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Javerbhai Jorabhai v. Gordhan Narsi
Concise, Structured Summary of the Opinion (Batchelor, J.)
Factual and Procedural Background
The plaintiff (appellant) sued as mortgagee to recover possession of a house and Rs. 14 as rent or, alternatively, to recover Rs. 749 from the mortgaged house and other properties if the mortgage were held void. The plaint alleged a registered mortgage deed of 1897 executed in favour of the plaintiff's father by defendants 1 & 2 and by Shankar Narsi (the deceased husband of defendant 3), the mortgagors having purchased the properties from the bhagdar owner in 1893. In 1901 part of the property was sold to pay part of the mortgage debt and the balance of the debt was secured by a fresh mortgage of the house now in suit. The defendants remained in possession under yearly rent-notes (the last passed in 1908) and refused to surrender possession. The plaint also pleaded that, if the plaintiff were not entitled to recover possession, he was entitled under a covenant in the mortgage deed to Rs. 749 as compensation.
The defendants admitted execution of the mortgage-deed and the rent-notes but pleaded that they were void under the Bhagdari Act, that the plaintiff took no effective interest under the instruments, and that the suit was barred by limitation. Both the trial Court and the lower Court of Appeal found the mortgage and the leases void ab initio, that the defendants were not estopped from raising that defence, and that the plaintiff's claim to compensation (so far as based on the mortgage consideration) was time-barred. On those findings the suit was dismissed as to the house, and the plaintiff appealed.
Legal Issues Presented
- Whether the 1897 mortgage and the subsequent rent-notes are void under section 3 of the Bhagdari Act, 1862.
- Whether the plaintiff is entitled to compensation (restitution) where the principal contract (mortgage) is void — in particular, whether section 65 of the Indian Contract Act or other doctrines permit such relief.
- Whether a separate covenant in the mortgage instrument (promising compensation if possession is disturbed) can be enforced independently of the main mortgage despite the mortgage being void by statute.
- Whether any claim for compensation is barred by limitation, and if not, what period or events determine the accrual of the cause of action.
- If compensation is allowable, what is the measure of the plaintiff's recovery given the mortgage’s statutory invalidity (including application of the Damdupat rule limiting recovery)?
Arguments of the Parties
Plaintiff's Arguments
- The plaintiff sued as mortgagee to recover possession of the house or alternatively money due under the mortgage/covenant.
- He relied on continuous possession from the transfer following the 1897 mortgage up to July 1909 and on the series of yearly rent-notes (last 20 June 1908) showing the defendants attorned as his tenants; on this foundation he asserted a limited interest in the property and sought compensation under the covenant when defendants refused to surrender possession in July 1909.
- The plaintiff maintained that the covenant in the mortgage (promising compensation in event of disturbance) provided an independent basis for compensation and that the breach occurred in 1909, making the claim within time.
Defendants' Arguments
- The mortgage-deed and rent-notes were void under section 3 of the Bhagdari Act because the property was an unrecognised sub-division of a bhag and thus could not lawfully be alienated or mortgaged.
- The plaintiff thereby took no enforceable interest under the mortgage or rent-notes.
- The plaintiff’s claim (particularly as based on the mortgage consideration) was barred by the statute of limitation.
Table of Precedents Cited
| Precedent | Rule or Principle Cited For | Application by the Court |
|---|---|---|
| Jijibhai v. Nagji | Authority that a mortgage is void under the Bhagdari Act even though the original mortgagors were not bhagdars. | Relied upon to support the conclusion that the mortgage in the present case was void under s.3 of the Bhagdari Act. |
| Ardesir v. Vajesing | Holds that where a contract is void ab initio the consideration must be taken to have failed from the date of contract (relied on limitation consequences). | The lower Courts relied on it (and on the Privy Council decision cited below) to hold that the plaintiff's right to compensation based on the mortgage consideration failed from 1897 and hence was time-barred under Article 62 of the Limitation Act. |
| Hanumun Kamat v. Hanuman Mandur | Privy Council decision forming the basis for Ardesir's rule on consideration failing ab initio where contract void by statute. | Used as the foundational authority for treating the mortgage consideration as failed from the date of the void contract, with limitation consequences. |
| Kerrison v. Cole | English case holding a personal covenant in an instrument enforceable even though the transfer part of the instrument was void by statute; statute avoided only the transfer and not independent collateral contracts. | Adopted as persuasive authority to support enforcement of the collateral covenant in the present mortgage instrument, despite the mortgage itself being void under the Bhagdari Act. |
| Payne v. Mayor of Brecon | Followed Kerrison and Mouys v. Leake; held covenant to repay valid though mortgage was invalid under statute; Court approved earlier authorities. | Relied on to show English authorities consistently allow collateral covenants to be enforced despite statutory invalidity of the principal security; used to bolster the conclusion that the covenant in the present deed may be enforced. |
| Mouys v. Leake | Dealt with a rent-charge void by statute but where the deed contained a personal covenant to pay; the covenant was held valid. | Quoted and treated as analogous authority supporting enforcement of a collateral covenant despite statutory invalidity of the principal grant. |
| Adam Umar v. Bapu Bawaji | Shows possession under an alienation void under the Bhagdari Act is adverse to the true owner. | Referred to support the conclusion that plaintiff’s long possession under the void alienation was adverse and relevant to the acquisition of an absolute title to the limited interest. |
| Budesab v. Hanmanta | Holds that possession of a limited interest, when held adversely for the statutory period, creates an unimpeachable title (like possession of the absolute interest). | Applied to conclude that the plaintiff’s adverse possession of the limited interest for the statutory period (over twelve years) gave him an absolute title to that limited interest as against the defendants. |
Court's Reasoning and Analysis
The Court's analysis proceeds in a sequence of linked legal propositions based on statutory text, limitation principles, analogous English authorities and possession law:
- Statutory invalidity of the mortgage: The Court began by noting the property was an unrecognised sub-division of a bhag, so alienation was prohibited by section 3 of the Bhagdari Act, 1862. It accepted (and the appellant did not press contrary submissions) the view established in Jijibhai v. Nagji that the mortgage is void under that Act even though the original mortgagors were not bhagdars. The rent-notes were treated as integral to the same indivisible transaction and therefore tainted with the same illegality — both mortgage and rent-notes held void.
- Limitation consequences for consideration-based claims: The Court analysed the plaintiff's alternative route to compensation — restitution for the failed consideration of the mortgage — and noted the lower Courts had relied on Ardesir v. Vajesing (following the Privy Council in Hanumun Kamat v. Hanuman Mandur) to conclude that where a contract is void ab initio, consideration is taken to have failed from the date of contract. Applying Article 62 of the Indian Limitation Act, the Court acknowledged that any claim based on the original consideration attaching to the 1897 mortgage is time-barred because the consideration failed from 1897.
- Inquiry into the separate covenant: The Court then considered whether a separate covenant in the deed (promising compensation if the house were disturbed or taken out of possession) could support a timely claim independently of the mortgage's invalidity. The covenant was broader than the covenant considered in Ardesir: it covered both hindrance to taking possession and later disturbance/removal of possession. The Court accepted that if the covenant is an independent basis of liability, the claimed breach occurred in July 1909 (when the defendants refused to give up possession after expiry of the last rent-note), so the covenant claim would be within time.
- Statutory permissibility and English analogies: The Court found no Indian statute (including the Indian Contract Act) that forbids enforcing such a collateral covenant and noted section 65 of the Contract Act supports the restitution principle (though perhaps not directly dispositive). Because the point was not fully covered by Indian enactments, the Court turned to English authorities. It relied on Kerrison v. Cole (and subsequent approvals in Payne v. Mayor of Brecon and Mouys v. Leake) to hold that where the statute voids the transfer part of an instrument for political/regulatory reasons, it does not necessarily require voiding every independent collateral covenant contained in that instrument. The Court analogised the object of the Bhagdari Act to the English statutes considered: the Act aims to prevent certain alienations for political reasons, not to punish the parties or invalidate unrelated personal covenants; therefore the covenant could remain enforceable.
- Possession and the accrual of title to the limited interest: The Court addressed the effect of long possession. It accepted the plaintiff's factual case that, after the 1897 mortgage, the plaintiff (or his predecessor) held possession of the limited interest continuously until July 1909, during which time the defendants attorned to him by giving yearly rent-notes. Because the plaintiff had been in adverse possession of that limited interest for over twelve years, the Court treated his title to that limited interest as having become absolute against the defendants by July 1909. The Court cited Adam Umar v. Bapu Bawaji (possession under an alienation void under the Bhagdari Act is adverse) and Budesab v. Hanmanta (possession of a limited interest held adversely for the statutory period yields unimpeachable title).
- Measure of recovery: Although the covenant was enforceable and the plaintiff entitled to compensation, the Court held that because the mortgage itself is void the amount recoverable must be curtailed according to the Damdupat rule (a limitation on recovery where security is void). Applying that rule, the Court limited the plaintiff's recovery to double the principal and computed the decree accordingly.
Holding and Implications
Holding: The Court held that both the mortgage and the rent-notes were void under section 3 of the Bhagdari Act, but that the plaintiff could enforce the collateral covenant in the mortgage instrument for disturbance of possession. Because the plaintiff had been in adverse possession of the limited interest for over twelve years, the breach occurred in July 1909 and the covenant claim was within time. The Court limited recovery under the Damdupat rule to double the principal and entered a decree for the plaintiff for Rs. 400 with costs and interest at 6% until realization. The decree of the lower Court was varied accordingly.
Implications:
- Direct effect: The plaintiff obtains a monetary decree of Rs. 400 (with costs and interest), despite the mortgage instrument being void as to the transfer; the collateral covenant provided an independent route to relief.
- Limitation and restitution: The decision distinguishes between (a) restitution claims based on the failed consideration of a void contract (which are treated as failing from the date of contract and may be time-barred under Article 62) and (b) claims based on a separate collateral covenant whose breach may occur later and thus may be within the statutory period.
- Statutory construction principle: The Court applied authority showing that where a statute voids a transfer for regulatory reasons, courts need not extend that statutory nullification to independent collateral personal obligations contained in the same instrument absent clear legislative intent — the statute's object is to prevent the transfer, not to work injustice by invalidating unrelated personal covenants.
- Possession doctrine: The judgment reaffirms that adverse possession of a limited interest for the statutory period can confer an unimpeachable title to that limited interest vis-à-vis the true owner/other parties.
- No sweeping new precedent: The opinion applies and synthesizes existing authorities (Indian and English) and explains their application to the facts; it does not purport to create a novel statutory rule beyond those applications.
Decree varied. Judgment for plaintiff: Rs. 400 with costs and interest at 6% until realization.
End of summary — all content strictly reflects the information contained in the provided opinion.
Batchelor, J.:— The plaintiff, who is the appellant before us, brought this suit as mortgagee to recover possession of a house and Rs. 14 as rent or, in the alternative, to recover Rs. 749 from the mortgaged house and other properties of defendants in case the Court should hold that plaintiff's mortgage was void. The plaint set out that the house in suit and certain other properties were, by a registered deed of 1897, mortgaged to the plaintiff's father by defendants 1 and 2 and Shankar Narsi, the deceased husband of defendant 3, these mortgagors having purchased the properties from the bhagdar owner in 1893; that in 1901, on accounts being taken, part of the property was sold to pay part of the mortgage debt, while the balance of the debt was secured by a fresh mortgage of the house in suit; that the defendants 1 and 2 and Shankar Narsi, or, after his death, his widow, the third defendant, remained in possession of the house as plaintiff's tenants under yearly rent-notes; that the last such rent-note was passed in 1908; and that the defendants refused to surrender possession. It was further pleaded that, in case the plaintiff should not be held entitled to recover possession, he was in any event entitled, under a covenant contained in the deed of mortgage, to a sum of Rs. 749 as compensation, that being the sum due under the mortgage.
The defendants admitted the mortgage-deed and rent-notes, but contended that they were void under the Bhagdari Act, that the plaintiff took no interest in the property either under the mortgage or under the rent-notes, and that the suit was barred by limitation. On the material issues both the trial Court and the lower Court of Appeal have found that the mortgage and the leases were void ab initio, that the defendants were not estopped from raising this contention and that the plaintiff's claim to compensation was barred by limitation. On these findings, so far as concerns the house now in litigation, the suit was dismissed. From this dismissal the plaintiff brings the present appeal.
The property in suit being admittedly an unrecognised sub-division of a bhag, its alienation is prohibited by section 3 of the Bhagdari Act, 1862. The argument advanced in the lower Courts that this mortgage could be saved from the prohibition was not pressed before us, and Jijibhai v. Nagji is authority for the view that the mortgage is void under the Act none the less because the original mortgagors were not bhagdars. The rent-notes were, we think, part and parcel of the one indivisible transaction; they are, therefore, tainted with the illegality which affects the mortgage, and they must suffer the same fate. We hold that both the mortgage and the rent-notes are void.
The only remaining question is that to which the arguments before us were almost exclusively confined, namely, whether the plaintiff is entitled to any and what compensation. The lower Courts, following Jijibhai's case, have decided that the plaintiff has a good claim to compensation under section 65 of the Contract Act, but both Courts have felt compelled to hold that the claim is out of time, though the learned Subordinate Judges recognise the hardship of a decision which deprives the plaintiff both of his mortgage security and of the money which he advanced. It may be observed in passing that the hardship happens in this case to be all the greater because it is found that the plaintiff had no knowledge of the bhag character of the property until the decision of a former suit filed so late as 1908. But both the Courts have felt constrained to hold that, inasmuch as the contract of mortgage was void ab initio, the consideration must be taken to have failed from the date of the contract, that is, 1897, whether the plaintiff was aware of the illegality or not; for this view they have relied on Ardesir v. Vajesing, which followed the decision of the Privy Council in Hanumun Kamat v. Hanuman Mandur. It cannot be denied that if this view be sound and taking account of the whole of plaintiff's case, the claim for compensation is out of time. So far as the contract of mortgage is concerned, the consideration unquestionably failed ab initio, and the money advanced by the plaintiff's predeeessor-in-title was money received by the defendants for the plaintiff's use, within the meaning of Article 62 of the Indian Limitation Act. Under that Article, therefore, the plaintiff is now too late to obtain compensation in respect of the consideration attaching to the mortgage.
But there still remains the question whether the plaintiff is not entitled to recover for breach of a separate covenant contained in the deed of mortgage. That covenant was passed by the defendant mortgagors in the following terms, “if there should be any hindrance or obstruction concerning the house, or if the house should be taken out of your possession, then we and our property and our heirs and representatives are liable for any loss you may suffer and for your moneys advanced.” Assuming for the moment, that this covenant can properly be made the basis of a claim for compensation independently of the original mortgage it is plain that that claim will be within time, for the plaintiff's case is that the breach of the covenant did not occur till 1909 when, the term of the last lease having expired, the defendants refused, on demand made, to surrender possession and the suit was filed in 1910. We may notice also that this covenant is of a different character from that which, in Ardesir's case, was held incapable of saving the plaintiff's suit from the bar of limitation. For there neither the plaintiff nor his vendor had possession of the wanta land in suit, and the covenant, it was held, did not amount to an agreement to compensate the purchaser for nonpossession, but proceeded on the assumption that he had obtained possession. Here the covenant covers as well the cases where hindrance or obstruction should occur in taking possession as the case where possession, after having once been obtained, is afterwards taken away from the purchaser.
It remains to determine whether, although the mortgage is void under the Bhagdari Act, it is open to the plaintiff to claim under this covenant. It has not been suggested that in the Indian Contract Act or any other Indian enactment there is anything to prohibit such a claim; and the only provision which has any bearing upon the question of its validity, namely section 65 of the Contract Act, favours the view that the defendants are bound to make restitution. Having regard, however, to the precise wording of section 65, there may perhaps be difficulty in holding that this section is directly applicable to our present facts, but the section at least indicates that the plaintiff's claim is consonant with the general principle adopted by the statute. Assuming that the plaintiff's claim under the covenant cannot be wholly justified by reference to section 65, it follows that the point under discussion is not covered by any Indian enactment. That being so, it is competent to us to turn for guidance to the decisions of the English Courts on a similar state of facts. In Kerrison v. Cole the plaintiff sued upon a bill of sale transferring to him the property in certain ships by way of mortgage security for a sum of £2,500 advanced by the plaintiff. But the bill of sale itself was void under a particular statute inasmuch as it did not recite the certificates of registry. Yet it was held that the plaintiff was entitled to sue the mortgagor upon his personal covenant, contained in the same instrument of mortgage, for the repayment of the money. For the defendants it was contended that the whole instrument was void, and Counsel relied upon the comprehensive words of the statute which were that “the Bill or other instrument of sale shall be utterly null and void to all intents and purposes,” arguing that the suit was an attempt to make the instrument good to one intent and purpose. The Court, however, held that the statute was not to be construed thus harshly, and Lord Ellenborough, C.J, after observing that in terms the statute purported to vacate only the bill of sale, said “It does not vacate the whole instrument which may happen also to contain any other independent contract between the parties; but that part of it only which operates as a bill of sale………… To go farther, and vacate the covenant for the payment of the money lent, would be going beyond the reason and object of the Legislature in order to work injustice.” And Le Blanc, J. said: “The object of the Act, which was to enforce a mere political regulation, is effectually attained by avoiding the transfer of the ships, for want of the requisites in the bill of sale: and there being nothing immoral in the transaction itself, there is no necessity for carrying the construction further.” The words which we have quoted seem to us to be apposite to the present case. The Bhagdari Act, like the English statute, has for its object to enforce a political regulation, the preamble setting forth that the permanence of this superior tenure is endangered by the practice of attachment and sale, by civil process, of the homesteads and buildings appertaining to the bhags, and that it is desirable to prevent the alienation of any unrecognised portion of a bhag. But, as in the English case, there is nothing immoral in such alienations per se; for political reasons they are prohibited by law. And as the English statute, in the words of Lord Ellenborough, vacated only the bill of sale itself, and not any other independent contract which might be contained in the instrument, so section 3 of the bhagdari act provides only that it shall not be lawful (inter alia) to alienate or mortgage any unrecognised sub-division of a bhag, that any such alienation or mortgage shall be null and void, and that the Collector may remove from possession any such alienee or mortgagee who is in possession in violation of the section. It is, in the present case, the mortgage only that is to be avoided, and, following the language of Le Blanc, J., we may say that the object of the Act is effectually attained by avoiding the mortgage and, there being nothing immoral in the transaction itself, there is no necessity for carrying the construction further so as to enable the mortgagor both to recover possession of the security and to retain the moneys advanced. Kerrison v. Cole was followed in Payne v. Mayor of Brecon, where Mouys v. Leake was also relied on. This latter case was concerned with the grant of a rent-charge created by a rector out of his benefice, such charge being absolutely void under the statute 13, Eliz. c. 20. But as the deed of grant contained a covenant by the rector personally to pay the charge, the Court refused to order the deed to be delivered up for cancellation, and held the covenant to be valid. The grounds upon which Lord Kenyon, C.J put the judgment of the Court were stated in the following words, which appear to us applicable to the present appeal: “In this case,” said his Lordship, “one of the defendants executed a deed, by which he granted an annuity or rent-charge out of certain benefices. This is not malum in se. There is nothing wrong in such a transaction, except as far as it is prohibited by the statute. If indeed there had been any moral turpitude mixed in it, I would have followed it in all its consequences: but a deed that was intended to operate one way, may operate another way, ut res magis valeat quam pereat, if honesty requires it.” It seems, therefore, to be clear that where, as here, the covenant is collateral and not merely dependent upon the principal contract, it may, in such circumstances as these, form the proper basis of a claim, even though the main contract be, as here, wholly null and void by statute. It appears necessary to explain that this is so in conformity with the authorities cited, because in Payne v. Mayor of Brecon Baron Bramwell, as he then was, used language which might seem to cast doubt on the proposition that the covenant might be good even though the alienation might be wholly void by statute. We do not think, however, that the language used was really intended so to decide a question which was not then strictly before the Court, because the learned Judge himself quoted with approval the decision in Kerrison's case, where the mortgage of the ships was void by statute, and Watson, B. relied upon Lord Kenyon's judgment in Mouys v. Leake, where the grant of the rent charge was void by statute. The most, therefore, that defendant's counsel can now make of Payne v. Mayor of Brecon, is to say that it was not so strong a case as either of the other two, and that the Court decided the case they had before them; but in so doing, they expressly approved the decisions in Mouys v. Leake and Kerrison v. Cole. For the rest it is only necessary to add that in Payne's case the Municipal Corporation of Brecon had borrowed money for a purpose to which the borough fund was not applicable by section 92 of 5 and 6 Will. 4, c. 76, and had, as security, executed a deed of mortgage without the approbation of the Lords of the Treasury, as required by section 94 of the Act. The mortgage was consequently invalid, but the deed contained a covenant to repay the borrowed money, and it was held that this covenant was valid. The judgment of the Court was, as we have said, based upon the cases of Mouys v. Leake and Kerrison v. Cole as to which Watson, B. said “Those cases are founded on good sense and are sound law, and it would be mischievous tb disturb them.” That being so, it cannot, we think, be fairly said that in Payne's case the Court decided for the validity of the covenant merely because the mortgage executed by the corporation was only invalid, and not wholly void by the statute. Apart from the general reliance on the authority of the cases of Mouys v. Leake and Kerrison v. Cole, the ratio of the decision in Payne's case was, in the words of Martin, B., that there was nothing in the statute of Will. IV which prohibited a corporation from entering into a covenant to pay its lawful debts. We find that there is nothing to that purpose in the Bhagdari Act, and that, though the transfer by way of mortgage must be set aside as void under the statute, the English authorities show, consistently with the principles embodied in section 65 of the Indian Contract Act and section 38 of the Specific Relief Act, that the plaintiff is entitled to claim under the covenant.
Now the covenant promises compensation in the event of the disturbance of possession, and the plaintiffs case upon this point is put in this way. The first mortgage was executed on 3rd February, 1897, and covered the house now in suit together with certain other properties. By another mortgage of 1901, the house alone was secured. The house was never redeemed from the mortgage of 1897, and the possession then transferred to the plaintiff was held by him continuously till July 1909, when it was first challenged by the defendants. Throughout this period, the defendants passed annual rent-notes to the plaintiff, and, consequently, held as the plaintiff's tenants. The last of such rent-notes was passed on 20th June, 1908, and it was not till after the expiry of this rent-note, that is July 1909, that the defendants, upon demand made, refused to surrender possession. The period from February 1897 to July 1909 exceeds the twelve years prescribed by the statute, and the plaintiff relies upon his possession throughout that period as giving him an absolute title to the limited interest and so justifying his claim under the covenant for compensation for disturbance. In our opinion this contention must be allowed. The mortgage and the rent-notes are void, but the plaintiff for over twelve years was in possession of the limited interest as mortgagee in possession and in assertion of that right held adversely to the defendants, who continuously attorned to him. As against the defendants the plaintiff's title to the limited interest had become absolute by July 1909, and it is now too late for the defendants to deny either the plaintiff's possession or their own disturbance of that possession in July 1909. If authority be needed for these conclusions, we may refer to Adam Umar v. Bapu Bawaji as showing that possession held under an alienation void under the Bhagdari Act is adverse to the true owner, and to Budesab v. Hanmanta as showing that possession of a limited interest, equally with possession of the absolute interest, creates, when held adversely for the statutory period, an unimpeachable title.
It follows that the plaintiff has a good claim for compensation under the covenant. But since the mortgage is void, the amount of the claim must, under the Damdupat rule, be limited to double the principal. There will therefore be a decree for the plaintiff for Rs. 400 with costs throughout and interest on judgment at 6 per cent, till realisation.
Decree varied.
J.G.R
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