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Nandlal Chunilal v. Gopilal Manilal
Factual and Procedural Background
This suit was filed for administration of the estate of Vrijvalabhdas Dwarkadas deceased in accordance with his will dated 12th May 1888 by his daughter Somi. Somi died during the pendency of the suit and is now represented by her minor son Nandlal. The Subordinate Judge dismissed the suit as not maintainable in its present form on various grounds. The Joint Judge in first appeal confirmed the decree on the same grounds and additionally on the ground of limitation. The present Court disagreed with those conclusions and considered the matters set out below.
Legal Issues Presented
- Whether the suit for administration in the form filed is maintainable under Section 213 of the Civil Procedure Code.
- Whether the plaintiff should have filed a suit for possession instead of an administration suit (including issues relating to court-fees and stamping).
- Whether Articles 88 and 89 of Schedule II of the Limitation Act apply, or alternatively whether Article 123 of Schedule II governs limitation for the claim asserted.
- Whether the estate is presently divisible or distributable in the lifetime of the widow Dhiraj, and the consequences for the suit.
Arguments of the Parties
Plaintiff's Arguments
- The plaint was properly filed as an administration suit under Section 213 of the Civil Procedure Code and follows the form of the second plaint at No. 107 Schedule IV of the Civil Procedure Code.
- The plaintiff cannot state what property she will be entitled to without accounts being taken; the will does not specify values of ornaments alleged to be part of the residue.
- The plaint was stamped under Section 7, Clause IV (b) of the Court Fees Act as an administration suit (taking accounts) and the plaintiff offered to pay additional fees if a larger amount is found due.
- The plaintiff's right to recover her share was not time-barred when the suit was instituted; if limitation were shorter, Dhiraj's notice of 25th March 1901 could operate as an acknowledgment under Section 19 of the Limitation Act.
Defendant Dhiraj's Arguments
- The suit is not maintainable in its present form (as found by the lower Courts).
- The plaintiff should have filed a suit for possession (not an administration suit), with an underlying suggestion that fee considerations favored possession proceedings.
- Parts of the ornaments claimed by the plaintiff are Dhiraj's own Stridhan (worth over 1,800 rupees) and ornaments worth nearly 3,000 rupees out of the residue have been properly disposed of by her.
- The estate is not yet distributable; accordingly limitation may bar the suit (contention that share has not become deliverable and will not be so till after her death).
Table of Precedents Cited
| Precedent | Rule or Principle Cited For | Application by the Court |
|---|---|---|
| Bai Amba v. Pranjivandas (1894) I.L.R. 19 Bom. 198 | That plaints in administration suits should be treated as plaints for taking accounts and stamped under Section 7, Clause IV (b) of the Court Fees Act. | The Court held the present plaint was stamped accordingly in conformity with that principle. |
Court's Reasoning and Analysis
The Court disagreed with the lower Courts' dismissal and held the suit was not bad in form. It reasoned that Somi (now represented by Nandlal) is a residuary legatee and that Dhiraj, who is in possession of the bulk of the property and was appointed trustee in 1892 during Somi's minority, is effectively in the position of an administrator. Section 213 of the Civil Procedure Code expressly provides for an administration suit in such circumstances, and the plaint follows the prescribed form.
The Court rejected the contention that the plaintiff was obliged to sue for possession merely because higher court-fees might have been charged in such a form. The plaintiff's assertion that accounts are necessary to ascertain her share was accepted as reasonable given the will's omission of values for ornaments claimed as part of the residue. The Court relied on Bai Amba v. Pranjivandas to treat the plaint as stamped under Section 7, Clause IV (b) of the Court Fees Act and noted the plaintiff's offer to pay additional fees and the protective operation of Section 11 of the Court Fees Act (preventing execution until additional fees are paid).
On divisibility, the Court held that even if the estate might be indivisible during Dhiraj's lifetime, that would not render the form of suit defective; administration suits are the proper forum to try such questions and to obtain accounts and directions for administration. The Court did not accept the lower Courts' conclusions on indivisibility as final and directed a remand for evidence on that question, noting Dhiraj's prior offer (notice of 25th March 1901, Exhibit 45) to divide the estate.
On limitation, the Court found Articles 88 and 89 of Schedule II (applied by the Joint Judge) inapplicable, observing that this was neither a suit by a factor nor by a principal against his agent. The Court invoked the equitable principle (quoted from Snell) that actions for administration can be instituted only by persons whose claims are not barred by limitation. It held that Article 123 of Schedule II (12 years after the share becomes deliverable) would be the appropriate article if a suit for the share had been brought. As Dhiraj contended the share had not yet become deliverable and at the earliest became deliverable on Somi's majority (which the Joint Judge placed in 1895), the 1902 suit was not necessarily time-barred. The Court additionally noted that Dhiraj's 1901 notice might operate as an acknowledgment under Section 19 of the Limitation Act if a shorter limitation applied.
Accordingly the Court concluded that the decrees of the lower Courts should be reversed and the matter remanded for retrial on the merits with directions to determine the substantive questions identified.
Holding and Implications
REVERSED AND REMANDED FOR RETRIAL
Direct effect: The decrees of the Subordinate Judge and the Joint Judge are reversed and the case is remitted for re-trial on the merits. The Court directed that on remand the following matters (among others) require adjudication: the particulars of the testator's estate at death; whether the second defendant (Dhiraj) has disposed of any part and whether such disposition was justifiable; the present composition of the estate; and how much should be set aside for maintenance under the will (notably for Bais Kashi and Dhiraj). The Court also noted that Dhiraj's notice of 25th March 1901 may be relevant as an acknowledgment under Section 19 of the Limitation Act.
Costs: Costs hitherto incurred, including costs of this appeal, are to be costs in the suit.
No broader precedent was announced beyond the application of existing statutory provisions and the cited authority; the decision effects the parties' rights by remanding the matter for full adjudication rather than creating a new legal rule.
1. This suit was filed for the administration of the estate of Vrijvalabhdas Dwarkadas deceased in accordance with his will, dated 12th May 1888, by his daughter Somi. She died during the pendency of the suit and is now represented by her minor son Nandlal. The Subordinate Judge dismissed the suit holding that it was not maintainable in its present form on various grounds. The Joint Judge has in first appeal confirmed the decree on the same grounds as well as on the ground of limitation. I cannot agree with them.
2. I fail to see how the suit is bad in form. Somi is a residuary legatee under the will of the deceased. The contending defendant Dhiraj, widow of the deceased and step-mother of Somi, is admittedly in possession of the bulk of the property of the deceased in accordance with the will. She was appointed trustee of the property by the Court in 1892. during Somi's minority and has continued in possession since, claiming partly in her own right to maintenance and partly as the heiress of her deceased daughter Jethi who was joint residuary legatee under the will with Somi. She is for all practical purposes in the position of an administration. Section 213 of the Civil Procedure Code expressly provides for an administration suit under such circumstances and the plaint in this case is almost in the same form as the second one at No. 107 Schedule IV of the Civil Procedure Code.
3. It has been urged that the plaintiff should have filed a suit for possession. The main ground for this contention would appear from the Subordinate Judge's judgment to be that she would have had to pay larger Court-fees if she had done so. But I do not see why a plaintiff should be driven to file a suit in a particular form simply in order to make him pay larger fees when the law explicitly leaves it open to him to file it in a less expensive form. There has been no improper attempt on the plaintiffs part to evade payment. Her allegation that she can not state what property she will be entitled to unless accounts are taken, seems to be quite correct, The will does not mention the value of the ornaments left by the deceased. The plaintiff alleges them to be worth over 5,600 rupees. Defendant Dhiraj asserts that ornaments out of these worth over 1,800 rupees are her own Stridhan and that ornaments worth nearly 3,000 rupees out of the residue have been properly disposed of by her. The plaintiff denies both these assertions and unless accounts are taken it will not be possible to determine the extent of plaintiff's share. The case of Bai Amba v. Pranjivandas (1894) I.L.R. 19 Bom. 198 shows that plaints in administration suits should be treated as plaints for taking accounts and stamped under Section 7, Clause IV (b) of the Courts Fees Act and the present plaint has been stamped accordingly. The plaintiff has offered in her plaint to pay additional fees if a larger amount than that at which she has valued her claim is found due to her and Section 11 of the Court Tees Act will prevent execution of the decree until such additional fees are paid.
4. It has also been argued that plaintiff should not have filed a suit for administration because her right to the share of her deceased step-sister Jethi is very doubtful and because the estate cannot be divided in the life-time of Dhiraj accordingly to the construction put upon the will by the lower Courts. Supposing the opinions of the lower Courts on these points to be correct, I fail to see why that should make the suit bad in form. It is just questions of this kind that have to be tried in administration suits. Even if the estate is indivisible during Dhiraj's life-time the plaintiff is entitled to have accounts taken of its administration in the past and have directions issued for its right administration in the future, so that when it eventually passes to him he may suffer no undue loss. In this connection I would also state that I do not accept the opinions of the lower Courts as to the present indivisibility of the estate as final. The question will have to be decided after remand after giving due opportunity to both parties to produce evidence. If after making due provision out of the estate for the maintenance of Bais Kashi and Dhiraj there is a surplus, I see nothing in the will which would make that surplus indivisible at present. Dhiraj has herself offered to divide the estate and give her share to Somi in her notice of 25th March 1901 (Exhibit 45). That shows how the parties themselves understood the will before " they came into Court.
5. I now come to the question of limitation. Articles 88 and 89 of Schedule II of the Limitation Act applied by the Joint Judge seem to me inapplicable. This is neither a suit by a factor, nor by a principal against his agent. The Limitation Act does not explicitly provide a period of limitation for an administration suit. In England the principle is that
"actions for the administration of the estates of deceased persons can only be instituted by persons whose claims to recover are not barred by any statute of limitation."(See Snell's Principles of Equity, 14th edition, page 2G7). I should think the same principle applicable in India. In the present case Somi's right to recover her share of her father's estate was not time-barred when she instituted this suit. If she had filed a suit for that share it would have fallen under Article 123 of Schedule II of the Limitation Act, i. e., it would have had to be filed within 12 years after her share became deliverable. Defendant Dhiraj's own contention is that it has not even yet become deliverable and will not be so till after her death. At the earliest it became deliverable when Somi attained majority. According to the Joint Judge she attained majority in 1895 and this suit was instituted in 1902. If a shorter period of limitation had been applicable it would have been necessary to consider the effect of Dhiraj's notice of 25th March 1901 (Exhibit 45), for it is clearly an acknowledgment of right signed by her within the meaning of Section 19 of the Limitation Act.
6. I would reverse the decrees of the lower Courts and remand the case for re-trial on the merits in the light of the above remarks.
Lawrence Jenkins, C.J.
7. I agree with the decree proposed by Mr. Justice Khareghat.
8. In the face of the second defendant's contention that the estate is not yet distributable, it cannot in my opinion be successfully contended by her at this stage that the suit is barred by limitation.
9. Before the rights of the parties can be determined, it will be necessary among other things to ascertain of what particulars the estate of the testator consisted at the time of his death, whether the second defendant has disposed of any and what part of the estate, whether such disposal was justifiable, of what does the estate now consist and how much of the estate should be set aside to meet the claim for maintenance under the will.
10. There may be other points that will also require adjudication before the rights can be determined and I only mention those which appear to me to be in any case necessary.
11. Costs hitherto incurred including costs of this appeal will be costs in the suit.
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