (supra), the Supreme Court observed thus: if a person against whom a preventive detention order has been passed can show to the Court that the said detention order is clearly illegal, why should he be compelled to go to jail? To tell such a person that although such a detention order is illegal he must yet go to jail though he will be released later is a meaningless and futile exercise.

21 The Court held that if a person against whom a preventive detention order has been passed comes to the Court at the pre-execution stage and satisfies the Court that the detention order is clearly illegal, there is no reason why the Court should stay its hands and compel the petitioner to go to jail even though he is bound to be released subsequently (since the detention order was illegal ). The liberty of a person is a precious fundamental right under Article 21 of the Constitution and should not be lightly transgressed. In the facts of the present case, it is apparent that the impugned order of detention has been passed on irrelevant grounds and as such, is clearly illegal. In the circumstances, in the light of the law laid down by the Apex Court, there is no reason why this Court should stay its hands and compel the petitioner to go to jail even though he is bound to be released subsequently.

22 The present case is also squarely covered by the decision of the Apex Court in Alpesh Navinchandra Shah V/s. State of maharashtra (supra) inasmuch as when a similar order of detention passed against a co-accused has been revoked by the State government on the recommendation of the Advisory Board, the impugned order of detention passed against the petitioner is also likely to be revoked. In the circumstances, the petitioner who is similarly placed with the co-accused, is entitled to the same treatment.

23 For the foregoing reasons, the petition succeeds and is, accordingly, allowed. The impugned order of detention dated 16th september 2008 passed by the Police Commissioner, Ahmedabad City against the petitioner Bahadursinh Gambhirsinh Parmar is hereby quashed and set aside. Rule is made absolute accordingly.