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Bhurabhai Jamnadas v. Bai Ruxmani

Bombay High Court
Mar 28, 1908
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Factual and Procedural Background

This opinion arose on a second appeal concerning a suit to recover a sum of Rs. 366 said to be the female plaintiff's palla (dowry). At the time of the girl's betrothal the male plaintiff's father transferred that sum to the girl's father, Jagjivandas, to hold as her palla in accordance with caste practice. The money was to be held for the girl's benefit until she had a house of her own and demanded it or its proceeds. The trial and the first appellate Court treated the matter as involving a trust; the lower appellate Court concluded the suit did not fall under Section 10 of the Limitation Act (and so was time-barred). A preliminary objection was raised by Mr Gokaldas that, under the Provincial Small Cause Courts Act, no second appeal lay. The court below made findings (not all clear in the judgment) indicating either that the trust fund had been misappropriated or that it had become mingled with the estate of Jagjivandas and descended to the defendant (a representative/relative, described as the present defendant or his widow). The present Court considered whether a second appeal was competent and whether Section 10 of the Limitation Act applied so as to save the suit from the bar of limitation. The final outcome was that the decree of the lower appellate Court was reversed and the decree of the Subordinate Judge restored except as to the part decreeing personal liability of the defendant; that clause was deleted and left to be substantiated, if possible, in execution. The defendant was ordered to bear all costs throughout.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether a second appeal was competent despite a preliminary objection under the Provincial Small Cause Courts Act — i.e., whether the case is a "suit relating to a trust" within the meaning of Article 18 of Schedule II such that a second appeal lies.
  2. Whether the suit fell within Section 10 of the Limitation Act (i.e., whether the suit is one "for the purpose of following such property in his or their hands" against a person in whom property has become vested in trust or his representatives), and therefore was within time, or whether it was barred by limitation as held by the lower appellate Court.

Arguments of the Parties

Arguments advanced by the defendant (or respondent)

  • There was a preliminary objection (pressed by Mr Gokaldas) that under the Provincial Small Cause Courts Act no second appeal lay.
  • The chief argument addressed to the Court was that the facts found do not disclose any trust; alternatively the money was merely a deposit which became merged in the bride's father's estate and hence was not trust property capable of being followed under Section 10.
  • The defendant relied on findings or assumptions that the sum became merged in Jagjivandas's estate (so that the action was essentially for a debt or against the estate rather than to follow trust property).

Arguments advanced by the plaintiffs (or appellants)

  • The money was held by Jagjivandas as a trustee for the female plaintiff (a direct/express trust for the specific purpose of the bride's palla), and therefore the suit is a suit to follow trust property and comes within Section 10 of the Limitation Act.
  • Even if the fund had been misappropriated or dissipated, the plaintiffs contended the suit could still follow the trust property or recover the value from the trustee's estate under the tracing and following principles recognised in the authorities cited.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Vundravandas v. Cursondas (1897) I.L.R. 21 Bom. 646 Stated that the phrase "trust for a specific purpose" is a more expanded mode of expressing the idea of an "express trust" (English law). The Court followed this view to treat Jagjivandas's liability as established under an express trust or a "trust for a specific purpose."
In re Hallet's Estate; Knatchbull v. Hallett (1880) 13 Ch. D. 696 Tracing principle: sums removed from an estate by a trustee can, in certain respects, be treated in tracing the trust assets; distinctions about whether money is treated as authorised removal or fraudulent removal inform tracing. The Court relied upon this authority to meet the objection that the fund could not be followed because it had been dissipated—arguing that tracing principles allow recovery where the loss is caused by improper dealing.
Miller v. Race (1758) 1 Burr. 452 Illustrated the traditional rule that "money has no earmark" and the limitation of that doctrine to bona fide takers for value. The Court cited it to explain the limited reach of the "money has no earmark" doctrine and to distinguish claims against bona fide purchasers for value from claims of a cestui que trust seeking to follow trust property.
Moss v. Hancock [1899] 2 Q.B. 111 Further authority on the limitations of the "money has no earmark" doctrine (protection of bona fide transferees for value). Used alongside Miller v. Race to show that the doctrine does not preclude the present suit which is not a claim against a transferee for value.
Balwant Rao v. Puran Mal (1883) I.L.R. 6 All. 1 (Privy Council) Interpretation of the phrase "following the property" in Section 10: means for the purpose of recovering the property for the trusts in question; property used for other purposes may be recovered without limitation bar. The Court cited this Privy Council decision as a controlling authority that Section 10 permits recovery where trust property has been applied to improper purposes, thereby defeating a limitation defence.
Thackersey Dewraj v. Hurbhum Nursey (1884) I.L.R. 8 Bom. 423 Explained that Section 10 is satisfied if the money can be traced to the trustee's hands and the loss is shown to have been caused by misconduct or improper dealing. The Court relied on Justice Scott's application of Balwant Rao to support that misappropriation or improper dealing permits Section 10 to apply.
Sethu v. Subramanya (1887) I.L.R. 11 Mad. 274 Held that a suit to recover temple funds alleged to have been misappropriated fell within Section 10 despite the objection that the money could not be followed in specie. The Court cited this Madras High Court decision as further support for applying Section 10 where trust funds have been misappropriated.
In re Hallett's Estate (referred again in Heaton, J.'s reasoning) Authoritative exposition on following trust property and tracing into the trustee's estate. Heaton, J. referenced this as clearly and comprehensively expounding the question of following trust property and relied on it in concurring with the result.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Court proceeded in a structured way.

  1. Preliminary objection on competence of second appeal: The objection that, under the Provincial Small Cause Courts Act, no second appeal lay was considered and rejected because the present case was regarded as a "suit relating to a trust" within the meaning of Article 18 of Schedule II of the Act; consequently a second appeal was competent.
  2. Interpretation and applicability of Section 10 of the Limitation Act: The Court set out the two conditions precedent in Section 10 — (a) the suit must be against a person in whom property has become vested in trust (or his legal representatives/assigns); and (b) the suit must be for the purpose of following such property in his or their hands. The Court emphasized that whether these conditions are satisfied depends primarily on the facts as found by the lower appeal Court, which must be accepted on second appeal.
  3. Factual findings and treatment of ambiguities: The Court took the facts in the way least favourable to the appellants (i.e., assuming the trust fund had been misappropriated or dissipated) because the lower Court's precise factual conclusion was not completely clear. Even on that hypothesis the Court held that Section 10 could apply.
  4. Existence and nature of the trust: Both Courts had accepted that the arrangement was a trust and not a mere deposit. The Court analysed the facts: the bridegroom's father transferred the sum fixed by caste for a girl's dowry to the girl's father to hold for her benefit; the beneficial interest passed to the girl; Jagjivandas took as trustee. The Court treated this as an express trust and specifically as a "trust for a specific purpose" (the customary dowry).
  5. Whether the suit is one to follow trust property: Addressing the second requirement of Section 10, the Court considered the contention that where a fund has been dissipated it cannot be followed. The Court distinguished English law (where the Judicature Act 1873 contains a broad rule barring limitation as between trustee and cestui) and preferred to interpret Section 10 of the Indian Limitation Act on its own terms. The Court held that when trust money has been applied to purposes other than the trust purpose (i.e., misappropriated), the beneficiaries should not be in a worse position than if the money had been applied to identifiable property: tracing principles (In re Hallett) and the authorities (Balwant Rao, Thackersey Dewraj, Sethu) support that the suit may be regarded as one to follow the property and thus come within Section 10.
  6. Reliance on Indian authorities: The Court relied on Balwant Rao v. Puran Mal (Privy Council) for the meaning of "following the property," and on subsequent Indian High Court decisions (Thackersey Dewraj and Sethu) that applied the Privy Council view to cases of misappropriated trust funds. Those authorities led the Court to conclude that the suit is not barred by limitation.
  7. Concurring view (Heaton, J.): Heaton, J. independently applied the definition of trust in Section 3 of the Indian Trusts Act, found the facts fit that definition (author, trustee, beneficiary and trust property for a specific purpose), and concluded that the suit was indeed one to follow the trust property; he expressly relied on In re Hallett's Estate as sufficient authority for the tracing/following principle.
  8. Resulting determination: Based on the foregoing, the Court concluded Section 10 was applicable and the suit was within time; therefore the lower appellate Court's decree was reversed except for the part declaring personal liability of the defendant, which was to be deleted and left to execution.

Holding and Implications

HOLDING: The Court held that the present suit is a suit relating to a trust and that it falls within Section 10 of the Limitation Act; accordingly the suit is not barred by limitation. The decree of the lower appellate Court is reversed and the decree of the Subordinate Judge is restored except as to the part decreeing personal liability of the defendant, which is deleted and left to be substantiated, if possible, in execution. The defendant must bear all costs throughout.

Implications:

  • Direct effect: The Subordinate Judge's decree is reinstated except that the clause as to the defendant's personal liability is removed and left to execution proceedings; the defendant is ordered to pay costs.
  • Scope and precedent: The opinion rests on existing provisions of Section 10 of the Limitation Act and on a line of Indian authorities (including the Privy Council in Balwant Rao) and tracing principles (In re Hallett's Estate). The Court's decision applies those authorities to hold that misappropriation or dissipation of trust funds does not prevent a suit from being one to "follow the property" within Section 10. The opinion does not purport to lay down a novel rule of law beyond applying and reconciling existing authorities to the facts of this case.
Show all summary ...

1. A preliminary objection was raised by the Honourable Mr Gokaldas that under the Provincial Small Cause Courts Act no second appeal lay, but it appears to me clear that this is a "suit relating to a trust" within the meaning of Article 18 of Schedule II of the Act, so that a second appeal is competent.

2. The only other question debated is whether, as the first Court held, the suit falls under Section 10 of the Limitation Act and so is within time, or whether, as the lower appeal Court has decided, the suit does not fall under this section, in which case it would admittedly be barred by time.

3. Section 10 of the Limitation Act requires as conditions precedent to its applicability, first, that the suit should be against a person in whom property has become vested in trust for a specific purpose or against his legal representatives or assigns, and, secondly, that the suit should be for the purpose of following such property in his or their hands. The question is whether the present suit answers both these requirements. That will primarily depend upon the facts of the case, and upon the findings of the lower appeal Court, which we must accept in second appeal. I take it that the main facts found are that a sum of Rs. 366, being the amount of the female plaintiffs palla or dowry was, on the occasion of her betrothal to the male plaintiff, made over by the male plaintiff's father to the keeping of the lady's father, Jagjivan, as a fund constituting her palla in accordance with the usual practice prevailing in the caste; and that this fund has been misappropriated either by the original trustee or after his death by his successive legal representatives, his deceased son, or that son's widow, the present defendant.

4. In thus putting the facts on the footing of a misappropriation I am taking the case least favourable to the appellant, and I do so because the precise conclusion of fact which the lower appeal Court arrived on this point is not clear to me. It may be that the Court intended to find that the trust fund still remains mingled with the estate of Jagjivandas Avhich has descended to the defendant. On the other hand there are some passages in the judgment which suggest to my mind that the finding intended was that the trust fund had been misappropriated and squandered; and as this latter hypothesis is the less favourable to the decision which I have reached. I adopt it for the purposes of this judgment though I hope to show that the result is unaffected whichever finding of fact may have been intended by the Court below.

5. This, then, being the state of facts, the first question which arises is whether there was a trust of the fund for a specific purpose. That there was a trust, and not a mere deposit, is a proposition which both Courts have accepted and which seems to me abundantly clear. Jagjivandas was to hold the money, which amounted to the precise sum fixed by the caste for a girl's dowry, as the dowry of the female plaintiff and for her benefit. The beneficial interest passed to her from the male plaintiff's father. She was then only about four years old, and the understanding was that her father was to hold the money on her behalf, or to convert it into ornaments and hold them on her behalf, until she came to have a house of her own and demanded the fund or its proceeds. The male plaintiff's father's interest in the money ceased, and after the transfer he would not have been entitled to demand the repayment of the money to himself. It is plain that Jagjivandas took as trustee for the female plaintiff.

6. And it seems to me equally plain that he took on a "trust for a specific purpose." In Vundravandas v. Cursondas (1897) I.L.R. 21 Bom. 646 it was held by a Division Bench of this Court that this phrase was merely a more expanded mode of expressing the same idea as that conveyed by the expression "' express trust" of English law. I think that we should follow this opinion, and I do not doubt that the expression "trust for a specific purpose" was used, like "express trust," in contradistinction to trusts arising by implication of law, trusts resulting and trust constructive; but the' point is not of much present consequence for, as it seems to me, Jagjivandas's liability is established under either form of the definition. For there is no question here of a constructive or resulting trust, but of a direct trust, created by the author, who himself constituted Jagjivandas the trustee. And in my opinion it was also a trust for a specific purpose, namely for the provision of the customary dowry for the betrothed girl. It"is no answer to say that there is no evidence proving the precise words used when the fund was made over to the girl's father and guardian. At this distance of time such evidence is not to be expected, nor is it necessary where, as here, there is other evidence to shew that these were the terms upon which the money was given to Jagjivandas. The material point is that this fact should be established, as it is held to be in this case; it matters nothing whether it is established by the proved use of a certain form of words or by the acts, the conduct, and the relation of the parties, and by the circumstances surrounding the transfer : in either case it is an express trust. I think, therefore, that the first requirement of Section 10 of the Limitation Act is fulfilled.

7. It remains to consider the second requirement, namely that the suit should be for the purpose of following the trust property into the hands of the trustee or his legal representative. If this condition be also complied with, it will not assist the defendant that the trustee Jagjiwandas died in 1877, for admittedly she is now his legal representative and would therefore be liable to the extent of his estate descended to her. Is, then, the present suit a suit for following the property in the hands of the trustee's legal representative ? It may be said that a money fund which has been simply dissipated cannot be followed, and, so far as I am aware, the English cases go no further than this that the trust property may be followed into any other form in which after conversion it may be traceable. But I venture to doubt whether the English decisions are of much direct assistance in interpreting Section 10 of the Indian Limitation Act; for in England there is the broad rule that no claim of a cestui que trust against his trustee for any property held on an express trust or in respect of any breach of such trust shall be held to be barred by any statute of limitation : see Section 25(2) of the Judicature Act, 1873. I prefer, therefore, to base this judgment on the provisions Section 10 of the Indian Act. Here it is important to remember that the detence is a bare denial of the trust; that plea is found against the defendant and we are left, as I have explained, to the conclusion that the trust money has been misappropriated, that is, spent on objects unconnected with the trust. In such a case it is difficult to see why the plaintiffs should be placed in any worse position than they would occupy if it appeared that the money had been spent in breach of the trust in purchasing other property which could now be identified ; and the formal objection based on the disappearance of the fund in specie may be met by the consideration that the moneys removed from his estate by Jagjivandas should be deemed to be moneys which he was authorised to remove, and not moneys which it would be fraudulent for him to remove : see In re Hallet's Estate, Knatchbull v. Hallett (1880) 13 Ch. D. 696. So, as to the argument that " money has no earmark. " that doctrine has long been very limited, and, as at present understood, onlymeans that a person who bona fide takes money as currency is not affected by any want of title in the person from whom he received it : see Miller v. Race (1758) 1 Burr. 452 and Moss v. Hancock [1899] 2 Q.B.111. But here we are not concerned with any claim on a transfer for valuable consideration, and it would seem, therefore, that the character of the trust property affords no reason for excluding the suit from the operation of Section 10. That being so, I am of opinion that, under the decisions of special authority in India the section should be held applicable to the present suit. In Balwant Rao v. Puran Mal (1883) I.L.R. 6 All. 1 the question of the interpretation of the phrase " following the property" in this section came before the Privy Council, and their Lordships laid it down that the expression "means for the purpose of recovering the property for the trusts in question; and that when property is used for some purpose other than the proper purpose of the trusts in question it may be recovered, without any bar of time, from the hands of the persons indicated in the section." In Thackersey Dewraj v. Hurbhum Nursey (1884) I.L.R. 8 Bom. 423 where there was a claim for the return of moneys lost to a trust, Mr. Justice Scott in applying this decision says: " I think the section is satisfied if the money can be traced to the trustees' hands and if the loss can be shown to have been caused by their misconduct and improper dealing with it; otherwise every improper use of trust money in trade or speculation would be beyond the application of the section." The same view commended itself to a Division Bench of the Madras High Court in Sethu v. Subramanya (1887) I.L.R. 11 Mad. 274 where the plaintiff as manager of a temple sued to recover a certain sum alleged to have been part of the temple funds and to have been misappropriated by a former manager. The objection that the money could not be followed in specie was disallowed, and the suit was held to fall within the ambit of Section 10.

8. For the reasons which I have indicated I think that, following these decisions, we ought to hold that the present suit is not barred by lapse of time. It is a suit to recover for the trust property which, on the case most favourable to the defendant, has been used for some purpose other than the proper purpose of the trust, and no bar of limitation can arise.

9. The result is that we must reverse the decree of the lower appellate Court, and restore the decree of the Subordinate Judge except as to the part decreeing the claim against the defendant personally. That claim must be left to be substantiated, if possible, in execution : the clause as to defendant's personal liability will be deleted, but the decree of the Subordinate Judge is otherwise affirmed, and the defendant must bear all costs throughout.

Heaton, J.

10. The chief argument addressed to us, was that the facts found do not disclose a trust. It seems to me that they bring the matter precisely within the definition of trust given in Section 3 of the Indian Trusts Act, for there was trust property, the money deposited for a bride's palla; there was an author of the trust, the bridegroom's father ; a person beneficially interested in the property, the bride : and a trustee, the bride's father. It also seems to me to be clear on the facts that the trust was for a specific purpose, as there was a deposit of a'sum of money for a definite and well understood object, viz. the palla of the bride. The trust, therefore, was one of the class contemplated by Section 10 of the Limitation Act. The suit, as the pleadings, the judgment of the first Court and the decree of that Court show, was treated as a suit to follow the trust property. The Court of first appeal thought that substantially it was a suit of the nature described in Article 98 of Schedule II to the Limitation Act, viz. a suit to recover the amount and make good the loss, if any, occasioned by a breach of the trust, out of the estate of the deceased trustee. But that conclusion was largely founded on the assumption that there was not a trust of the kind contemplated in Section 10, and on a conjecture, not amounting to a finding of fact, that there may have been a breach of the trust. The assumption was wrong as has been already explained; and the conjecture is too vague to accept as a basis for decision. That being so, there remains in my mind no doubt that the suit was one to follow the trust property. It might conceivably have been met in various ways, but the one selected and pressed in the Courts below and here, was that there was not a trust ; or at least no trust such as is contemplated in Section 10. It was not asserted, much less found as a fact, that even if there was such a trust, there was no trust property which could be followed. The facts established indicate that there is trust property which can be followed. It is found that the bride's father received Rs. 366 in trust or in other words that there was in his possession a sum of Rs. 366 as trust property. It is not definitely found what became of that sum, but it was argued in this Court on behalf of his present representative that it was a deposit with the bride's father, and as such became his property, for which he was responsible only as a debt requiring to be repaid. The argument assumes that there was no trust and is therefore wrong : but it also assumes that the money became merged in the estate of the bride's father; and that assumption may be accepted as a statement of fact not adverse to the interest of his representative, the respondent. It also appears to be the fact found or assumed in both the Courts below. It being found that there was trust money which became merged in his own property, it follows that the trustee's estate was trust property which could be followed to the extent necessary to discharge the trust. The facts found do not establish anything which enables it to be said that the estate has so changed its character that it can no longer be properly described as trust property capable of being followed. The question of following trust property is clearly and comprehensively expounded in the case of In re Hallett's Estate, (1880) 13 Ch. D. 696 and it is unnecessary for me to refer to any other authority.

11. For these reasons I concur in the order proposed by my learned colleague.