- Bookmark
- Share
- CaseIQ
Percy F. Fisher v. Ardeshir Hormasji Gazdar
Concise Analytical Summary of the Opinion
Factual and Procedural Background
The plaintiff sued defendant No. 1 to recover Rs. 13,350 and interest for monies allegedly lent and advanced at various times in 1920, and sought an order for sale of certain shares (226 deferred ordinary shares of the British Dye Stuffs Corporation) alleged to have been pledged to him in or about January 1922 as security for repayment of the loans; the plaint also contained ancillary reliefs.
Defendant No. 1 denied the loans and interest payments, asserting instead that moneys were paid to the plaintiff to cover gambling/wagering losses incurred by defendant in the plaintiff's house. He denied the existence of a pledge and said the shares had been entrusted to the plaintiff for sale in England (about January 1922) and remained unsold. In about 1926 a corporate amalgamation complicated conversion of the shares; defendant refused to hand over 236 preference shares which were required to be converted simultaneously. The plaintiff refused to return the other shares unless defendant gave a receipt acknowledging that the plaintiff held them as security. Defendant counterclaimed for return of the shares.
Defendant No. 1 was adjudicated insolvent on 22 November 1933 and the Official Assignee is on record as defendant. The Official Assignee adopted defendant No. 1's written statement. Several issues were raised; the defendants contended the suit was barred by limitation and the issue of limitation was tried as a preliminary issue. The suit was filed on 13 May 1929.
The plaintiff applied, during the hearing, to amend the plaint to rely on certain payments specified in Exhibit B and on the alleged pledge as grounds to avoid the bar of limitation; the Court allowed the amendment on terms as to costs and the amendments were made.
Legal Issues Presented
- Whether the plaintiff's personal claim for moneys lent and advanced in 1920 is barred by limitation.
- Whether the plaintiff's right to realise security (the alleged pledge of shares in January 1922) is barred by limitation.
- Whether payments of interest (as alleged in Exhibit B and para. 3 of the plaint) or the act of pledging the shares in January 1922 operate to extend or revive the period of limitation applicable to either the personal claim or the claim to enforce the pledge.
- When, for the purposes of Article 120 of the Limitation Act, the "right to sue" accrues in relation to a pawnee's right to enforce a pledge (i.e., whether accrual is the date of pledge, or the date of demand/refusal or some other event).
Arguments of the Parties
Plaintiff's Arguments
- That the sums were lent and advanced in 1920 and the shares were pledged in or about January 1922 as security for repayment.
- That certain payments specified in Exhibit B to the plaint (including some interest payments) and the pledge itself should save the suit from being time-barred; the plaintiff applied to amend the plaint to explicitly rely on those grounds.
- Relied on authority (including a Privy Council decision) to argue that the right to sue under Article 120 accrues when the defendant infringes or threatens to infringe the plaintiff's asserted right (arguing the right accrued around January 1927 when the plaintiff asked for a receipt and the defendant refused).
Defendants' Arguments
- The suit is prima facie barred by limitation because the loans were allegedly made in 1920 and the pledge was in January 1922, whereas the suit was filed on 13 May 1929.
- Counsel for defendants maintained that the payments alleged in the plaint did not satisfy Section 23 of the Limitation Act because they were not made before the expiration of the period of limitation.
- Argued (on the issue of nature of the claim) that a suit to recover money secured by a pledge is a suit for money lent and advanced and is governed by the limitation period applicable to such personal claims.
- Maintained that, even assuming facts in the plaint, neither the alleged payments nor the pledge operated to extend the limitation period applicable to the personal claim or to the claim to realise the pledged security.
Table of Precedents Cited
| Precedent | Rule or Principle Cited For | Application by the Court |
|---|---|---|
| 10 Bom. L.R. 346 | That if the plaintiff had put forward one ground of exemption from limitation, he is not precluded from applying at the hearing to claim exemption on another, not inconsistent, ground. | The Court relied on this authority in allowing the plaintiff to amend the plaint to add alternative grounds for exemption from limitation (subject to costs/terms). |
| 34 Bom. 250 | Held that even if no ground of exemption from limitation is alleged initially, the plaintiff may apply for amendment of the plaint to show on what precise ground he contends the suit is within time. | This authority supported the Court's decision to permit the plaintiff to amend the plaint to plead additional grounds bearing on limitation. |
| 30 Bom. 218 | Held that a suit to recover a balance due after sale of pledged property is still a suit for money lent; the presence of movable property pledged does not change the nature of the suit from one for money lent. | The Court used this principle to analyze the nature of the plaintiff's suit and to explain why the personal claim is governed by the limitation period for money lent (Article 57). |
| 1922 Bom. 183 | Illustrated a situation where an acknowledgment forming the basis of the suit was in writing. | Distinguished by the Court: the cited case had a written acknowledgment, whereas in the present case no such written acknowledgment was produced to take the plaintiff's personal claim out of the ordinary limitation rule. |
| 1930 P.C. 270 (Privy Council) | Held that the right to sue under Article 120 accrues when the defendant has infringed or threatened to infringe the right asserted by the plaintiff. | The Court considered this holding but concluded that the Privy Council's interpretation depends on the class of case; the Court held instead that for a pawnee the right to sue to realise the security accrues on default (simultaneous with the right on the loan where the loan is payable on demand). |
| 27 Mad. 528 | Held that claims against pledge property are governed by Article 120 and claims against the debtor personally are governed by Article 57. | The Court relied on this decision to support the distinction between the personal remedy (Article 57) and the remedy against pledged property (Article 120), and to reason about accrual and concurrent remedies. |
| 22 Cal. 21 | Referred to for the proposition that the claim against pledge property and the claim against the debtor are governed by different Articles (similar to 27 Mad. 528). | The Court cited it as further support for the legal distinction between remedies against the person and remedies against pledged goods. |
Court's Reasoning and Analysis
The Court proceeded through the following analytical steps (as stated in the opinion):
- Preliminary procedural step: because limitation was pleaded, the issue of limitation was tried as a preliminary issue. The plaintiff applied to amend the plaint to rely on payments in Exhibit B and the alleged pledge to save the suit from the bar of limitation; the Court allowed the application relying on authorities (10 Bom. L.R. 346 and 34 Bom. 250).
- Identification of applicable limitation periods: the Court identified that the personal claim for money lent and advanced is governed by Article 57 of the Limitation Act (three years) and that the claim in respect of movable pledged property is governed by Article 120 (six years). The Court also noted Article 145 provides 30 years in a different context (suit to recover pledged property from the pawnee), and discussed the distinctions among these Articles as they bear on accrual.
- Accrual timing for the personal claim: loans were allegedly made at different times in 1920; where money is lent from time to time, limitation as to each loan runs from the respective loan date. The plaint showed a credit entry of Rs. 2,038 dated 2 February 1921 and the next payment of interest in Exhibit B was 31 March 1924 (more than three years later), so Section 20 of the Limitation Act (which concerns payments on account of principal) was found not to apply; Section 23 (acknowledgement) was also not satisfied because alleged payments were not made before expiration of the three-year period.
- Whether the alleged pledge constituted a fresh cause of action or acknowledgment that would extend limitation: the plaintiff argued the pledge in January 1922 operated as an acknowledgment/refreshing event. The Court found no authority to treat the subsequent pledge as a new cause of action in relation to the personal claim and held that neither the alleged interest payments nor the alleged pledge extended limitation as to the personal claim; thus the personal claim was time-barred.
- Accrual timing for the remedy against the pledged property: the Court analyzed the nature of the contract of pledge and the pawnee's remedies under Section 176 of the Contract Act — the pawnee may sue for the debt while retaining the goods as security and may seek sale through the court or sell out of court. The Court reasoned that where the loan is payable on demand (as here, in the absence of a stipulated period), the right to sue on the debt and the right to sell in default accrue simultaneously on default. The Court rejected a categorical application of the Privy Council's formulation (that accrual is only upon infringement/threatened infringement) as universally decisive; instead it held the accrual must be seen in relation to the class of case and, for a pawnee, accrual occurs on default.
- Application to the facts: because the alleged pledge was in January 1922 and the suit was filed on 13 May 1929 (more than six years after the date of pledge), the Court concluded the remedy to enforce the pledge was barred by Article 120. The Court noted earlier authorities (27 Mad. 528 and 22 Cal. 21) as supportive of the distinction between personal and pledge remedies.
- Payments of interest and extension of limitation for the pledge claim: the Court examined whether interest payments (Exhibit B) could extend the limitation for the claim to enforce the pledge. It held that Section 20 applies only to payments on account of the debt or legacy (interest as such on the loan) and that payments of interest on the loan do not extend limitation in respect of the pawnee's right to have the pledged property sold. The Court reasoned that allowing interest payments to prolong the pledge remedy while the personal claim was already barred would produce an inconsistent outcome; only an acknowledgement of liability specifically respecting the plaintiff's right to have the property sold (and satisfying Section 19) could have that effect, which was not pleaded or proven.
- Conclusion of analysis: having found the personal claim barred under Article 57 and the remedy against the pledged property barred under Article 120, and having rejected the contention that interest payments or the pledge itself extended limitation for either claim, the Court held the suit to be time-barred and dismissed it with costs.
Holding and Implications
Holding: The Court dismissed the suit as time-barred. The opinion concludes explicitly: "Suit dismissed."
Implications:
- Direct effect on the parties: The plaintiff's personal claim for recovery of monies lent and advanced (governed by Article 57 — three years) is barred by limitation; the plaintiff's claim to enforce the alleged pledge of shares (governed by Article 120 — six years) is also held to be barred because the suit was filed more than six years after the date of the alleged pledge. The suit is dismissed with costs.
- No broader legal innovation or new principle was announced by the Court beyond its application and clarification of existing principles: the Court relied upon and applied established authorities concerning amendment to pleadings, the nature of suits involving pledges, accrual of causes of action for pledge remedies, and the limited circumstances in which payments or acknowledgements affect limitation. The opinion does not purport to establish a novel precedent beyond these applications.
G.R/R.K
Order: Suit dismissed.
1. The plaintiff has filed this suit to recover from defendant 1 the sum of Rs. 13,350 and interest for moneys lent and advanced to him at different times in 1920, and for an order for sale of certain shares alleged to have been pledged with him in or about January 1922, as security for repayment of the loans advanced to him, and for other ancillary reliefs. Defendant 1 was adjudicated insolvent on 22nd November 1933, and the Official Assignee is now on record as defendant in the suit. He has appeared at the hearing and adopted the written statement of defendant 1 who denies the loans and payments for interest, but says that moneys were paid by him to the plaintiff on account of the losses sustained by him on certain gambling and wagering transactions which, according to him, were carried on in the plaintiff's house. He denies the pledge and says that the shares, namely, 226 deferred ordinary shares of the British Dye Stuffs Corporation, were entrusted by him to the plaintiff for sale in England in or about January 1922, and have still remained unsold. In or about 1926 the British Dye Stuffs Corporation was amalgamated with other corporations in England, and defendant 1 wanted to have the shares converted into shares of the new amalgamated company, but they could not be so converted unless 236 preference shares of the British Dye Stuffs Corporation which remained with him were also converted at the same time. He refused to hand these over to the plaintiff, and plaintiff refused to hand over the other shares to defendant I unless defendant 1 passed to him a receipt stating that the plaintiff held the shares in his possession as security for moneys advanced to defendant 1 from time to time. Defendant has counterclaimed for the return of the shares which are still in the possession of the plaintiff.
2. Several issues were raised is the suit. The defendants however contend that the suit is barred by limitation, and the issue of limitation was tried as a preliminary issue. The loans having been advanced in 1920 and the alleged pledge being of January 1922, this suit filed on 13th May 1929, is prima facie barred, and it was for the plaintiff under the provisions of O. 7, R. 6 of the CPC to show the ground upon which exemption from limitation was claimed, so that the suit might still be within time. Certain payments, are alleged in para; 3 of the plaint as payments to the plaintiff by defandant 1 in respect of interest as such, but these do not satisfy the requirements of Section 23 of the Limitation Act, as they were admittedly not made before the expiration of the period of limitation. Counsel for the plaintiff next argued that he relied on all the payments specified is Ex. B to the plaint and also on the pledge for saving the bar of limitation, and he applied for amendment of the plaint accordingly. Counsel for the defendants objected, as the plaint and the written, statement had both been filed mora than five years ago, and the plaintiff was well aware that defendant had raised the defence of limitation Under O. 6, R. 17 however the Court may at any stage of the proceedings of a suit, allow a party to amend, and it has been held in 10 Bom. L.R 346 (1), that if the plaintiff has put forward one ground of exemption from limitation. In is not to be precluded from applying at the hearing to claim exemption on another and not inconsistent ground of exemption. In 34 Bom 250 (2) the appel Court has gone even further and held that even if no ground of exemption from limitation is alleged, the plaintiff may still apply for an amendments of the plaint is order to show on what precise ground he contends that the suit is within time. The application was therefore allowed on certain, teems as to payment of costs, and the amendments have accordingly been made.
3. Counsel for the defendants argued that on the facts as state in the plaint and assuming them for the sake of the argument on the issue of limitation to be true the suit was still time barred. The suit is for the recovery of the moneys alleged to have been advanced to defendant I from time to time and also for realization of the security given for the loans nearly two years later by sale of the shares which were pledged with the plaintiff and for a sale. A suit for the recovery of money secured by a pledge is really a suit for moneys lent and advanced, and it has been held in 30 Bom 218 (3), that a suit to recover a balance due after the sale of the pledged property is none the less a suit lot money lent, even if the money claimed secured by a pledge. If therefore the suit is one to recover the unpaid balance of a loan the fact that moveable, property has been pledged does not change the nature of the suit. The period of limitation for suit to recover moneys lent and advanced is three years under Article 57. When money is lent from time to time, limitation rules as regards each loan from the respective date of that loan. The loans were, according to the plaintiff, made at different times in 1920. A sum of Rs. 2,038 is credited to defendant 1 as of 2nd February 1921, and the next payment of interest, which is specified in Ex. B, is of Rs. 75 on 31st March 1924, which is more that three years later. Accordingly, Section 20 of the Limitation Act, does not apply. Counsel for the plaintiff however relied on the alleged pledge in January 1922, and argued that the giving of the pledge was an acknowledgment of liability on the part of defendant 1, and though S. 19 did not apply in terms as there was no acknowledgment in writing, he argued that the acknowledgment of liability was itself a cause of action, and the pledge in January 1922 helped to extend the period of limitation. He relied on 1922 Bom. 183 (4), but in that case the acknowledgment, which formed the basis of the suit, was in writing. No authority was cited to show that a subsequent pledge in 1922 is a new cause of action in relation to the personal claim for the loins alleged to have been advanced in 1920. In my opinion, neither the payments of interest nor the alleged pledge extend the period of limitation as regards the personal claim, and the same is therefore barred.
4. With regard to the pledge, which is denied by defendant 1, it was conceded on both sides that the only article which applies is Article 120 the period is six years and runs from the date when the right to sue accrues. The right to sue means the right to claim relief by legal procedure, that is to say the right to bring the particular suit with reference to which the plea of limitation is raised. Generally speaking, such a right accrues when the cause of action arises. The cause of action comprises the facts which must necessarily be proved in order to entitle the plaintiff to the relief which he asks for. The question is, when does the right to sue accrue in respect of a pledge? The answer to the question must depend on the nature of the contract of pledge, assuming that the pledge is either admitted or proved, and on a consideration of the rights of the pawnee thereunder. The pawnee has a special property in the thing pledged, while the general property continues to remain with the owner. The pawnee is entitled to retain the goods pledged for payment of the debt, interest ane the expenses incurred by him for preservation of the goods. He is not entitled to a decree for foreclosure, for the pledge does not, like an English mortgage, operate as a transfer of ownership, but the contract carries with it an implication that the security may be made available to the pawnee to satisfy the obligation. The pawnee can under Section 176 of the Contract Act, bring a suit on the debt, retaining the goods a security, and ask for a sale through the Court, or he can sell the goods out of Court himself. He has his right of action for the debt notwithstanding the possession of the goods, subject to the pawnor's right to redeem the goods upon tender of the amount due before the sale. He has also his Tight of action to have the pledged property sold in order to realize his security. Now it is conceded that the right to sue on the lotas arises from the respective date of each loan, for in the absence of any stipulated period for payment, the loan is payable on demand.
5. The right to sue on the security in default of payment must therefore be simultaneous with the right to sue on the loan, for if the loan is payable on demand, the right to sell in default of payment must also accrue at the same time. Counsel for the plaintiff however relied on 1930 P.C 270 (5), in which it was held that the right to sue under Article 120 accrued only when the defendant had infringed or threatened to infringe the right asserted by the plaintiff in the suit, and he argued that the plaintiff's right to sue on the plaint must be deemed to have accrued to him in or about January 1927 when according to para. 9 of the written statement plaintiff asked the defendant for a receipt before handing over the shares in his possession showing that the plaintiff held the shares as security for his loan, and the defendant refused to do so.
6. In my opinion the interpretation of the words ‘right to sue,’ as laid down by the Privy Council, cut depend upon the particular class of case to which the Article is sought to be applied. In order that there may be an infringement or threatened infringement of the plaintiff's right there need not necessarily be a demand and refusal in every case. The right which the plaintiff asserts in this suit is the right given to him under S. 176 to sell the pledged property. That right accrued to him on default of payment of his debt, and the debt being payable on demand and in fact not having been paid, there is an infringement of his right to sell, and the right to sue therefore accrued to him on default. There cannot, in my opinion, be one terminus a quo or starting point of limitation for the right to sue on the debt and another for the right to sell the pledged property. In 27 Mad. 528 (6) it was held that the claim to proceed against the pledge property was governed by Article 120, and the claim against the debtor personally was governed by Article 57: see also 22 Cal. 21 (7) and Pollock and Mulla's Commentary on S. 176, Edn. 6, p. 547. It is true that in neither of these two cases was the suit brought more than six years after the date of the pledge, and it has not been explicitly stated that the period of limitation runs from the date of the pledge. But that result follows from the nature of the pledge which I have discussed before. The period of limitation for a suit to recover the pledged property from the pawnee is 30 years from the date of the pledge under Article 145, and it has been held that in India, even if there is a demand and a refusal, limitation under that Article runs from the date of the pledge and not from the date of the refusal. The personal remedy of the pawnee on the loan and his right against the pledged property are distinct but concurrent, and even if the personal security is barred, the right to enforce the security against the property still remains. The suit having been filed in 1929, i.e, more than six years after the date of the alleged pledge, is, in my opinion, barred by limitation.
7. The next question is, whether the payments of interest on the loan specified in Ex. B extend the period of limitation in respect of the claim under the pledge. It must be remembered that loans and the pledge were not contemporaneous. The loans are alleged to have been made in 1920, and the pledge is alleged to have been made sometime in the beginning of 1922. Section 20 of the Limitation Act, refers only to a payment of interest as such on a debt or legacy, i.e, on the loan. Now the pawnee's cause of action, which is based on his right to enforce his charge by sale of the pledged property, is embodied in the reliefs contained in prayers (c) and (d) of the plaint. As against that right the payment of interest as such on the loans within the period of limitation cannot extend limitation. Otherwise the result will be that the plaintiff's personal claim will be barred for the reason mentioned before, namely, that interest was not paid as such within the period of limitation, i.e, three years, whereas the right of action to have his security realized and his debt paid out of the sale proceeds of the property is kept alive by reason of payment of interest, on the loan within the period of limitation, i.e, six years. Such a position will be inconsistent when the loan itself is barred. An acknowledgment of liability in respect of the plaintiff's right to have the property sold for the realization of the security would extend the period of limitation if the acknowledgment satisfied the requirements of S. 19 of the Act, but with that I am not here concerned. I am only concerned with the question of payment of interest. The payments of interest as such on the loan do not save the bar of limitation, and the payment of interest on the loan so far as the pledge is concerned cannot save it either. In the result I hold that the suit is time-barred, and must be dismissed with costs.
G.R/R.K
8. Suit dismissed.
Alert